Post-Chicago Afghanistan and beyond

Post-Chicago Afghanistan and beyond

May 23, 2012

The official announcement in Chicago by the newly elected French President of the withdrawal of the French Fighting Forces of Afghanistan by the end of 2012 was anticipated as a possible controversial topic for the Alliance. This was not the case for good reasons but it must not dissemble the crucial questions remaining on the future of Afghanistan and NATO.

The French decision has actually no serious incidence neither on the on-going ISAF mission effectiveness, nor on the transition plan to Afghan Forces, or on Alliance solidarity and unity of action.

The French Contingent currently deployed in Afghanistan (3400) representing hardly 3.5% of the total strength, its withdrawal is not likely to affect the balance of forces. Moreover the French have already handed over to Afghan National Army most of the territory they used to control East of Kabul in Surobi and Kapisa Provinces; they will just have to end the transition quicker than initially planned. Unless it is followed by similar initiatives of other Allies, their departure earlier than expected will not affect significantly the global NATO transition Plan: 30 000 US Troops are planned to come back home by the end of this year as well as similar percentage of other Contingents.

As far as solidarity within the Alliance is concerned, it has never been measured in accordance with the ratio of deployed forces contribution. The recent Operation in Libya was conducted only with forces provided by a few Allies even though it was a NATO Operation. Furthermore, NATO’s new posture in Afghanistan after 2014 will focus only on training, logistic support, funding and advising, and the French President has stated that France will shoulder its share of the burden. As Secretary General Rasmussen pointed out rightly, the Atlantic Alliance is an Alliance of Nations, and the form and level of commitment in NATO Operations are a national decision. Therefore the legitimacy of the French decision cannot be contested. Only the details of its implementation must be handled in full transparency with NATO Allies.

More worrying than the French early withdrawal of combat forces, and unrelated, are the questions of the future of Afghanistan and the future of NATO.

Uncertainties remain regarding the evolution of the situation in Afghanistan. The main objective of the intervention in this country in 2001 was to combat terrorism and defeat Al Qaeda. In the absence of a clear strategy to achieve it, namely the definition of an end goal and of an end state, efforts were oriented toward fighting the Talebans (as former supporters of Al Qaeda), while trying to build up an Afghan democratic state capable of successfully banning terrorist activities on its soil. Unfortunately, Talebans are at home in Afghanistan and civil war in this country cannot be ended without making them a part of the political solution.

The establishment of a stable and sovereign State in Afghanistan depends on whether the main ethnics groups (Pachtuns -including Talebans- Tadjiks, Hazaras, Uzbekhs) accept to live together. This is the ground condition for ensuring the safe and secure environment indispensable to develop a sound economy and build an efficient government. The main uncertainty regards the capacity of the current Afghan government, in close link with NATO and with neighbouring countries to achieve this reconciliation by 2014. If not, Afghanistan will have to face another long period of instability in which NATO’s role is difficult to define. In any case, a durable solution will have to be political rather than military, although punctual military actions must not be excluded to facilitate it.

On the other side, post-Afghanistan NATO will have to adapt to a very new context. While the United States, subject to war fatigue and budget cuts in defense, is turning its focus and efforts to Air-Sea Battle in the Asia Pacific and Middle East areas (cf Strategic Guidance January 2012), the European Allies will have to tackle their responsibility in security in their neighbourhood in a more effective way. It is likely that US support to European security issues will have to be balanced by corresponding European support to US initiatives elsewhere.

In any case, the future of the transatlantic link and of NATO will depend on the will and capacity of the Europeans to strengthen their military capabilities. This will require for them not only to increase their resources for defense but also to go for shared ambition and acceptance of risks, a common strategy, pooled and shared assets. To reach these goals, the EU is likely to play a critical role.

A lire aussi, autour du sujet :

Le futur de l'OTAN est européen

Le Monde.fr | 21.05.2012 à 09h10 • Mis à jour le 21.05.2012 à 09h10

Par Jean-Paul Perruche, directeur de recherche à l'IRSEM et Jolyon Howorth, professeur de sciences politiques et de relations internationales à Yale.

Jean-Paul Perruche, ancien directeur général de l'Etat-Major de l'UE est aussi président d'EuroDéfense-France.