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DEFENDING EUROPE? A STOCKTAKING OF FRENCH AND GERMAN VISIONS FOR EUROPEAN DEFENSE

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ABSTRACTS

Numerous examples seem to illustrate the incompatibility of French and German strategic cultures. The two countries' very different political choices in concrete situations such as the military intervention in Libya have been the subject of many debates. These differences not only hamper European security policy and thus the establishment of the European Union as a full-fledged world-wide security actor, but also cooperation within the Franco-German tandem. While France and Germany remain the "motor" couple of European integration, their dialog on security matters continues to be difficult (and too infrequent, notably in times of the Euro crisis). Strategic cultures, world views and ideas on the role to play on the international stage, as well as the attention (publicly) devoted to security policy are essentially different. Mutual incomprehension is thus manifest in Paris and Berlin, with obvious difficulties to understand the other's objectives and motivation.

The aim of this study consists of taking stock of strategic thinking in France and Germany. More concretely, it intends to identify compatible and incompatible aspects, as well as the potential for compromise, in these national considerations on the future of CSDP and NATO. In so doing, it concentrates on five issues: strategic visions, threat perception and military doctrine; the institutional framework for European defense; military interventions; capabilities as well as the industrial dimension.

De nombreux exemples semblent illustrer l'incompatibilité des cultures stratégiques en France et en Allemagne. Les choix politiques très différents des deux pays dans des situations concrètes telle que l'intervention militaire en Libye ont été l'objet de nombreux débats. Ces différences entravent non seulement la politique de sécurité européenne et donc l'établissement de l'Union Européenne comme acteur mondial à part entière, mais également la coopération au sein du tandem franco-allemand. Alors que la France et l'Allemagne restent le couple « moteur » de l'intégration européenne, leur dialogue sur les questions de sécurité reste difficile (et trop peu fréquent, notamment en ces temps de crise de l'Euro). Les cultures stratégiques, les visions du monde et du rôle que l'on devrait y jouer ainsi que l'importance que l'on attache (publiquement) à la politique de sécurité sont essentiellement différentes. On constate donc une incompréhension mutuelle manifeste à Paris et à Berlin, un mal évident à comprendre les objectifs et les motivations de l'autre.

Le but de cette étude consiste avant tout à dresser le bilan de la réflexion stratégique en France et en Allemagne. Plus concrètement, elle vise à identifier les aspects compatibles et incompatibles ainsi que le potentiel de compromis dans ces réflexions nationales en vue d'un débat sur l'avenir de la PSDC et de l'OTAN, en se concentrant sur cinq aspects: la vision stratégique, la perception de la menace et la doctrine militaire ; le cadre institutionnel de la défense européenne ; les interventions militaires ; les capacités ainsi que la dimension industrielle.

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACT	Allied Command Transformation
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
EATC	European Air Transport Command
EDA	European Defense Agency
EDTIB	European Defense Technological and Industrial Base
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
FGDSC	Franco-German Defence and Security Council
LPM	Loi de Programmation Militaire
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDPP	NATO Defense Planning Process
OCCAR	Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement
OHQ	Operational Headquarters
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe

INTRODUCTION

It is a mundane assertion: A common European approach to European Defense has long been called for, yet it is far from being achieved. This is not least due to divergent notions of such a project's purpose and scope. Different perspectives on "finality" not only characterize debates about European integration as such, but they are especially prominent in this policy field that touches upon issues of autonomy and national sovereignty like no other. From minimal solutions that make the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) the junior partner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to bold visions of a *Europe de la défense* and a European army, the bandwidth of the debate is particularly large. As of 2015, when the Ukraine crisis underlines the fact that territorial defense has anything but vanished from European agendas while it is increasingly clear that the United States is not willing (and able) to continue to guarantee Western Europe's security, thinking about the continent's security in an holistic manner is more important than ever before. The security and defense challenges Europe is facing have perhaps never been as obvious as at the time at which the continent looks back upon the outbreak of the devastating First World War one hundred years earlier. That there is today a European Union is a direct consequence of the lessons learned from this war and the ensuing Second World War. Franco-German reconciliation has always been at the core of European integration, yet Paris' and Berlin's record in terms of bold moves in security and defense policy is rather weak. Then French President Nicolas Sarkozy thus explained in 2007 that "France and Germany have put the fundament in place" for what eventually became the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy (Sarkozy, 2007) – but continues by stating that "in Saint-Malo, France and the United Kingdom have continued this building."[1]

To be fair, the Franco-German relationship does indeed own a number of institutions and formats explicitly dedicated to defense cooperation.[2] France and Germany thus have a vivid exchange of officials and military officers at different levels and work together on issues such as training (for personnel on *Tigre* helicopters or paratroopers, for instance); the best known example is certainly the Franco-German Brigade. The Elysée Treaty from 1963, with which it all started, indeed stipulates "rapprochement of military doctrine" and "common conceptions" as objectives under the headline "defense."[3] Franco-German defense cooperation nevertheless remained mainly symbolic until François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, in the year of the Treaty's 25th jubilee, signed an additional protocol to the Elysée Treaty in 1988. This protocol established the Franco-German Defense and Security Council.[4] The Council – which meets in official settings with the ministers of defense and foreign affairs – has a number of working groups devoted to various sub-themes. It issues

[1] Author's translation in the text: « la France et l'Allemagne ont mis en place les fondations » ; « A Saint-Malo, la France et le Royaume-Uni ont poursuivi cette construction ». Sarkozy N, 2007, Discours du Président de la République, Conférence des Ambassadeurs.
[2] An overview is for instance provided at the following official website.
[3] See the Elysée Treaty's Title B "Defense." Interestingly, the French and German versions of the text already illustrate one of the issues to be addressed below: while the French version uses the term "doctrine" ("rapprocher leurs doctrines en vue d'aboutir à des conceptions communes"), the German text uses the much weaker "Auffassungen", i.e. "views" or "perceptions" ("ihre Auffassungen einander anzunähern, um zu gemeinsamen Konzeptionen zu gelangen").
[4] Read the German version and the French text.

declarations at regular intervals, in which Germany and France generally agree on closer cooperation on various aspects of security and defense matters (FGDSC, 1988). In parallel, the informal "Chantilly Process" allows for discussions and debates beyond the official protocol.

As Nicolas Sarkozy however noted, in past years, the driving forces behind what has become the status quo in the field of security and defense policy in the European Union have rarely ever been France and Germany. Single initiatives mostly dating from the Mitterrand-Kohl era, such as plans to revive the Western European Union or the creation of the Franco-German Brigade (which later became the core element of the Eurocorps in 1993), the inclusion of ESDP in the Maastricht Treaty (title V, launched by three Franco-German letters) or the creation of the European Air Transport Command (EATC) notwithstanding, other couples have played more decisive roles. Indeed, the perhaps somewhat unlikely French-British duo is at the origins of Saint Malo and everything that followed. Outside or inside the EU framework, Paris and London had bolder objectives, although they may have offered Berlin to join in on proposed projects, such as was the case when the EU Battle Groups were initiated. France and Germany, in turn, who like to picture their close relationship as a "motor" for European integration, have had relatively little to contribute beyond rhetoric and symbolic measures. What is more, the record in recent years is remarkably weak, bold declarations notwithstanding. The Franco-German brigade, was indeed initiated in the late 1980s; the originally Franco-German project of a European Air Transport Command dates from 2010. In general, however, Franco-German defense cooperation has remained at the symbolical level and below the potential of Europe's driving couple, notably when it comes to one of its strength: generating ideas, compromise and providing leadership.

The origins of this Franco-German leadership vacuum in security and defense matters lie deep. In this field that directly touches upon national sovereignty and the very core of statehood and national autonomy, this is hardly surprising. For various historical and political reasons, France and Germany have rather different approaches to foreign affairs and especially security and defense policy. The position they intend to occupy in the world and the prioritization of instruments to be used to that effect, their perceptions on the EU's and NATO's role as well as their own role within these institutions are not necessarily on par with each other. Numerous examples hence seem to illustrate the incompatibility of strategic cultures in France and Germany. These differences are to be found at all levels of security policy making, ranging from the formulation of military doctrine, the regional scope of European security policies or the exact purpose of multilateral settings to the logic underpinning the approach to defense industries. Different political choices in concrete situations, such as the military interventions in Congo in 2006 or Libya in 2011, have given rise to many debates. Yet, at a time when Great Britain is considering to leave the European Union and when the Polish-French couple – in a certain sense another ideal couple when it comes to strategic visions in Europe – has only limited weight, the Franco-German couple's continued relevance seems self-evident. At the time being, this relevance is more of a paper phenomenon than of a reality. Yet, Peter van Ham's post-Amsterdam assessment that "there is little chance of a coherent European foreign and security policy to emerge if France and Germany fail to manage and co-ordinate their analyses, policies and means" remains also valid under the Lisbon Treaty in an EU with twenty-eight member states – while also underlining that Franco-German difficulties to understand each other in security and defense matters are nothing new (Van Ham, 2011). Although the two countries in many ways continue to be

the "motor" of European integration, their dialog on s ecurity matter remains complicated (and too much of a rare phenomenon, notably in times of the Euro crisis when issues other than defense seem more relevant). Strategic cultures, worldviews, ideas on roles to be played on the international stage as well as the relevance (publicly) ascribed to security policy are essentially different. The same is true for political systems, decision making and planning processes, where administrative structures are asymmetric to the extent that many entities do not have a natural counterpart. Moreover, these different players within the same political system do not necessarily pursue the same interests and policies. Manifest mutual incomprehension, but also frustration, is thus widely palpable in Berlin and Paris, where the respective partner's objectives and motivations seem hard to grasp and are sometimes perceived as being on the verge of irrationality – on both sides.

Paris' and Berlin's relative inability to understand each other has consequences at various levels that go beyond the purely bilateral. They of course stand in the way of cooperation within the so-called Franco-German tandem, be it at government, military or industrial levels. They, however, also pose problems when it comes to cooperating with additional European or transatlantic partners, for instance engaging in joint missions or Pooling and Sharing initiatives. Overall, the above-named differences therefore also hamper the development of a European security policy and thus the establishment of the European Union as a full-fledged global actor. Conversely, overcoming Franco-German blockades may also lead to progress for Europe as a whole.

Perhaps more than ever, this was of relevance in 2014, the year of NATO's Wales Summit that was initially intended to deal with the post-ISAF Alliance and turned out to be in large parts dedicated to Russia and the future of cooperative security. But 2014 was also the year in between the two European Union Summits on security. When the European Council held its first ever summit to debate defense matters since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in December 2013, the heads of state and government decided upon homework to do, identifying priority actions built around three axes: "increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP; enhancing the development of capabilities and strengthening Europe's defence industry" (European Council , 2013). The Council, among other things, called for the development of frameworks respectively strategies and identified four areas of capabilities development where gaps need to be filled (drones, air-to-air refueling, satellite communication and cyber security capabilities). Although its results were not met with exuberant joy in the observer community, many analyses nevertheless grant that important steps forward have been made in December 2013.[5] NATO's Wales Summit equally resulted in decisions on several concrete measures to be implemented in the months and years to come, perhaps most famously so the Alliance's newly planned "spearhead" force. Both institutions' summit meetings have thus resulted in extensive to-do lists Europeans are currently more or less busy addressing, pertaining to a number of issues that range from the definition of threats to procurement and industrial cooperation. Whether all these measures and provisions are always compatible or whether similar work is done in parallel in two different settings remains an open question. Implementation nevertheless is of course yet another story.

[5] See e.g. Missiroli, A., December 2013, "European defence – to be continued. ISSUE Alert", *European Union Institute for Security Studies*; Fiott D., February 2014 "An Industrious European Council on Defence?", *Security Policy Brief n^{o} 53*, Egmont Institute; Biscop S., March 2014, "The Summit of Our Ambition? European Defence between Brussels and Wales", *Security Policy Brief n^{o} 55*, Egmont Institute.

Within this context, this study first and foremost intends to take stock of the ways in which Germany and France reason about the future of European defense. In other words, it is not intended to assess Franco-German cooperation as such. Rather, it is meant to analyze French and German approaches to five different key issues all pertaining to the wider realm of European defense: military doctrine and the general foundations of security policy; the institutional settings of Europe's security architecture; military intervention; capabilities and finally the industrial dimension. The subsequent chapters will be limited to the military dimensions of European security, leaving the matter of civilian crisis management aside.

In so doing, the study adopts a holistic point of view and considers the defense of Europe as one single policy field, in order to overcome the often made artificial distinction between the European Union and CSDP on the one hand and NATO on the other. Since both are core elements of Europe's security architecture, studying European security without one or the other makes in fact little sense. Moreover, the same set of troops is used in both contexts. In analyzing French and German approaches to the above-named five issues, the study aims at identifying compatible and incompatible aspects as well as the potential for compromise in these national ways of thinking in light of a debate on the future of CSDP and NATO, as well as the development of European defense in the years to come. What are the respective country's rationales in approaching specific issues? Where could France and Germany again play their traditional role of a "European motor," where does mutual understanding seem excluded, and where does there seem to be enough room for maneuver in order to reach compromise? And what do Paris and Berlin expect from each other?

The study is based on the official sources, scholarly works and media reports listed in the bibliography at the end of this text. In addition, it also draws upon a number of research interviews carried out with officials and experts in Paris, Berlin, Brussels and Washington D.C. In almost all cases, however, these interviews were only granted under the condition that no names be mentioned and no direct quotes be included in the report. For that reason, the results of these interviews are only indirectly comprised in the present paper, as they have helped to get a grasp of Paris' and Berlin's overall assessment of the current state of play in European defense. The same applies to statements made at various colloquia under Chatham House rules the author has participated in while this report was prepared and written. Needless to say, any mistakes contained in this report are of course the author's sole responsibility.

In its structure, the present report follows the ideal-typical train of thought in strategy making: what are the – immediate and emerging – threats, how can Europe counter them and what is needed to counter them? It is hence structured in five main chapters, each subsequently dealing with French and German attitudes and approaches to one of the five key fields identified. After a brief introduction (I), it sets out asking about the purposes of European defense, i.e. defense against what, whom and for what? (Chapter II). From there, it moves on to the institutional settings of that European defense and the respective national priorities when it comes to designing the continent's security architecture (III). Chapter IV then addresses the issue of how these institutions and assets should (potentially) be put to use in actual military interventions. This chapter is followed by a discussion of capabilities and the prospects of common European approaches (V). The sixth chapter

then deals with the industrial dimension (VI). Each of these chapters will begin with an introduction summing up the European state of play, before moving on to two sections specifically dedicated to France and Germany. A concluding chapter then sums up the report and intends to offer a number of avenues for Franco-German cooperation in the field of security and defense.

STRATEGIC VISIONS, THREAT PERCEPTION AND MILITARY DOCTRINE

Introduction: Strategic visions in Europe

While strategy implies the definition of general objectives for foreign policy, the purpose of military doctrine consists of defining under what conditions and circumstances states resort to using their military power and how they do this.[6] Strategy must by definition be based on an analysis of states' (security) environment and an assessment of risks and threats emanating from that environment. Yet, although France and Germany basically share the same security environment due to their geographical proximity, the two countries' approaches to security and defense policy are essentially different. Despite all the rhetoric on close friendship and cooperation, Paris and Berlin seem to live in almost different worlds as far as security is concerned. As has indeed often been noted, France and Germany are in fact rarely on the same page when it comes to the fundamentals of security and defense matters.[7]

Rather than being a merely Franco-German "problem," however, such differences characterize strategic cultures throughout Europe.[8] Yet, in light of these two countries' weight on the continent and their role as a "motor" of European integration, these differences have farther reaching consequences in a Franco-German context. Given the matter's intergovernmental character, socialization effects from above, i.e. top-down from a supranational level, have not taken place to harmonize outlooks and approaches despite decades of European integration. In other words, the national level remains the dominant level in this policy field. The fact that Germany and France have always had different priorities with respect to the two bodies potentially available for such processes of "harmonization from above" – namely NATO and CSDP and its predecessors – has not helped either in shaping a common strategic culture. While the Federal Republic has "grown up with NATO" and considers the Alliance to be the cornerstone of its security policy, France's priority has always been the pursuit of the "Europe of defense," the *Europe de la défense*. Unlike other policy fields, security is thus not only torn between the national and EU levels, but actually, because of NATO, faced with yet another – dominant and rivaling – international organization that has left an imprint and shaped priorities in many capitals. It is thus little surprising that a common vision of how Europe

[6] For a more detailed introduction that moreover is relevant to the cases at hand, see Posen B., 1984, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

[7] See for instance 1996, Soutou G-H., 1996, *L'Alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands 1954-1996*, Paris, Fayard; Longhurst K., 2004, *Germany and the Use of Force. The Evolution of German Security Policy 1990– 2003*, Manchester, Manchester University Press; De Russé AH, June 2010, « La France dans l'OTAN. La culture militaire française et l'identité stratégique en question ». *Focus Stratégique n°22,* Institut Français des Relations Internationales; Riecke H., November 2011, « La culture stratégique de la politique étrangère allemande », *Note du Cerfa n° 90*, Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI); Charilllon F., November 2011, « Leitlinien der strategischen Kultur Frankreichs, DGAPanalyse Frankreich », *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik* (DGAP).

[8] For an introduction to the notion of strategic culture, see Johnston, A., 1995, "Thinking about Strategic Culture". *International Security n°19* (4), 32-64.

is to be defended has not exactly emerged – in fact, it is not even clear that the need to (autonomously) defend Europe is acknowledged to the same extent by all twenty-eight EU member states. To state that absent a common European strategic culture, Europe also lacks a common vision of the threats it is facing and how it intends to deal with these is consequently a common place.

Looking at both the current European Security Strategy, "A Secure Europe in a Better World" (2003) (European External Action Service) and NATO's Strategic Concept (2010), Europeans at first sight seem to have a rather firm grasp of what it is they ought to be afraid of. Both documents contain lists of risks and threats and analyses of the European or Euro-Atlantic security environment. The EU document thus identifies five key threats, namely terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and organized crime. NATO's Strategic Concept lists the same threats, but also includes technology-related issues (cyber security, new types of weapons and warfare and "key environmental and resource constraints."[9] In both cases, these risks and threats testify of a widened definition of security, ranging from nuclear proliferation to the consequences of climate change. Many officially listed risks and threats thus appear as rather distant geographically and sometimes diffuse, including cyber security or terrorism, and mostly beyond the "traditional" conventional military spectrum.[10] As a logical consequence, the general emphasis in many current security policy debates is on crisis management and its many facets, not on "traditional" territorial defense. This is not only obvious in national White Papers, but also clearly stated in the very design of CSDP according to the Lisbon Treaty. And even NATO has made collective defense only one out of three primary areas of activity (although Article V of course remains the core), otherwise focusing on cooperative security with partners (Russia and the Partnership for Peace countries) and crisis management (in that order of relevance).

Across Western Europe, the unanimous assessment has until very recently been that the threat of a conventional attack on the territory is low[11] – though, as e.g. NATO's Strategic Concept says, "the conventional threat cannot be ignored."[12] Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the subsequent events in Eastern Ukraine have proved the latter assertion to be justified. Current events in Ukraine may perhaps not lead to a real paradigm shift, yet they definitively bring territorial defense and collective security back in (albeit the more urgently so from those member states located to the East[13]). The Alliance's Wales summit has thus clearly been under the impression of

[9] See the Strategic Concept's title "The Security Environment." NATO. Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, 20 November 2010.

[10] NATO for instance has established its "Emerging Security Threats Division" in 2010, which deals with Cyber Defence, Counter Terrorism, Energy Security, WMD Proliferation and Nuclear Policy, Strategic and Defence Economic Analysis and Scientific and Technological Cooperation with NATO's partner countries.

[11] See OSCE NETWORK. *Threat Perceptions in the OSCE Area*, Report by the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, April 2014.

[12] Point 7 of NATO's Strategic Concept.

[13] Most vocally so Poland: "NATO should return to effectively ensuring the possibility of collective defence for its members," the president [Komorowski] also said, remarking that it was essential to strengthen NATO's eastern border. 'We all feel this and say it,' he added." Polish Presidency. Presidents in favour of strengthening NATO's Eastern flanc. Warsaw, July 22, 2014.

events in Eastern Europe, perceived as a "watershed" moment within the Alliance. The in-depth analysis of the Ukrainian crisis and its ramifications is still on-going at NATO.

Within a purely EU context, the 2003 European Security Strategy was drafted in response to the United States' War on Terror and especially the attacks on Iraq. It, however, remains a weak document, failing to serve the purpose of an actual strategy (Toje, 2005). Although extensive revisions have been called for many times, none was ever really undertaken so far.[14] Projects carried out by think-tanks – such as the European Global Strategy Project launched by the then foreign ministers of Sweden and Poland, Carl Bildt and Radosław Sikorski, and subsequently also strongly relying on Spanish and Italian experts, with German and French contributors joining in at a rather late stage and without a leading role – had unfortunately hardly managed to influence the political debate in a sufficient manner.[15] Defining a true European security strategy hence remains an unfinished task; the December 2013 Summit made no steps forward toward that objective. Federcica Mogherini, however,has launched the process of reviewing the 2003 strategy in 2015. Catherine Ashton's preparatory report for the December Summit – notably calling for Europe's "strategic autonomy" – may serve as a good basis (Ashton, 2013). On the "other side" – as NATO is called in Brussels jargon – and from a purely "Clausewitzean" vantage point, the North Atlantic Alliance's Strategic Concept is not much better at defining priorities and the use of means to achieve them and under what circumstances.

The search for common ground on the strategic foundations of the defense of Europe therefore proves difficult. Instead of being purpose-driven and objective-oriented, the above-mentioned documents lack a clear vision and actual guidance on when and how to use force, the EU Security Strategy even more so than NATO' Strategic Concept. (Official) European threat perception most of the time equals the lowest common denominator. And even a shared analysis of the environment is not guaranteed to automatically yield a common European approach to security. A shared and agreed-upon catalog of risks and threats does in fact not necessarily mean shared and agreed-upon priorities – be it in terms of regions, but also in terms of the use of specific instruments in countering these risks and threats.

[14] The official review in 2008 hardly brought any substantial changes.

[15] See the project's final report, European Global Strategy Project, 2012, *Towards a Global European Strategy. Securing European Influence in a Changing World*, available at www.europeanglobalstrategy.eu. Numerous authors have in addition called for a revision of the EU Security Strategy and/or the development of an EU "Grand Strategy." For an overview of that debate, see e.g. Andersson JJ. and Biscop S. (eds), 2008, *The EU and the European Security Strategy. Forging a Global Europe*; Andersson JJ. et al. *The European Security Strategy: Reinvigorate, revise or reinvent?*, UI Occasional Papers 7, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2011; Howorth J., 2010, "The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain?", *Journal of Common Market Studies* 48(3), 455-475; Rynning S., 2003, "The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?", *Security Dialogue* 34 (4), 479-496; Biscop S., July 2012, "EU Grand Strategy: Optimism is Mandatory", Egmont Institute Security Policy Brief 36; de France, O.; Whitney N., April 2013, "Europe's Strategic Cacophony. 27 Countries in Search of a Proper Security Strategy", European Council on Foreign Relations Working Paper; Gnesotto N., 2009, "The Need for a More Strategic EU", in Vasconcelos Á. (de), (ed.) *What ambitions for European Defence in 2020*?, Paris, European Institute for Security Studies, 29-38; Howorth J., February 2011, "Europe at a Historical Crossroads: Grand Strategy of Resignation?", Institute for European Integration Research Working Paper, Austrian Academy of Sciences; Kempin R. and Overhaus M., February 2012, "Europa braucht eine neue Sicherheitsstrategie Überlegungen und Fahrplan zur Neufassung der ESS", *SWP-Aktuell.*

Absent a European doctrine, the strategic debate continues to take place at the national levels, with varying degrees of intensity. France has thus published a new White Paper on Defense in 2013. Germany, in turn, is currently discussing a potential new role for the country in the world, in light of what is perceived as its growing responsibility. During the fall of 2014, the German minister of defense, Ursula von der Leyen, announced that a new White Paper would be drafted for mid-2016. Although EU and NATO member states' security is by necessity closely linked, these national debates are not automatically intertwined. Instead of more interconnected debates, indicators of a tendency toward the opposite direction are in fact observable in a Franco-German context. Contrary to 1994, when both France and Germany drafted new White Papers in close cooperation, subsequent versions (2006 in Germany; 2008 and 2013 in France) came about without such intense collaboration (although German experts were consulted in both 2008 and 2013) (Jonas, Von Ondarza, 2010). While strategic culture and the basic ideas behind security policy making cannot and must of course not be reduced to studying official documents, security strategies and comparable documents are nevertheless a good starting point. Assuming that they somehow embody the respective strategic community's consensus on the matters at hand, it seems fair to consider these documents as an embodiment of strategic culture and visions of the world. The following sections are intended to provide a more detailed overview of these respective national debates, French and German fundamental principles in security policy and the key concepts that determine strategy design.

France: Strategic autonomy as the chief objective in an evolving security environment

France is the only European state with territorial possessions on all continents except the Arctic. Along with Great Britain, it holds a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council. In other words, the scope of French foreign policy making is the world. With its comparably coherent elites, shaped by a strong educational system and a certain continuity of its military traditions, France has a "strategic community" that deserves that name. Unsurprisingly, therefore, French strategic thinking and its output is among the most elaborate in the world, as allegedly even Henry Kissinger contended. Official French documents support that assessment, first and foremost the White Paper on Defense and National Security.

The French approach to international security is essentially laid out in two documents published to that very effect: the regularly updated White Paper (French Ministry of Defense, 2013) and the military programming law (*loi de programmation militaire* or LPM) meant to implement the White Paper. While the first outlines the analysis of the country's environment and defines strategic priorities, the latter is a law on defense spending that covers a period of six years. France's most recent White Paper was published in 2013, when the current edition replaced the 2008 version. Ordered by incoming President François Hollande in 2012, it was prepared by a Commission made up of representatives from various ministries, the armed forces and experts – including two foreigners, the German president of the Munich Security Conference, Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, and the British Ambassador to France, Sir Peter Ricketts.[16] Although the initial plan consisted of merely

[16] For details on the Commission and the working process, see the French White Paper on Defense and Security, where the text of the 2013 White Paper may also be downloaded (including in an official English translation)

updating the 2008 edition, the far-reaching evolutions in France's security environment, but also the economic and financial crisis, eventually led to the drafting of a new document. The current LPM, in turn, was voted in December 2013 and covers the years 2014-2019. The six-year intervals derive from the insight that defense spending requires more than an annual perspective. Nevertheless, the provisions on military spending contained in the LPM are not written in stone; they may be subject to change given that, in case of conflict, the government's yearly budget law prevails over long-term planning.[17]

The 2013 French White Paper contains an in-depth analysis of the international system, which is described as "genuinely multipolar, but also more fragmented," and which – absent effective global governance – implies the necessity of a more "regional approach to crisis management." It then moves to a sophisticated distinction of "threats related to power," "risks of weakness" and "threats and risks intensified by globalization." The first essentially refers to "traditional" conflict among states as well as nuclear proliferation, and the White Paper notably concludes that "Russia is equipping itself with the economic and military clout that will enable it to engage in power politics." "Risks of weakness," in turn, emanate from failed states and the absence of governance. In this context, the White Paper notes "the multiplier effects of globalisation, which shrinks and unifies the strategic landscape and brings closer both threats related to power and risks of weakness."

In short, the world has thus not really become a safer place in recent years, though many of the risks and threats are faraway and sometimes indirect. In its analysis of France's strategic environment, the 2013 White Paper states that

> [w]ithout wishing to underestimate the potential of certain states for doing harm, or ignoring the risk of a strategic shift, France no longer faces any direct, explicit conventional military threat against its territory.

More concretely and in light of the rise of new major powers and the simultaneous financial crises, the "United States and Europe have seen a reduction of their room for manoeuvre." The situation in Arab countries, in the Middle East and notably the outcomes of the so-called Arab spring are also deemed to be of primary relevance. The longest passage, however, deals with the "strategic development of the United States," where the White Paper notes that the U.S. "refocuses its geopolitical priorities" – in other words, what is generally termed the "Pacific Pivot" or "Rebalancing." For the French White Paper,

> [t]his change of circumstances in the United States and Europe has implications for crisis management policies and for the institutions responsible for international security.

Against the backdrop of the above described evolutions within the international system, the analysis concludes that

[17] See Chapter IV below for more details on the 2014-19 *Loi de programmation militaire*.

> [t]he strategic implications of these changes impact profoundly on the security of France and its EU partners. Although the spectre of a major conflagration in Europe has receded, Europeans cannot afford to ignore the unstable world around them and to which they are inextricably linked. Both stakeholders in and major beneficiaries of the globalization process, they have to deal with a systematic increase in major risks and the vulnerability of the European Union to threats from beyond its borders. For example, a major crisis in Asia would have considerable economic, commercial and financial consequences for Europe.

Within the context of the international security environment outlined above, France's armed forces need to take on three principal tasks: protection, deterrence and interventions. These all contribute to the five strategic priorities for French foreign and security policy determined by the White Paper, namely to:

- Protect the national territory and French nationals abroad, and guarantee the continuity of the Nation's essential functions;
- Guarantee the security of Europe and the North Atlantic space, with our partners and allies;
- Stabilize Europe's near environment, with our partners and allies;
- Contribute to the stability of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf;
- Contribute to peace in the world.

In regional terms, France has a number of regions it defines as "priority areas to its defence and security", namely "the regions on the fringes of Europe, the Mediterranean basin, part of Africa (from the Sahel to Equatorial Africa), the Arabo-Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean." In Africa in particular, the colonial past is a factor, which is why "[t]he Sahel, from Mauritania to the Horn of Africa, together with part of sub-Saharan Africa, are also regions of priority interest for France due to a common history, the presence of French nationals, the issues at stake and the threats confronting them." The permanently based French troops in Africa, the so-called *dispositif prépositionné*, is one of the concrete underpinnings of this regional priority (along with France's military presence in other regions of the world).

If nobody follows suit, France continues to be prepared to intervene on its own, as most recently the *Serval* (Mali, 2013-14) and *Sangaris* (Central African Republic, since December 2013) operations have proved. In fact, the principle of strategic autonomy requires Paris to preserve all capabilities necessary to carry out military interventions on its own. Yet, "[t]he majority of external operations will, however, continue to be conducted in coalition".And getting there first is also important, as for instance the Parliament's defense commission notes with respect to *Opération Serval*: "France has demonstrated its capacity to enter first in a theater, which is key to its strategic autonomy."[18]

[18] Author's translation in the text: « La France a démontré sa capacité à entrer en premier sur un théâtre, clef de son autonomie stratégique. » French National Assembly, Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées. Rapport d'information no 1288 sur l'opération Serval au Mali, Paris, 18 juillet 2013, p. 34.

Within that context, "strategic autonomy" is thus France's key foreign and security policy objective. Paris' pursuit of strategic autonomy has a number of implications, as will also become evident in subsequent chapters. Closely linked to this notion is also the *force de frappe*. The White Paper unequivocally insists on France's status as a nuclear power and states that "[n]uclear deterrence is the ultimate guarantee of our sovereignty". The fact that France has a nuclear deterrent at its disposal, according to the White Paper,

> ensures, permanently, our independence of decision-making and our freedom of action within the framework of our international responsibilities, including in the event of any threat of blackmail that might be directed against us in the event of a crisis. Nuclear deterrence is therefore embedded in the more global framework of the defense and national security strategy, which takes into account the entire spectrum of threats, including those considered to be under the threshold of our vital interests. […] There are strong links between nuclear deterrence and conventional capabilities. Deterrence, which guarantees protection of our vital interests, gives the President of the Republic freedom of action in exercising France's international responsibilities, in defense of an ally or application of an international mandate.

In sum, France thus makes clear in its White Paper that it intends to play an important role on the international stage, true to its global interests and presence. The 2013 French White Paper reaffirms strategic autonomy as well as France's status as a nuclear power. It moreover stresses power projection, but also intelligence and "modern" warfare and cyber-security. In regional terms, the White Paper sets forth that Europe's immediate neighborhood, the Mediterranean basin, part of Africa (from the Sahel to Equatorial Africa), the Arabo-Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean are France's geographic priority. Strategic autonomy finally remains the core principle. Its implications for the French approach to capabilities, interventions and industrial policies will be discussed in subsequent sections.

Germany: more responsibility in world affairs?

Germany does not have a national security strategy. Calls for establishing such a strategy have in the past been rejected by the federal government, so that the current situation is the result of a deliberate choice by default.[19] The German approach to security consequently is in sharp contrast with the French. Absent a true strategic community, the circle of people debating security policy is rather small. In the political sphere, it suffers from a lack of continuity; basic matters need "to be explained from scratch to the incoming guys after each and every election," as one officer interviewed for this paper complained. But even other factors are essentially different: public opinion differs, elites and decision-makers differ in their education and socialization and of course role within society, the prestige associated with defense matters differs, as well as the self-image of the country's role in the world is hardly comparable to that of France. Identifying a German "military doctrine" or the like consequently amounts to a much harder task – the problem not being that this

[19] E.g. by the conservative member of the *Bundestag* Roderich Kiesewetter.

doctrine is so well hidden, but rather that it does not really exist. Axiomatic statements on German security and defense policy are nevertheless to be found in a number of documents: the 2006 White Paper, the 2011 Defense Policy Guidelines as well as, to some extent, the coalition agreements between the parties that constitute the government majority, currently between the Christian and the Social Democrats under Angela Merkel (signed in late 2013). Absent a clearly formulated strategy, getting a firm grasp of the (official) German interpretation of its global and regional security environment can consequently be complicated.

The current White Paper, the second post-Cold War edition after 1994, was published in October 2006 and must therefore be considered outdated in many respects: not only has the security environment evolved considerably in the more than eight years since it was written (notably on the southern rim of the Mediterranean, but also the 2008 Georgian war took for instance place after its publication), the Paper also dates from before both the Treaty of Lisbon and the far-reaching changes it brought about for CSDP and NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept. Moreover, also the reform of the German armed forces was launched years after the White Paper came out. Back in 2006, the White Paper was essentially drafted by the Ministry of Defense's Planning Unit, while no wider debate about its content was intended during the process. It was adopted by the government in late October and subsequently made public.

Besides the sections devoted to the future of the German *Bundeswehr*, the analyses and stipulations it contains are hardly surprising and reflect the standard (post-modernist) discourse on security affairs: multilateralism and values; globalization and an ever more complex security environment, interdependence and non-traditional threats i.a. emanating from a lack of governance; the emphasis on NATO as the key security actor while simultaneously stressing the EU's relevance; and networked security (German Ministry Of Defense, 2006). In this respect, it is thus largely compatible with the French White Paper. Unlike its French counterpart, however, the German White Paper contains no systematic analysis of the international system and its evolution and no information on regional priorities, nor does it provide a hierarchy of objectives and the role various components of the country's security and defense policy (such as, for instance, the armament industry) are to play with respect to specific overall objectives.

During the fall of 2014, Berlin has announced that the 2006 White Paper and replacing it with a more up-to-date version, to be published around mid-2016.[20] In the meantime, a more recent – and thus also more interesting – source for the official German security environment analysis are the 2011 "Defense Policy Guidelines," a 17-pages-document intended to

> set the strategic framework for the mission and the tasks of the *Bundeswehr* as an element of the whole-of-government approach to security. They describe the security objectives and security interests of the Federal Republic of Germany. They are based on an assessment of the current situation and also include current and likely future developments (German Ministry of Defense, 2011).

[20] For more information on the planned White Paper.

As far as the security environment in which Germany evolves is concerned, and perfectly in line with the general European discourse relying on a so-called wider notion of security, the 2011 document concludes that

> [a] direct territorial threat to Germany involving conventional military means remains an unlikely event. Over the past few years the strategic security environment has continued to change. Globalisation has led to power shifts between states and groups of states as well as to the rise of new regional powers. Today, risks and threats are emerging above all from failing and failed states, acts of international terrorism, terrorist regimes and dictatorships, turmoil when these break up, criminal networks, climatic and natural disasters, from migration developments, from the scarcity of or shortages in the supply of natural resources and raw materials, from epidemics and pandemics, as well as from possible threats to critical infrastructure such as information technology.

Within the overall context of the country's security environment – and obviously following the assessment that a direct territorial threat is unlikely –, the guidelines moreover identify a number of German security interests:

- preventing, mitigating and managing crises and conflicts that endanger the security of Germany and its allies;
- advocating and implementing positions on foreign and security policy in an assertive and credible way;
- strengthening transatlantic and European security and partnership;
- advocating the universality of human rights and principles of democracy, promoting global respect for international law and reducing the gap between the rich and the poor regions of the world; facilitating free and unrestricted world trade as well as free access to the high seas and to natural resources.

The Coalition agreement, finally, stays true to Germany's reputation and the electoral campaign of which it is the result: it sets out with "The Economy, Growth and Innovation" and deals with security matters only under the last two (content-related) headlines 6 "A Strong Europe" and 7 "Responsibility in the world," without devoting a specific section to the issue. Unsurprisingly, therefore, it has almost nothing to say about the security environment and strategic challenges, except repeating on several occasions that the world is "globalized" (Christian democratic union, Christian social union and German socialdemocratic party, 2013).

Notably compared to France, German strategic visions and threat perception thus remain rather vague and difficult to grasp. This is not only a problem and sometimes source of discontent for its Allies, it also makes German diplomats' and military officers' lives harder on an every-day basis, since detailed positions on specific matters can only rarely be derived from a larger conceptual framework. Given that there is no predefined position on a large number of matters other nations – to quote a German official – can simply "take from the shelves," German strategy-making by necessity often

occurs on an ad-hoc basis. What is more, these strategies are sometimes designed "on the ground" and then sent to Berlin as proposals, instead of being designed at the heart of the German foreign policy apparatus in accordance with Grand Strategy objectives, hence somehow reversing the classical flow of top-down strategy making and implementation.

Unsurprisingly therefore, Berlin's choices are sometimes qualified as irrational and occasionally even erratic by critics – including French officials interviewed for this project. Germany is said to lack a red thread that connects decisions taken in past years in a logical manner: why Afghanistan, why not Libya? What is more, the absence of such a red thread also means that German foreign and security policy seems hard to predict. German foreign policy does indeed lack a sound strategic basis that provides criteria when that sort of choice is required. That said, there certainly are a number of basic principles that characterize German foreign and security policy. The founding notion of "never again war" and "never again Auschwitz" is translated into a "culture of restraint", value-driven foreign policy and a multilateralism as a condition *sine qua non* for external military intervention. "Going it alone" is no option for the Germans, as is reiterated at a variety of occasions.[21] Others would simply argue that domestic political conjunctures are the main explanatory factor in German foreign and security policy.

This stands in sharp contrast with the much more coherent (strategic) elites in France. For obvious historical reasons, Germany cannot look back on the continuity other "great powers" have when it comes to their military traditions. Despite the concept of the "citizen in uniform," the distance between the strategic community and the armed forces on the one hand and "ordinary people" on the other is far greater in Germany than in most other Western democracies. Former Minister of Defense Thomas de Maizière thus for instance complained in 2012:

> As far as the security policy debate is concerned, the great majority of Germans does either not feel competent enough – or they simply do not feel responsible, since many things seem to be far away (de Maizière, 2012).

Volker Rühe, another former German Minister of Defense, once famously stated that post-reunification Germany was "encircled by friends." This is still the underlying sentiment in general German approaches to security: there is no sense of urgency. In German public debate, (external) security matters are consequently of little salience. This was not least illustrated by the 2013 electoral campaign in which foreign policy – let alone security policy – played a subordinate role. The 2013 electoral campaign focused on few issues in general, but the country's role in Europe or even in

[21] Specifically on German strategic culture, see e.g. Berger T., 1998, *Cultures of Antimilitarism. National Security in Germany and Japan*, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press; Dalgaard-Nielsen A., 2005, "The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-emptive strikes", *Security Studies n°36* (3), 339-359. Longhurst K., 2004, *Germany and the Use of Force. The Evolution of German Security Policy 1990–2003*, Manchester, Manchester University Press; Malici A., 2006, Germans as Venutians: The Culture of German Foreign Policy Behaviour", *Foreign Policy Analysis* (1), 37-62; Rittberger V., (ed.), 2001, *German Foreign Policy Since Unification. Theories and Case Studies,* Manchester, Manchester University Press.

the world was not on the national agenda.[22] In a most general way, in the country's political debate, security policy is widely considered to be an option, but not a necessity:

> Germany may consequently opt in to participate in military missions – such as in Kosovo or Afghanistan – but it may also chose to stay on the side-line – such as in the Iraqi or Libyan cases – without, and this is the key point, having to fear *security* ramifications. When the country decides to opt-out, the consequences it faces are merely political and, to some extent, economic, given that it pays the price in terms of reliability, reputation as a good ally (and perhaps reconstruction contracts) (Kunz, 2014).

Change may, however, be underway. This, at least, is the hope observers associate with the current debate on German foreign relations. This debate primarily arose from within the security and defense policy community, and is of course now fueled by recent events in Ukraine, the Islamic State and the general impression of a world unraveling. Slowly but steadily, the number of voices calling for a more "responsible" German foreign policy in light of Germany's growing power and influence is raising. The leading German think-tank on international affairs – the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) – for instance published a joint report with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) on "New Power, New Responsibility" (Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik and German Marshall Fund, 2013). In the political sphere, three leading official German representatives gave speeches at the 2014 Munich Security conference that all went into the same direction: Foreign Minister Frank-Walther Steinmeier, Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen and Head of State Joachim Gauck (whose speech writer was also involved in the SWP/GMF project that resulted in the above named report).

In his opening statements on "Germany's role in the world: Reflections on responsibility, norms and alliances," President Gauck named a range of questions that set the tone for these reflections:

> Are we doing what we could do to stabilise our neighbourhood, both in the East and in Africa? Are we doing what we have to in order to counter the threat of terrorism? And, in cases where we have found convincing reasons to join our allies in taking even military action, are we willing to bear our fair share of the risks? Are we doing what we should to attract new or reinvigorated major powers to the cause of creating a just world order for tomorrow? Do we even evince the interest in some parts of the world which is their due, given their importance? What role do we want to play in the crises afflicting distant parts of the globe? Are we playing an active enough role in that field in which the Federal Republic of Germany has developed such expertise? I am speaking, of course, of conflict prevention. In my opinion, Germany should make a more substantial

[22] See Forschungsgruppe Wahlen's polling results, available at www.zdf.de. According to these polls, the five most relevant issues to voters were jobs (25 %), wages (18 %), the Euro/Euro crisis (16%), pensions (15 %) and social justice (12 %). See Forschungsgruppe Wahlen's infographics, available at www.zdf.de. The one televised debate between the two main candidates, Chancellor Angela Merkel and Social Democrat Peer Steinbrück, may serve as another instance backing the claim that foreign and security affairs did not matter during the campaign (available at http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1332710.html.)

> contribution, and it should make it earlier and more decisively if it is to be a good partner.
>
> Germany has long since demonstrated that it acts in an internationally responsible way. But it could – building on its experience in safeguarding human rights and the rule of law – take more resolute steps to uphold and help shape the order based on the European Union, NATO and the United Nations. At the same time, Germany must also be ready to do more to guarantee the security that others have provided it with for decades. (Gauck, 2014).

Much of the subsequent debate focused on Gauck's statement on military force, which he qualified as the means of last resort, which Germany should not reject by automatism:

> However, when the last resort – sending in the Bundeswehr – comes to be discussed, Germany should not say "no" on principle. Nor should it say "yes" unthinkingly.

Both minister of defense von der Leyen and foreign minister Steinmeier echoed these statements in their respective speeches. Arguing that Germany was a "major economy and a country of significant size," von der Leyen declared that "the Federal Government is prepared to enhance our international responsibility." (Von Der Leyen, 2014). Foreign minister Steinmeier, in turn, explained that

> Germany must be ready for earlier, more decisive and more substantive engagement in the foreign and security policy sphere. Assuming responsibility in this sphere must always mean something concrete. It must amount to more than rhetorical outrage or the mere issue of grades for the efforts and activities of others. (Steinmeier, 2014).

Although the Chancellor herself made no statement to that effect, it is hardly conceivable that two of her ministers deliver speeches on the fundamentals of German foreign policy without her consent. What is more, both ministers as well as the president have since then reiterated the points made at various occasions, notably Gauck (who, however, has no executive powers in the German political system, so that his role in this debate rather serves to prepare the nation for upcoming changes and not making actual decisions). The Foreign Ministry itself has launched the so-called *Review 2014* project in order to foster a debate on the future of German foreign policy.[23]

Yet, whether these changes in rhetoric really imply actual changes in policies remains to be seen – and especially, whether they will be underpinned by the allocation of means and funding. At the time being, it seems fair to say that the ongoing debate has rather little real world implications in terms of German foreign policy. The Review's final report does hardly contain any surprises. While some signs are indeed visible, though not necessarily linked to the debate – such as the government's adopting

[23] Read the final report published in February 2015.

an "Africa Strategy," sending additional troops to Mali or, perhaps more importantly, the launching of the Rühe-Commission tasked to examine the parliament's role in Bundeswehr deployments abroad (see below) and the fact that Germany took a lead role in NATO's so-called "spearhead" force (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force – VJTF, an immediate reaction to Russian revisionism) – what really comes out of this process, or even what the *Review 2014* project's end result is meant to be beyond the final report (and organizational changes within the Ministry), is not entirely clear at this point. Measures explicitly to that end have not been taken so far, and the security-related debates that went on during the "summer of crises" 2014 sometimes seemed entirely disconnected from any idea of more German foreign policy engagement: the country *i.a.* discussed armament exports (see below), drones and what to do against ISIS in Iraq and the role Germany ought to play in that context along the very lines that always have characterized German foreign policy debates in years past. Increases in defense spending (a key outcome of NATO's Wales summit) are far from receiving unanimous support even from within the government coalition.

The wider German public also stays true to itself and remains highly reluctant toward military intervention of any kind – and even grows increasingly reluctant. An opinion poll carried out in May 2014 by the Körber Foundation, within the framework of the above named *Review 2014* project, thus shows that only 37 % of respondents are in favor of more engagement, while 66 % say that Germany should stick to its approach of restraint – which is about the opposite of the results yielded by a 1994 poll (37 % for restraint, 62 % in favor of assuming more responsibility). Among the respondents opposed to more engagement in 2014, 73 % say that Germany has enough domestic problems it should address first, 50 % say their position is linked to German history and 37 % believe that Germany's influence in the world is too limited to have an impact (Körber, 2014).The poll's result moreover show a clear preference for what may be termed altruistic foreign policy objectives, as the top two priorities considered as "very important" by the respondents are "protecting human rights around the world" and "improving environmental and climate protection," only then followed by "ensuring energy supply" (Körber, 2014). In light of the strong role of the German parliament in security policy (see below), public opinion is likely to weigh in heavily even in years to come. Ongoing changes in the country's party system may also prove relevant in this context.

At a more conceptual level, attempts at triggering a debate on German foreign policy interestingly emphasize the notion of "responsibility." In other words, the key driving factor (or at least the factor identified as the one that should be the key driving factor) behind German approaches is still not framed as "interests" or "strategic objectives," but rather as a moral obligation. The proposed "change" is thus much less wide-ranging than it may appear at first sight, given that the (discourse on the) rationale behind German foreign policy remains intact. It is merely the variety of its actions that is called for to be expanded. One of the reasons certainly consists of difficulties to sell any line of argument based on interests in the domestic context.

In sum, neither the Munich Security Conference speeches nor subsequent statements and publications should therefore be taken as compelling indicators for a massive change in German strategic culture. What matters is still what happens "on the ground," in the various missions and operations, NATO's Defense Planning Process or in the procurement and maintenance of capabilities.

Although a number of factors conducive to evolution are currently present, the outcome of this evolution may be one way or another. Increasing security pressures (Russia, the terrorist threat in the Middle East, cyber challenges to name but a few), resource scarcity (triggering more multinational cooperation and reducing Germany's freedom of action) combined with pressure emanating from within the security policy community clearly offers a window of opportunity for readjustments in German security policy. Revising the 2006 White Paper is obviously a good start.

Conclusions: France and Germany in different worlds?

Much has been written about the French and German so-called strategic cultures and the differences that between them. As already this first chapter clearly shows, the starting points for security policy formulation are essentially different in both countries. In terms of "doctrine," France and Germany are worlds apart – and not only in terms of content and diverging ambitions and objectives, but also in terms of how explicitly this content and objectives are spelled out. The degrees of what may perhaps be labeled "strategic maturity" thus differ widely. It is actually the authors of the French White Paper who included the following sentences in the 2013 edition, and it seems fair to assume that somebody had Germany in his mind when writing these lines:

> Although the Lisbon Treaty's inclusion of solidarity and collective defense clauses was a recognition of the fact that the Member States are equally concerned by most threats, their perceptions, strategic cultures and national ambitions remain very diverse. The specific history of each Member State is reflected in the links forged in every continent, and sometimes in their contrasting visions of the role of military force in international relations (French Ministry of Defense, 2013).

To simply outline a number of observations based on the above quoted White Papers and texts, it is interesting to note the extent to which the French version is more elaborate. Setting out with precise definitions of the terms "risk" and "threats", it paints a broad picture of the international system, its structure and the change it is undergoing. Germany lacks any text that could be qualified as equivalent.

Rather unsurprisingly, therefore, the relationship between Paris and Berlin is characterized by a number of misunderstandings and incomprehension. In its most extreme forms, while the French have a hard time to understand that the Germans are really serious about leading "altruistic" foreign policies across the globe, Germans tend to stand stunned when confronted with notions such as the *rayonnement de la France* they believed had long disappeared from contemporary politics. The French official discourse on nuclear deterrence does not make things easier (see below). A related problem consequently is that, at least implicitly, both sides sometimes seem to believe that they have reached some sort of higher stage of development on a teleological scale: while Germany has "left geopolitics and Realpolitik behind," or so many argue, France is "still" stuck with thinking in those terms. Resorting to caricature, the situation could thus be summarized as the French desperately waiting for a German strategic awakening that would lead Berlin to realize the security

challenges posed by a globalized world and then induce it to join France in its efforts to build a European defense. The Germans, in turn, wait for Paris to understand the relevance of their values. Discontent with Germany is in any case clearly palpable in France, although few people express is as clearly as former Prime Minister François Fillon who declared that he "deems it unacceptable that Germany continues, in the name of its past, to exonerate itself from the efforts necessary for the European continent's security."[24] Most famously, however, it is the former Polish minister of foreign affairs, Radosław Sikorski, who declared that he feared German power less than he was beginning to fear German inactivity (Sikorski, 2011). In Germany, in turn, suspicions on France's African agenda have not grown smaller since Mali, when Berlin was informed of *Opération Serval* twenty-four hours in advance.

Fundamental change is yet unlikely to happen anytime soon. While the French approach broadly squares with the predictions of realist theory of international relations (Rynning, 2010) and – at least on paper – follows the traditional "realist" cascade of analyzing the environment, determining objectives and identifying the resources required to achieve them (nevertheless adding a pinch of budgetary constraints), the German approach to debating security policy remains to a large extent normative even within the context of the "new" debate and the Review 2014 process. Moving from German "restraint" as a moral imperative to more "responsibility" in today's world, the starting point for most arguments brought forward remains a certain understanding of values and German moral obligations. It is therefore not clear whether the "new" approach to foreign and security policy that has been discussed in Germany for about two years now will really lead to more strategic compatibility with France. A mere change of vocabulary, while "traditional" German reasoning remains fundamentally intact, will in fact not make it easier for the two countries to find common ground – and explain their foreign policies to their respective public opinions.

Besides these ideological underpinnings and beyond public opinion, officials and analysts also stress a number of fundamental differences once the structure of German interests is laid bare. Interlocutors on both sides of the border are quick to emphasize that the two countries' strategic interests are fundamentally different – and especially located in different regions of the world (read: not necessarily in Africa). What is more, it is not always easy to use the term "interest" in a German context at all. Even German officials may consequently describe German foreign policy as being "altruistic" (as compared to the French "interest-driven" approach). Agreeing on common interests and finding ways to foster them together is of course difficult if one side claims not to have any interests. Although this may appear like a caricature (and certainly is a caricature in many ways, especially assuming that German officials are certainly a bit more likely to actually discover German interests once the doors are closed and the general public is shut out), it nevertheless touches upon a fundamental problem in Franco-German security cooperation. Moreover, these different approaches have concrete consequences in multinational settings: as can often be heard, German officers "really think and act" multilaterally, without receiving concrete orders from Berlin to pursue specific national interests. In many practitioners' observations, other, and in particular officials who are French nationals, instead tend to be perceived – and to perceive themselves – as representatives

[24] Author's translation in the text: « je juge inacceptable que l'Allemagne continue, au nom de son passé, de s'exonérer des efforts nécessaires à la sécurité du continent européen ». Défense Européenne : Fillon juge « inacceptable » la position de l'Allemagne, *Le Point*, August 27, 2014.

of their respective capitals. Different conceptions thus translate at the level of officers' socialization and self-perception, taking abstract doctrinal notions down to the individual's level in working groups or other multilateral settings.

In many cases, these problems do not necessarily only arise from the situation outlined above, but rather from perceptions held on the respective partner country. Experts and practitioners in both countries not only hold ideas about their own country's strategic culture, but also about the respective other country's. These ideas, often reinforced by concrete cooperation experiences in various fields and fuelled by almost ridiculous incidents – from administrative cooperation to military interventions on the ground, from the drafting of joint letters to the observation that *Bundeswehr* military personnel were at first prohibited from using vehicles in Afghanistan because German emissions testing certificates had expired – do not always make French-German cooperation and understanding easier. Mutual distrust is clearly an issue: while Germans fear that France is trying to instrumentalize them for their hidden (African) agenda, the French fear German unreliability when things really matter. Linked to that issue are also German fears that French ambitions for a "Europe-puissance" may be intended to serve only French purposes, i.e. the prolongation of French power with European means. Paris' regional focus on Africa seems highly suspicious, while there is always a certain hint of megalomania presumed on France's part, with "Paris thinking that they are at the same level as Washington, which of course, they are not." In German newspapers, a popular synonym for "France" is "*la Grande Nation,"* and its connotation is not always admiring. Strategic autonomy is generally perceived as an outdated concept on the other side of the Rhine (and elsewhere), while the French nuclear deterrent has very few friends in Germany. Neither of these fears entirely lack empirical grounds. Germany's insistence on values is sometimes been perceived as dishonest, as a false pretext for inaction. Exaggerating a bit and again recurring to caricature, France is in turn often viewed in Germany as an interventionist nation, where one single person can decide to go to war. These French wars generally take place in francophone Africa. Germans, on the other hand, have the reputation of being too soft, ignorant of the imperatives of global geostrategy and failing to understand the difference between wartime and peacetime and the different regulations they require in the armed forces' everyday life.

On a more optimistic note, however, it is worth noting that France and Germany generally share their assessment of the security situation. Talking to officials on both sides, the list of risks and threats is essentially similar. Both Paris and Berlin thus understand the gravity in what is happening in Ukraine. They for example also agree that Europe – and especially NATO – should not exclusively focus on Ukraine. It is thus rather the conclusions drawn from this assessment that can differ, as well as the priorities they define in regional, but also functional terms. While the two countries' general approach to strategy thus seems to be hard to compare, at least the starting point for all security policy-making proves to be a common basis for more and better cooperation.

THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPEAN DEFENSE

Introduction: CSDP and NATO as the two pillars of Europe's security architecture

Commitment to a European defense instead of purely national approaches is a matter of course in both Paris and Berlin, reiterated in almost every official speech addressing the fundamental matters of defense policy and enshrined in national doctrine documents. When it comes to pushing toward a stronger European defense, Paris and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Germany, are thus always on board – at least on paper and in policy declarations. While *l'Europe de la défense* has been a French foreign policy objective since the inception of the European project, defending the continent along with others rhymes perfectly with the German desire for multilateralism. Yet, understandings of what this would mean, exactly, have often differed. The old division of "Europeanists" and "Atlanticists" has in fact never been entirely overcome between France and Germany.[25] What started with the preamble Chancellor Adenauer added to the Elysée Treaty in 1963 – much to President de Gaulle's anger and exasperation – thus continues to at least in part set the tone for Franco-German debates on the European security architecture, sometimes below the surface and sometimes above. Even today, the debate on the institutional future of European defense is therefore in fact a double debate: how much Europe do we want? And what should be the dosage of "America" in this? While the first question is first and foremost a matter of national sovereignty and how much of it should be transferred to a supranational level, the latter refers to notions of the European Union as a global actor on the international stage that should be entirely autonomous from the United States or not, depending on the various views.

Throughout the course of European integration, the project's "finality" in general and in the field of European defense policy in particular has never been defined. From continued exclusively intergovernmental cooperation to the creation of a truly European army, theoretical options are indeed numerous, and most EU member states do have some sort of finality in mind in their approaches. Dodging related questions has, ironically, been a recipe for success in past attempts at taking the idea of a European defense a step further. As François Heisbourg hence noted in 2000, "a certain studied imprecision about the eventual destination has also been essential to the progress of ESDP" (Heisbourg, 2000). The same applies today to the Common Security and Defense Policy. Yet, the deeper integration has become, the more apparent it is that the question on its purpose and finality will need to be addressed, not necessarily for its own sake but rather to make European defense work. Moreover, Europeans will at some point have to come to terms with the parallel lives of NATO and the European Union – and be it only because the United States gets down to business with its pivot to Asia. Yet, it is also in light of ever scarcer financial resources that Europeans will need to think very thoroughly about the efficiency and effectiveness of their security and defense efforts at national levels as well as within the framework of different multilateral settings.

[25] For an historical account of that matter from the 1950s onward, see Soutou GH., 1996, *L'alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996,* Paris, Fayard.

As of 2015, the institutional framework for the defense of Europe is made up of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance and the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy.[26] The question is today no longer a debate on either-or, but rather one of the exact relationship between them and their responsibilities. While NATO has existed since 1949, CSDP, in its current shape and with its current institutions, is a child of the Treaty of Lisbon. Succeeding to a number of initiatives and policies that all contributed to the European alphabet soup, CSDP is the policy that takes European integration farthest in the field of security and defense policy, while of course remaining purely intergovernmental.[27] At first sight, it thus qualifies as a bold step forward toward a European defense. Yet, while it already goes almost too far (away from a strong transatlantic defense link) for some, others complain that it still does not go far enough. The issue of NATO vs. CSDP is thus is the very concrete translation of the above-mentioned opposition between "Gaullists" and "Atlancticists:" how much NATO do we want, and in particular, how much of United States involvement? What division of labor between CSDP and NATO? With what capabilities for whom? Both NATO and CSDP have had their weak moments in past years and decades, as various attempts at "reviving" them or "giving new impetus" clearly illustrate. And although the December 2013 EU Council may have been an important gathering for CSDP and although NATO certainly has benefitted from the Ukraine crisis, many of the questions pertaining to Europe's security architecture still await answers.

Within this context, it is worth remembering that – although the Lisbon Treaty explicitly offers the possibility –, strictly speaking, CSDP is at present not about defending Europe in Europe. Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty clearly states that CSDP is to take place in "missions outside the Union," and that it "shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defense realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework."(Treaty of Lisbon, 2007). The Lisbon treaty foresees so-called structured co-operation to allow member states to move forward, on several matters including this one. Yet, the political willingness to make use of that provision is not there. And although the Lisbon Treaty contains a so-called solidarity clause, this clause has nothing of the strength – and binding character – of the North Atlantic Treaty's article V which stipulates that an attack upon one member is an attack upon all. In other words, collective territorial defense in Europe is (still) NATO's business. With the return of "traditional" conflicts about state borders to Europe during 2014, this aspect may even increase in relevance in future debates as the Alliance's September 2014 Wales Summit unequivocally demonstrated. The European Union's stepping up its game to effectively replace NATO seems highly unlikely at present. In other words, both institutions will continue to exist and operate in parallel for the foreseeable future. It is the details of this coexistence and potential attempts at making their lives less parallel that are currently at stake.

[26] Other organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or – depending on the notion of "security" one wishes to apply – the Council of Europe also deal with security matters. Yet, since no other organization or entity than NATO and CSDP have a military component, this report will only focus on the latter two.

[27] For an overview of developments in the field of European security, see Howorth J., 2014, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union,* 2nd edition, London, Palgrave Macmillan.

As the above quoted Lisbon Treaty article already hints at, the relationship between the NATO and CSDP and its predecessors has not always been easy. The reasons for these difficulties are located at various levels, from geostrategic to Brussels institutional. Certain states play a particularly inglorious role, given that the Turkey-Cyprus nexus currently blocks almost everything. Issues, however, also lie deeper than that. At the core has always been the question of how much weight is to be attached to the transatlantic link, and this question has naturally found different answers in different EU member states. Viewed with a highly critical eye in Washington at the outset, the U.S. issued a "pre-Maastricht warning in the early 1990ies that European Union should not weaken NATO's trans-Atlantic link," the so-called Dobbins' demarche (Goldsmith, 1992). Within Europe, divergent conceptions of a European security policy's relationship with the transatlantic security architecture have always been a key obstacle and continue to be crucial to this day. The division of labor between CSDP and NATO is consequently also subject to different visions. While NATO rather clearly stands for collective defense – yet yearning for significance beyond Article V, notably in a post-ISAF setting – CSDP has been, and continues to be, subject to a variety of visions: should a European defense policy serve the purpose of emancipation from the U.S. and thus cover the entire spectrum? Or should it rather be an add-on to NATO, providing the (civilian) tools and the know-how the Alliance itself lacks? While NATO's role has always been rather clearly defined, even after the end of the Cold War, the purposes and tasks and especially future prospects of CSDP have always remained somewhat vague – perhaps not in the treaties, but most certainly so when it comes to ultimate goals and objectives in European leaders' heads.

Attitudes on the other side of the Atlantic have evolved considerably since Dobbins' demarche: from outright reject to open calls for more European defense cooperation, Washington has in effect made a U-turn over the past two decades. Fears of a European balancing move have given way to more favorable views – and in fact concrete expectations directed at the Europeans. At NATO's 2008 Bucharest summit, then U.S. President George W. Bush admitted that the European Security and Defense Policy (CSDP's predecessor) was both "useful and necessary." (Duff, 2008). Closer links between NATO and the EU thus seemed a good idea, and in the Bucharest Summit Declaration, the allies underline the need to work together:

> We are therefore determined to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership as agreed by our two organisations, to achieve closer cooperation and greater efficiency, and to avoid unnecessary duplication in a spirit of transparency, and respecting the autonomy of the two organisations. A stronger EU will further contribute to our common security (NATO, 2008).[28]

Today, U.S. leaders almost unequivocally (and sometimes angrily and short of patience) call for more European engagement, that is, for Europe's coming of age in security matters. And the 2012 U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance – entitled "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense" – concludes that

[28] See NATO, April 3, 2008, *Bucharest Summit Declaration*, Point 14.

> [m]ost European countries are now producers of security rather than consumers of it. Combined with the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, this has created a strategic opportunity to rebalance the U.S. military investment in Europe, moving from a focus on current conflicts toward a focus on future capabilities. In keeping with this evolving strategic landscape, our posture in Europe must also evolve (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012).

A first in transatlantic affairs, the passage may well be interpreted as yet another formulation of Washington's intent to "rebalance" to Asia, expecting Europeans to henceforth take care of their security on their own. As a matter of fact, the idea of an American withdrawal from NATO has already been spoken out loud (Posen, 2013). In the mid to long run, decisions on the "dosage" of America in European defense may thus well be taken in Washington rather than in Paris, Berlin or London. The NATO Defense Planning Process clearly hints at that direction, although the current crisis in Ukraine may delay a partial U.S. drawback from European security affairs. This should, however, not make Europeans believe that business as usual, including declining defense budgets, is an acceptable option from Washington's perspective.

Attempts at overcoming the two institutions' status of mere coexistence have basically failed. Even at official levels, this is widely recognized: as for instance the 2010 letter by the Weimar Triangle foreign ministers notes, "there is ample room for improvement in our [NATO-EU] relations."[29] Both Catherine Ashton and Andres Fogh Rasmussen had made better contacts one of their priorities. There certainly is wide agreement on the need for NATO and CSDP to complement each other. Yet, what does complementarity mean? The Berlin-Plus agreements of 2003 that were intended to address that precise matter, granting the EU access to NATO assets, have never "really" been applied.[30] The agreement consequently has ceased to matter in practice. Germany is thus no longer a big fan of the arrangement, while France, for obvious reasons, never has been. About a decade after its conclusion, Berlin-Plus is widely considered to have "outlived itself:"

> At the time it was about "no Discrimination, no Duplication, no Decoupling," creating, in political terms, the notion of hierarchy between NATO and CSDP. But this did not stop unproductive competition between NATO and CSDP. (Coelmont and de Langlois, 2013).

Notably the fact that Berlin-Plus effectively confers NATO a "right of first refusal" is considered detrimental to CSDP. This is, however, far from being the only reason behind unfruitful CSDP-NATO relations. Even simpler – and in a way also much more absurd – than Berlin-Plus and its implications, any closer link or even concrete cooperation between CSDP and NATO is prevented due to the

[29] French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Ministry of Defense, German Ministry of Defense, Polish Ministry of Defense, December 6, 2010, *Letter to Ms Catherine Ashton*, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, European Council. Paris, Berlin, Warsaw.

[30] The only two examples of Berlin-Plus being applied refer to the EU's taking over from NATO in the Balkans in post-conflict settings, i.e. no situations in which acute crisis management was required (operations Concordia and Althea).

Cyprus issue (which may, of course, also come in handy for member states who do not, in fact, wish for closer cooperation) and resulting obstructive Turkish and Cypriot positions.[31] The 2013 "Turkey Progress Report" on the state of play of EU membership negotiations with Ankara hence simply notes that "(t]he issue of EU-NATO cooperation beyond the 'Berlin plus' arrangements, involving all EU Member States, remains to be resolved."[32] Strategic cooperation of the two institutions, i.e. at the level of the Political and Security Committee and the North Atlantic Council, cannot and does not formally take place. Coordination merely exists at the operational and tactical levels, among Operation and Force Headquarters. Meetings also take place at working group and policy directors' levels. Coordination has also happened in developing the EU's Maritime Strategy, one of the tasks defined by the December 2013 EU Council Conclusions.

Today, beyond collective defense, NATO and CSDP engage in very similar fields. Both are active in crisis management – sometimes at the same time in the same region such as off the coast of Somalia –, and both seek to strengthen partner countries' capacities, NATO through its Defense Capacity Building activities, the EU through its respective missions and the Enable and Enhance Initiative (E2I). Both have established forces for rapid reaction, NATO the NATO Reaction Forces (NRF), the EU its Battle Groups. Both intend to generate capacities through cooperation, NATO through its Smart Defense Initiative, the EU through the European Defense Agency and Pooling & Sharing. Thr Framework Nation's concept is in effect what in an EU context would be labeled as "permanent structured cooperation" – except that it takes place within NATO. The "comprehensive approach," linking military with civilian means, clearly is an EU specialty while NATO's efforts to that effect have not been overly convincing (while also lacking all Allies' support). When it comes to planning and conduct capacities, interoperability and common standards, NATO however simply plays in a different league. NATO today remains crucial to guarantee compatibility, interoperability and the norms of its allies (de Langlois, 2014).

Among the evergreens on the institutional side in the debate on the future of CSDP are therefore individual planning capacities for the European Union, i.e. an EU Operational Headquarters.[33] First proposed at the so-called Praline Summit in 2003 and later called for in Weimar Triangle format initiative subsequently joined by Rome and Madrid, foreign ministers sent a letter to Catherine Ashton in September 2011[34], *i.a.* declaring that "she must set up a European 'Operational HQ' by any means necessary, including a legal mechanism, created by the Lisbon Treaty that bypasses a British veto" (Waterfield, 2011). Fiercely opposed by the British, the establishment of such a permanent OHQ is indeed considered by many – still including Paris and Berlin – to be the leap forward the

[31] As a consequence of their unresolved conflict, Turkey today blocks Cyprus in NATO, while Cyprus blocks Turkey within the CSDP. For example, whenever EUFOR Althea – taking place under Berlin-plus – is discussed in the EU's Military Committee, Cyprus has to leave the room.

[32] European Commission, Turkey Progress Report 2013, Document SWD (2013) 417 final, 2013, 75, accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council *Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014,* COM (2013)700 final.

[33] For more details on the matter, see Simon L., "Command and control? Planning for EU military operations", *European Union Institute for Security Studies,* Occasional Paper No 81, Paris.

[34] French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Ministry of Defense, German Ministry of Defense, Polish Ministry of Defense. *Letter to Ms Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.*

European Union must make in the years ahead, based on the learnings from past CSDP operations and missions. Given the British resistance, however, the issue is not officially on the agenda.

Yet, back in 2011 and 2012, the debate on an EU OHQ triggered by the Weimar-plus initiative had led to the establishment of an "EU Operations Centre" for CSDP missions in Africa, "with the aim of coordinating and strengthening civil-military synergies between the three CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa" (European External Action Service, 2003). This Center may eventually prove to be a sort of nucleus for an EU OHQ, albeit through the backdoor. While the Center's mandate was initially set to expire in March 2014, it was prolonged without any changes by another twelve months to last until March 23, 2015 by a Council decision in December 2013.[35] A strategic review in 2014 resulted in another prolongation until 2016, while the Center's geographic responsibility was extended to also include the Sahel region. The EU's Political and Security Committee agrees that the Center should also be allowed to extend its activities to other regions and tasks, i.e. anything short of planning and conduct. The discussion on the latter has been postponed due to British opposition; the current solution foresees the Center's strengthening without adding more personnel. When and if, during the review of the European External Action Service until 2016[36], the issue of planning and conduct capacities comes back on the agenda, the Weimar-plus countries (France, Germany, Poland, Italy and Spain) agree that the EU Operations Center should serve as a basis for an European Operational Headquarters.

Another big item on the current agenda is the revision of the Athena mechanism, i.e. funding for CSDP missions which cannot be paid for from the EU's budget. Although Athena covers a small amount of so-called common costs, CSDP missions are to date still mainly paid for on a "cost lie where they fall"-basis.[37] In other words: the states who send troops also pay for these troops. Needless to say, incentives to engage do not exactly get higher in light of the monetary costs incurred (adding to the political price tag). Moreover, financial issues have simply prevented the use of certain instruments in the past, such as the Greek-led HELBROC Battle Group during the first half of 2014 in the Central African Republic. The latest review of the Athena mechanism was decided in September 2014, yet did not lead to a fundamental change of the situation. Although more money would of course be unlikely to compensate for the lack of political will, a lesser financial burden may still help member states in their decisions on whether to contribute forces or not.

The following sections intend to outline French and German priorities on the institutional framework of European defense in greater detail. It intends to cover fundamental issues such as "Europeanist" or "Atlanticist" preferences with respect to Europe's security architecture, but also Paris' and Berlin's respective approaches to concrete issues within the EU or NATO frameworks.

[35] See Council Decision 2013/725/CFSP of 9 December 2013 amending and extending Decision 2012/173/CFSP on the activation of the EU Operations Centre for the Common Security and Defense Policy missions and operation in the Horn of Africa, Brussels, 2013.

[36] The 2010 review had decided to leave the matter to Catherine Ashton's successor. Federica Mogherini now has until December 2015 to present a report.

[37] For more information, see the Council's "Athena Fact Sheet".

France: the quest for more Europe

The Europe of defense – *l'Europe de la défense* – is a French invention. Much to France's decision-makers' despair, however, no other state's level of ambition matches Paris' visions. The French strategic community is of course aware of this and in Chapter 5, dealing with France's engagement in the European Union and NATO, the 2013 French White Paper consequently lists three options as being "illusionary for France:"

- going it alone, in other words defending solely our own vital interests and abdicating any regional or global responsibilities. Our status in the United Nations, our history and the scale of our interests throughout the world make this option unrealistic and inopportune;
- delegating our future security to the USA and NATO. The Atlantic Alliance is a pillar of the French defense policy, but it must take into account the differences of priorities that require each member of this Alliance to assume their own responsibilities;
- the option of an integrated European defense. France reaffirms its ambition for a credible and effective European defense strategy, but it cannot ignore the stumbling blocks to development of the European framework (French Ministry of Defense, 2013).

The White Paper also insists on the different natures of NATO and the European Union, stressing the EU's character as something that is much more than an alliance:

> NATO and the European Union are different types of organisation. NATO is a political-military alliance, whereas the European Union is, for its members, a global project with political, economic, commercial, diplomatic and military dimensions.

As Hubert Védrine notes, "[t]here are several reasons why the Europe of Defense has stalled. France's lack of action since 2009, which has enabled the Commission and the technostructrure in Brussels, amongst others, to claim that, now that France is back in NATO, she has lost interest in the Europe of Defense, whereas she had been its sole advocate" (Védrine, 2012). In other words, France's preferred version – namely that of a *Europe de la défense*, independent from the United States – is beyond reach at the time being and in the foreseeable future. It is this insight in particular that is the source of France's (newly found) pragmatism with respect to the security architecture for the European continent. If the best option is not available, it might indeed be a logical preference to make the second-best option as good as possible. Seen from the outside, French positions relative to the institutional design of European defense have thus evolved considerably in recent years, in essence following a "if you can't beat them, join them"-logic as critics would point out.

The 2013 White Paper also underlines France's interest to fully participate in NATO. President Sarkozy's "return" into the Alliance's integrated command marked the end of decades outside integrated NATO structures (while it is still worth nothing that France was in fact never entirely

gone).[38] Perhaps more importantly, it also marked the end of a French stance toward and within NATO that was generally perceived as simply being obstructive. Framed as a "pragmatic" move by Sarkozy, the return was not met by unequivocal praise amongst French politicians (Hubert Védrine, for instance, opposed it), while the military was generally much keener on France's full participation in the Alliance. As President Sarkozy made utterly clear, the "Europe of defense" remained France's true priority (which, however, must not be seen as being incompatible with good French-U.S. relations, he said).[39] French politicians other than Sarkozy are indeed also quick to stress that France's "return" to NATO must not be misinterpreted as Paris' giving up on European defense. As noted in a 2013 Senate report, "France, who considers itself as the principal motor of *l'Europe de la défense*, is partly responsible for the current situation. The way in which its leaders have signed the Franco-British defense agreements in 2010 and its full reintegration into NATO can have left its partners under the impression that it renounces the very idea of a Europe of defense although this is naturally not the case" (French Senate Committee For Foreign Affairs And Armed Forces, 2013). Rather, as Hubert Védrine states in his 2012 report on the "Consequences of France's Return to NATO's integrated military command, on the future of transatlantic relations, and the outlook for the Europe of defense," Sarkozy argued that "by returning to the integrated command, France would mitigate her Allies' mistrust concerning its Europe of Defense initiatives" (Védrine, 2012). Whether this succeeded remains an open question – the fact that Sarkozy explained in 2007 that his objective consisted of "renovating NATO and thus its relation with France" (and not the other way around) certainly had the potential to make some Germans nervous.[40] French efforts at explaining its motivation notwithstanding, considerable skepticism as to Paris' intentions persists in Germany. While France's "return" to NATO was officially welcomed by the German government (Merkel, 2007) (although Berlin had not been consulted), not everybody is convinced of Paris' intentions. Or, as one German interviewee for this study summarized it, "it would be wrong to believe that France came back into NATO because it wanted to strengthen the Alliance."

The "new pragmatism" with respect to NATO notwithstanding, building a *Europe de la défense* thus remains the top priority in European defense matters. President François Hollande for instance reiterated this preference at his press conference on January 14, 2014 (only the third one since he took office in 2012), where he presented three initiatives aimed at "*la relance de l'Europe*", i.e. the "re-launch of Europe." In implementing these initiatives, Germany remains the partner of choice, given that they must "first and foremost be among France and Germany" – with the third initiative targeting defense:

[38] France was in fact strongly present at the Alliance already after 1995, i.e. under Sarkozy's predecessor Jacques Chirac. It thus participated in all the Alliance's military interventions even before its "return," contributed to NATO's budget, was part of the NATO Response Force, supported Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and brought back military personnel to SHAPE and ACT in 2004. For an account of the various steps that led to the decision and its implementation, as well as the conditions set, see Védrine H., *Report for the President of the French Republic*.

[39] See his speech to the French ambassadors on the matter: Sarkozy, N., August 27, 2007, *Discours du Président de la République, Conférence des Ambassadeurs*, Paris.

[40] Author's translation in the text: "la rénovation de l'Otan et donc de sa relation avec la France." Sarkozy N., Discours du Président de la République, Conférence des Ambassadeurs.

> And finally, the third initiative may be surprising. I would like to see a Franco-German couple able to act for a Europe of defense. Of course, there is the Franco-German Brigade, [French minister of defense] Jean-Yves Le Drian could talk about thus better than I can. But we must do more than a brigade. We have to display a joint responsibility for peace and security in the world.[41]

The option for a truly European defense included in all Treaties since Maastricht is an objective France is not ready to give up on. For Paris, CSDP must thus be endowed with the means and assets required to play that role instead of evolving in the shadows of the Atlantic Alliance.

This is, however, a view that is not necessarily shared outside of France. As a 2013 report by the French Senate thus rather diplomatically notes, "[f]or some, but not for France, NATO must be entrusted with important military operations, while the European Union has to stick to civilian crisis management" (French Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs and Armed Forces, 2013). It is thus no wonder that French disappointment with the current state of CSDP and the Europe of Defense is considerable across the board, with non-negligible anger at especially its German and British friends for being of no help in moving things further: "Not a single European country has backed France's ambitions and her conception of the Europe of Defense, even as these were defined and redefined in increasingly realistic and pragmatic terms" (Védrine, 2012). In the French discourse, it is thus clear that preferences lie with making use of the Lisbon Treaty's provisions on permanent structured cooperation, a Europe with "variable geometry".[42] François Fillon, a future conservative candidate for the 2017 presidential elections, thus for instance declared in 2013 that "we have to conceive *l'Europe de la défense* in a pragmatic manner, on the basis of structured cooperation because, at 27, we will not get any further" (Fillon, 2013).

On the more pragmatic grounds of the existing European security architecture, however, and as Hubert Védrine put it in 2012, "[t]he real question is how France can best defend her fundamental security and defense interests today and tomorrow, along with her independence, autonomous decision-making" (Védrine, 2012). This is in line with the 2013 French White Paper, which states that

> France's strategic autonomy is underpinned by national ownership of its essential defense and security capabilities. Its current capabilities together with the action it envisages to maintain them enable it to meet its collective security commitments, not least in the context of the Washington Treaty, which established the Atlantic Alliance.

[41] Author's translation in the text: « Enfin, la dernière initiative pourra surprendre. Je souhaite qu'il y ait un couple franco-allemand qui puisse agir pour l'Europe de la défense. Bien sûr, il y a la Brigade franco-allemande, Jean-Yves Le Drian pourrait en parler mieux que moi. Mais nous devons faire davantage qu'une brigade. Nous devons montrer une responsabilité commune pour la paix et la sécurité dans le monde ». Hollande F., Ouverture de la conférence de presse du Président de la République au Palais de l'Élysée le 14 janvier 2014.

[42] In general terms, this for instance was an objective pursued by the UMP party during the 2014 European Parliament electoral campaign, but also socialist president François Hollande has made statements to that effect. On defense properly speaking, see e.g. future presidential candidate François Fillon: Fillon F., 29 April 2013, « L'Europe de la défense », Question d'Europe 276, Robert Schumann Foundation Policy Paper; See also: French Senate Committee For Foreign Affairs And Armed Forces. « *Pour en finir avec l'Europe de la Défense* ».

> This wholehearted commitment to NATO is fully compatible with the preservation of France's decision-making autonomy and freedom of action, promoting the French vision of an Alliance of responsible nations in control of their destiny and accepting their national responsibilities (French Ministry of Defense, 2013).

In positioning France within the institutional framework of European defense policies, national sovereignty thus remains the guiding star. Notably budgetary constraints, however, push Paris to also seek closer cooperation with its partners. Absent any concrete projects for such structured cooperation, the real emphasis currently lies on fine-tuning existing institutions and notably implementing the 2013 Summit Conclusions, the Operational Headquarters issue, the revision of the Athena mechanism, i.e. the funding mechanism for CSDP missions. While France is part of the Weimar-plus group of countries pushing for an EU OHQ, Paris is also in favor of extending the Athena mechanism to cover more costs (Journal officiel de la République Française, 2013). President Hollande's proposals prior to the December 2013 summit to include unilateral missions – such as France's interventions in Mali and the Central African Republic, *Serval* and *Sangaris* – were however met with strong opposition by other EU member states and never made it into the Council conclusions.

Germany: a status quo-oriented ally

A true debate on Europe's security architecture does not take place in Germany. While some were genuinely tempted by Russian President Medvedev's 2008 proposals on a pan-European security architecture, business as usual without much questioning of the current state of affairs seems to be the preferred *modus operandi* for most. Bold ideas and sweeping visions is nothing that is dealt with in Berlin. More ambitious attempts at thinking about European defense did never go very far; official Germany has always been quite content with the European security architecture as it is. The Transatlantic link is of crucial relevance to Berlin, and the French ambitions for European emancipation from the United States are viewed with a certain skepticism. Berlin has consequently displayed little ambition to actively shape CSDP and notably its military dimension. Specifically German contributions to the development of Europe's defense thus mainly pertain to its non-military aspects and civilian crisis management, such as the proposals of an "Enable and Enhance"-Initiative (E2I) for partner countries or the idea to use the EU Battle Groups for training and surveillance missions.

Official – and thus currently decisive – approaches are clearly status-quo oriented. Within its preferred multilateral context, NATO remains the key institution for German security policy. German military officers in particular stress the "socializing" role of NATO and the fact that careers are "made" within the Alliance. The 2011 German Defense Policy Guidelines consequently stipulate that

> [t]he North Atlantic Alliance remains the centrepiece of our defense efforts. Alliance solidarity and making a reliable and credible contribution to the Alliance are part of Germany's raison d'état. Germany stands by its international responsibility within the

> Alliance and the commitments we have made in the interest of our security. Developments within the Alliance are decisive in determining Germany's defense policy (German Ministry of Defense, 2011).

Then minister of defense Thomas de Maizière explained in 2013 that "[t]he main *political* home of Germany is the EU, its *security* home is NATO" (de Maiziere, 2013), (only to add that "[t]his is why we want to *contribute* to promoting France's goodwill towards NATO and the United Kingdom's goodwill towards the EU.") This is echoed in the current government's 2013 Coalition agreement, where the signing parties declare:

> We commit ourselves to NATO and to its new Strategic Concept. The transatlantic Alliance is and remains the core foundation of our security and defense policy in the face of new risks ad threats in a globalized world (Christian democratic union, Christian social union And German socialdemocratic party, 2013).

In the same vein, the government declares to "support" NATO's Smart Defense Initiative and underlines Germany's willingness to contribute as a Framework Nation (i.e. supporting its own proposal, see below). The 2013 coalition agreement nevertheless contains rather little on CSDP and security affairs in general and the institutional setting in particular. The 2011 Defense Policy Guidelines, in turn, are somewhat more explicit:

> The consistent development of Europe's civilian and military capabilities as well as cooperation in the field of technology and industrial policy within the European Union will strengthen Europe politically while also serving our national security interests. Germany coincides with its partners in this respect and will develop bilateral and multilateral initiatives aimed at further progress. Franco-German relations play a pivotal role owing to their special nature, underlined in the Élysée Treaty, and their unique closeness (German Ministry of Defense, 2011).

Finally, the Coalition agreement calls for greater harmonization and complementarity between the European Union and NATO:

> Defense Planning within the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance must be better harmonized. Duplications must be avoided. NATO and EU capabilities must be complementary.[43]

[43] Author's translation in the text: „Die Streitkräfteplanung in Europäischer Union und Nordatlantischer Allianz ist enger aufeinander abzustimmen. Dopplungen sind zu vermeiden. NATO- und EU-Fähigkeiten müssen komplementär zueinander sein." Christian democratic union, Christian social union and German socialdemocratic party, *Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten*, 116.

The German texts do consequently not contain any surprising statements on Europe's security architecture. And even beyond the declaratory level, little innovative thinking is emanating from official Berlin.

Discontent with the current situation is even felt with the governing party, Angela Merkel's CDU. Two of its leading members of the Bundestag on security affairs, Andreas Schockenhoff and Roderich Kiesewetter, published a widely debated paper in 2012 that assesses that

> [t]he EU has until today not managed to create the kind of capacity of action in the field of security policy that would correspond to Europe's economic weight – despite all institutional progress since the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).[44]

The German absence of ambition does, however, not only pertain to the highest institutional level, but also at initiatives within the existing institutional framework. The creation of the EU Battle Group Concept may serve as a perfect illustration. Initially a Franco-British idea, Paris and London were soon joined by Berlin which decided to play a rather active role: "Clearly German policy-makers have looked to shape the Battlegroup Concept politically which coincides with their traditional motor role within the EU" (Chappell, 2009). Yet, Berlin's role consisted mainly of avoiding the African focus envisioned by both France and the United Kingdom, i.e. making Africa the "top priority" for the new Battle Groups (Adams, 2004). Although the Battle Groups are considered to be a political success, they have, in reality, never been deployed to this very day (Major, Mölling, 2010).

Current issues, in turn, receive somewhat greater attention. This first and foremost is valid for the issue of an EU permanent Operational Headquarters, where Germany is still one of the main supporters along with the other four nations that form the Weimar+2 group. Germany also supports the improvement of the Athena mechanism, yet Chancellor Angela Merkel was among the most vociferous opponents of François Hollande's suggestion to include unilateral missions into the funding mechanism – arguing, *inter alia*, that Germany could not participate in the funding of a mission where it did not participate in the decision-making (Stroobants, 2013).[45]

Conclusions: common ground at technical levels, not on visions

As far as institutions are concerned, the Franco-German relationship is characterized by both divergence and convergence, albeit at different levels. France and Germany certainly differ in their

[44] Authors translation in the text: „Der EU ist es bis heute nicht gelungen, sicherheitspolitische Handlungsfähigkeit herzustellen, die dem ökonomischen Gewicht Europas entsprechende Handlungsfähigkeit herzustellen – trotz aller institutionellen Fortschritte seit Einführung der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP) und der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (GSVP)." Schockenhoff A., Kiesewetter R., May 30, 2012, *Europas Sicherheitspolitische Handlungsfähigkeit stärken. Es ist höchste Zeit.* Working Paper, 3.

[45] On *Opération Serval*, the German government was notified 24 hours in advance.

overall ambitions for European defense, yet they usually get along rather well when it comes to technical details within the existing frameworks. France thinks much bigger in terms of the continent's security architecture but has never managed to convince Germany to join it in its efforts, yet the two countries nonetheless share common objectives within the framework of existing NATO and CSDP structures. When it comes to shaping the institutional framework of European defense, the problem, in a Franco-German context, does thus not so much consist of different visions. Rather, France has a vision that Germany does not share. While France continues to dream the dream of the *Europe de la défense,* Germany is utterly status-quo oriented, merely willing to address issues that appear as small technicalities in comparison to the boldest French visions. In this respect, a 2014 report by the French Senate concludes that

> [t]he little German appetence for a true European foreign policy and the development of a common security and defense policy fits with the impression of a Germany that is no longer that interested in deepening the European project.[46]

Whether Germany's (and Angela Merkel's) reluctance is really the expression of a general integration fatigue as the report assumes remains to be seen. A general skepticism toward security matters and French (African) ambitions in fact seem to be equally likely explanations. In any case, the above quotation illustrates the different priorities Paris and Berlin attach to building the *Europe de la défense,* hence resulting in the following summary of the situation: "Germany stays deeply attached to NATO and remains extremely reluctant toward any sort of force projection outside the European territory" (French Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs and Armed Forces, 2013). Yet, France and Germany also declare their willingness to "give a new impetus for the Common Security and Defense Policy. "[47]

The obvious shortcomings of current structures seem to bother Paris much more than Berlin. Moreover, different outlooks on global geostrategy and systemic thinking come back into the picture when discussing Europe's security architecture. The implications of the United States' Pacific Pivot are taken much more seriously in France – or perhaps simply better understood. While the shifts in the global distribution of power and the United States' evolving strategic priorities constitute an – important – variable in the French debate, the changing nature of the transatlantic relationship does not receive quite the same attention in Germany, where the transatlantic relationship is essentially discussed in its purely bilateral dimension, without any systemic implications.[48] It is for this reason that the French currently see a certain window of opportunity for greater European autonomy in security matters, but their frustration at Germany only increases in the face of Berlin's unwillingness to move.

[46] Author's translation in the text: « Le peu d'appétence de l'Allemagne pour une véritable politique étrangère européenne et pour un développement de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune concourt à l'image d'une Allemagne qui ne serait plus aussi intéressée à l'approfondissement du projet européen. », French Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs and Armed Forces, *Pour en finir avec 'l'Europe de la Défense'*, 33.

[47] Author's translation in the text: „einen neuen Anstoß zur Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik geben." Franco-German Defense And Security Council. Erklärung des Rates des Deutsch-französischen Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrats (DFVSR). Press Release, February 19, 2014.

[48] This debate, consequently, is dominated by issues such as TTIP, and especially the NSA revelations.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Franco-German tandem's record is far less impressive in this realm than in other fields of European integration. Projects such as the Franco-German brigade notwithstanding, the real motor in this field have been others. While NATO has always been American-driven, progress in the EU context – if there is any – essentially goes back to Franco-British cooperation. The French impression to plough a lonely furrow as the only *real* proponent of a Europe of Defense is thus not only palpable in writings such as the Védrine Report, but also in conversations with experts and policy-makers. Bold visions therefore seem to have vanished almost entirely from the agenda. In carrying out research interviews in Paris, Berlin and Brussels, it turned out that "pragmatic" seems to be the buzz word of the year. Yet, the problem with pragmatism is that it only ever makes sense in relation to a specific objective. If objectives differ, so must pragmatisms.

The debate on the general future institutional shape of European defense is more dynamic in expert and think tank circles than at official levels. Concrete proposals increasingly target the revival of some sort of "European caucus" within NATO. These ideas are both a response to the expected consequences of the United States' Pacific Pivot and true pragmatism to indeed avoid duplication and investing in EU structures NATO already has. Some analysts hence conclude in a rather outspoken manner that

> [i]t is time to re-think the relationship between CSDP and NATO, which, in practice, has led to sub-optimal performance on the part of both, to dysfunctional practices at both institutional and operational levels, to many crossed political wires, and to much waste of resources and efforts. As long as this continues, neither NATO nor CSDP is likely to achieve its true objectives. (Howorth, 2012)

In reality, however, bold moves on a new European security architecture are simply not on the agenda. At the official levels, despite constant stresses of the importance of closer and better links between NATO and CSDP, major evolutions are unlikely at the time being. Both sides will continue to develop in parallel, with CSDP being the junior partner – or, as one military official put it: with NATO being the sun and CSDP the moon that only shines thanks to the sun. As far as France's return to NATO is concerned, observers argue that more would have been in it for a strengthened "European pillar," based on better Franco-German cooperation. Yet, this has not happened. France and Germany as a couple do not play any major role within the Alliance, where the Quint is the key informal setting. Potential for better coordination would clearly have existed, for instance with respect to Afghanistan. (Clouet, Marchetti, 2011) Preparations for the Alliance's 2014 Wales Summit have been troubled by Russia's annexation of Crimea and other events in Ukraine. For that reason, a number of important debates have not yet taken place, but are due to take place in preparation for the next Summit in 2016. On NATO's post-ISAF future, there should be room for cooperation for France and Germany. Both are highly skeptical toward ideas of making NATO a "global alliance," as notably ideas emanating from the United States foresee. Conversely, both also continue to oppose too narrow a focus on the Ukrainian crisis and its ramifications, including Eastern Allies' calls for permanently stationed troops east of the Oder-Neiße-line contrary to the 1997 NATO Russia Founding Act.

In sum, the big institutional debates are currently not (or no longer) on the agenda. It is thus at the very concrete and technical level that Franco-German agreement is the greatest and the most productive. The current agenda on European defense structures is of course to a large extent set by the results if the 2013 December Council and, in a Franco-German context, by the letter the French respectively German ministers of foreign affairs and defense, sent to Catherine Ashton on July 25, 2013. Although the preparations of this letter have "not always been easy," it constitutes the basis of Franco-Germans efforts in the years to come.[49]

The issues to be addressed include the review of the CSDP's crisis management mechanisms, and notably the question of an EU Operational Headquarters (see above). In this respect, Paris and Berlin's positions have not involved since the 2011 letter to Catherine Ashton by the Weimar-plus countries, asking for the establishment of autonomies planning capacities. Equipping CSDP with a permanent OHQ is thus still a project driven jointly by Paris and Berlin along with the other Weimar-plus countries. Paris and Berlin also seem to be more or less in agreement on bolstering the Athena mechanism on funding CSDP missions. The Franco-German Security and Defense Council thus declared in February 2014 that

> [b]oth countries call upon the member states to be ambitious in improving the ATHENA-mechanism, notably in order to be able to strengthen the EU's capabilities in the fields of rapid reaction as well as counselling and training third countries' armed forces in an ambitious way.[50]

France, in this context, intends to push the issue along with a reform of the EU Battle Groups until the next Summit in 2015, although the issue is not necessarily met with a lot of interest from other member states at this time. Germany is less active but supports most French proposals. The greatest German concern seems to be the issue of common costs: some more items covered by Athena are acceptable to Berlin, but not too many. Hollande's pre-summit proposal thus continues to be inacceptable. France, in turn, supports the German E2I Initiative, although it did not formally sign on to it. According to the Franco-German Security and Defense Council's February 2014 declaration,

> Germany and France notably work toward improving the EU's measures intended to enhance partner countries' and regional organizations' enabling to autonomously cope with crises; this not only involves counselling and training measures, but also equipping the security forces trained by the Europeans, while completely respecting European and internationally valid rules on the control of arms exports.[51]

[49] The letter as well as the Franco-German proposals pertaining to the three "Clusters" the Council dealt with.

[50] Author's translation in the text: „Beide Länder appellieren an die Mitgliedstaaten, den ATHENA-Mechanismus ehrgeizig zu verbessern, insbesondere um die EU-Fähigkeiten in den Bereichen schnelle Reaktion sowie Beratung und Ausbildung der Streitkräfte von Drittstaaten ambitioniert stärken zu können." Franco-German Defense and Security Council, *Erklärung des Rates des Deutsch-französischen Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrats* (DFVSR).

[51] Author's translation in the text: „Deutschland und Frankreich setzen sich insbesondere ein für eine Verbesserung der Maßnahmen der EU zur Stärkung der Befähigung von Partnerländern und

In this context, France is yet very skeptical of the idea that E2I should serve as a clearing house for arms exports, as the German proposal foresees, based on doubts that relevant information would truly be shared. The creation of a financial instrument, in turn, is met with much greater interest in Paris – while Berlin is not exactly convinced.

Regionalorganisationen zur eigenständigen Bewältigung von Krisen; dabei geht es nicht nur um Beratungs- und Ausbildungsmaßnahmen, sondern auch um die Ausrüstung der von den Europäern ausgebildeten Sicherheitskräfte unter voller Beachtung der europäischen und international gültigen Regeln zur Kontrolle von Rüstungsexporten." Franco-German Defense and Security Council. *Erklärung des Rates des Deutsch-französischen Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrats* (DFVSR*). Erklärung des Rates des Deutsch-französischen Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrats* (DFVSR).

MAKING USE OF MILITARY INSTRUMENTS: DECIDING ON AND IMPLEMENTING MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

Introduction: The difficulties to establish Europe as a global actor

Setting up an institutional framework is one thing, using it is another. This chapter will therefore deal with the concrete expression of European cooperation on crisis management, that is, military interventions. Such interventions are carried out by both NATO and the European Union through its Common Security and Defense Policy. For many, CSDP is primarily defined in terms of the missions undertaken. With considerable amount of CSDP and NATO missions of different size and scope launched since the end of the Cold War, France and Germany have a number of cases to look back upon. Not all of these cases have unfolded to each other's satisfaction. In fact, cerain of issues have caused more or less severe rifts between Paris and Berlin, and sometimes even other allies. Causes lie at various levels: from unwillingness to at all take action to the speed of decision making or action on the ground during a mission – if a mission at all takes place with everybody on board, and if everybody is involved in the decision-making process.

A certain mutual discomfort with each other's ideas and projects for interventions abroad is nothing new to the Franco-German relationship. Once there was, however, a tool like the EU Battle Groups, this discomfort logically engendered deeper consequences. Decisions pertaining to their non-use in, for instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006 or Chad/the Central African Republic in 2008 have caused intense debates. These cases indeed seemed to be the very scenarios for which the Battle Groups had been designed: temporary and in a UN-context. Although their use was proposed, the Battle Groups eventually stayed at home. Until today, the Battle Groups have in fact never been used, despite several occasions to do so.

Some years later, the case of the intervention in Libya is widely considered to be some sort of turning point – in political terms as well as in terms of capabilities. In a Franco-German context in particular, the ramifications of Germany's abstention in the United Nations Security Council vote on Resolution 1973 (establishing a no-fly zone) and its subsequent non-participation in the mission continue to be felt today (although, it may be worth adding, the German ambassador contributed to the required unanimous vote in the North Atlantic Council). It provoked an outcry even within Germany, where for instance the former foreign minister of the Green party, Joschka Fischer, called the decision a scandalous mistake, complaining that "German politics has lost its credibility within the United Nations and in the Middle East."[52]

[52] Author's translation in the text: „Die deutsche Politik hat in den Vereinten Nationen und im Nahen Osten ihre Glaubwürdigkeit eingebüßt". Fischer J., „Deutsche Außenpolitik – eine Farce", *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, March 24, 2011. For a general comment including outside perspectives, see Guérot U., and Leonard M., April 2011, "The New German Question: How Europe Can Get the Germany it Needs", European Council on Foreign Relations.

Germany's reputation as a reliable ally has suffered in consequence. And while many – including politicians – are aware of this, there is currently no consensus on what needs to be done about it. The establishment of the so-called Rühe-Commission may be a first step toward addressing the matter (see below), yet the question remains utterly delicate.

When it comes to the use of military force abroad, France and Germany have essentially different prerequisites. These not only stem from different strategic cultures, interests and priorities as outlined above, but also from different political systems and different constitutional provisions. The room for maneuver enjoyed by the French president in this respect is unthinkable for a German chancellor, who will need the *Bundestag*'s consent for each and every deployment of the *Bundeswehr*. Against the backdrop of a general public that is much less incline to support anything related to the security, a military mission's price tag in terms of political capital is thus much bigger in Germany than it is in France. Conveying this message to Paris is not always an easy task, while France's global ambitions are not automatically understood and approved of in Berlin.

Given that it would be beyond the scope of the present study to discuss each and every mission so far carried out within the framework of CSDP or NATO, the following pages will instead focus on selected cases that have been of particular relevance for the topic at hand.[53] Much of the argument will therefore be based on EUFOR RD Congo, the interventions in Mali as well as Operation Unified Protector in Libya, i.e. those missions that have caused a great deal of debate between France and Germany.

France: power projection as a matter of course

The "whether" of French military interventions is not at stake, it is the "when" and "how" that is at the center of the attention. In this vein, the 2013 French White Paper identifies three objectives for military interventions abroad:

> External intervention responds to a triple objective: ensuring the protection of French nationals abroad; defending our strategic interests and those of our partners and allies and exercising our international responsibilities. It gives the crucial strategic depth to France's security stance, whether this means preventing exacerbation of a crisis or putting an end to a situation of open conflict that might endanger our security interests (French Ministry of Defense, 2013).

[53] For a detailed discussion of these missions, see e.g. French National Assembly, April 9, 2013, Commission des affaires européennes, *Rapport d'information n° 911 sur la relance de l'Europe de la défense*; Asseburg M., and Kempin R., (eds.), December 2009, *Die EU als strategischer Akteur in der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik? Eine systematische Bestandsaufnahme von ESVP-Missionen und -Operationen*, SWP Studie S32, Berlin. See also Major C., and Mölling C., SWP *EU-Battlegroups. Bilanz und Optionen zur Weiterentwicklung europäischer Krisenreaktionskräfte.*

In the Fifth Republic, the President enjoys a wide range of competences. He is Commander in Chief of the armed forces (article 15 of the French Constitution) and foreign, security and defense policy are his "*domaine reservé.*" The French army is an *armée exécutive*; the President can single-handedly decide on French military interventions. The Parliament needs to consent to prolonging the intervention within four months after the initial decision was taken. Change of these constitutional provisions is not in sight. During the 2012 presidential campaign, then Socialist candidate Francois Hollande talked about greater involvement for the *Assemblée Nationale*. Nothing of this has yet materialized, guaranteeing the French President room for maneuver that continues to exceed that of most of his foreign counterparts by far.

In a recent report by the French Senate, this constitutional setting is considered an advantage. Under the headline *Les avantages du processus décisionnel politique français* ("The advantages of the French decision making process"), the authors thus conclude that, contrary to countries in which parliamentary procedures hamper quick decision-making – such as, of course, Germany – France is better off:

> Auditions of ambassadors and defense attachés from allied countries, and notably of Ms. Wasum-Reiner, ambassador of Germany, have allowed to show the advantages of the French decision making process under the Fifth Republic in the case of engaging the armed forces abroad.[54]

In CSDP, and to a lesser extent also within NATO, France is widely seen as the driving force behind military intervention for crisis management. Many missions have thus been initiated by Paris, such as EUFOR RD Congo, EUFOR Chad/RCA or Unified Protector in Libya. While this may, on the one hand, be seen as extraordinary engagement for European security, more skeptical voices prevail. On the decision to give NATO a prominent role in the mission in Libya (although France was confident in its ability to lead the operation outside the Alliance), one observer thus notes:

> Well, NATO has more experience and capabilities in this field. But this is in fact as much about the role and position of France within NATO as well as within the EU and CSDP. At the moment, Paris is again playing Solitaire, trying to win over other for its objectives. […]. On the other hand, however, France does not want to be an ally like others and leave the primary responsibility to NATO, but is trying to instrumentalize the EU in this case. The majority of member states, in turn, want to again contain France. Moreover, a decision for NATO guarantees that the Americans are on board.[55]

[54] Author's translation in the text: « Les auditions d'ambassadeurs et d'attachés de défense de pays alliés, et notamment de celle de Mme Wasum-Reiner, ambassadeur d'Allemagne, ont permis de mettre en évidence les avantages du processus décisionnel français sous la Ve république en cas d'engagement des forces armées à l'extérieur. » French National Assembly, July 18, 2013, Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées. Rapport d'information n° 1288 sur l'opération Serval au Mali. Paris, 34/35.

[55] Author's translation in the text: „Nun, die NATO hat hier mehr Erfahrung und Kapazitäten. Aber es geht hier tatsächlich genauso um die Rolle und Position Frankreichs in der NATO sowie in der EU und der GSVP. Paris gibt derzeit wieder den Solitaire, der andere für seine Ziele gewinnen will. […] Andererseits aber will Frankreich sich

Unsurprisingly, French voices sound somewhat differently, underlining that "[t]he majority of CSDP missions […] have taken place in a holistic approach toward conflict prevention."[56] Within this context, France had initially and repeatedly pushed for the use of multilateral capabilities. A French Parliamentary report thus regrets the non-use of the Eurocorps and, even more so, the Franco-German Brigade, notably in Mali. Although the political will has, on different occasions, lacked on both sides, the report clearly identifies the Germans as responsible in the case of Mali:

> Yet again, political willingness was cruelly absent, which is, according to your Rapporteurs, even more regrettable since the 50th anniversary of the Élysée Treaty between France and Germany was celebrated at the end of January 2013.[57]

On Mali, Paris' incomprehension toward partners' attitudes is even greater, since French efforts to rally support for a mission took place two months after a Weimar-plus Declaration was published in which the five countries explicitly wrote that they

> encourage [their] partners to increase their efforts with respect to their efforts on favor of finding a political solution to the Malian crisis, as well as to contribute to a possible training mission in support of the Malian armed forces.[58]

As far as EUTM Mali, but also *Serval*, is concerned, the report concludes, "it needs to be noted that for *Opération Serval* as much as for EUTM Mali, European solidarity has not expressed itself under satisfactory conditions."[59] Although "softer" in nature than *Serval* because it is no combat mission, even EUTM Mali was difficult to mount, with enormous difficulties to generate the forces required. Paris thus specifically wondered why neither the Franco-German Brigade nor the Weimar Battle

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nicht eingliedern und die primäre Verantwortung der NATO überlassen, sondern versucht hier die EU zu instrumentalisieren. Die Mehrheit der Mitgliedstaaten dagegen möchte Frankreich wieder einhegen. Außerdem garantiert eine Entscheidung für die NATO, dass die Amerikaner mit an Bord sind." Kempin R., „Die meisten EU-Mitglieder wollen Frankreich wieder einhegen", SWP Kurz Gesagt, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, March 23, 2011.

[56] Author's translation in the text: "La majorité des missions PSDC […] s'inscrivent dans une approche globale de prévention des conflits." French National Assembly, Commission des affaires européennes, *Rapport d'information n° 911 sur la relance de l'Europe de la défense*, 12.

[57] Author's translation in the text: « Là encore, la volonté politique a fait cruellement défaut, ce qui est, selon vos Rapporteurs, d'autant plus regrettable que le 50e anniversaire du Traité de l'Élysée entre la France et l'Allemagne a été célébré fin janvier 2013 ». French National Assembly, Commission des affaires européennes, *Rapport d'information n° 911 sur la relance de l'Europe de la défense*, 29.

[58] Author's translation in the text: « Nous encourageons nos partenaires à accroître leurs efforts en faveur d'un règlement d'une solution politique à la crise malienne, ainsi qu'à contribuer à une éventuelle mission de formation en soutien aux forces armées maliennes. », French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Ministry of Defense, German Ministry of Defense, Polish Ministry of Defense, *Letter to Ms Catherine Ashton*, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

[59] Author's translation in the text: « force est de constater que, pour l'opération Serval comme pour la mission de formation EUTM Mali, la solidarité européenne ne s'est pas exprimée dans des conditions satisfaisantes. » French National Assembly, Commission des affaires européennes, *Rapport d'information n° 911 sur la relance de l'Europe de la défense*, 32.

Group (in stand-by at the time) were deployed. This seems even harder to understand given that, in light of the fact that, contrary to e.g. Libya, Syria or Palestine, the political factor should have weighed much less in the Malian case. The report's authors thus ask:

> What is the purpose of the European Union's having very well trained, projectable and interoperational bi- or multinational corps at its disposal if it is still unable to deploy them, for the sake of constitutional settings that prevent them from being sent to theaters?[60]

In line with its strategic ambitions, France has in the past carried out missions on its own, most recently the *Serval* and *Sangaris* operations in Mali respectively the Central African Republic. *Opération Serval* did not take place within an EU (or NATO framework) as France had initially wanted, because the EU, at this point, proved unable to act quickly enough, in addition to the general lack of political support deplored by Paris. As the *Assemblée Nationale'*s report contends:

> According to the answers provided by the Ministry of Defense to the questions your rapporteurs have asked, the 'Crisis Management Concept' developed by the EEAS' planning and crisis management unit was accepted by the member states, on December 10, 2012, only after several options of engagement of the European Union in Mali were presented and 'after multiple German blockades on the text'.[61]

The French stock-taking on Mali and its allies' support (which existed, although to very limited extent) thus comes to the conclusion that this is "somewhat bitter", given that – at least from Paris' perspective – Mali was the exact situation Europeans had the ambition to deal with within the framework of CSDP – and once more, proved unable to.[62]

The Malian case perfectly illustrates a general French sentiment of being left alone when things really matter. Paris' partners are perceived as hesitant, and often also as lacking solidarity. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the French Parliament's commission on Defense and Armed Forces concludes that "for combat missions under urgent conditions, national intervention remains more efficient than

[60] Author's translation in the text: « À quoi sert-il que l'Union européenne ait à sa disposition des corps bi ou multinationaux très bien entraînés, projetables, interopérables si elle reste toujours dans l'impossibilité de les déployer, au nom du respect de dispositions constitutionnelles qui font obstacle à leur envoi sur le terrain ? ». French National Assembly, *Rapport d'information n° 911 sur la relance de l'Europe de la défense*, 32.

[61] Author's translation in the text: "Ainsi, selon les réponses fournies par le ministère de la Défense aux questions adressées par vos rapporteurs, le 'concept de gestion de crise' développé par la Direction de la planification et de la gestion des crises du SEAE n'a été validé par les États membres, le 10 décembre 2012, qu'après la présentation de plusieurs options d'engagement de l'Union européenne au Mali et 'après de multiples blocages allemands sur le texte'." French National Assembly, Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, *Rapport d'information n° 1288 sur l'opération Serval au Mali*, 86/87.

[62] Author's translation in the text: "Cependant le bilan reste un peu amer." French National Assembly, Commission des affaires européennes, *Rapport d'information n° 911 sur la relance de l'Europe de la défense*, 32.

European intervention."[63] In the specific case of Mali, according to the report, this was due to the need for consensus among nations who do not necessarily share France's strategic interests in the Sahel region, the high number of intermediate decisions that need to be taken in the planning process, but also to the fact not all states are able to react as quickly as France for constitutional reasons, caveats and finally interoperability issues (French National Assembly, Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, 2013).

The Commission on Defense and Armed Forces however also sees glimpses of hope. Based e.g. on the support *Serval* received from other nations[64], it concludes that "this concrete mutualization of European means, on the basis of voluntariness, shows that a pragmatic Europe of security and defense is anything but out of reach."[65] Whether Paris really counts on Berlin in that context is another question.

Germany: afraid of "African adventures"

To state that, when it comes to launching military operations, Germany is never on the forefront, is a common place. Rather, German engagement tends to be the result of pressure exerted by its allies, and generally at the lowest intensity level possible. In recent years, Berlin has participated in a number of missions and stayed outside others. As a number of recent examples hence illustrate, Germany is extremely reluctant to actually use military force. This is anything but a new insight – yet, in light of a potentially developing European defense policy, it is increasingly seen as a problem. Issues raised by Germany's friends and allies first and foremost concern Berlin's reliability as a partner.

In a German context, the question of military intervention in fact covers two different aspects when decisions are to be taken. Firstly, absent a pre-formulated National Security Strategy, the country has to take the debate on its strategic interests from scratch each and every time the option of German participation in a CSDP or NATO mission arises. Secondly, the questions pertain to the process that leads to the actual decision to get engaged, and notably the parliament's consent without which no Bundeswehr soldier can be sent anywhere. Unlike in France, therefore, numerous actors beyond the military and the executive are involved, first and foremost the members of the German *Bundestag* and its Defense Committee.

[63] Author's translation in the text: "pour des missions de combat en conditions d'urgence, l'intervention nationale reste plus efficace que l'intervention européenne." French National Assembly, Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, *Rapport d'information n° 1288 sur l'opération Serval au Mali*, 84.

[64] Ten nations e.g. provided logistical support with air transportation or medical evacuation – including Germany. Berlin yet excluded the deployment of combat troops. Among all supporting nations, Germany contributed the highest number of flights.

[65] Author's translation in the text: "Cette mutualisation concrète des moyens européens, sur la base du volontariat, démontre qu'une Europe pragmatique de la sécurité et de la défense n'est nullement hors d'atteinte." French National Assembly, Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, *Rapport d'information n° 1288 sur l'opération Serval au Mali*, 63.

As a matter of principle, *Bundeswehr* deployments need to take place in a multilateral setting, since, in the words of the 2011 Defense Policy Guidelines, "[a]s a general rule, Bundeswehr missions abroad are planned and conducted in cooperation with allies and partners within the UN, NATO and the EU" (while evacuation and rescue operations are "generally a matter of national responsibility") (German Ministry of Defense, 2011). Rather than stressing the military aspect, German governments especially like to emphasize the civilian dimension, in line with the German pet notion of networked security ("*vernetzte Sicherheit*"). In their 2013 Coalition agreement, the government parties for example state that

> [t]he European Union more than ever needs a strategic debate on what it can and intends to achieve with primarily civilian means or potentially military interventions. The European Union and its member states can provide valuable help in building-up democracy, the rule of law and performant administrations in third countries. This especially applies to the fields of police and justice. We work toward further connecting the civilian and military instruments of the European Union and improving Europe's civilian and military capacities for crisis prevention and conflict settlement. Defense Planning within the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance must be better harmonized. Duplications must be avoided. NATO and EU capabilities must be complementary.[66]

Sometimes military intervention is nevertheless unavoidable. First experiences with EU military operations, however, have not necessarily been positive from a German perspective. EUFOR Congo, in 2006, has entered the German debate on military intervention as something like a traumatic experience. It adds to mitigated feelings with respect to Germany's participation in ISAF in Afghanistan, where it took several years until the first defense minister in charge – Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg – called the operation by its name and said what it actually was: a war. EUFOR Congo was widely perceived as exactly the kind of "African adventure" the Germans do not want to be dragged into. When the EU received a formal request by U.N. Under-Secretary General for Peace-Keeping Jean-Pierre Guéhenno in late December 2005 for a CSDP operation in Congo in order to ensure that the planned elections can take place under good circumstances, the German government was everything but enthusiastic about intervening in the country. The fact that Guéhenno is a French national already seemed suspicious to some, well aware of France's special interests in Africa. Yet, Berlin did eventually not manage to avert both the intervention and its own engagement:

> Some states declared very early on that they would not want to participate, which meant that the federal government got under pressure because it had – like some other

[66] Author's translation in the text: "Die Europäische Union braucht mehr denn je eine strategische Diskussion, was sie mit vorrangig zivilen Mitteln teln oder gegebenenfalls auch militärischen Einsätzen erreichen kann und will. Die Europäische Union und ihre Mitgliedstaaten können wertvolle Hilfe beim Aufbau von Demokratie, rechtsstaatlichen Systemen und einer leistungsfähigen Verwaltung in Drittländern leisten. Das gilt insbesondere für die Bereiche der Polizei und Justiz. Wir setzen uns dafür ein, die zivilen und militärischen Instrumente der Europäischen Union weiter miteinander zu verknüpfen und Europas zivile sowie militärische Fähigkeiten zur Krisenprävention und Konfliktbeilegung zu verbessern.", Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union and German Socialdemocratic Party, *Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten*, 116.

> states – missed it to declare its non-participation in time, while Germany was considered to be one of the few states with the capacity to lead the operation. [67]

With the UK opting out right from the beginning and the French arguing that they already had assumed the lead in Operation Artemis in Congo in 2003, there were only the UK, Italy and SHAPE left with the required capacity. In the event, Germany ended up with the lead of the operation, with German general Karlheinz Viereck as Operations Commander and the *Einsatzführungskommando* in Potsdam leading the operation:

> The decision at government level was eventually taken at the Franco-German Summit on 14 March 2006, where the French President declared his readiness to send a contingent of a comparable size to the Germans [roughly one third of all troops each]. In this situation, the federal government – despite all concerns – saw no possibility to elude leadership of the operation.[68]

Many German accounts of EUFOR Congo and the politics behind it thus boil down to the German's having somehow been cornered by the other Europeans and especially the French. As Peter Schmidt contends, the criteria in the decision-making process were not so much German interests in Africa, but rather an interest in EU decisions' credibility and solidarity vis-à-vis France (Schmidt, 2006). Criticism even arose from within the armed forces, based on doubts on Germany's interests in Congo and severe concerns about the armed forces' preparedness to intervene in Africa. In a newspaper interview, the then president of the German Armed Forces' Association (*Bundeswehrverband*) thus concluded that the federal government's decision was primarily to be seen as a concession to the French government:

> For the *Bundeswehrverband*'s president Gertz, the intervention is primarily a concession to the French government. 'We let ourselves be roped in for the special interests of third countries and now have to pull the chestnuts out of a fire others have ignited,' Gertz argued in a conversation with this newspaper, noting the historical ties between Germany's neighbors France and Belgium to Congo. 'It is planned to secure an election with 1,700 soldiers, while 17,000 UN-soldiers are already in the country,' the

[67] Author's translation in the text: „Einige Staaten erklärten frühzeitig, dass sie sich nicht beteiligen wollten, wodurch die Bundesregierung unter Entscheidungsdruck geriet, weil sie es – wie auch einige andere Staaten – verpasst hatte, rechtzeitig eine Nichtbeteiligung zu deklarieren und Deutschland als einer der wenigen Staaten galt mit der Kapazität, die Operation zu führen." Schmidt P., 2006, „Freiwillige vor!. Führungsrolle wider Willen: die Bundeswehr und ihr Einsatz im Kongo", *Internationale Politik*, 70.

[68] Author's translation in the text: „Die Entscheidung auf Regierungsebene wurde letztlich auf dem deutsch-französischen Gipfeltreffen am 14. März 2006 getroffen, auf dem sich der französische Staatspräsident bereit erklärte, ein ähnlich großes Kontingent zu stellen wie die Deutschen. In dieser Situation sah sich die Bundesregierung – aller Bedenken zum Trotz – außerstande, sich der Führung der Operation zu entziehen." Schmidt, P., 2006, *Freiwillige vor!. Führungsrolle wider Willen: die Bundeswehr und ihr Einsatz im Kongo*, 70.

> *Bundeswehrverband*'s president says, warning against putting the lives of German soldiers at risk for a symbolic contribution.[69]

The lack of political accountability on the EU institutions' part – as compared to national ministers of defense and in this case the German minister – also had implications in cases such as EUFOR RD Congo. Given that it is the German parliament that decides on the terms of German military interventions, military considerations have not played the key role in defining the German armed forces' mandate. As a consequence, it was not always best suited to achieve the predefined objectives. Germany had indeed insisted on five criteria to be met, including limitations both in time and geographical scope. The final adoption of the Bundeswehr's mandate resulted in heated debates.[70]

As a consequence of its "bad experience," Germany refused to participate in EUFOR Chad/RCA shortly thereafter, openly opposing the French-proposed mission.[71] Berlin nevertheless made the symbolic move to send four officers to the OHQ in Mont Valérien, yet without necessarily achieving the desired effect in Paris. Since then, Berlin has participated in a number of EU operations, although not always meetings its allies' expectations toward the German contribution. Recounting them all beyond the scope of this report, and numerous academic papers and articles have already been published on the matter.[72]

Germany's allies' frustration over what is perceived as a lack of German support is in fact palpable in numerous sources and at various levels of detail. Reproaches always boil down to Germany's leaving the "dirty work" to others, be it in existing missions such as in Afghanistan (where the Germans stayed in the North, long considered "safer" than the South) or by simply staying away, such as in Libya in 2011. In this context, the German insistence on connected security and civilian crisis

[69] Author's translation in the text: „Für Bundeswehrverbandschef Gertz ist der Einsatz in erster Linie ein politisches Zugeständnis an die französische Regierung. „Wir lassen uns für die speziellen Interessen Dritter einspannen und müssen jetzt die Kastanien aus dem Feuer holen, das andere angezündet haben", verwies Gertz im Gespräch mit dieser Zeitung auf die engen, historisch begründeten Verbindungen der deutschen Nachbarn Frankreich und Belgien in den Kongo. „Hier soll mit 1700 Soldaten eine Wahl gesichert werden, während bereits 17 000 UN-Blauhelme im Land sind", warnt der Vorsitzende des Bundeswehrverbandes davor, für einen „symbolischen Beitrag", das Leben deutscher Soldaten aufs Spiel zu setzen." Herholz A., May 18, 2006, „Heftiger Streit um Abenteuer in Afrika. Scharfe Kritik von Bundeswehrverband und FDP – Mehrheit im Bundestag wohl sicher", *Nordwest-Zeitung Online*.

[70] For a discussion of EUFOR RD Congo in the context of German strategic culture, see Becker S., 2014, "Germany and War. Understanding Strategic Culture under the Merkel Government", IRSEM, *Paris Paper n° 9*, 36.

[71] On EUFOR Chad/RCA, see Berg P., "EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Die EU als Agent französischer Interessen", in Asseburg M., and Kempin R., (eds.), *Die EU als strategischer Akteur in der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik? Eine systematische Bestandsaufnahme von ESVP-Missionen und –Operationen*, 62-76.

[72] Again, see especially French National Assembly, Commission des affaires européennes. *Rapport d'information n° 911 sur la relance de l'Europe de la défense*. Asseburg M., and Kempin R., (eds.), *Die EU als strategischer Akteur in der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik?*. See also: Schmitt O., Strategic Users of Culture: German Decisions for Military Action, *Contemporary Security Policy* 33 (1), 59-81; Noetzel T., 2011, "The German politics of war: Kunduz and the war in Afghanistan", *International Affairs* 87(2), 397-417; Miskimmon A., 2012, "German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis", *German Politics* 21(4), 392-410.

management is often perceived as a pretext not to get engaged in missions that have the potential to truly hurt.

This was again particularly visible in the context of the 2011 intervention in Libya in order to enforce Resolution 1973. The core argument in foreign minister Guido Westerwelle's justification of Germany's non-participation in Unified Protector in 2011 was thus the risk of civilian casualties.[73] Berlin feared to again be dragged into a military intervention it did not want, and it was again wary of the French engagement on the matter (which, moreover, was not coordinated with Germany). The tone notably between the two "friends" France and Germany became rough. When a humanitarian EU Mission, EUFOR Libya, was debated, then French minister of defense Gérard Longuet said that he

> [w]as however glad to see that 'those big European nations who had not joined us at the beginning of the coalition are now beginning to understand to what extent it is necessary for them to catch up.' 'Germany will resolutely participate in the humanitarian initiative announced by the European Union, which is basically an oral re-examination [after previous failure]' he continued.[74]

EUFOR Libya was meant to have a humanitarian purpose, on the lower end of the intensity specter, limited in scope and time – and hence much more to the German public's and decision-makers' taste than the Unified Protector combat mission. It eventually never took place in practice (all that ever happened was the establishment of an OHQ in Rome and some planning for potential deployments – which would not have been possible without the establishment of the OHQ, given the EU's lack of planning capacities). To this day, "Libya" remains one of the code words for Germany's reluctance to engage in military intervention as well as – from its critics' perspective – Berlin's lack of reliability and solidarity.

Another example in this vein are statements to be found in a French National Assembly report, on the topic of the military hospital the Germans deployed exclusively for the benefit of the EU Training Mission in Mali which ran in parallel with the French *Opération Serval*:

> But numerous observers have deplored the slowness with which other countries, such as Germany, took the decision to provide logistic support for Operation Serval. By the way, General de Rousiers has told your rapporteurs that he could observe suspicion with

[73] On September 4, 2009, a German colonel called for airstrikes against two fuel tankers captured by Taliban. More than one hundred civilians lost their lives, and political ramifications in Germany were considerable.

[74] Author's translation in the text: "s'est cependant réjoui que 'celles des grandes nations européennes qui ne nous ont pas rejoint au début de la coalition sont en train de mesurer combien il serait nécessaire de rattraper leur retard'. 'L'Allemagne participera résolument à l'initiative humanitaire annoncée par l'Union européenne et qui est au fond l'oral de rattrapage', a-t-il poursuivi.", April 12, 2011, « Libye : La France se sent seule », *Le Figaro*.

> respect to France's intentions within the framework of its intervention in Mali with some of the military representatives of the EU member states.[75]

On more concrete terms, the report evokes the issue of a field hospital deployed by the Germans, to which the French were not granted access:

> If it is of anecdotic nature to note that one member states has provided its soldiers with two portable sauna equipment, the situation of the military hospital, 'role 2' in NATO's classification, that the Germans installed in Koulikoro is more serious. This hospital indeed mobilizes considerable means – almost sixty personnel, including 9 doctors – for relatively little activity given that it is not open to the local population and that it cooperates only very little with the sanitary support element of the Serval forces, yet less well equipped and frequented more. […] While views on the expedience of widely opening-up military sanitary installations for civil populations are still divided, it could have been possible, at least, to better coordinate this European capacity with the sanitary support capacities of Serval, which were anything but overdesigned.[76]

Most German decision-makers are of course aware of these reproaches, and some even share them. Yet, the political price tag of deploying the *Bundeswehr* is high, and ethical considerations dominate the public debate surrounding them. In this context, and absent clearly defined German strategic interests, conflicts with allies, including France, often seem like the lesser evil.

The challenge, however, does not only concern Germany's active participation in and contribution to EU and NATO missions. The question in fact also pertains to the usability of German assets included in integrated structures in case the structures are needed for missions in which Germany does not participate. The latter issue has indeed the potential to hamper more serious attempts at pooling and especially sharing, including the implementation of the German-proposed Framework Nation

[75] Author's translation in the text: "Mais nombre d'observateurs ont pu regretter la lenteur avec laquelle d'autres pays, comme l'Allemagne, ont pris la décision d'apporter un appui logistique à l'opération Serval. Le général de Rousiers a d'ailleurs confié à vos rapporteurs qu'il avait pu percevoir chez certains des responsables militaires des États membres de l'Union des suspicions sur les intentions de la France dans le cadre de son intervention au Mali.", French National Assembly, Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, *Rapport d'information n° 1288 sur l'opération Serval au Mali*, 85.

[76] Author's translation in the text: "S'il est anecdotique de remarquer qu'un État membre a équipé ses militaires de deux équipements portatifs de sauna, plus sérieuse est la situation de l'hôpital militaire installé par les Allemands à Koulikoro, correspondant à un 'rôle 2' dans la classification de l'OTAN. Celui-ci mobilise en effet des moyens très importants – près de soixante personnels, dont neuf médecins – pour une activité d'autant plus faible qu'il n'est pas ouvert aux populations locales et qu'il coopère très peu avec les éléments de soutien sanitaire des forces de Serval, pourtant moins bien dotés et plus sollicités. […] Si les avis sont toujours partagés sur l'opportunité d'ouvrir largement les installations sanitaires militaires aux populations civiles, on aurait pu, à tout le moins, faire en sorte de mieux coordonner cette capacité européenne avec les capacités de soutien sanitaire de l'opération Serval, qui étaient loin d'être surdimensionnées.", French National Assembly, Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, *Rapport d'information n° 1288 sur l'opération Serval au Mali*, 88. "Role 2" refers to the type of hospital in NATO jargon.

Concept NATO adopted at its 2014 Summit in Wales or multinational assets such as AWACS or the European Air Transport Command. This continues to be an unresolved issue, which is, nevertheless, dealt with within the context of the Rühe Commission.

Besides the often invoked historical dimension behind this strategic culture of restraint, there are today very tangible legal reasons that prevent assertive German military interventionism (which are, of course, directly linked to the historical dimension): any intervention of the German armed forces requires the *Bundestag*'s consent.[77] A key role, in this context, is played by the *Bundestag*'s Defense Commission, which (unlike other parliamentary Commissions that essentially debate legislative bills) considers the control of the Federal Ministry of Defense and the Bundeswehr to be its primary task (German Bundestag, Defense Committee, 2013). The current regulations, i.e. the so-called parliamentary reserve or *Parlamentsvorbehalt*, have been confirmed by the German Constitutional Court on a number of occasions.[78] It thus constitutes a legal and political obstacle to Germany's making active use of the *Bundeswehr* abroad and participating in military operations. Unilateral decisions to deploy German forces are excluded, in line with the German prerequisite of multilateralism. Although its proponents rightly argue that, so far, parliament has never rejected any mandate for a military mission, critics retort that the government only presents the *Bundestag* with proposals it knows will pass. That said, there are today no voices who seriously suggest to abandon the parliamentary reserve and to move toward executive decision-making. Rendering mission mandates "*bundestagssicher*" – "*Bundestag* proof" – by finding consensus across all relevant parties (from German political parties to Brussels) in the run-up to voting procedures is consequently a huge task on those officials' plate who are in charge of writing the proposal. Very importantly indeed, the *Bundestag* must not only give its consent on a yes-or-no basis, but actually provide the Bundestag with a detailed mandate that also contains provisions on how the *Bundeswehr* is to intervene, including technical aspects such as the number of troops and their equipment. In short, the question of German military interventions is thus not only of political nature, as it also has a legal component at constitutional level. Mandates eventually presented to the parliament are thus in a shape the majority can live with, not always to everybody's delight. Representatives of the German Armed Forces indeed complain that the parliament's Defense Committee interferes with matters that should in fact be left to military planning, such as purely technical issues.[79]

While most people are aware of the parliamentary reserve's implications and the challenges it may pose in a transnational setting, the necessity to change it is far from making unanimity. Broadly speaking, the notion of a "*Parlamentsarmee*" – the parliament's army – is widely accepted and

[77] For a more detailed introduction to the matter, see Drent M., March 2014, "Sovereignty, parliamentary involvement and European defence cooperation", *Clingendael Report,* The Hague.

[78] Most recently so in 2008 in a widely debated ruling on Germany's participation in the use of AWACS aircraft over Turkey in 2003. The red-green government under Chancellor Schröder had back then not sought parliamentary agreement, arguing that German participation in AWACS flights was part of routine operations within NATO. Called upon by the liberal group in the Bundestag – where the liberal party was in the opposition at the time – the Constitutional Court strengthened the parliamentary reserve, arguing that the *Bundestag*'s consent is required under all circumstances in which there is a possibility for German military personnel to be involved in armed conflict. See German Constitutional Court. BVerfG, 2 BvE 1/03 vom 7.5.2008, Absatz-Nr. (1-92).

[79] EUFOR RD Congo is again a good illustration of this point.

supported. Debates on the parliament's involvement in military decisions thus mainly concern the *how*, rather than the *if*: abolishing it altogether is not on the agenda. In the spring of 2014, the Bundestag implemented a Commission – headed by former Member of Parliament and minister of defense Volker Rühe (Christian Democrats) – that is tasked to

> […] investigate how the rights of the Parliament can be secured on the path of increasing Alliance integration and in spite of the diversification of tasks. The Commission's aim is to investigate, in legal and political terms, the respective need for action to adapt the Law on Parliamentary participation. Building [on its investigation], the Commission should formulate options, if possible in consensus, that could potentially result in a formal law-making procedure. [80]

The Commission counts twelve members and is composed of representatives from the government parties (i.e. the Christian Democrats as well as the Social Democrats) and a number of external experts. The two opposition parties within the *Bundestag* – the Left Party (*Die Linke*) and the Greens (*Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*) – refused to take part in that Commission, out of fear that its results would be predetermined anyway and not in favor of keeping up strong parliamentary control (*Spiegel Online*, 2014)/ Its final report is due in late June 2015, but spectacular changes in Germany's legal framework are hardly to be expected.

Pushes for a review of the parliamentary reserve have indeed emanated from the conservative party, whereas the Social Democrats are at best divided on the issue. Concrete ideas were most explicitly spelled-out in the 2012 Schockenhoff/Kiesewetter-Paper, where its authors – two leading conservative members of the *Bundestag*[81] and a number of associated experts – argued that

> strengthening the capacity to act in security policy can only work if the member states in part renounce their national sovereignty. An effective CSDP will have pooled the individual states' military capabilities and put them under a joint command to such a large extent that it will no longer be possible to impose national caveats as single opinions. German soldiers could thus take part in an EU mission that would not have been decided by the German government and the German *Bundestag* by its own initiative. In return for this renouncement of sovereignty, Germany – like all EU member states – would, however, gain more capacity of action in foreign and security policy as well as a more effective and affordable set of instruments. […] This renouncement of

[80] Authors's translation in the text: „… zu prüfen, wie auf dem Weg fortschreitender Bündnisintegration und trotz Auffächerung von Aufgaben die Parlamentsrechte gesichert werden können. Ziel der Kommission soll die rechtliche und politische Prüfung eines entsprechenden Handlungsbedarfes zur Anpassung des Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetzes sein. Die Kommission soll darauf aufbauend Handlungsoptionen möglichst im Konsens formulieren, die gegebenenfalls in ein förmliches Gesetzgebungsverfahren eingebracht werden können". See German Bundestage, Antrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD. Einsetzung einer „Kommission zur Überprüfung und Sicherung der Parlamentsrechte bei der Mandatierung von Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr", March 11, 2014, Drucksache 18/766.

[81] Andreas Schockenhoff passed away in December 2014, Germany thus lost one of its most prominent voices in security and defense policy.

> sovereignty in particular concerns the *Bundestag* with its, in a European comparison, strong role of co-determination and should result in a reform of the parliamentary reserve in the case of *Bundeswehr* interventions abroad. The *Bundestag* must continue to have the final say, taking the shape of a prerogative to call back [the *Bundeswehr*] when such decisions are taken. It would yet be a strong sign of trust building vis-à-vis our partners to make the German decision-making system more flexible.[82]

In the German debate, it is important to note that the parliamentary reserve is also seen as a protection against German troops being used in the pursuit of other nation's national interests, such as (allegedly) in EUFOR Congo. These "other nations" of course first and foremost include France, and notably its interests on the African continent, as ever a deep source of suspicion for the German public. The issue is of course also linked to non-negligible skepticism toward the EU and NATO and fears of "Brussels" deciding over German soldiers' fates. Despite these fears being ungrounded in the present institutional setting that requires unanimity in both institutions before military operations can be launched, this is an aspect that regularly comes back in the discussion. It also fits nicely into the broader discourse of Germany pursuing "altruistic" objectives, whereas France – stuck with a "realist" paradigm – "still" follows the logics of power politics and national interests.

As already noted above, although the public debate is dominated by issues pertaining to sending off troops on military interventions, the implications of Germany's parliamentary reserve are in fact twofold. Besides the deployment of German soldiers abroad in specific crisis management operations, the question is also what it means for German staff and assets in integrated military structures. This matter is of course of utmost importance for any meaningful Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defense cooperation, including the German-proposed Framework Nation Concept. For Germany to be considered a reliable partner in such settings, "assured availability" of German contributions is naturally of key relevance when it is needed. Also such instances, the Constitutional Court has confirmed, are currently covered by the parliamentary reserve. In other words, German military personnel is not authorized to e.g. take part in AWACS missions within the framework of an operation in which Germany is not participating (and for which, therefore, exists no mandate adopted by the *Bundestag*).

[82] Author's translation in the text: „Die Stärkung der sicherheitspolitischen Handlungsfähigkeit kann nur durch einen teilweisen Verzicht der Mitgliedstaaten auf ihre nationale Souveränität gelingen. Eine wirkungsvolle GSVP wird die militärischen Fähigkeiten der einzelnen Staaten in so starkem Maße zusammengelegt und unter geteilte Führung gestellt haben, dass es nicht möglich sein wird, nationale Vorbehalte als Einzelmeinung durchzusetzen. Deutsche Soldaten könnten damit in einen EU-Einsatz gehen, den die deutsche Regierung und der Deutsche Bundestag allein aus eigener Initiative nicht beschlossen hätten. Im Gegenzug für diesen Souveränitätsverzicht erhielte Deutschland – wie alle EU-Mitgliedstaaten – aber mehr außen- und sicherheitspolitische Handlungsfähigkeit und ein wirkungsvolleres und bezahlbares Instrumentarium. […] Dieser Souveränitätsverzicht betrifft gerade den Bundestag mit seiner im europäischen Vergleich starken Mitspracherolle und sollte sich in einer Reform des Parlamentsvorbehalts bei Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr niederschlagen. Der Bundestag muss weiterhin das letzte Wort in Form eines Rückrufvorbehalts bei solchen Entscheidungen behalten. Es wäre jedoch ein deutliches Zeichen der Vertrauensbildung gegenüber unseren Partnern, das deutsche Entscheidungssystem zu flexibilisieren." Schockenhoff, A., Kiesewetter R., *Europas Sicherheitspolitische Handlungsfähigkeit stärken*, 7/8.

As a direct consequence, Germany (as any other nation) has in effect a veto right in integrated structures: if it decides not to allow the use of the components to which it contributes, the whole structure is de facto on halt, or at least only functional if other nations compensate for the lacking German contribution. Examples of such events of course include the use of AWACS assets, but also the European Air Transport Command has already encountered similar problems. During the Libya campaign 2011, in which Germany did not participate, the German made an indirect contribution by performing a maximum of flights not linked to the operation, hence freeing resources for the participating nations. EATC Commander Pascal Valentin in an interview qualified this as the Germans "showing their solidarity by doing all missions the other nations couldn't do because of their involvement," as an instance of the EACT's generating "trust and confidence in peace time and during a crisis." (Schoeffmann, 2014) Many of Germany's partners are nevertheless slightly less incline to praise the German attitude as a display of solidarity.[83]

Conclusions: a gap still to bridge

While the approach to military intervention is straightforward in France and in line with France's defined strategic priorities, Germany has a much harder time resorting to the use of force. The difficulties faced by Paris and Berlin when it comes to military interventions are yet not located at the military level itself, but at the level of (grand) strategy as much as they are linked to two very different degrees of being used to going to war.

Rather, they stem from different outlooks on their respective roles in the world, on Europe's role in the world as well as on the legitimacy and purpose of such interventions. The paths toward troop deployment, from strategic rationales to the actual decision-making procedures, are thus hardly comparable. This is likely to remain that way in the foreseeable future, and the only level at which change really may be induced – in either country, but the need for change is certainly being perceived as greater in Germany – is the national level.

Once troops are underway, however, differences do not end. As mentioned, earlier, an often heard complaint is for example that "the Germans don't know the difference between peace time and war time." The anecdote of the expired German emissions testing certificates in Afghanistan may again serve as an illustration of that point. Berlin is of course aware of problems like these, and progress is coming slowly. In its defense, it must also be noted that Germany has come a long way since the end of the Cold War.

Most interesting, in this context, is certainly the Rühe-Commission's work. Although an abolishment of the parliamentary reserve is not on the agenda – and for some good reasons, many would add –, a modified approach could have far-reaching implications. Currently discussed options seem to include models of "advance agreement," e.g. the *Bundestag* consenting to all *Bundeswehr* activities in the twelve months ahead while retaining the right to call back deployed troops at any time. However,

[83] To be fair, it should however be noted that also other states have opted out of EATC in the past. For example, France withdrew its planes when it needed them for *Serval*.

not even all members of the Commission seem to agree with the proposal – let alone the opposition parties who boycott the Commission's work out of fear that it will result in the parliamentary reserve's weakening. Moreover, wether such a regulation would increase Germany's allies' trust in Berlin's reliability also remains an open question.

Going on missions requires more than political will. It is also contingent on the availability of necessary means, as the following chapter will discuss in greater detail. With decreasing defense budgets and diminishing capabilities, states' willingness to launch military operations will even more be subject to financial considerations than is already the case today. In an EU context, the revision of the Athena mechanism is of relevance. Moreover, as the French National Assembly's European Affairs Committee suggests, the distinction between civilian and military missions should also be revised, given that civilian missions can benefit from much more EU funding than military operations, largely paid for on a costs-lie-where-they-fall basis, i.e. with the member states sending troops (French National Assembly, Commission des affaires européennes, 2013).

CAPABILITIES: REQUIREMENTS, BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND THE INTRICACIES OF POOLING AND SHARING/SMART DEFENSE

Introduction: what capabilities for what kind of security actorness?

Within the wider context of European defense, the issue of capabilities is one of the most intricate. It is in this context that cooperating states ultimately need to consider their approaches to sovereignty on an everyday basis. Questions cover a wide range of aspects: from the type of assets needed, how to procure and potentially develop and build them to the issue of how these assets can be bought and used jointly in order to increase efficiency and perhaps even effectiveness. Interoperability is yet another key challenge for effective European power projection. As numerous examples in the past have illustrated – incompatibility among communications systems in Afghanistan or lacking air-to-air refueling capabilities in Libya, to only name two –, there are also considerable technical obstacles to cooperation. This chapter will deal with the demand-side of this process, focusing on capability objectives and requirements, as well as options to achieve them, nationally or by means of cooperation in pooling or sharing settings.[84] The background of all this is: within both NATO and the European Union, the gap between ambitions and capabilities is widening.

Since the end of the Cold War, Europe's militaries have undergone considerable change. France embarked much earlier on a path toward modernizing its armed forces and adapting them to the new security environment that emerged after the Soviet Union's demise.[85] After vivid debates that essentially opposed President François Mitterrand and the Socialists, attached to the armed forces' being anchored amidst society through conscription, on the one hand and the conservative parties on the other, the decision to professionalize the army was taken under President Jacques Chirac. In 1997, compulsory military service was abolished for all French nationals born after 1979. Germany, in turn, officially started its reform of the *Bundeswehr* in 2010 and the process is still ongoing. In both countries, the objective consisted (and still consists) in smaller, more mobile and highly professional forces trained and qualified for missions abroad. For both France and Germany, this amounts to a paradigm change with wide-ranging implications for the organizations as such, but also for equipment and procurement.

When it comes to capabilities, Europe is headed in the wrong direction overall; according to a number of observers, Europe is even on the path toward "demilitarization" (Whitney, 2011). Some analysts go as far as to warn against "Europe's Maginot moment," given that in the rest of the world, defense expenditure is on the rise (de France, 2014). In times of financial and economic crises, defense budgets are shrinking throughout Europe, (Mölling, Brune, 2011) although it is worth remembering

[84] Pooling, in this context, refers to joint procurement and the merging of capabilities, while sharing means that more than one nation use capabilities within a collective framework. Sharing also implies that states may give up on specific capabilities altogether, instead using other nations' assets when needed.

[85] For the challenges that arose in a Franco-German context due to France's much earlier reform efforts in the late 1990s, see e.g. Forster K., June 1998, „Perspektiven deutsch-französischer und europäischer", *Rüstungskooperation*. *Aktuelle Frankreich-Analysen Nr. 10*, Deutsch-Französisches Institut.

that defense spending started to decrease long before the current crises broke out. Taking advantage of the so-called peace dividend was the order of the day. Deplored not only by scholars and analysts, Europe's dwindling defense budgets have also been the object of a number of cautionary speeches by U.S. officials.[86] NATO's former Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, joined into the chorus on numerous occasions, *inter alia* reminding the Alliance's European members of the 2% objective set in 2002: all NATO allies should commit to spending at least 2% of their GDP for security and defense. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, France fulfilled that objective in 2013, spending 2.2 % of its GDP – however, without counting pensions, also the French spending only amounts to 1.5 %. Germany clearly failed to do so, spending 1.4 % (Perlo-Friedman, Solmirano, 2014). Yet, the sheer numbers of military spending still do not necessarily imply that the money is spent in the right way. The underlying reason for much of these capability gaps and reductions in defense budgets is of course the economic crisis and the ensuing lack of financial resources. Europe's most potent armies have therefore "reached a point where they no longer can be everything they want to be," (Shurkin, 2013) even though official declarations may give opposite expressions.

The consequences of this lack of capabilities are clearly palpable and could be felt uncomfortably in past endeavors. Notably Operation Unified Protector has, in 2011, shown beyond doubt that the Europeans simply do not have the means required. As Jolyon Howorth notes, "Libya demonstrated unequivocally that, even after twenty years of preparation, the EU's capacity to mount a significant military mission in its own backyard is grossly inadequate." (Howorth, 2012) This assessment is widely shared among analysts and practitioners alike. Europe thus especially lacks so-called strategic enablers for expeditionary missions: strategic transport and air-to-air refueling capabilities, but also means in the field of intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance. But even on a day-to-day basis beyond deployment abroad, European allies have a hard time to live up to their multilateral commitments, also with the North Atlantic Alliance.[87] Armed forces are overstretched, including on the personnel side.

Simply increasing national military spending is, however, not an option in times of budget cuts across the board due to the ongoing economic crisis. For most countries, budgetary constraints are in fact more determining in defense planning than threat perception or the assessment of the security environment. The inherent dangers in these developments are obvious. Since financial resources – as well as the willingness to spend serious money on procurement – are dwindling throughout the continent, the magic formula policy-makers have come up with is cooperation across borders. In times of austerity and the ongoing Euro-crisis, efficient defense spending is indeed more important than ever. For that reason, pooled and shared equipment has many advantages to offer. The idea to avoid the parallel existence of twenty-five armies, twenty-one air forces and eighteen navies, but

[86] Perhaps most prominently so Gates R., June 10, 2011, "The Security and Defence Agenda (Future of NATO)", Speech delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Brussels/Belgium. More recently so: see Garamone J., June 4, 2014, Hagel Urges European NATO Members to Boost Defense Budgets, American Forces Press Service.

[87] As German defense minister Von der Leyen U. had to admit in September 2014, Germany currently fails to fulfill its commitments under the NATO Defense Planning Process, see: Marodes Material, September 27, 2014, „Bundeswehr erfüllt Nato-Anforderungen derzeit nicht", *Spiegel Online.*

most of them still too small to be able to act alone, seems compelling. "Specialization by default" instead of "specialization by design" as NATO's former Secretary General Rasmussen put it, i.e. as the inevitable result of budget cuts, is another unwanted scenario to be avoided through cooperation. Moreover, streamlined requirements would allow for economies of scales when acquiring new material: a recent McKinsey study, for example, claims that "if Europe were to aggregate demand to the same level as the US enjoys, average batch sizes would be 570 % bigger." (McKinsey & Company, 2013) After the European Defense Agency's creation in 2004, the official beginnings of Pooling & Sharing, as defense cooperation on capabilities is labeled in the EU context, goes back to an initiative Germany and Sweden presented for the 2010 Ghent Summit. Within NATO, the same principle is called "Smart Defense" and was officially endorsed at the 2012 Chicago summit, following a number of earlier attempts at streamlining national defense planning that were barely successful.[88] In parallel, NATO also launched its Connected Forces Initiative, intended to increase interoperability among Allies and partner countries, notably through joint training and exercises.

CSDP is yet mainly considered by its crisis management undertakings abroad. However, while many of the missions are more a matter of symbolism than of strategic necessity due to their size and scope, security and defense cooperation on equipment and assets is a field with both great potential and strategic relevance. Some analysts therefore even call for CSDP's main emphasis to be transferred from missions to security and defense cooperation (Von Ondarza, Overhaus, 2013). Although perhaps not at the center of public attention, improving and enhancing military capabilities has long been an objective for EU security policy. Next to crisis management intervention, pooling and sharing is in fact the second key policy field to be covered by the Common Security and Defense Policy. From the Helsinki Headline Goal and the subsequent European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), to the establishment of the European Defense Agency (EDA) and the informal Ghent Summit, the aim has always been to equip Europe with meaningful assets, potentially across borders. In July 2012, the European Defense Agency and OCCAR concluded an agreement on cooperation.[89] Today, the EDA works on capability development, research and development and armaments cooperation, as well as on the establishment of a European Defense Technological and Industrial Base, with each of these topics being endowed with its own strategy. On Pooling and Sharing, the EDA's code of conduct – which member states can apply on a voluntary basis – was endorsed by the EU's ministers of defense in 2012.[90] It targets member states' defense planning and "provides an important framework to systematically consider cooperation from the outset in national defense planning for the whole life-cycle of a capability, as well as minimize the number of variants of the same equipment to optimize potential savings." (Barcikowska, 2013)

On NATO's side, national capabilities have always been at the center of attention. At the core of NATO's Defense Planning Process (NDPP, introduced in its current form in 2009) is the establishment of capability requirements in light of the type of needs the Alliance has defined. Individual member states are then tasked to provide the required capabilities on the basis of their size. The Defense Planning Process is thus a top-down approach, although it is not legally binding and participation is

[88] For an historical introduction to European armament cooperation, see Hébert JP. and Hamiot J. Jean (eds.), 2004, *Histoire de la coopération européenne dans l'armement*, CNRS.

[89] See Occar & Eda build links, seeking efficiencies through cooperation.

[90] For an overview of the EDA's activities, see European Defense Agency, 2014, *Annual Report 2013*, Brussels.

not mandatory. It only has indirect pooling and sharing implications, since it is intended to synchronize and harmonize national defense planning. The Smart Defense Initiative, in turn, complements this approach and is intended to close identified capability gaps through cooperation among allies; Allied Command Transformation (ACT) has a coordinating role in these efforts. Smart Defense was embraced at the Alliance's 2012 Chicago Summit in a declaration on defense capabilities in which Allies explicitly "recognize the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence" and state that "NATO will work closely with the European Union, as agreed, to ensure that our Smart Defence and the EU's Pooling and Sharing Initiative are complementary and mutually reinforcing" (NATO, 2012). NATO's Connected Force Initiative goes beyond the material dimension of Smart Defense and focuses on what may be labelled the human factor in military cooperation. Most recently, the Alliance adopted the Framework Nations Concept at its 2014 Wales Summit (see below).

In financial terms, states could indeed gain much from increased cooperation on acquisition and operation of military material, but also maintenance. With respect to intra-EU cooperation, there is considerable potential for savings; the figures presented in the 2013 *Cost of Non-Europe Report in European Common and Security Policy* are indeed impressive. According to its author,

> [t]he spread for the cost of Non-Europe in defence is thought to range from €130 billion, at the higher end, to at least €26 billion, on a more conservative calculation (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2013).

When comparing the French and German defense budgets – approximately €42.19 billion (French Ministry of Defense, Secrétariat Général pour l'Administration, 2014) and €32.44 billion (German Ministry of Defense, Bundesministerium der Verteinigung, 2014) [91] respectively in 2014 – to those figures, the potential of "more Europe" in terms of budget efficiency and increased capabilities is more than obvious.

The success of Pooling and Sharing or Smart Defense has nevertheless, at least so far, been mitigated at best, be it in pooling or sharing equipment (NATO, 2013).[92] A few initiatives, such as the European Air Transport Command (EATC)[93], stand out. Compared to the various missions carried out, however, defense and industrial cooperation in fact more resembles the military operations' step sibling. As observers conclude, cooperation on procurement is "yet another point of fundamental blockades for European defense cooperation."[94] To date, there are about seventy cooperation programs among EU Member states in the fields of training, equipment acquisition and cooperation. With thirty-two

[92] See also: Major C., and Mölling C., May 2013, "Synergies between EU and NATO? Specialisation as the litmus test for "Smart Defense" and "Pooling and Sharing", *Nordika Programme, Note N^{o} 12/13,* Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique. On Smart Defense, see also Johnson P., Labenz T., and Driver D., 2013, "Smart Defense: Brave New Approach or Déjà Vu?", *Naval War College Review* 66 (3), 39-52.

[93] At the December 2013 Council, heads of state and government praised the EATC as an example to emulate.

[94] Author's translation in the text: „ein weiterer Punkt fundamentaler Blockaden der europäischen Verteidigungskooperation." Clouet L-M., and Marchetti A., *Ungewisse Zukunft der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik*, 9.

ongoing such projects, Italy seems to be the most cooperative member state, followed by Germany and France with 29 and 28 respectively (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2013). The ranking list of most cooperative couples does nevertheless not include the latter two countries, as it is headed by Belgium/The Netherlands (22 programs), Italy/France (20), Italy/Spain (20) and The Netherlands/Germany (19). As far as the financial aspect is concerned, the figures are unequivocal: in 2011, 73 per cent of all equipment procured by value was conducted on a national basis; in 2012, the percentage even amounted to 82 – as opposed to goal set by EDA's Ministerial Board, namely that 35 per cent of all procurement should happen on a collaborative basis. Also, "between 2006 and 2010 cooperative procurement never exceeded, on average, 26 per cent of the combined national procurement budgets". In other words, there clearly is potential – and need – for more cooperation, including between Paris and Berlin.

The reasons for this lack of success seem almost obvious. Absent a common strategy and military doctrine, it is difficult to define common requirements. Giving up on national sovereignty proves as difficult as ever, at various stages of the process: as has be discussed above, while France's objective of "strategic autonomy" sometimes hampers cooperation, it is the German parliamentary reserve that poses problems when common assets are to be actually used in interventions. Different approaches to the industrial dimension of defense procurement constitute yet another challenge (see chapter VI below).

Some progress is, however, in sight. At the EU level, the 2013 December Summit on Security resulted in a rather concrete to do list and identified of priorities in closing capability gaps. This list adds to the eight priorities defined by the Foreign Affairs Council in 2012. In December 2013, the European Defense Agency was thus tasked to develop incentives and a cooperation policy framework, and priority areas – four in total – encompass the development of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) in the 2020-2025 timeframe; the development of air-to-air refueling capacities; satellite communication as well as the development of a cyber-roadmap and concrete projects on training and exercises (European Council, 2013). The EDA, along with the Commission, was also tasked to develop a Defense Industrial Standards Roadmap by the end of 2014. In addition, it is now "working on innovative ideas to stimulate defence cooperation such as non-distorting fiscal measures as well as pooled acquisition modalities, together with the Commission, to support research and technology (R&T), security of supply and industry." (Schoeffmann, Mahon, Butterworth-Hayes, 2014)

For France and Germany, their proposals made prior to the December 2013 Summit continue to set the agenda. At the purely bilateral level, France and Germany have underlined their willingness to work more closely together since 2010, and explicitly so on defense industries in their 2012 Declaration of Intent on new perspectives for Franco-German armament cooperation (German Ministry Of Defense, French Ministry of Defense, 2012). These declarations have apparently not yet yielded any concrete results (Major, 2013). In sum, therefore, assessments of the Franco-German track record on defense cooperation are thus anything by encouraging. The conclusion drawn by Jean-Marie Clouet and Andreas Marchetti in 2011 is arguably still valid today:

> Most generally, armament cooperation rather constitutes an apple of discord rather than a factor for cooperation between France and Germany, which also has ramifications for armament cooperation at the European level. Because of their poor performance, the multilateral armament cooperation programs have come to be seen as deterring examples: surcharges, increased complexity, delays, too detailed specifications, politicization of industrial questions. In addition, the programs monopolized different actors' attention, resources and political energy, which had detrimental effects on other joint armament programs.[95]

Finally, a French specificity comes back in the picture in the realm of capabilities: nuclear deterrence. Although it may seem to represent a minor side note, the instrument's costs are so high that it must not be ignored. France's *force de frappe* has moreover been the source of considerable conflict between France and Germany in the past, which continue to loom in the background. Unwilling to buy French arguments on the instrument's usefulness, Berlin is highly supportive of global nuclear disarmament, sometimes at the cost of a clash with Paris like in the run-up to NATO's 2010 Lisbon Summit were Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy had to meet on the fringes of the event to find a last-minute compromise. At the core of the row that threatened the adoption of the Alliance's current Strategic Concept were Berlin's hopes that NATO missile defense would reduce the dependence on nuclear deterrence – hopes it wanted to see translated into official language:

> French officials argued today that they had already made concessions to the Germans by dropping their insistence that missile defence be described as a 'complement, but not a substitute' for the nuclear deterrent. The Germans, by contrast, still hoped to strengthen the link between the missile shield and nuclear weapons in the document (Traynor, 2010).

The Concept finally states that the member states "are resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." The sentence then continues, at France's request, adding "in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all" (NATO, 2010). Germany, in turn, agreed to the formulation "as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance". This commitment is reiterated in the German 2011 Defense Policy Guidelines, where it is said that "[i]n keeping with its Strategic Concept, NATO remains a nuclear alliance. The necessity of nuclear deterrence will continue to exist, as long as nuclear weapons can be a threat in military conflicts" (German Ministry of Defense, 2011).

[95] Author's translation in the text: "Grundsätzlich stellt die Rüstungskooperation eher einen Zankapfel zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland als einen Faktor der Zusammenarbeit dar, was sich auch auf die Rüstungskooperation auf europäischer Ebene auswirkt. Die multilateralen Programme der Rüstungskooperationen werden wegen ihrer Fehlleistungen inzwischen als abschreckende Beispiele angesehen: Preisaufschläge, gesteigerte Komplexität, Verzögerungen, zu detaillierte Spezifizierungen, Politisierung industrieller Fragen. Zudem banden die Programme Aufmerksamkeit, Mittel und die politische Energie unterschiedlicher Akteure, was sich zum Nachteil anderer gemeinsamer Rüstungsprogramme auswirkte." Clouet L-M., and Marchetti A., *Ungewisse Zukunft der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik*, 10.

France: the means necessary to preserve strategic autonomy

The 2013 White Paper sets the tone for the French armed forces. It is meant to acknowledge the fact that objectives set in 2008 are out of reach due to the economic and financial crisis – objectives the minister of defense himself qualified as "too optimistic" (Le Drian, 2013). The White Paper is yet also the expression of France's refusal of "*déclassement stratégique*" – "strategic downgrade" – as well as the attempt to adopt a "more efficient armed forces model, based on a renewed military strategy."[96] This strategy, as noted above, foresees three core tasks for the armed forces, namely protecting the territory and its population, nuclear deterrence as well as military intervention abroad. In this context, "strategic autonomy" remains the key principle. The country's military posture's requirements are logically derived from it:

> This principle requires us to preserve the resources that give us freedom of assessment, planning and command, while also favouring the critical capabilities that form the basis of our freedom of action. These capabilities are essential to defending our vital interests and allowing us to take the initiative in simple, predictable operations (joint force command, intelligence and targeting capabilities, special forces, combat resources in contact with the adversary); they are also crucial to our capacity to play an important role in a coalition in order to preserve our autonomy (campaign of precision strikes deep into hostile territory, independent capability of first entry in a theatre of operation, command capability enabling us to assume the role of lead nation in a medium-scale inter-allied operation or an influential role preserving our sovereignty in a multi-national operation). These capabilities must, in particular, enable us to play a full role within the European Union and assume all our responsibilities within the Atlantic Alliance and NATO command structures (French Ministry of Defense, 2013).

For multinational contexts, and in particular of course NATO and collective defense, this means that

> France's strategic autonomy is underpinned by national ownership of its essential defence and security capabilities. Its current capabilities together with the action it envisages to maintain them enable it to meet its collective security commitments, not least in the context of the Washington Treaty, which established the Atlantic Alliance. This wholehearted commitment to NATO is fully compatible with the preservation of France's decision-making autonomy and freedom of action, promoting the French vision of an Alliance of responsible nations in control of their destiny and accepting their national responsibilities.

Chapter 6 of the French White Paper, which deals with "Implementing the strategy," thus defines five strategic functions to be fulfilled by the French armed forces (in close cooperation with domestic

[96] Author's translation in the text: "un modèle d'armée plus efficient, fondé sur une stratégie militaire renouvellée." Le Drian J-Y., *Discours du Ministre de la Défense: Présentation du Livre blanc à la Marine nationale à Toulon*.

actors such as the police or the *Gendarmerie nationale* for the tasks pertaining to national security "at home"). These are

a) "knowledge and anticipation," allowing France to make autonomous assessments of situations
b) "deterrence," "intended to protect France from any State-led aggression against its vital interests, of whatever origin and whatever form."
c) "protection," meaning the protection of France's territorial integrity and its citizens, preserving "the nation's major vital functions and increasing its resilience."
d) "prevention," meaning the development of norms at national and international level, as well as fighting against trafficking and the pursuit of disarmament and peace-building.
e) "intervention," serving the above-quoted triple objective of protecting French national abroad, defending France's and its partners' strategic interests and exercising the country's international responsibilities.

Although these functions are said to be of equal importance, crisis management and interventions nevertheless seem to be the French armed forces' core business given respective scenarios' likelihood to materialize. Besides territorial defense, the 2013 White Paper consequently defines the necessity to own the means required for military interventions in a number of specific world regions:

> Over and above the resources required to protect the national territory, France intends to have military capabilities enabling it to take action in priority areas to its defence and security: the regions on the fringes of Europe, the Mediterranean basin, part of Africa (from the Sahel to Equatorial Africa), the Arabo-Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. These capabilities enable France to make its contribution to international peace and security in other parts of the world.

More concretely, it foresees three types of operations the French armed forces must be able to carry or at least participate in in the above named regions, namely

- operations conducted on an autonomous basis, such as evacuation of French or European nationals, counter-terrorism operations or response to attacks;
- operations as part of a coalition – in the framework of the European Union, an established alliance such as NATO or on an ad hoc basis – in which France may take the initiative and command or in which it will exercise a dominant influence;
- operations as part of a coalition in which France will make a contribution, but where command is entrusted to an allied nation, most commonly the United States.

Within this context, France wants to own everything required to be an autonomous actor, able to project power outside its borders, as strategic autonomy – again – is at the core: "France therefore

makes the principle of strategic autonomy the main pillar of its external intervention strategy." Accordingly, the White Paper specifies a number of requirements for its intervention capabilities:

> To guarantee its capability for autonomous reaction in the event of a crisis, France will have a national emergency force of 5,000 troops on standby, enabling it to constitute an immediate reaction joint force (FIRI) of 2,300 troops, that can be mobilized to intervene over a radius of 3,000 km from the national territory or a foreign base, in seven days. France remains capable of immediate action within this seven-day deadline through use of airborne resources.
>
> […]
>
> All the forces engaged in this capacity in all the theatres concerned will be composed of the following resources, together with the associated command and support functions:
>
> - special forces and the support functions required to accomplish their mission;
> - the equivalent of a combined forces brigade representing 6,000 to 7,000 land troops, equipped primarily with wheeled armoured vehicles, medium tanks, fire support and battlefield organization resources, as well as attack and tactical helicopters;
> - a frigate, a combined force projection and command vessel (BPC) and a nuclear attack submarine, depending on the circumstances;
> - twelve or so jet fighters, attached to the different theatres of operation.

Putting all this into practice will nevertheless represent a real challenge in light of long-standing budget constraints and the provisions of the *Loi de programmation militaire* (LPM) for 2014-19 adopted in late 2013.[97] LPMs are intended to define priorities both in terms of budget and in terms of capabilities, based on the White Paper on Defense and National Security. Compared to other European countries – as well as other French budgets –, France's military spending is still relatively high, but challenges nevertheless lie ahead for French defense planning. Although the "tsunami" (Cabirol, 2012) of spending cuts many had feared could be avoided, the French armed forces' financial room for manoeuver is nevertheless shrinking. While the programming law represents an attempt to conciliate "the willingness to maintain a high level of ambition, adapted to our country's security needs and international responsibilities, with the necessity of restructuring the state budget,"[98] less money for the armed forces is unavoidable. Although – in line with the promises

[97] See Loi relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2014 à 2019 et portant diverses dispositions concernant la défense et la sécurité nationale (n° 2013-1168 du 18 décembre 2013). For access to all documents related to the passing of the LPM.

[98] Author's translation in the text: „Elle conjugue, dès lors, la volonté de maintenir un niveau d'ambition élevé, adapté à ces besoins de sécurité et aux responsabilités internationales de notre pays, avec la nécessité du redressement des finances publiques". Annexe : report de la Loi relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2014 à 2019 et portant diverses dispositions concernant la défense et la sécurité nationale (n° 2013-1168 du 18 décembre 2013), 1st paragraph.

made by President Hollande in March 2013 (Hollande, 2013) – the current LPM thus does not stipulate massive cuts, notably as far as procurement and research and development are concerned, the law will engender downgrading on personnel as well as the reduction of procurement volumes. It thus defines a defense budget (excluding pensions) of 29.61 billion Euros in 2014, intended to increase to 32.36 billion Euro in 2019 (article 3). This means that the budget remains stable as compared to 2013, of course without taking inflation into account. Very importantly, however, article 3 also defines "exceptional earnings" to be achieved by the state for instance selling property, radio frequencies or *Rafale* jets. These "exceptional earnings" amount to 6.13 billion Euro included in the overall budget; to what extent they will really be made as planned, remains an open question. Deals over *Rafale* sales with Qatar, India and Egypt have nevertheless been signed so far.

That said, the provisions contained in military programming laws are not written in stone. Past LPMs have in fact never entirely been respected (one reason being that yearly fiscal planning may well lead to changed allotments). As Martial Foucault thus noted in 2012,

> [e]very MPL without exception is unveiled to the tune of resolute declarations by the French government, (sometimes moderate) enthusiasm on the part of the general staff, and overly ambitious strategic ambitions. However, compliance with and execution of the 10 previous military spending plans do not fit well with the idea of ring-fenced defense budgets. Since 1994, no spending bill has been respected: through a combination of credit deferrals, program cancellations and public financing crises, the ministry of defense adjusts as best it can to these constraints (Foucault, 2012).

Against the background of France's overall efforts to consolidate its budget, ideas to make further cuts to the defense budget – despite the current LPM – came up in 2014. As a result, the chiefs of staff of the army, the navy and the air force, as well as General de Villiers, Chief of the Defense Staff, threatened to resign in case the promised budget were not to be respected (*Le Monde*, 2014). The LPM eventually remained untouched (at least for now), but the challenges facing the French military remain considerable. As General de Villiers stated in an interview in July 2014, "the French armed forces are operating at 120 % of their possibilities." (Barluet, 2014) And according to media reports, there is today a 45 billion Euro funding gap for ordered new materiel (Lamigeon, 2013). As a consequence, contracts will have to be renegotiated and volumes reduced.

All was thus not well before the financial crisis hit. The French Court of Auditors already noted in 2012 that budget cuts compromised the implementation of both the previous White Paper from 2008 and the investment program foreseen in the 2009-2014 *Loi de programmation militaire*, the difference amounting to 4 billion Euro (French Court of Auditors, 2012). Given that earlier LPMs had failed to foresee the right investments, the "under-investments in modern equipment had to be corrected by the LPM 2009-2014 at the price of severe personnel cuts."[99] The current LPM stipulates

[99] Author's translation in the text: "…sous-investissement en équipements modernes que la LPM 2009-2014 s'est efforcée de corriger au prix d'une déflation sévère d'effectifs." Garnier G., May 2014, "Les chausse-

the reduction of 33,757 jobs (article 5). As the result of decisions made in the past, France is today suffering from lacking or dysfunctional materiel, leading to questions as to its usability in deployments. The chiefs of staff of the army, navy and air force agree that training levels are in decline (Garnier, 2014). And, as Guillaume Garnier puts it,

> [i]f the system is still breathing, that is because it is, in a way, using its reserves. This capital of competences, currently holding its breath, must inevitably benefit, in the short-term, of an increase of its level of activity. Otherwise, the operational added-value the armed forces have benefitted from will quickly be lost.[100]

Finally, as noted above, France's nuclear deterrent capabilities are a national specificity. In light of budgetary constraints and the asset's costs, questions on the *force de frappe* seem in order. Yet, given its central role in French security doctrine (see section II.2. above), Paris refuses to consider abandoning it despite considerable costs. They have never been seriously questioned by French decision-makers, although there are a number of prominent opponents and a debate arose at the time when the 2014-19 *Loi de Programmation Militaire* was discussed in 2013, as the Green party asked for the abolishment of the French nuclear arsenal (Europe écologie les verts, 2013). Although nobody else but the President can effectively take the decision to abolish France's nuclear deterrence, the parliament's defense commission organized a number of hearings during the spring of 2014 in order to discuss strategic, industrial, financial and ethical issues linked to the matter – a first in "the fifty years during which nuclear weapons have existed in our country" (French National Assembly, 2014). As the commission's president, Patricia Adam, summarizes in her foreword to the published hearing statements which resulted in the appraisal that

> it is necessary to master both the technologies of sub-marine navigation, nuclear propulsion, underwater ballistics and the integration of all this in confined space. This prodigy of engineering costs about 0.1 % of the Gross Domestic Product. At this price, France remains an autonomous nation, influential and respected, and protected from the humiliation of nuclear blackmail like it suffered from in 1956.[101]

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trappes de la remontée en puissance. Défis et écueils du redressement militaire », *Focus Stratégique N^{o} 52*, IFRI, 28.

[100] Author's translation in the text: "Si le système respire, c'est donc en vivant, en quelque sorte, sur ses réserves. Ce capital de compétences, en apnée, doit nécessairement bénéficier à court terme d'une dynamique de redressement du niveau d'activité sans quoi la plus-value opérationnelle dont ont bénéficié les armées se paupérisera rapidement." Garnier G., July 18, 2012, Les chausse-trappes de la remontée en puissance, 31. See also French Senate, Committee For Foreign Affairs And Armed Forces. *Forces armées: Peut-on encore réduire un format "juste insuffisant"?.* Rapport d'information n° 680 (2011-2012).

[101] Author's translation in the text: "il faut maîtriser à la fois les techniques de la navigation sous-marine, de la propulsion nucléaire, de la balistique en plongée et l'intégration de l'ensemble dans un espace confiné. Ce prodige d'ingénierie coûte environ 0,1 % du produit intérieur brut. À ce prix, la France demeure une nation autonome, influente et respectée, protégée de l'humiliation d'un chantage nucléaire comme celui subi en 1956." French National Assembly. Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, *Recueil d'auditions sur la dissuasion nucléaire*, 6.

The above quoted costs only refer to the submarine deterrent, to which the price-tag for airborne devices needs to be added. It is only the latter "cheaper" asset that has been subject to serious proposals of abandonment, first and foremost for financial reasons. The 2013 White Paper, however, maintains that both submarine and airborne nuclear weapons are required to guarantee the nation's independence. Regardless of its high costs, the then Chief of Defense Staff consequently also argued on favor of a nuclear deterrent, saying that it beyond doubt contributes to France's standing in the world.[102] This is also the line of argument to be found in the 2013 White Paper.

Nuclear assets are generally perceived as a guarantee of independence that has no conventional alternative. Ballistic missile defense is therefore not a substitute, because, as General Henri Bentégeat underlines, "it would, in my view, be crazy to give up nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear disarmament is not complete, simultaneous and verified."[103] Budget constraints yet force to think twice, so that "equilibrium must be found between our deterrent forces and our forces for action.[104]

When it comes to multinational defense cooperation, France supports both EU and NATO efforts to that effect and makes significant contributions in both contexts. Yet, this support is subject to two conditions:

> firstly, the NATO member nations must play the decisive role in the development of defence capabilities, as the Alliance cannot act in the nations' stead. Nations must take responsibility for ensuring their defence, organizing their capability development and deciding on the use of their capabilities;
>
> secondly, this initiative must not result in an increase in the scope of NATO common funding, as capabilities developed in a multinational framework are supposed to be financed directly by the Allies concerned (French Permanent Representation, 2013).

The French eagerness to preserve its military means in its own hands is again obvious, yet the White Paper also underlines the benefits of pooling and sharing within the EU. On NATO, the White Paper

[102] Author's translation in the text: "la capacité nucléaire n'est pas le seul déterminant de la puissance d'un État mais en ce qui concerne notre pays, elle y contribue. Incontestablement. Le choix de la dissuasion nucléaire a un coût, évidemment: 3,5 milliards d'euros en début de période et 4,5 milliards en fin de période. Mais comme en toute chose, ce coût doit être mis en perspective – je pense à ce qu'il représente dans le budget de l'État – et considéré au regard de ce qu'il apporte. En termes de statut, d'influence et d'effet à obtenir sur le plan militaire. Soyons clairs : sans cette capacité, les armées françaises ne bénéficieraient pas de la même considération." French National Assembly. Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées. *Recueil d'auditions sur la dissuasion nucléaire*, 170.

[103] Author's translation in the text: "ce serait à mon avis une folie que d'abandonner notre dissuasion nucléaire tant que le désarmement atomique n'est pas complet, simultané et vérifié." French National Assembly. Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées. *Recueil d'auditions sur la dissuasion nucléaire*, 70.

[104] Author's translation in the text: "Un équilibre est à trouver entre nos capacités de dissuasion et nos capacités d'action." French National Assembly. Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées. *Recueil d'auditions sur la dissuasion nucléaire*, 72.

stresses "interoperability," which may well be read as the opposite of pooling and sharing capabilities:

> Common funding must be strictly controlled and reserved for priority projects and activities that benefit all the Allies and reinforce their interoperability, which is core to the added value provided by the Alliance. In this context, France will take care to ensure that the capacity of Nations wishing to act independently in other frameworks is guaranteed. France itself, while fully engaged in the allied military command, intends to preserve the means of its sovereignty in all circumstances (French Ministry of Defense, 2013).

France yet clearly supports concrete pooling and sharing projects, notably in the field of strategic airlift and air-to-air refueling. And overall, France sees the establishment of a "Europe of defense" – including the mutualization of capabilities – as the answer to a "risk of general strategic downgrade" for Europe.[105] French minister of defense Jean-Yves Le Drian thus also underlined that "[i]n this content, it is self-evident that we can only wish for the acceleration of our means' mutualization within a Europe of Defense" (only to also state that "I work toward this, but I will not hide to you that this is difficult, given that, contrary to myself, my counterparts do not see this perspective of Europe's strategic downgrade as a major issue").[106]

Strategic autonomy does not necessarily seem compatible with pooling and sharing military equipment. Iit is consequently little surprising that Germany has had a hard time convincing France to endorse its Framework Nation Concept, eventually adopted by NATO at its 2014 Wales Summit. Although French fears, in this respect, also had to do with the "regionalization of NATO," which France opposes, also flexibility- and sovereignty-related issues naturally mattered. Moreover, Paris argued, Germany may well turn out to be an unreliable partner. In the so-called Clusters now planned or already existing, France does not participate (the three active framework nations being Germany, the UK and Italy).

In an EU context, the above-cited report by the French National Assembly's European Affairs Commission welcomes the EDA's expanded competences since Lisbon and states that

> The main challenge is for the EDA to become a promoter for armament projects carried out as European cooperation, in order to endow European armed forces with interoperable equipment corresponding to their operational needs. In this respect,

[105] Author's translation in the text: "un risque de déclassement stratégique global." Comments to that effect have been made by defense minister Le Drian J-Y., on a number of occasions, See e.g. Cabirol M., November 12, 2012, « Comment Paris va prendre l'initiative pour relancer l'Europe de la défense ? » *La Tribune*.

[106] Author's translation in the text: "il va de soi que, dans ce contexte, on ne peut que souhaiter l'accélération de la mutualisation de nos moyens au sein d'une Europe de la défense."; "je m'y emploie mais je ne vous cacherai pas que c'est difficile du fait que, contrairement à moi, mes homologues ne voient pas dans cette perspective de déclassement stratégique de l'Europe un enjeu majeur." Cabirol M., Comment Paris va prendre l'initiative pour relancer l'Europe de la défense.

> France is interested in numerous cooperation topics, notably in the fields of space technology, maritime surveillance, strategic airlift, drones and communications.[107]

The French approach to pooling and sharing is thus perhaps not overly enthusiastic. Paris' interests essentially concern cooperation in fields where pooled or shared assets could close French capability gaps, and so-called strategic enablers in particular. The establishment of a European army – within the framework of the *Europe de la défense* – is thus not really on Paris' practical agenda. In the fields named above, however, France's interest is high given that it would greatly benefit from European capabilities – which are on the to-do list that emanated from the 2013 European Council on defense.

Germany: really covering the full spectrum?

Like almost everywhere else in Europe, recent years' German approaches to the *Bundeswehr* and its equipment are first and foremost a matter of budgetary constraints. This is the background against which the wide-ranging reform process of the armed forces was undertaken in the past years and the financial dimension continues to be among the decisive paradigms. Germany's (relative) economic strength notwithstanding, the *Bundeswehr* still faces budgetary constraints that outweigh political and strategic considerations (even though ever scarcer financial resources may not be the only reason for such an economic approach). On paper, however, ambitions remain high. Just like in France, the German objective consists of maintaining so-called full-spectrum capabilities. "Breite vor Tiefe", i.e. "breadth before depth" is the key formula. While undergoing reform in order to become more expeditionary, no specific capabilities are to be given up (Mölling, 2011). The 2013 Coalition agreement moreover states that the *Bundeswehr* is a military in use – "*Militär im Einsatz*" (Christian democratic union, Christian social union and German socialdemocratic party, 2013). Given Germany's post-1945 history, this is not as self-evident as it may seem in other national settings. Within that context and according to the 2011 Defense Policy Guidelines, the German armed forces need to be able to basically do everything across the spectrum (although the document resorts to euphemisms):

> The *Bundeswehr* must retain capabilities for operations across the entire intensity spectrum, including observer missions, advisory and training support as well as preventive security measures (German Ministry of Defense, 2011).

This broad approach notwithstanding, the same document also sets forth that international conflict prevention and crisis management are "more likely tasks," and these tasks therefore "determine the outline of the new *Bundeswehr* structure". Yet, "[e]ssentially, the forces available for these tasks also

[107] Author's translation in the text: "Le défi majeur est que l'AED devienne une pépinière des programmes d'armement réalisés en coopération européenne, afin de mettre à la disposition des forces armées européennes des équipements interopérables et correspondant à leur besoin opérationnel.Dans cette perspective, la France est intéressée par de nombreux thèmes de coopération, en particulier dans les domaines de l'espace, de la surveillance maritime, du déminage maritime, du transport stratégique, des drones et des communications." French National Assembly, Commission des affaires européennes, *Rapport d'information n°911 sur la relance de l'Europe de la défense*, 76.

fulfil the requirements of territorial and collective defense as well as homeland security tasks of the *Bundeswehr*".

The 2011 Defense Policy Guidelines moreover define a number of general tasks for the German *Bundeswehr* that are said to be "interconnected":

- territorial defense as collective defense within the North Atlantic Alliance;
- international conflict prevention and crisis management – including countering international terrorism;
- participation in military tasks within the EU Common Security and Defense Policy;
- homeland security contributions, i.e. defense tasks on German territory as well as administrative assistance in case of natural disasters and large-scale accidents, for the protection of critical infrastructure and in cases of domestic emergency;
- rescue and evacuation operations including hostage rescue operations abroad;
- partnership and cooperation as a part of multinational integration and global security cooperation in the context of modern defense diplomacy;
- humanitarian relief abroad.

As analysts argue, however, the *Bundeswehr*'s actual situation is somewhat different from what is proclaimed in official documents. As Michael Shurkin hence points out with respect to the German army,

> [it] is retaining heavy forces, but it is reducing their size and marginalizing them. On paper, the resulting force resembles the French army. However, available evidence suggests that, due to cultural and other factors, including the legal framework in which the military operates, Germany's commitment to the combined-arms maneuver warfare end of the capability spectrum is the weakest of the [German, French and British] militaries […]. It is instead sliding toward a focus on stability operations while the French try to dig into a middle ground (Shurkin, 2013).

And he continues, with respect to the stated ambition to be able to cover the entire spectrum:

> However, although on paper the German force structure resembles that of France and the UK, with their largely medium-weight forces, the Germans appear to be tilting more toward the lower end of the intensity spectrum. The difference has less to do with weapon systems […] than with the cultural and political differences that appear to inform priorities (Shurking, 2013).

The German Bundeswehr has suffered from budget cuts in past years. As far as the Bundeswehr's equipment is concerned, the situation is "not too good, at some points even devastating."[108] Although all this has been known to the military and experts for a long time, the issue has erupted in the public sphere during the fall of 2014 when its concrete implications became obvious. In mid-September, it was for example revealed that almost the entire fleet of the German marine force's helicopters had to be grounded: out of 43 helicopters, only four were fit to fly (Hickmann, 2014). Other systems encounter similar problems, often due to lacking replacement parts – the price of savings made in earlier years. A German *Transall* airplane meant to be a part of the Ebola airlift thus stranded on Grand Canaria, while the defense minister had to admit that she could not promise to evacuate German home from West Africa if they fall sick, for a lack of adequate planes (Gebauer, 2014). Moreover, the German armed forces are also overstretched in terms of personnel, mainly due to the high number of deployments abroad and notably in Afghanistan.

A report on the Bundeswehr's procurement published by external experts in October 2014 furthermore reveals major issues at various levels. On more than 1,000 pages, it confirms that defense equipment is generally delivered too late, more expensive than planned and beyond that not working properly. A lack of professionalism on the ministry's and its agencies' part seems to be one element of the explanation, the industry's practices another. In addition, the report complains that the criteria behind procurement contracts too often are "political." [109]

Despite the media attention currently devoted to the armed forces' equipment and procurement: the general public tends to be skeptical toward defense spending in general, while politicians normally attempt to keep the matter below the radar of public attention. Opinions expressed by German leaders, up to the Chancellor, more often than not imply that there is no need to increase defense spending. Thus, although at NATO's September 2014 Summit even Berlin committed to fulfilling the target, defense minister von der Leyen rejected this objective in an interview shortly thereafter. She nevertheless also called for more money in light of the new tasks ahead (*Süddeutsche Zeitung,* 2014). Chancellor Merkel, when asked whether the decisions taken at NATO's Wales Summit would require increases in the German defense budget, replied:

> In this context, we do not need any new means now, we can also do this with the possibilities the *Bundeswehr* has. You must not forget that we, for example, also reduce our troops elsewhere, in Afghanistan. Starting from the beginning of 2015, there will not be any combat mission there anymore, and we can then address new challenges. I believe it was the right decision to say that we have to be prepared to, should something happen one day, if one of the NATO member states is in a difficult situation, that we then have to be able to react quickly.[110]

[108] Author's translation in the text: „nicht allzu gut, teilweise sogar verheerend." Hickmann, C., September 27, 2014, „Materialprobleme bei der Bundeswehr. Nichts mehr im grünen Bereich", *Süddeutsche Zeitung*.

[109] Only a 52-page excerpt of the report has been made public: KPMG, P3 Group and Taylor Wessing, September 30, 2014, Umfassende Bestandsaufnahme und Risikoanalyse zentraler Rüstungsprojekte. Exzerpt. Berlin.

[110] Authors translation in the text: „In diesem Zusammenhang brauchen wir jetzt keine neuen finanziellen Mittel, das können wir auch aus dem heraus machen, was die Bundeswehr an Möglichkeiten hat. Sie dürfen

In March 2015, it was however announced that defense spending would increase by 1.2 billion € in 2016. Until 2019, the increase will even amount to 8 billion € -- as justified by the current security situation (Von der Leyen, 2015).

The Bundeswehr as such is not very dear to Germans' hearts. The public "debate" around its reform, and notably the abolition of conscription in 2011, was therefore mainly centered on issues such as the abolishment of the *Zivildienst* – young men objecting to military service instead serving in hospitals, kindergartens, charities etc. – and the economic consequences this disappearance of cheap labor engenders. The implications for Germany's security policy and its ability to project military power were, in turn, of little interest to the general public (Puglierin, Sinjen, 2011).

Much more so than in other countries, acquiring new capabilities sometimes also involves public debate. This is notably the case when it comes to drones – one of the four priorities identified by the EU December 2013 Council – heavily opposed by parts of the general public. While this public opposition is certainly linked to outrage over the United States' practice of so-called "targeted killings" (never intended for German drones) and confounds armed and unarmed drones, decision-makers still need to take these debates seriously, not least in light of the parliament's role in such decisions. The formulations used in the Coalition agreement clearly reflect the ongoing debate:

> Unmanned aerial vehicles already today play an important role in the Bundeswehr's deployment in Afghanistan, in reconnaissance and to protect our soldiers. The Bundeswehr will also depend on such capabilities in the future. The Coalition will promote European development of unmanned aerial vehicles. Europe rapidly needs a common regulatory framework for their certification and participation in the European air traffic. The Coalition will continue initiatives undertaken to that effect.
>
> We categorically oppose extralegal killings with armed drones violating international law. Germany will advocate for armed unmanned aerial vehicles to be included in international disarmament and arms control regimes and will promote the proscription according to international law of fully automated weapon systems, which take away the decision on the use of arms from human beings.[111]

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nicht vergessen, wir reduzieren zum Beispiel an anderer Stelle auch unsere Truppen in Afghanistan. Dort wird es ab Anfang 2015 keinen Kampfeinsatz mehr geben, und dann kann man auch wieder neue Herausforderungen in den Blick nehmen. Ich glaube, es waren richtige Beschlüsse zu sagen, wir müssen doch darauf vorbereitet sein, dass, wenn einmal etwas passieren sollte, einer der Mitgliedsstaaten der NATO in Bedrängnis kommt, dass dann auch schnell reagiert werden kann."
Ulrich A., September 9, 2014, "Merkel: Russlands Vorgehen darf nicht ohne Folgen bleiben," Interview with Chancellor Angela Merkel, *RBB Inforadio*.

[111] Author's translation in the text: „Unbemannte Luftfahrzeuge spielen bereits heute beim Bundeswehr-Einsatz in Afghanistan bei der Aufklärung und dem Schutz unserer Soldatinnen und Soldaten eine wichtige Rolle. Auch künftig wird die Bundeswehr auf derartige Fähigkeiten angewiesen sein. Die Koalition wird eine europäische Entwicklung für unbemannte Luftfahrzeuge voranbringen. Europa braucht schnell ein gemeinsames Regelwerk für ihre Zulassung und Teilnahme am europäischen Luftverkehr. Die Koalition wird die entsprechenden Initiativen hierzu weiterführen. Extralegale, völkerrechtswidrige Tötungen mit bewaffneten

The debate also resulted in a *Bundestag* hearing on the ethical aspects of drones (German Bundestag, 2014), and will certainly gain new momentum since that minister von der Leyen has announced her intention to "revive" the *EuroHawk* program her predecessor cancelled in May 2013 due to problems with certification: the European Aviation Safety Agency would only allow it to fly over uninhabited areas since the drone had no anti-collision system. While the defunct program cost millions of Euros and was badly managed, experts also have serious doubts on von der Leyen's revived project (Steiner, 2014). Von der Leyen has been a supporter of Germany's acquiring of drones since early on in her ministry, as she for instance made clear in a speech at the *Bundestag* in July 2014 when she argued on favor of armable drones (opposed by the Social Democrats) (*Tagesschau Online*, 2014). In what way a revived drone program would be linked to European efforts at acquiring drones is a matter not yet addressed by the minister. In any case, given to the sums required to acquire them, German drones will need to be approved of by the *Bundestag*, meaning that the government will not be able to afford ignoring the debate they engender.

Germany is yet, of course, aware of the need for increased defense cooperation at European level as well as its potential benefits, both in EU and NATO contexts. Comparing France, the UK and Germany, Alexandra Jonas and Nicolai von Ondarza even conclude that Germany is the country that is most willing to contribute to multinational force structures. They notably base their argument on the case of NATO's E3A-component, in which Germany is a full participant, while both France and the UK are operating autonomous air surveillance systems (Jonas, and Von Ondarza, 2010). The idea of cross-border military cooperation in any case goes well with the German desire for multilateralism, while the perspective to save money also seems attractive. Germany thus joined the Franco-British Battle Group proposal early on, and the 2013 Coalition agreement reads as follows, with respect to the North Atlantic Alliance's Smart Defense Initiative:

> We support defense cooperation on the basis of the Smart Defence Initiative, to plan, procure and supply military capabilities together and to maintain the armed forces' interoperability within the Alliance. Germany is prepared to contribute, as a framework nation, to providing capabilities for the Alliance together with other NATO partners.[112]

The same is valid for Pooling & Sharing with the European Union – in fact, the initiative was proposed by Germany in Sweden back in 2010. Declaratory support is, however, not enough in the views of

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Drohnen lehnen wir kategorisch ab. Deutschland wird für die Einbeziehung bewaffneter unbemannter Luftfahrzeuge in internationale Abrüstungs- und Rüstungskontrollregime eintreten und sich für eine völkerrechtliche Ächtung vollautomatisierter Waffensysteme einsetzen, die dem Menschen die Entscheidung über den Waffeneinsatz entziehen." Christian democratic union, Christian social union and German socialdemocratic party. *Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten*, 124.

[112] Authors's translation in the text: „Wir unterstützen die Verteidigungskooperation auf Grundlage der Smart-Defense Initiative, militärische Fähigkeiten gemeinsam zu planen, zu beschaffen und bereitzustellen und die Interoperabilität der Streitkräfte im Bündnis zu erhalten. Deutschland ist bereit, als Rahmennation dazu beizutragen, zusammen mit anderen NATO-Partnern Fähigkeiten für das Bündnis zu erbringen." Christian democratic union, Christian social union And German socialdemocratic party, *Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten*, 117.

some. As two influential members of parliament – Christian Democrats Andreas Schockenhoff (†) and Roderich Kiesewetter – wrote in their widely acclaimed Working Paper in 2012,

> Europe must acquire its own independent capacity to act in the field of security policy in a credible way. It is about time, since national losses of capabilities already happen today, and they can lead to European losses of capabilities if these processed happen in an uncoordinated manner. This is why we need closer cooperation in the field of security policy and courageous steps toward deeper military integration while we simultaneously must further develop the transatlantic division of labor.[113]

The Defense Policy Guidelines, however, adopt a more careful stance, stating that

> a particular focus will be on intra-European coordination. Before this approach can be applied, a thorough, national analysis of the various options for military cooperation must be conducted to identify:
>
> - capabilities that are of critical national importance and are therefore kept available on a strictly national basis;
> - capabilities that allow closer cooperation with partners without compromising national capability (pooling);
> - capabilities where a mutual, coordinated reliance on European partners is conceivable (role and task sharing).
>
> Mutual dependencies for and on operations can only be accepted to the degree required for the execution of tasks. With this in mind, the priority must be to identify tasks that can in future be performed together or be shared with allies (German Ministry of Defense, 2011).

At NATO level, in turn, Germans is the initiator of the Framework Nations Concept the Alliance adopted at its 2014 Wales Summit. Introduced by her predecessor de Maizière, defense Minister von der Leyen qualified the Framework Nation Concept as a "European solution to a European problem." (Von Der Leyen, 2014). The Concept foresees so-called "clusters," composed of several nations who, together, provide capabilities through closer cooperation, yet retaining sovereignty over their assets and personnel. Clusters contain framework nations who retain a large profile of capabilities, thus allowing smaller nations with more specialized profiles to contribute their capabilities to the entire

[113] Author's translation in the text: „Europa muss seine eigenständige sicherheitspolitische Handlungsfähigkeit glaubwürdig gewinnen. Es wird höchste Zeit, denn nationale Fähigkeitsverluste finden bereits heute statt, und sie können zu europäischen Fähigkeitsverlusten führen, wenn diese Prozesse unkoordiniert erfolgen. Deshalb brauchen wir eine engere sicherheitspolitische Zusammenarbeit und mutige Schritte in Richtung einer Vertiefung der militärischen Integration bei gleichzeitiger Weiterentwicklung der transatlantischen Arbeitsteilung." Schockenhoff A., and Kiesewetter R., *Europas Sicherheitspolitische Handlungsfähigkeit stärken*, 3.

cluster's benefit. Overall, the Framework Nations Concept is thus meant to increase NATO's capabilities, through the more efficient and effective combination of existing assets.[114] The German-led clusters are currently discussed with partner nations.[115]

Yet, although the willingness to do so may certainly exist – and take shape in the EACT or the Framework Nation Concept proposed by Berlin – the practice of these German contributions is not unproblematic. As far as Pooling and Sharing is concerned – and sharing in particular – the German parliamentary reserve comes back into the picture. The viability of – but also partners' trust in – Germany as a framework nation in international settings will in large part depend on Berlin's ability and willingness to actually make use of the capabilities at hand. The results of the Rühe Commission's work are therefore likely to have direct consequences on the structures and opportunities of European defense cooperation, as well as on the actual practicability of Pooling and Sharing or initiatives within the Framework Nations Concept in order to avoid the potential drawback "that smaller nations which gear their armed forces towards one cluster leader may end up being held hostage to the defence policies of their lead country" (Drent, 2014).

Conclusions: still room for improvement

As observers note, although confronted with similar strategic and budgetary challenges, the French and German armed forces do not necessarily develop in the same direction. Approaches in Paris and Berlin differ, which is hardly surprising in light of the overall differences in approaching security and defense matters:

> France concluded from its experience in the Afghanistan mission that its force had become too soft and that, if anything, it had to reaffirm its conventional warfighting skills, even as part of its preparation for stability operations. However, there appears to be tension within the French army regarding the resources required for such a fight. Also, France has been using precision-guided standoff weapons to good effect in recent operations in Libya and Mali while at the same time fielding a fairly large ground force in Mali. As for Germany, it does not appear to have drawn any clear lessons from the Afghanistan mission. There seems to be ambivalence both about what to take away from Afghanistan and about what kinds of fights the German army will face in the future (Shurkin, 2013).

[114] For some observers, the proposal even has a domestic aspect to it, since, as Jan Techau notes, "[t]he proposal is not only a substantial conceptual contribution by Germany to the debate about NATO's future. It is also a clever self-binding mechanism. Knowing full well the risks of the volatile domestic debate about all things military, by committing itself as a framework nation, the leadership in Berlin has one more argument at home as to why Germany can't weasel out any longer. Germans dislike violating multinational commitments. The framework nations concept is just as much about tactics at home as it is about strategy in NATO." Techau J., June 17, 2014, Germany's Budding Defense Debate, Blog Entry.

[115] For more information, see the federal governments' answers to a number of members of the Bundestag, German Federal Government. Antwort auf die kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Doris Wagner, Agnieszka Brugger, Dr. Tobias Lindner, January 29. 2015, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, " Drucksache 18/3705, Berlin.

All these strategic considerations nevertheless take place against the background of shrinking financial resources. Increasing budgetary constraints, many had hoped, would also trigger more cooperation among nations. This has, at least so far, failed to materialize. Pooling and Sharing (EU) and Smart Defense (NATO) were the two buzzwords. In practice, however, the potential of cooperation is far from being fully used, limited to auxiliary capabilities. Too many obstacles persist and as Alexander Vershbow, NATO Deputy Secretary General, notes, "more fundamental defence cooperation required a change of mind-set", a change he has not yet seen (Schoeffmann, Mahon, 2014).

That this change of mind-set has not (yet) taken place was again visible during the run-up to the December 2013 Summit. As ever, the levels of ambition differed in Paris and Berlin, while a British veto loomed in the background. The already vague proposal for a summit declaration hence became even vaguer at Germany's initiative, especially concerning concrete definitions of timeframes (Schmitz, 2013). Moreover, it was said to be "obvious that the [German] federal government, usually pushing so much for integration, does not trust the Commission when it comes to defense matters. German officials consequently deleted the sentence saying that the EU's High Representative should analyze changes in the global security structure, in close cooperation with the Commission.'" (Schmitz, 2013).

Of course, France and Germany nevertheless agree on the decisions taken in December 2013 with respect to capabilities and have pledged to work together on their implementation. Most of this cooperation is currently ongoing, meant to produce first results by the end of 2014. Outcomes are yet rather meager. Together with Poland, they had already declared before the summit that

> we fully support the need to enhance mutually reinforcing cooperation to facilitate the delivery of capabilities. We should notably build upon the key partnership between EDA and ACT and encourage their fruitful cooperation in already defined areas (French Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, German Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Ministry of Defense, German Ministry of Defense, Polish Ministry of Defense, 2010).

Some differences yet exist, with respect to the institutional setting and ACT'S role on these new projects. While France wants to bet on the EDA and implement the Summit decision in an autonomous European manner, Germany again is more oriented toward NATO and wants to take ACT's work into account. Likewise, France seems more hesitant vis-à-vis the EDA's taking over NATO standards. Finally, Paris and Berlin hold opposing views on tax exemptions for EU procurement via OCCAR, an already existing practice in the NATO context. While France is a strong supporter of such ideas, Germany is an equally strong opponent. The technical character of all these matters notwithstanding, it is crucial to bear in mind that it is in the fine print of pooling and especially sharing that the security policy debate has come full circle. As a matter of fact, it all boils down to state sovereignty in the 21st century: who is to decide on the use of national military assets? Without states' relinquishing at least parts of their sovereignty, no progress is foreseeable. As concrete attempts at taking existing initiatives further thus show, the red line continues to be national

sovereignty. In the case of the widely acclaimed EACT, for instance, states are willing to establish common standards on issues like pilots' flying hours (where NATO's standards prove insufficient), but merging transport plans remains out of the question (French National Assembly, 2013). Other areas prove more difficult and "philosophical" differences prevail. This notably concerns Missile Defense within a NATO framework. And as far as the Franco-German Brigade is concerned: until today, Berlin and Paris have not managed to equip their soldiers with the same weapon systems.

When it comes to choosing partners for defense cooperation, the Franco-German tandem is not necessarily the first that comes to mind. As far as the four projects decided upon in December 2013 are concerned, it should, however, also not be forgotten that they "merely" are about strategic enablers – and not about core capabilities of territorial defense. Past successes in multinational cooperation moreover pertain to training or field hospitals. In military terms, the Germans and the French do not necessarily perceive each other as the most important partner. Both have indeed other important partners in the field, for instance the British for the French or the Dutch for the German. Moreover, bilateral cooperation with the United States is a priority for German decision-makers and military officers.

The gaps that arise are not necessarily material in nature, they may as well be political. One example of course is the issue of air-to-air refueling, *i.a*. identified as a key priority by the EDA. Yet, as became blatantly clear in Libya, the fact that respective capabilities exist within Europe does not automatically mean that they can be used. The success of pooling and sharing is thus also, to a large extent, a matter of political will to make commitments on a day-to-day basis, effectively giving up on sovereignty. To be fair, this is not only a problem caused by the Germans. Concerning France and the European Air Transport Command, it is for instance the Germans who complain that in light of the many French caveats, the EATC is in fact "no realization of the European idea."

A good start may be to address bureaucratic obstacles to effective pooling and sharing. The reason, as given in a French parliamentary report, for not using the EATC during *Opération Serval*, was "complexity:"

> […] according to the defense minister's cabinet, it is because of the complexity of the procedures, hardly compatible with the operational tempo, that the European integrated air transport command – EATC, standing for European Air Transport Command – has only been requested in very limited ways.[116]

When thinking about future capability objectives and military cooperation, France and Germany should furthermore keep efficiency in mind. The infamous 2-percent-objective is in fact again very

[116] Author's translation in the text: "Ainsi, selon le cabinet du ministre de la Défense, c'est en raison de la complexité des procédures, peu compatible avec le tempo opérationnel, que le commandement européen intégré des transports aériens – EATC, pour European Air Transport Command – n'a été que très peu sollicité." French National Assembly, Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées. *Rapport d'information n° 1288 sur l'opération Serval au Mali*, 86.

"European" in nature, defining input instead of output, asking "what?" instead of "what for?". Yet, simply spending more will not help at all if it is wrongly spent. Moreover, if Germany indeed increased its defense spending to 2 % of its GDP, this would also imply that Germany's defense budget would be the largest in Europe, given that it also has the largest GDP. Whether all European partners – in light of already existing fears of German "hegemony" and Berlin's dominance in other fields of European politics – would be comfortable with such a development is an open question.

The nuclear issue, finally, is likely to remain unanswered (at least in a Franco-German context) for some time to come. Although the current German government is less vociferous on the matter, (French) nuclear weapons will remain a contentious issue within the Franco-German relationship. Seen as a considerable contribution to pan-European security shouldered by one nation (or in fact two, counting the British), the disregard Germans tend to have toward the *force de frappe* annoys more than a few people in France, where the feeling to be misunderstood is sometimes obvious:

> We need to fight the idea, which is still very present abroad, that France maintains its deterrence in order to preserve its international prestige. […] [T]his deterrence contributes to our allies' security, notably by making the defense engagements our country has underwritten in multilateral or bilateral treaties more credible.[117]

Against that background, Hubert Védrine's 2012 account of the "German issue" – probably written still under the impression of the 2010 pre-Lisbon row – deserves to be quoted in full:

> The German issue is a more delicate matter. France's desire to "revive" French-German defence relations in the broader context of the 1963 Treaty and in an effort to give new impetus to the bilateral relationship, may run into problems. And not just on disagreements about the euro, energy and so on. It must be acknowledged that France and Germany's divergent views on nuclear deterrence, and nuclear power per se, are still very much in the news. Germany prefers the NATO framework for carrying out any military operations, as one of the largest contributors to the NATO budget and with its very large conventional forces. Berlin also killed the EADS/BAE project for various reasons (industrial nationalism? 2012-2013 context? Other reasons?) However, even though the French and German Ministers of Defence signed a letter of intent to promote cooperation on capabilities on 4 June 2012, we are still left with the question of whether Germany really wants to act in defence matters in a European or French-German partnership (Védrine, 2012).

[117] These are Bruno Tertrais' words. Author's translation in the text: "Il convient de tordre le cou à une idée, encore très prégnante à l'étranger, et selon laquelle la France maintient sa dissuasion dans le but de préserver son prestige international. […] [l]a dissuasion contribue à la sécurité de nos alliés, notamment en crédibilisant les engagements de défense souscrits par notre pays en vertu de traités multilatéraux ou bilatéraux." French National Assembly. Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées. *Recueil d'auditions sur la dissuasion nucléaire*, 12.

Although these are harsh words, and the opinion expressed may not be shared in the same intensity across the French foreign and security establishment, Védrine certainly has a point. As French nuclear "guru" Bruno Tertrais thus summarizes

> For the Germans, this is a difficult and sensitive matter on which the successive governments have not always been able to find a position. I take note of the fact that we used to exchange much more with the Germans on military nuclear maters in the 80s as compared to today, which is not normal. It is a pity that this matter mainly remains outside our strategic dialog. The Lisbon Summit has for example been the occasion of a Franco-German incident pertaining to missile defense, which our partners then saw as a substitute for nuclear military assets. I believe that it is not healthy that this matter is so rarely addressed, including among specialists.[118]

Since France is increasingly facing budget constraints, ideas seem to circulate in Paris to engage in cooperation with Berlin. In short, given that Germany also benefits from the French nuclear umbrella, they might as well contribute financially. Ideas to that effect are nevertheless discarded as "ridiculous" in Berlin, while Germans point out that "if the French put their nuclear weapons into NATO, they will get all the funding opportunities they want."

[118] Author's translation in the text: "Pour les Allemands, il s'agit d'un sujet difficile et sensible sur lequel les administrations successives n'ont pas toujours su se positionner. Je note qu'on échangeait avec l'Allemagne beaucoup plus sur le nucléaire militaire dans les années quatre-vingt qu'aujourd'hui, ce qui est anormal. Il est dommage que ce sujet reste largement en dehors de notre dialogue stratégique. Le sommet de Lisbonne a par exemple été l'occasion d'un incident franco-allemand au sujet de la défense antimissile, nos partenaires l'envisageant alors comme un substitut au nucléaire militaire. Je considère qu'il n'est pas sain que ce sujet soit peu abordé, y compris entre spécialistes." French National Assembly, June 27, 2014, Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, *Recueil d'auditions sur la dissuasion nucléaire*. 15/16.

THE INDUSTRIAL DIMENSION

Introduction: the challenge of building a European Defense Technological and Industrial Base

On the demand side, the basic idea behind closer cooperation, pooling and sharing in the industrial field pertains to economies of scale to be made, but also to efficiency to be gained by designing, certifying, using and maintaining one single system (or at least only a few systems) instead of several. Added to this is of course also increased interoperability across borders, which would benefit Europe as an effective and efficient security actor. The industrial dimension of European security, in turn, represents the offer-side of the capability issues discussed in the previous chapter: who develops and builds what, and where will it be sold? How can European defense firms cooperate, and how can Europe preserve a viable defense industry in order to avoid dependence U.S. or Chinese imports?

Within the European Union – and contrary to the United States, the European defense industry's main competitor – different firms produce the same type of equipment. There are consequently several Europeans tanks, frigates, fighter jets and other military materiel on the market: while EU member states in total count eleven suppliers of frigates, the United States has one; Europe has seventeen production lines for tanks, the U.S. has two (European Commission, 2013). This not only appears to be inefficient and problematic in light of making procurement more efficient. What is more, European products – such as, for instance, the *Eurofighter*, *Rafale* and *Gripen* fighter jets – compete with each other on European and world markets – often at their own detriment and for the benefit of their U.S. competitors. Notably the German and French defense industries (with Germany and France representing the 3rd respectively 5th largest arms exporters in the world according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) manufacture goods that serve the same purpose and interest the same clients. The European defense industry is thus highly fragmented, and in times of austerity, its survival is increasingly at stake. There is simply not enough demand on respective national markets, while "structuring projects" such as the development of new fighter jets are not in sight. In other words, the situation is bound to get worse. Exports to e.g. Brazil or India may help firms in the short-term, but total focus on foreign markets will not solve the European industry's structural problems.

On the offer side, the hope is to cease intra-European competition on world markets and make use of synergies and to thereby, ultimately, guarantee the European defense industry's survival. For former High Representative Catherine Ashton and many others, it is thus self-evident that Europe must "reverse the trend of fragmentation and move towards consolidation and increased competitiveness of the defence equipment market." (Schoeffmann, Mahon, Butterworth-Hayes, 2014). Whilst the logic of the argument is again compelling, industrial realities in Europe have little in common with the bold visions of a European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). As a McKinsey report from 2013 thus contends, "[i]t is not remarkable that Europe's defense industry, both in aggregate and in its individual segments, is fragmented. But the extent of that fragmentation

is remarkable" (Mckinsey & Company, 2013). Five countries currently have significant defense industries, namely the United Kingdom, Sweden and Italy, as well as France and Germany.

Attempts at establishing a so-called European Defense Technological and Industrial Base are mainly driven – besides the European Defense Agency – by the European Commission and the European Parliament, with the Commission using the internal market as its main argument. While the Parliament sees a chance for "more Europe" in this field (European Parliament, 2013), the Commission has become a key actor in past years, since

> [p]rogress in security and defence at the EU level as a result of the CFSP/CSDP and the adoption of the European security strategy have been seen by the Commission as an opportunity to enlarge its competencies in this sensitive domain. The Commission wants to profit from the community instruments in order to support the CFSP/CSDP.[119]

From the Commission's perspective, the ongoing economic crisis and the defense budget constraints it engenders represent a window of opportunity. As then Commission President José Manuel Barroso said in his 2011 State of the Union Address,

> at a time when defence budgets are under pressure, we must do more together with the means at our disposal. The Commission is assuming playing its part: we are working towards a single defence market. We are using our [competencies? Word missing in the official transcript] under the Treaty with a view to developing a European defence industrial base (Barroso, 2011).

The European Commission can of course not directly influence national defense market structures, but has to recur to indirect measures. It thus mainly pursues its objectives through its competencies on the internal market, as well as through its support for research and development. The European Commission has indeed long sought to subsume defense procurement under the rules of the internal market, putting an end to the use of Article 346 TEU in this field (allowing member states to make exceptions from the rules on the basis of "essential security interests"). In light of the defense market's specificities – linked to notions of sovereignty and autonomy, but also practices such as offsets and sometimes fiscal incentives – this is of course a much more complicated task than in the case of civilian products.

The Commission has issued a number of Communications and directives, starting with its Communication on "European defence industrial and market issues: Towards an EU defence equipment policy" in 2003 (European Commission, 2003). The subsequent Defense Package of 2009 forms today the "regulatory backbone of a European Defence Equipment Market" (European

[119] For an introduction to the Commission's role in CSDP, see Lavallée C., 2012, The European Commission's Position in the Field of Security and Defense: An Unconventional Actor at a Meeting Point, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society 12*(4), 375.

Commission, 2012). It includes two directives on arms transfers within the EU and defense equipment procurement. The Commission also decided to set up a "Task Force" in 2011, including "all the relevant Commission directorates general" and working "closely with the European Defence Agency and the European External Action Service" (Hale, 2011). This Task Force produced a non-paper, in which it reaches the conclusion that the EU's obvious capability gaps are not the defense industry's fault, given that "the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) could deliver most of the technologies and materiel we would need," but "clearly a direct consequence of budget constraints" (European Commission, 2012). While the European defense industry is still competitive, thanks to past investments in research and development as well international exports, the paper argues, "[i]n the long run, competitiveness on world markets can only be maintained on the basis of a truly European home market in which EU companies can operate freely in all Member States and benefit from a demand side which is consolidated at the European level". Against this background, the Task Force identified three priority areas for Commission action, namely the Internal Market, industrial policy and research and innovation.

The defense package was followed in July 2013 by another Communication by Commissioners Michel Barnier (Internal Market and Services) and Antonio Tajani (Industry and Entrepreneurship), entitled "Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector," involving in total twelve Directorate Generals (European Parliament, 2013). It intends to strengthen the European defense sector through a number of measures, based on the Defense Package which is to be strictly enforced. Focusing on the offer side, the plan includes measures such as suppressing offsets and truly opening up national defense markets, establishing an EU industrial policy for the defense sector or fostering competitiveness through support for exports on third markets. In June 2014, the Commission published its Implementation Roadmap for the Communication issued one year earlier (European Commission, 2014).

Also within the Franco-German Relationship, working together on defense industry issues nevertheless has a certain track record. As far as procurement is concerned, there have been several Franco-German projects in the past, sometimes involving partners beyond Germany and France. These include *Tiger/Tigre* helicopters, *Transall* and *Alphajet* airplanes, the *Milan* missiles, and now the A400M. Since the A400M program was launched in 2003, no major defense cooperation projects were, however, undertaken. And the joint projects that were implemented revealed that cooperation is a lot easier on paper than in reality. The case of the Franco-German combat helicopter *Tigre*, for instance illustrates the "devilish details of bilateral military co-operation," as the project suffered from numerous deferrals that cost many years. "The initial timetable was wrecked by the different basic needs of the German and French armies, linked to differences in military culture and strategy. Germany wanted an anti-tank helicopter, whereas France preferred a support protection version that would be geared toward air combat as well. Now there will be three versions of the Tigre: one for Germany and two for France." (Van Ham, 1999). The other examples are not necessarily more encouraging: one of the main reason behind the delays in the A400M program, for example, are due to the fact that there is not one A400M, but many: one for each ordering country. Had they all chosen the same configuration, the price per plane would – allegedly – have decreased by 15 million €. What all these projects have in common is that although they may eventually have been successful from a technical and military perspective, they clearly do not qualify as economic

successes and have sometimes had detrimental effects on the political climate between Paris and Berlin.[120] Yet, more is to come, at least according to official declarations made in past years. The *Agenda Franco-Allemand 2020* from 2010 thus states that France and Germany intend to

> [d]evelop our dialog on defense industry matters with a view to
>
> - rationalize this sector and act in a concerted manner on our equipment projects, as well as with our partners through the European Defense Agency
> - establish fair rules of the games on the defense market among European and transatlantic partners.[121]

This Agenda was followed up by a number of other initiatives and notably the 2012 declaration of intent on new perspectives for Franco-German armament cooperation (German Ministry of Defense, French Ministry of Defense, 2012). Likewise, both countries identified a list of potential joint projects in the wake of the Elysée Treaty's 50th anniversary in January 2013. Yet, most of these ideas have so far failed to materialize, with the exception of Franco-German ambitions to develop a new battle tank by 2030 announced in May 2015 (Gebauer, 2015). The fact that French Nexter and German KMW (manufacturer of the *Bundeswehr*'s current standard tank, the "Leopard") are about to merge is of course likely to matter within that context.

Again at the European level, especially the run-up to the December 2013 summit has seen a number of reports and official initiatives directly on defense industry. The European Parliament adopted the so-called Gahler-report calling for the development of a European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (European Parliament, 2013). Catherine Ashton, in her interim report for the foreign minister's meeting in Vilnius on 7 September 2013, urged member states to strengthen the common defense industry and get their act together on joint projects, arguing that "[t]he concerted effort of all stakeholders (Member States, industry and the European Institutions) is required to safeguard the future of Europe's defence industrial base" (Ashton, 2013). France and Germany also came with suggestions. The Franco-German proposals prepared in the run-up to the Summit include a number of measures directly pertaining to the field, asking the European Council to "stress the importance of the European Defence industry," while also underlining "the distinctive character and specificity of the defence market" (German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Ministry of Defense, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Ministry of Defense, 2013). France and Germany explicitly ask the European Commission to "assert the implementation and application of the Defence Directives, and

[120] For a brief overview of events surrounding Franco-German armaments cooperation, see Clouet L-M., and Marchetti A., Ungewisse Zukunft der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. For an in-depth case study of the intricacies of joint procurement, see Uiterwijk D., Soeters J., and Van Fenema P., 2013, "Aligning national 'logics' in a European military helicopter program", *Defence & Security Analysis* 29(1), 54-67.

[121] Author's translation in the text, February 4, 2010, "développer notre dialogue sur les questions industrielles de défense en vue de rationaliser ce secteur et de nous concerter en amont sur nos projets d'équipements, de même qu'avec nos partenaires par le biais de l'Agence européenne de défense ; établir des règles du jeu équitables sur le marché de la défense entre partenaires européens et transatlantiques", *Agenda franco-allemand 2020*, Paris, 6.

in particular to abandon the practice of offsets within the EU." Moreover, Paris and Berlin argued that "EDA and the Commission should be tasked to develop a roadmap for the development of defence industrial standards on the basis of preparatory work conducted by the EDA." Under the headline "Industrial Measures/Supporting SMEs," France and Germany invited the Council to ask the Commission for concrete measures to that effect. Finally, Paris and Berlin insists that the "potential of civil-military synergies […] is not yet fully realized," requesting that "t[]he Commission and EDA should be tasked to work on solutions with industry and research institutions to set up a European framework allowing and improving the mutual use of civilian and military research results for dual use applications." At the Council meeting itself, "Strengthening Europe's Defense Industry" constituted the third Cluster, resulting notably in a number of to-dos for the European Defense Agency. The Conclusions thus note that a well-functioning defense markets is based on openness and state that a roadmap for the Commission's Communication on the matter will be developed. They also stress the relevance of research & development,[122] arguably the big topic of the years ahead.

France: The defense industry serving strategic autonomy

With more than 5,000 companies, the French defense industry is the second-largest in Europe (right after the United Kingdom's), directly employs 165,000 people with an annual turnover of about 15 billion Euro, of which on third is generated through exports (French Ministry of Defense, Direction générale de l'armement, 2015). It represents about 25 percent of Europe's defense industry. In all of France's most important defense firms – Airbus, Dassault Aviation, DCNS, MBDA, Nexter, Safran and Thales – the French state is at least indirectly involved, and sometimes even owns everything altogether. The above-named firms, despite the high number of companies, represent the strategic and technological core of the industry. This structure is the result of three phases of restructuring since the end of the Cold War, linked to transformation at global and European level. The third phase, still ongoing, implies the French defense industry's internationalization (Fleurant, Quéau, 2014).

The French defense industry is the result of a state-led industrial policy in pursuit of the goal of national strategic autonomy, of which it is the technological and industrial expression. Its roots go back to the early post-World War II years and President Charles de Gaulle. The industry is thus an element of the country's overall security strategy. Its role is anchored in the 2013 White Paper, which contains an entire section devoted to the matter:

> The defence industry is a key component of France's strategic autonomy. It also contributes to a coherent political, diplomatic and economic ambition. It alone can guarantee the secure supplying of equipment supporting our sovereignty and of critical weapons systems and ensure that it matches operational needs as defined by the Ministry of Defence (French Ministry of Defense, 2013).

[122] On an assessment of the Council's implication from the defense industry perspective, see Fiott D., February 2014, "An Industrious European Council on Defence?", *Security Policy Brief No 53*, Egmont.

The implication of the above is yet not that France's defense industry must necessarily be able to produce the totality of military equipment required by the country's armed forces. Acknowledging that France (like all other European countries) is no longer able to sustain an entire defense industry on its own, the 2008 White Paper defined three "circles" of procurement. France thus should preserve the capacity to design, make and maintain equipment that is at the core of national sovereignty.[123] For the majority of its security and defense acquisitions, however, France will orient its strategy toward European interdependence. In all cases were security of procurement is not directly at stake, the country will resort to world markets (French Ministry of Defense, 2008).

In this vein, "[t]wo objectives must be pursued: we need to preserve a certain number of key technological capacities essential to our strategic autonomy, and to secure the future of the defence industry for economic and social reasons" (French Ministry of Defense, 2013). That said, in the industrial field, France's strategic autonomy is clearly faced with obstacles. The White Paper, with respect to the fact that the last reorganizations of the French industry took place in the 1990s, notes that "[c]anges are inevitable," and continues:

> The state today holds large direct interests in several top-ranking defence companies, public and private. Its policy as shareholder, which will not be limited to a conservative management of its assets, will be reconsidered, company by company, in a dynamic management approach. The main priorities will be supporting companies in their strategic choices, controlling sovereignty-related activities, reinforcing the European dimension of the defence industry and supporting development and protection of critical technologies.

The above-mentioned phase of internationalization is not necessarily the result of a strategic choice, but rather stems from economic necessities. Given that the domestic demand is shrinking and the development of the *Europe de la défense* has stalled, the industry is indeed forced to seek new markets outside of Europe for its products – with the active support of the French government which is well aware that the industry's survival depends on its success on world markets.[124] The French ministry of foreign affairs thus declares on its website that its diplomatic network is an "irreplaceable vehicle of information and influence for defence industries" (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). Also the 2013 White Paper pledges to support arms exports wherever possible. According to the industry's umbrella organization, the *Groupement des industries de défense et de sécurité terrestres et aéroterrestres*, exports amount today to 30 to 40 percent of its activities (Groupement des Industries de Défense et de Sécurité Terrestres et Aéroterrestres, 2015). The export strategy is in fact much more than the mere attempt to sell French products elsewhere. As Aude-Emanuelle Fleurant and Yannick Quéau underline,

[123] For a specification of such "sovereign industrial capacities," see French Senate, July 4, 2012, *Rapport d'information fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées par le groupe de travail sur les capacités industrielles souveraines / capacités industrielles militaires critiques*, Rapport n° 634 rectifié, Paris.

[124] These new markets are especially located in India and Brasil. See Fleurant A-E, Quéau Y., *Die französische Rüstungsindustrie*, 8/9.

> [w]hat is interesting in this context is that most firms pursue a business strategy with several 'home markets.' These markets are of the same importance as the French market, which illustrates their relevance. The development described thus leads to the French business groups' long-term presence abroad. There, they cater to needs other than the French and set up expertise and competence locally, while simultaneously watching their defense technological head start.[125]

Selling on the world market, however, does not necessarily solve all problems. The more knowhow is transferred, the less dependent client countries become on French technology. In many cases, transferring such knowhow is yet an integral part of the deal. Irrespective of export success, the French defense industry therefore remains dependent on sufficient means for research and development, which will allow it to stay at the cutting-edge of technology development. Current developments in French defense spending, however, point into the wrong direction.

Once more, therefore, the solution is sought at the European level through the creation of a European approach and increasing cooperation among European nations and industries. According to the 2013 White Paper, developing "the European defence market and consolidation of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) in the weapons sector is one of our country's strategic priorities " : (French Ministry of Defense, 2013)

> It is urgent to exploit all the potentialities of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and OCCAR (Organisation for joint armament cooperation). These two agencies offer an appropriate and effective framework for strengthening the quality of European cooperation in the defence industry, whether this means harmonising requirements or formulating and managing programmes. France considers, in particular, that the EDA should play the role of a catalyst capable of setting in motion – very far upstream – future technological and industrial cooperative initiatives between EU partners. In the future, a European arrangement, based on the current cooperation between the EDA and OCCAR, should allow States that so wish to acquire equipment in common under the same conditions as NATO agencies.

The last sentence – "under the same conditions as NATO agencies" – in this context refers to the issue of fiscal incentives. The European Council has invited the European Defense Agency to "to examine ways in which Member States can cooperate more effectively and efficiently in pooled procurement projects, with a view to reporting back to the Council by the end of 2014." (European Council, 2013). The EDA itself has called for VAT exemptions for projects it manages. In this context,

[125] Author's translation in the text: "Interessant in diesem Zusammenhang ist, dass die meisten Firmen eine Unternehmensstrategie mit mehreren „Heimatmärkten" verfolgen. Dabei kommt diesen Märkten die gleiche Bedeutung wie dem französischen Markt zu, was deren Relevanz verdeutlicht. Die beschriebene Entwicklung führt somit zur dauerhaften Präsenz der französischen Unternehmensgruppen im Ausland. Dort gehen sie auf andere Bedürfnisse als die französischen ein und siedeln vor Ort Expertise und Kompetenz an, während sie gleichzeitig auf die Wahrung ihres militärtechnischen Vorsprungs achten." Fleurant A-E., Quéau Y., *Die französische Rüstungsindustrie*, 10.

France is pushing for fiscal incentives even in an EU context, as they already apply to procurement within NATO, as one way to revive the European market.

Yet, the benefits expected from collaborative procurement notwithstanding, the 2013 White Paper also holds that industrial restructuring at the European level will need to take place, given that "[c]hances are inevitable." And it moves on:

> The state today holds large direct interests in several top-ranking defence companies, public and private. Its policy as shareholder, which will not be limited to a conservative management of its assets, will be reconsidered, company by company, in a dynamic management approach. The main priorities will be supporting companies in their strategic choices, controlling sovereignty-related activities, reinforcing the European dimension of the defence industry and supporting development and protection of critical technologies.

Giving up on state ownership is indeed a prerequisite for restructuring, such as in the planned merger between Nexter and KMW, which is supported by the French government. According to media reports, the agreement should be signed around July 14, 2015, i.e. French National Day (Altmeyer, 2015).

Germany: free market economy and export regulations

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI) 2013 Yearbook, Germany is the third largest arms exporter in the world. Not unlike the French armament industry, German arms producers are confronted with a national market that is way too small to ensure their economic viability. Exporting their products is thus the key to survival. Offering 316,000 jobs (Bundesverband der Deutschen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsindustrie, 2015) to a large extent to be found in the South of the country, the industry received authorization to export goods worth 5.845.628.422 € in 2013 (German Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, 2013). The German defense and security industry counts numerous small and medium sized enterprises (the famous German *Mittelstand*) and a number of larger players, of which – and this is the big difference with France – none is (partly or even entirely) state-owned.

Official documents such as the 2011 Defense Policy Guidelines or again the 2013 Coalition agreement naturally stress the industry's relevance. The government parties hence underline Germany's "elementary interest in an innovative, performant and competitive national security and defense industry," and support the "preservation of selected key technologies and industrial capabilities, notably with small and medium enterprises."[126] And given recent developments in Europe, the same document also states that

[126] Author's translation in the text: "Deutschland hat ein elementares Interesse an einer innovativen, leistungs- und wettbewerbsfähigen nationalen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsindustrie. Wir setzen uns für den Erhalt

> in the light of decreasing quantities closer military cooperation among European countries must be reflected in the cooperation of European defence industries, too. Agreeing on synergies when it comes to developing, procuring and operating military systems will be crucial for securing indispensable military capabilities in Europe. The same applies to defence cooperation within the Alliance and with other international partners (Christian democratic union, Christian social union and German socialdemocratic party, December 16, 2013).

Hover, since Germany generally lacks a coherent outlook on strategic affairs, the German armament industry's role in German security policy is not clearly defined either. Lines of argument that seem commonplace in France are put forward even in Germany: yet, reasoning in those terms is essentially limited to the manufacturers themselves, while there is no political consensus in sight on the industry's strategic relevance beyond these narrowly confined circles. Contrary to France, the German defense industry is thus first and foremost an economic actor and not primarily a security actor. This is for instance visible in the respective passages of the 2013 Coalition agreement, which states that

> [t]he field of the security and defense industry is not only of national interest from a technology and security policy interest. For that reason, we will make sure that core competencies and jobs will be preserved in Germany, and that technologies and capacities will be developed further.[127]

Another indicator of this attitude toward the defense industry is the failed EADS merger, which the German government stopped on other grounds than security considerations. According to an EADS spokesperson quoted in *Die Zeit*, "it is first and foremost the German [federal] government who has made this fail."[128] The German government is widely accused of having looked at the issue exclusively through the prism of industrial policy, ignoring any sort of security or "European" implication, since "[t]he EADS-BAE Systems merger was seen only as an inappropriate deal for German industry rather than as an opportunity to build an industrial platform for European defence" (Guérot, 2013).

Germany would, however, not be Germany if things were not surrounded by big debates on moral grounds. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Germany is also among the countries in which arms exports are considered to be most problematic. "Problematic", in this context, has both a political and a legal dimension. Politically, exporting weapons and military system is difficult to sell to voters. Legally, it is

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ausgewählter Schlüsseltechnologien und industrieller Fähigkeiten, insbesondere auch bei mittelständischen Unternehmen, ein." Christian democratic union, Christian social union And German socialdemocratic party. *Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten*, 124.

[127] Author's translation in the text: „Der Bereich Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsindustrie ist nicht nur aus wirtschaftlicher Sicht, sondern auch aus technologie- und sicherheitspolitischer Sicht von nationalem Interesse. Daher werden wir sicherstellen, dass Kernkompetenzen und Arbeitsplätze in Deutschland erhalten bleiben sowie Technologien und Fähigkeiten weiterentwickelt werden." Christian democratic union, Christian social union and German socialdemocratic party, *Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten*, 15.

[128] October 10, 2012, Author's translation in the text: „Das war in erster Linie die deutsche Regierung, die das hat scheitern lassen", „Die Fusion von EADS und BAE ist gescheitert", *Die Zeit Online.*

anchored in article 26 of the German constitution that weapons intended for warfare can only be produced and exported with the federal government's consent. While the issue had not been very prominent in public debate until very recently, that changed with the advent of the new "Grand coalition" government in the fall of 2013. The incoming minister for Economic Affairs, the Social Democrats' party president Sigmar Gabriel, announced on several occasions that arms exports were a matter of foreign and security policy, and not of economic policy. As it is his ministry – the ministry of economic affairs, and not the ministry of defense – that is in final charge of export control, that kind of statement is not free from relevance for the industry.[129] During the spring and summer of 2014, Gabriel triggered a debate that essentially opposed Social Democrats buying into his line of argument (as well as Leftists and Greens who call for an end of arms exports altogether) and conservative representatives who underlined the economic and strategic necessity of armament sales abroad. Gabriel's statement were yet not met with unanimous praise even within his own party, as trade unions – traditionally strong allies of the Social Democrats, and in particular the metal workers' union that also represents employees in the armament sector – are opposed to anything that might result in job losses. Most recently, Gabriel has declared that responsibility for arms exports should be moved to the ministry of foreign affairs (Gabriel, 2014).

But even beyond the political dimension, exporting German arms is an intricate matter. The authorization process is complicated and tedious, to the extent that industry representatives see it as an obstacle to business. Foreign arms manufacturers advertise their products, *inter alia*, using the argument that they are "German-free," i.e. not containing German-made components and thus not subject to – what is perceived as – overly restrictive export regulations. Industry representatives have logically not failed to reply to Gabriel, including Airbus's CEO Tom Enders who threatened that job cuts may be the consequence: "I am concerned about the increasingly restrictive arms export policy of Germany. This might trigger additional layoffs in Germany, beyond our current reduction plans. […] Eventually, we might have to consider closing down entire sites or product lines or moving them outside of Germany." (Hepher, Bryan, 2014). Moreover, decisions on export take six to nine months on average, which – so its representatives complain – hampers the German industry's competitiveness.

Change in the German practice is yet not in sight – at least not to the better from an export-friendly perspective. Nevertheless, the German Constitutional Court rejected to rule on the parliament's role in granting export authorization in October 2014. The (opposition) Green party had sued the government within the context of the year-long debate on the exportation of Leopard 2-tanks to Saudi-Arabia, questioning the current practice according to which the federal government informs the *Bundestag a posteriori* once a year (*Die Zeit*, 2014).

And the current debate may have even wider ramifications. While Sigmar Gabriel has reiterated his tough stance on exports, defense minister von der Leyen has launched what she labeled "Agenda Procurement" ("*Agenda Rüstung*") in reaction to the above-mentioned experts' report (Bundesverband der Deutschen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsindustrie, 2014). Among a number of

[129] The exact procedure to follow for arms exports is defined in a federal law. Besides the ministry of economic affairs, it involves the ministries of defense and foreign affairs.

objectives to be achieved with this Agenda, there also seems to be a discussion intended on "dimensions of provision" ("Erbringungsdimensionen," a word that can only emanate from the ministry of defense), i.e. a discussion about which capabilities should be procured from national, European and global suppliers, with the three respective colors covering about one third of the slide each. But the slide detailing these considerations moreover leaves three technological fields open for further discussion among members of the government: armored vehicles, handguns and submarine units – that is, three of the core areas of the German defense industry's activities.[130] In other words, the future will likely see a debate on the defense industry led in Berlin, on export restrictions as well as the preservation of core technologies in Germany.

Conclusions: really the right direction?

Like all industrial sectors, the defense industries in France and Germany are structured in entirely different ways. Large, state-owned companies on the one side, an independent sector comprising numerous small and medium enterprises on the other side: already in terms of entities, the French and German industries are hardly comparable. Different and deeply rooted understandings of industrial policy in both countries add to that incompatibility, and in particular when it comes to the state's role in the context. The French state thus simply owns some of the major players on its defense market, while the Germans profess free market economy. The most important difference yet arises from the French defense industry's key role within France's overall strategy of strategic autonomy. This role confers a certain inflexibility, at least in the eyes of German observers – who also tend to be highly skeptical of France's overall economic situation in general and the French government's performance in particular.

On the other side, the German case is not without intricacies either. The current German government's policies on export control are unlikely to attract much praise from the actors directly concerned by them. Sigmar Gabriel's argument that arms exports must not be seen as a purely economic matter but rather as a security policy issue may seem like a matter of course to most Frenchmen. Yet, this argument is unlikely to mean that Germany is moving into France's direction as far as the defense industry is concerned. Rather, it must be interpreted as "we will not sell at any price," and arguably not much more at this point – in other words, there is no strategic rationale to that statement. The hardened German approach on arms exports is in fact likely to cause severe trouble between Berlin and Paris and has already begun to do so. According to media reports, MBDA (partly owned by Airbus) has plans to sell Milan missiles to Saudi-Arabia, which is why, in turn, the German government is apparently seriously considering to block the export of German components from Germany to France. As Airbus' CEO, Tom Enders, says, "for us, as a Franco-German company, this really means that we would be scrapping the barrel."[131]

[130] The slides are available on the German go-to blog on security affairs by journalist Thomas Wiegold.
[131] Author's translation in the text: „Hier geht es für uns als deutsch-französisches Unternehmen dann wirklich ans Eingemachte." Hegman G., September 11, 2014, " Mit den Deutschen kann man den Export vergessen", *Die Welt*.

The red thread of this report hence also has its relevance when it comes to the industrial dimension of European defense. Fundamental differences between France and Germany, which have their roots at the level of grand strategy (or absence thereof), have consequences at the level of defense industrial cooperation. Ensuring strategic autonomy and making money are two kinds of logics that do not always go together:

> In France, armament programs stem more from the necessities of the operative use of the products developed for the armed forces; they also correspond to the precept of supporting an industry considered strategic. In Germany, compared with the aims of industrial and technological policies, this objective is less present, which does not remain without implications for the *Bundeswehr* […].[132]

As far as the industrial dimension is concerned, developments in Germany are viewed with concern by both German and foreign manufacturers, partners and clients. Frustration with and in Germany is thus palpable. In an interview with *Defense News*, Krauss-Maffei-Wegner's CEO Frank Haun (when asked about the planned merger with French Nexter) complained in September 2014:

> Sometimes I think this would be the utmost favor we could do for both the French and the German governments: shut down KMW in Germany completely and move it to France. In Berlin, we are treated like the mistress of politics: Everybody needs what we provide, but no one wants to be seen with us in public, and some would like to have us dead without being blamed for the killing. Paris has a relaxed attitude towards mistresses like us — we would be welcomed there with open arms (*Defense News*, 2014).

But consolidation in the defense sector has proven to be difficult in general. Experts say that the entire industry is actually moving into the wrong direction, with ever more competition due to ever more different products. In a Franco-German context, failures to cooperate in fact outnumber successful projects in recent years, most famously so the EADS/BEA-merger. Money was lost on feasibility studies, yet to no avail. As one interviewee put it, "there are a lot of sententious speeches about armament cooperation. In practice, these projects die on the spot because of conflicts." The discrepancy between ambitions and reality are thus particularly high in this field, and at least on the German side, the EDA's role is often seen rather skeptically for fear of it being a vehicle for French interests. The merger between German Krauss Maffei Wegman and French (state-owned) Nexter nevertheless seems to be on better way – despite the German minister for economic affairs' being skeptical (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, 2014). Yet, given that KMW is a private firm, its owners will

[132] Authors translation in the text: "In Frankreich ergeben sich die Rüstungsprogramme mehr aus der Notwendigkeit der operativen Verwendung der Güter, die für die Streitkräfte entwickelt werden und für diese bestimmt sind; sie entsprechen außerdem dem Gebot der Unterstützung für eine Industrie, die als strategisch angesehen wird. In Deutschland ist dieses Ziel im Vergleich mit den Zielen der Industrie- und Technologiepolitik weniger präsent, was nicht ohne Auswirkungen auf die Bundeswehr bleibt […]." Clouet L-M., and Marchetti A., *Ungewisse Zukunft der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. Notwendige deutsch-französische Reflexionen*, 11.

eventually decide – so far, their declared preference is the Franco-German merger. Whether official Paris and Berlin will manage to overcome their national reflexes thus remains to be seen. Otherwise, the European Commission seems to be the horse to bet on.

CONCLUSIONS: SUMMING UP THE STOCKTAKING AND AVENUES FOR FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION

The general picture: Paris, Berlin, the market and geopolitics

The conclusions reached in this report sound familiar: despite close cooperation between Paris and Berlin and their (self-chosen) role as motor for European integration, Franco-German cooperation on security and defense matters often proves difficult and holds considerable unused potential. Although there have been attempts at overcoming these challenges in the past, none has truly been successful. Yet, given that even definitions of what "success" would entail differ, this is hardly surprising. Many of the problems identified with the defense of Europe are general in nature. They pertain to a lack of resources, but also to structural lacunae in institutional design, approaches that were never entirely thought through, ad-hockery and bickering among sovereign nation states. The bulk of problems stem from the fact that European defense is hardly ever thought from the end. Within this context, France and Germany, as two heavy-weight actors on the scene, hold divergent views on a variety of issues. The trajectories of their positions thus sometimes meet and sometimes drift apart.

The roots of these positions, however, are not the same, despite the two countries' geographic proximity that essentially exposes them to the same risks and threats. France and Germany share the same security environment and they – officially and on paper – also share the same understanding of risks and threats emanating from that security environment. Both also agree on the need for multilateral security cooperation. At least theoretically, the French and German armed forces are meant to serve the same purposes. Yet, when it comes to actually launching military interventions, Paris and Berlin are no longer on the same page. As the above chapters have shown, Franco-German agreement seems primarily to be found at a mid-level pertaining to institutional assets. This indeed caters to both countries' preferences, France's desire for European defense and Germany's taste for institution-building. While Paris and Berlin differ both in their basic strategic outlook on the world as well as on the actual use of force, they consequently were or are able to agree on the need for EU Battle Groups or a permanent EU Operations Headquarters. Agreement on these matters at least persists until the respective assets are to be put to use. Differences, however, arise as soon as financial implications appear on the agenda. Franco-German misunderstandings are not at the root of CSDP's or even NATO's shortcomings. Nevertheless, a lack of cooperation between Paris and Berlin is at least partly to invoke for these problems not to be solved.

Although it may prove beneficial on a number of occasions, agreement on technical matters, however, is a rather superficial phenomenon. It is no sound basis for steps toward better cooperation. In the field of security and defense policy, the problem between France and Germany is in fact not that their positions differ, but rather that France has an overall strategy and Germany does not. For that reason, cooperation on helicopters, a European OHQ or the defense industry may certainly further European defense, but it will not solve the real problem. Likewise, pledges to

become more "pragmatic" will only hide the real issue, given that pragmatism can, by definition, only ever be about the *how*, but not replace lacking notions of the *what.* The deeper the degree of European integration, the greater that problem will become. Yet, to solve it, the ball is arguably in the German court. For Berlin to talk to Paris at eye level in strategic terms – and not an eye level that is bought – Germany will have to increase its efforts to define a security strategy. Such a security strategy would be a starting point for discussions with all its allies on the future of European defense, but also concrete military interventions or again the defense industry. The next step would then of course consist in a European security strategy worth its name, as numerous observers and analysts have been demanding for years.

Whether they recognize it or not, Germany and France (as well as their partners) are increasingly faced with the defense expenditure trilemma, confronted with the challenge of repositioning themselves within a triangle formed by security, national sovereignty and resource efficiency (Overhage, 2013). Both Paris and Berlin perfectly well understand "resource efficiency," and they also recur to notions of national sovereignty, even though these notions take somewhat different expressions: while France pursues strategic autonomy, Germany cultivates its parliamentary reserve associated with a "culture of restraint." The real difference between the two, however, is located at the third angle of the triangle: security. Germany has (still) a hard time to grasp that threats are real and need to be dealt with.[133] Reasons for this are manifold, but the United States' "benign hegemony" in European security affairs and a habit of free-riding Germans themselves tend to confound with pacifism is certainly the most relevant factor. Similar threats listed in official documents do thus not necessarily imply that both Paris and Berlin "read" their security environment in the same way. This, however, will be the main obstacle for Franco-German – and European – security cooperation in the years to come. As one person interviewed for this study thus summed up the current situation spot-on: France must learn to accept the market, Germany needs to accept geopolitics.

The ongoing debates in Germany, brought to a wider public's attention with the speeches given by two ministers and the federal president at the 2014 Munich Security Conference, may be a good starting point for change. Yet, the ongoing discussions must not be overstated in their relevance. At the time being, these are indeed debates in the plural form: while some discuss Germany's increased responsibility in world affairs, others discuss the *Bundeswehr*'s capabilities and procurement practices, while still others discuss the future of the parliamentary reserve. All these aspects would first of all need to be addressed in a coherent manner, based on an understanding of the interlinkages between them. Most importantly, however, although these issues are beyond doubt very relevant, the German debate still lacks a strand that would in fact be dealing with the starting point of all security policy: what does Germany need to be afraid of? In other words, what are the threats the country is facing? In an ideal world, only then would other, in comparison less fundamental, issues be addressed. Only if it starts dealing with this question can Germany become a truly constructive actor in European defense – instead of being "the new France" as some observers

[133] One recent illustration of this point may be an opinion poll from early October 2014: While 8 out of 10 respondents say that the Islamic State is a threat to Germany, only 28 % say that Germany should be more engaged in fighting it (while 49 % say that Germany should continue on its current level of engagement and 19 % say that Germany should be less engaged), See Infratest Dimap, *ARD-DeutschlandTREND*.

already labeled Berlin's stance within NATO in recent years (Rühle, 2009). Discontent with Germany is indeed felt beyond France, as for instance is obvious in this parliamentary report from the United Kingdom:

> We asked about the German position on European defence, which witnesses uniformly found disappointing. Dr Moelling [of the Berlin-based SWP] told us that Germany spent only 1.5% of GDP on defence. Ambassador Burns [former U.S. representative to NATO] was particularly critical, arguing that Germany should make a greater commitment to collective defence and modernisation of its own military forces. In Afghanistan, Germany had initially refused to deploy its troops to combat areas and use them for combat purposes, which had been a "bitter disappointment" for US commanders and civilians. He thought Germany should be able to field an army, air force, and navy that could stand separately but, because of weak defence budgets and a lack of commitment from its political leaders to a modern defence establishment, it had become a drag on NATO. Other American witnesses expressed similar frustrations over the German position, especially its role in Afghanistan and on its stance over Libya, although Germany had been helpful in "backfilling" during the Libyan campaign, keeping US bases functional. Etienne de Durand [IFRI, Paris] also commented on the problem of German political will, which affected Germany's ability to deploy its troops without caveats. The political culture was different and he did not think Germany would move quickly in the direction of collective defence.[134]

Waiting for results in the German strategy debate is of course no option, not least because there is no guarantee that it actually will produce results. Time is pressing, both in terms of fading European capabilities and rising threat levels. The 2013 French White Paper may well be a starting point for Franco-German and even further European considerations. Its basic assumptions – the need for European cooperation, but also the need for the ability to project power – reconcile two ideas Paris respectively Berlin hold dear: while France primarily sees the need to project power and views cooperation as a means to that end, Germany tends to consider cooperation an end in itself. Such different approaches are of course not ideal, but they are, at least, not mutually exclusive. Moreover, this attitude has not prevented Berlin from proposing the Framework Nations Concept, which – at least in theory – is exactly meant to increase Europe's ability to project power. In other words, there should be at least some basis for steps forward, even though the rationales behind concrete measures may differ.

Franco-German cooperation is yet not enough. In light of the challenge's dimension, but also existing cooperation frameworks, the European level is decisive. This is notably the case when it comes to defense cooperation, pooling and sharing and decisions to give-up on specific capabilities or serve as framework nation. Coordination is in fact required beyond France and Germany, for instance as far as capabilities are concerned:

[134] See chapter III, "The State of Play – The German Position" in: *UK Parliament, European Union Committee. Thirty-First Report, European Defence Capabilities: lessons from the past, signposts for the future*, 2012, Notes omitted.

> The irony is that specialisation might be conscious and by design at the national level. However, if it is not coordinated at EU or NATO levels, several national specialisations by design risk turning into an overall specialisation by default at the EU or NATO levels: if many states decide to specialise in, say, infantry, who is going to assure the amphibious force capability? (Major, Mölling, 2013)

European defense is nevertheless at a point were thinking big is required. Merely debating the technicalities of pooling and sharing will not take Europe any further – especially unless the big issue of sovereignty hidden in the fine print is not addressed. Rather, the big issues such as the institutional setting require attention. Within this context, there is room for Franco-German initiatives – provided that both Paris and Berlin mobilize the required political will. With reference to the possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty, visionaries already call for a Defense EuroGroup, primarily built upon French and British capabilities, associating Germany, equipped with a common European defense budget for common action (French Senate, Committee for Foreign Affairs and Armed Forces, 2013). The likelihood for such ideas to succeed of course seems limited. It would, however, be erroneous to stay passive and wait for the big move. For the sake of pragmatism, called for all about, a focus on smaller, easier to handle questions may be equally welcome. The "big" issues – such as the *Europe de la défense* vs. NATO or the nuclear question – are indeed unlikely to be resolved any time soon. Franco-German debates around these matters therefore sometimes tend to be reminiscent of theatrical performances where the protocol could as well have been written in advance. For Paris and Berlin, the challenge will thus consist of identifying new avenues for cooperation that stay abreast of the changes Europe and the world as a whole are currently undergoing.

Avenues for Franco-German cooperation

The track record of defense and security cooperation between France and Germany is long. Analyzing and assessing Franco-German cooperation within these fields has never been the objective of the present report. Yet, comparing the two approaches on a number of relevant matters has inevitably led to identifying issues were further consultation, explanation and perhaps cooperation seems in order, of course in addition to ongoing projects and formats outlined in various bilateral declarations. Functioning bilateralisms indeed continue to be key to shaping European cooperation and integration (Charillon, Ramel, 2010). The 2013 French White Paper states that "the impetus must come from highest political level of the Union, i.e. the European Council," which "must determine the role that Europe intends to play on the international stage and the nature of the world order that Europe wishes to promote in international forums and organisations and with respect to other States" (French Senate, Committee for Foreign Affairs and Armed Forces, 2013). In this context, the French preference is for the elaboration of a European White Paper "at a later time." Yet, of course even Paris is aware of the fact that such a Common approach is utopic at the time being (de France, Whitney, 2013).

As the previous section has attempted to argue, the main challenges ahead in fact lie at the strategic level. They pertain to analyzing the environment and to setting priorities in a number of fields,

ranging from capability development to industrial policy. Hoping for answers to miraculously emerge from Brussels seems to be a bad idea. Against that background, why not start in a Franco-German context, potentially to be extended to encompass the Weimar Triangle or even the Weimar-Plus countries? The idea of a Franco-German White Paper has been lingering around for quite some time, *i.a*. intended to remedy to the lacunae of a non-existing dialog on the very starting point of security policy formulation, i.e. threats and threat perception, (regional) priorities and the like. While there is an evident need to address the fundamental issues, some skepticism as to the format may be in order. Although it is certainly true that the very foundings of foreign and security policy need to be debated, semi-official formats may be more promising. There is, in other words, a sense in starting such a discussion process even if its results remain short of a full-fledged White Paper. Beyond the nitty-gritty of pragmatic cooperation, Europe must indeed also address the challenges at the strategic level to which it does not yet have an answer. France and Germany alone will of course not be able to provide definitive European answers on these issues. Yet, a strategic bilateral dialog may indeed be helpful, focusing on a number of questions related to the evolution of the international system. This dialog should formulate its ambitions short of a Franco-German White Paper. Moreover, it should avoid gatherings to "talk about strategy," but rather break down the issue in a number of smaller and more concrete challenges. These are, in the first place, questions that pertain to partners and other relevant actors in the European security environment, where notably three states stand out given their relevance to the continent's security: the United States, Russia and Turkey.

- With respect to the United States: How to deal with the United States' Pacific Pivot? Is it a window of opportunity for a "more European NATO"? Or does it imply the end of NATO as it has existed since the end of the Cold War?
- With respect to Russia: how should Europe deal with the new Russian stance in European affairs? What potential is there for future strategic partnership with Russia? What implications should Russia's behavior in Ukraine have for other policy fields, such as energy policy?
- With respect to Turkey and the Cyprus issue: Can unrest in the Middle East – at Turkey's borders – lead to a window of opportunities for solving this bilateral issue that stands in the way of improved EU-NATO relations? Carrots to be offered may include Turkish access to the European Defense Agency.[135]

The latter issue would hopefully also open doors for solving European defense's most pressing institutional issue: the parallel lives of NATO and CSDP. Although slight improvements are to be seen, real change is necessary. Here again, political leadership is required. And Germany seems to be in a particularly good position to play an important role, given its middle ground stance between "Europeanist" Paris and strongly "Atlanticist" London. With the recently found French pragmatism vis-à-vis NATO, and if the Turkey/Cyprus issue were to be solved, there could indeed be a window of opportunity for a sensible approach to redefining the relationship between the Alliance and the European Union's CSDP.

[135] Turkey has on several occasions expressed the ambition to participate in the European Defense Agency on similar terms as Norway and Switzerland.

This also pertains to streamlining Smart Defense and Pooling & Sharing. Both initiatives stand in front of the same challenges: their real breakthrough is still to come. What would really be needed is a holistic approach, both time-wise in terms of the equipment's lifecycle and strategy-wise in terms of being geared toward an all-European level of ambition. Such an approach would require closer linkages with national defense planning in order to yield optimal results.

Finally, while France already had defined the three circles of industrial capacities (national, European and global, depending on their relevance for national sovereignty) in 2008, the German defense ministry's thinking seems to go in the same direction. In other words, dialog and coordination seem to be in order given that – in light of existing Franco-German cooperation in bi- or multinational firms – Franco-German solutions may in fact serve both countries' interests.

Finding solutions for European defense clearly is a political and not a military problem. It is thus policy-makers' mindset that requires change. The real question, however, that outshines all other questions is of course: what for? What do we need CSDP and NATO for? What do we need capabilities for and what kind of capabilities? And who can build these capabilities? As long as the answers to these subordinate questions are taken for means in themselves, real progress on European defense will not be possible. In full recognition of what the outside world really looks like, there is no alternative to finally developing a European strategy.

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ETUDE DE L'IRSEM N°41

DEFENDING EUROPE? A STOCKTAKING OF FRENCH AND GERMAN VISIONS FOR EUROPEAN DEFENSE

Numerous examples seem to illustrate the incompatibility of French and German strategic cultures. The two countries' very different political choices in concrete situations such as the military intervention in Libya have been the subject of many debates. These differences not only hamper European security policy and thus the establishment of the European Union as a full-fledged world-wide security actor, but also cooperation within the Franco-German tandem. While France and Germany remain the "motor" couple of European integration, their dialog on security matters continues to be difficult (and too infrequent, notably in times of the Euro crisis). Strategic cultures, world views and ideas on the role to play on the international stage, as well as the attention (publicly) devoted to security policy are essentially different. Mutual incomprehension is thus manifest in Paris and Berlin, with obvious difficulties to understand the other's objectives and motivation.

The aim of this study consists of taking stock of strategic thinking in France and Germany. More concretely, it intends to identify compatible and incompatible aspects, as well as the potential for compromise, in these national considerations on the future of CSDP and NATO. In so doing, it concentrates on five issues: strategic visions, threat perception and military doctrine; the institutional framework for European defense; military interventions; capabilities as well as the industrial dimension.

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