Afghanistan,
Jegdaley Valley.
Operation Reginu.

DOMINIQUE DHE/SIRPA TERRE IMAGE

International relations

KEY MESSAGES

Over the next thirty years, international relations are set to undergo a profound change in power distribution, marked by:

- The closure of the chapter of 'western domination', which began in the 16th century, and the end of the American unipolar order that began at the end of the Cold War;
- The emergence of new powers with global influence (China, India, Brazil) or extensive regional influence (South Africa, Indonesia, Turkey, etc.), and a shift of the geostrategic, geopolitical, and geoeconomic balance towards the East and, to a lesser extent, the South.

These changes should lead to the establishment of a multipolar order and, more probably, an 'oligopolar' order, structured around regional poles or based on pragmatic alliances that shift according to the interests at stake. Above and beyond the traditional economic and military alliances, new poles or coalitions might form based on cultural, religious, ideological, or linguistic identity and on common interests (e.g., the environment).

In the context of globalisation and the explosion of flows, individual states will increasingly find themselves unable to face global challenges alone.

Although the emergence of a 'world government' by 2040 seems unlikely, growing interdependencies and global challenges should lead to an increased demand for multilateral co-operation, which will be increasingly complex and heterogeneous, but will not necessarily lead to a strengthening of the cooperative dynamic. In parallel, the tensions between the legitimacy, representativeness, and effectiveness of international organisations should continue to characterise, and possibly to hinder, global governance.

In view of the predictably growing fragility of the European economic model and the risk of strategic downgrading, Europe must overcome many challenges to maintain its median position of power, its stability, and its peaceful borders, in addition to its ability to wield influence. Above and beyond the necessary effort to maintain adequate European defence capabilities, via both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union, the main issue will be the European Union's ability to once again embody the idea of a political project that would be federating, protective, and a power lever; truly capable of defending the economic, social, environmental, and identity-related interests of the member states.

1 The end of western domination[1]

The 'western domination' that has prevailed since the 16th century is now coming to an end: the USA and the European countries no longer have a monopoly on scientific knowledge and technological innovation or international trade and finance, whilst their military supremacy is being eroded as newer players become increasingly powerful. More generally, the 'western model' born in the age of the Enlightenment and the universality of its values are being questioned and challenged by new models.

1.1 - The end of the American hegemony and the European decline

The next thirty years should see the gradual advent of a post-American world, which would close the chapter of the unipolar order that has prevailed since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consecration of the American hyperpower. The main unknowns concern the rate of this geopolitical transition and Washington's ability to adapt to the new balance of power that will be created. The USA's reaction to the relative decline of its hegemony will be decisive for international stability and recompositions.

The main issue for the USA, when new competitors such as China in particular are vying with it, will therefore be to maintain its position as the top world power, able to keep its leadership role on all continents.

Although Washington is likely to end its involvement in some regions, the USA should be able to continue relying on dynamic demographics, a powerful ability to innovate and adapt, considerable influence, control of material and immaterial flows (goods, persons, ideas, etc.) and armed forces with global capability that will not be equalled in the foreseeable period, to maintain a predominant position in most of the components of power. On the other hand, they will be facing major challenges, particularly in the economic sector, such as controlling public expenditure, managing the budget deficit, and coping with challenges to the supremacy of the dollar—all of which could affect the very basis of their power. They could thus be supplanted by China as the world's top economy in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) as early as 2020, and in terms of nominal value during the decade beginning in 2030.

The rise of China, which is the USA's main concern at present, combined with the fact that the most acute security issues are centred in Asia—a situation that is likely to continue for some considerable time—should make Washington place the Asia-Pacific region at the top of its strategic priorities. Any European withdrawal from the major world strategic and security issues would only accelerate and amplify this geopolitical shift.

Today, the European Union, in the grip of a major economic crisis, has reached a turning point in its history. The EU seems certain to lose its status as a top world economic power in the coming years, to be replaced by new international poles, and so the new focus is on avoiding a political, military, and economic downgrade.

Its assets are indisputable: world's leading economic and scientific power, conducting one quarter of world trade, with a positive international image, a centre of political stability. It is still the only recognised crisis management player with the capability to respond to the crisis in a global manner.

1- The term 'West' as used in this report denotes a path (common historical trajectory), a plan (based on liberal, democratic ideological values), a perception (external) and an identity and it is impossible to plot on a map; but in this report it usually refers to the European countries and the USA and, more generally, the OECD countries.



Comparison chart showing deployment of American forces worldwide, 1990-2011



Source: n°8228 MOND/DRM/SAG

Military Intelligence Division - September 2010

If it is to succeed, however, in maintaining its position on the international stage, upholding its values and making an effective contribution to international stability and prosperity, starting with its immediate neighbours, Europe will need to face the many challenges arising in particular from its sluggish demographics, public deficits, increasing energy dependence, competitiveness in relative decline, adaptation of its social model, lack of shared major projects and strategic visions in general, the risk of declining cohesion between member states and an increase in nationalistic attitudes, and the need to define its borders and bridge the gap between its citizens and its institutions.

Their divergent positions could encourage a situation in which each European country considers only its own narrow national interests, guided by pragmatism.

The abandonment of the traditional multilateral confines in favour of ad-hoc approaches alone could not only increase the risk of Europe becoming marginalised, but would also end up weakening the basic principles of solidarity that reigned over the construction of Europe and its ambitions to wield influence in the main international balances. Such a development could have a direct impact on both the progress of the European Union's security and defence policy, and cohesion within NATO.

Europe could therefore be less and less in a position of strength to impose its rules, its standards, and its agenda, and its influence could decline, including in its traditional regions of influence, which are increasingly strategic for Europeans.

1.2 - The shifting of power and influence towards Asia

The shifting of geopolitical balances towards Asia is now the most decisive strategic-political mutation, especially since the worldwide financial and economic crisis of 2008.

By 2025, the East and South Asian countries will be the most dynamic centres in terms of demographics (60% of the world population), their economy, and innovation. Despite the relative decline of Japan, Asia, which should consolidate its position as the leading importer and exporter in the world, will be home to the two main economic growth engines in the world: China and India. This will make Asia the new convergence point for the flows of populations, goods, and capital.



The EU in the world - 2011

Preferential agreements:

- European Economic Area
- African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP)
- European Neighbourhood Policy (including Euromed)
- Continental partnerships
- Bi-regional agreements
- Dialogues or bilateral agreements (established or in progress, global or sectorial with a specific State)

Sources: Compilation by the authors from the European Commission portal, http://ec.europa.eu/

M.-F. Durand, B. Martin, D. Placidi, M. Törnquist-Chesnier, *Atlas de la modernisation*, Presses de Sciences Po - Paris, 2007



EU external missions and operations : July 2011

Civilian missions
- in progress
- completed

Military missions
- in progress
- completed

Dual presence of civilian and military missions
- in progress
- completed

Source: Council of Europe

A.Palle, Delegation for Strategic Affairs, 2011

FOCUS

JAPAN: the risk of decline

The domestic impact of the earthquake in March 2011 dealt a blow to the Japanese economy, which had been experiencing a slight upturn. There was massive property damage (reconstruction costs estimated at 140 to 220 billion euros) and a large number of casualties (almost 25,000 people dead or missing). Moreover, the radioactive leakage recorded around the Fukushima power station will have a long-term effect on a zone representing 23% of Japan's fishing waters. The industrial sector, paralysed by the lack of electricity, will take quite some time to return its normal level of activity. The Japanese economy, which was replaced by China as the world's second economy in 2010, is still being strangled by a debt equivalent to 200% of its GDP and by a declining population. The short- and medium-term concern is that the near-paralysis of Japanese trade (second largest exporter in the world 20 years ago, fourth today) could have a negative effect on the country's already relatively low growth rate (around 2%), whilst the instability in the Near and Middle East should tend to push the price of oil upwards. This pressure on fossil fuels will continue until the production of nuclear power returns to its pre-earthquake level. The Japanese nuclear power sector, which provides between 25% and 30% of national energy production, could be permanently weakened, particularly in terms of export trade.

In addition to the economic and financial impact and the persistent question mark hovering over the future of the nuclear industry, the catastrophe in Japan will not be without consequences on the national psyche. Even though it has been steadfast in the face of the natural disasters and the nuclear accident that have struck it, Japanese society has long suffered from a lack of confidence concerning the future. It might, however, unexpectedly find a reason to bounce back under the impetus of rebuilding, and its fighting spirit could be restored. This trend, however, which has already been evident for several years in the demographic decline (the population was approximately 128 million in 2010, and is due to fall to 117 million by 2030 and 102 million by 2050) and accelerated ageing (with seniors now accounting for 23% of the population), could be accentuated by the current crisis and contribute to the gradual erosion of Japan's technological and financial superiority.

In the struggle between Beijing and Tokyo for influence in East Asia, the ability to support aid and development programs is still of primary importance, whether this aid goes to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN: Burma, Greater Mekong project) or South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan). Given the constitutional restrictions that weigh upon Japanese international initiatives (restrictions on military operations) and the consequent low visibility of its defence force, the scale of the task involved in reconstructing the country and the difficulty for Tokyo to maintain 'chequebook diplomacy' could damage its ambition to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

FOCUS

China, an emerged power, superpower in the making?

As the only Asian country that is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, a nuclear power, and a demographic and geographical giant, China has enjoyed continuous economic growth since its reforms in 1979 (an average of almost 10% per year over the last thirty years). China did not suffer from many effects of the world economic and financial crisis with regard to its competitors, and emerged with its international position consolidated. It was the seventh world economic power 20 years ago, it stole Japan's place as the second world economy in 2010, and if it continues on its present course, it could take first place from the USA by 2020-2025 (in purchasing power parity).

The Chinese authorities want China to hold the status of a major power—as it did in the early 19th century—in every aspect, whether classic (economic, political, military and diplomatic) or in the areas of 'soft power' (technological, scientific, and cultural). With this aim in mind, they are conducting a very strong public diplomacy offensive. Beijing considers American power to be both the strategic and economic benchmark, and the main threat against which it must equip itself.

The future of Chinese power nevertheless still depends on China's ability to deal with a certain number of challenges arising in particular from its very strongly outward-looking economic situation, the accelerated ageing of its population, very wide socio-economic inequalities, and the low level of human development. To be a complete global power, it must also be able to offer values with a universal scope or a political and social model that is internally durable and externally attractive.

On a political and diplomatic level, there are certain factors likely to upset the optimistic scenarios of democratic transition and 'peaceful development' (proclaimed by the regime) of Chinese power:

- The nature of the regime: Despite the development of a free-market economy, it continues to subscribe to the principle of a one-party communist system and democratic centralism. Up to now, China has demonstrated its ability to adapt from the inside whilst avoiding the risk of sclerosis, and it has succeeded in maintaining social stability thanks to reinforced control measures and an improved standard of living for its population. Despite this, the increased number of rural and urban riots against local potentates or against injustices, the increased demands of the better-off classes of Chinese society, who want more individual freedoms, more radicalised regional ethnic movements (Tibet, Xinjiang), and sharper divisions within the CCP itself are all potential factors favouring internal instability.

-Nationalism has replaced communist ideology. On the one hand, it takes the form of national pride in China's success in various areas, and a desire for China to resume its 'legitimate' place in the world, which it deserves thanks to its geographical and demographic mass, its seat on the Security Council, its history, and its culture. On the other hand, it takes the form of a more aggressive stance, particularly with regard to the West and certain Asian neighbours (Japan, India). Thus far, Chinese diplomacy had been guided by a form of pacifism and minimalism in its participation in the management of world affairs. Inspired by the '24-character strategy' promoted by Deng Xiaoping, it manifested itself in a desire for gradual development without seeking to be provocative or to enter into conflict. It could ultimately shift towards a non-cooperative stance. A more powerful China and more ambitious would be likely to demand respect and deference from others, thus reducing its tolerance to anyone who tried to interfere with its plans.

Uncertainties and foreseeable step changes:

- The absence of rule of law and a deficient business environment, and insufficient transparent economic information remain a source of weakness in the Chinese development model, which is not immune to speculation bubbles or crises due to overheating.
- A sudden and lasting slow-down of Chinese growth, as well as a major accentuation of economic inequalities and imbalances could cause political and social upheavals likely to upset the fragile social balance upon which Chinese national cohesion and the stability of the regime depend.
- A movement towards aggressive nationalism would result in a cooling of relations with neighbours and a tougher stance on territorial issues (borders with India, territorial waters, particularly in the South and East China seas), liable to lead to an escalation ending in violence and possibly even a significant classic conflict.
- If Taiwan were to move towards de jure independence, this could lead to a conflict.

A strategic withdrawal of the USA from the region for financial and/or political reasons would upset the strategic balances of the region and give China a pretext to tighten its grip on the whole of Asia.



Distribution of the Chinese population by age bracket, from 2010 to 2050
(millions of persons)

0-14 years | 15-64 years | 65-79 years | ≥ 80 years

Source: Activity reports, www.oxfam.org; www.panda.org; www.greenpeace.org; www.amnesty.org.

Virginie Raisson, *Atlas des futurs du monde 2033 (Atlas of world futures 2033)*, Robert Laffont, Paris, 2009

This increase in Asia's economic power goes hand in hand with military growth. According to the available data, the military expenditure of the Asian countries should soon exceed that of the European Union countries. Although one should not necessarily conclude that the military capabilities of the region will automatically overtake those of the European countries in the short or medium term, this indicator is revealing in and of itself.

This growth in Asian military capabilities is taking place within an unstable regional context, marked by the weakness in regional conflict-prevention mechanisms and the existence of many unresolved territorial conflicts, as well as strong tensions concerning the behaviour of North Korea, China and the Taiwan question, the Kashmir problem and, more generally, the chequered relations between India and Pakistan, India and China, and China and Japan. The cohabitation of four nuclear military powers in the region: China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea, and the risks related to the new proliferation crises are all factors that could aggravate the tensions in this part of the world.

Even so, the shifting of the centre of gravity towards Asia, combined with the end of the American hegemony, will not automatically make China the leading world power in the medium term, for at least two reasons. On the one hand, the internal challenges (political, social, and environmental) and regional challenges (mistrust of neighbouring countries) faced by China would be obstacles to this development. On the other hand, surrounded by countries with close ties to the USA that fear the emergence of a new hegemony, it must also reckon with the increasing power of India, potentially a front-ranking strategic rival.



The Beijing International Telecommunications Exhibition.
5 October 2011,
Beijing, China

STEPHEN SHAVER/AFP IMAGE FORUM

FOCUS

India and its regional environment, or the tectonics of the major emerging countries

Like its Chinese neighbour, India is growing in strength, but at a different rate and in a different way. India is a democratic power, with a focus entirely on its economic development. With a young and dynamic population, it has enjoyed steady economic growth since the late 1990s (greater than 8% per year between 2005 and 2009). This trend should continue in the years to come.

Its intentions are generally believed to be peaceful, and it has conducted its international relations responsibly. It aspires to a global role and, like its neighbour, China, it considers that it is entitled to this position because of its economic and demographic weight, its culture and its history. For these reasons, it is a candidate for a seat as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

These aspirations could, however, be hindered by ongoing troubled relations along its borders, most notably with Pakistan and China. For India, China should remain both a considerable market—it is currently its second trading partner, after the European Union—and a strategic rival.

Although it obeys its own motivations and dynamic, the conflict with Pakistan could in certain respects be repositioned in the context of this rivalry with China, because the alliance between Islamabad and Beijing will allow Beijing to maintain constant pressure on New Delhi. The economic and military support that China gives Pakistan is likely to remain a major thorn in the side of Sino-Indian relations.

These tensions should not interfere with the dynamic of economic exchange between the two countries. They do, however, shed light on the nature of the rivalry between these two major emerging countries which, although they have never had a head-to-head conflict, are locked in a struggle for influence, both directly and indirectly, all around their borders.

We are thus likely to witness not so much a clash as a case of friction between different ambitions in South Asia and around its edges. This could generate or amplify pockets of power vacuum (Afghanistan, Nepal, etc.) that both powers will try to exploit, but for which neither one will be willing or able to take responsibility. It will amplify the fear of exploitation of nationalistic sentiments within state borders or social movements arising from the growing tensions generated by extremely different rates of integration into the world economy (as illustrated, for example, by the rise of the Maoist movement in India).

At present these phenomena are regional, but their impact is potentially global. Power vacuums are where terrorism springs up and grows until it is exported to the outside.

1.3 - The emergence of new powers

Following the Asian tigers and dragons, the emergence, since the beginning of the decade, of the second generation of states with a new capability to transform the world geopolitical and/or geoeconomic scene will continue to disrupt the organisation and distribution of power on an international scale. According to projections, by 2050 the overall wealth of the seven emerging countries in the E7 group could be more than double that of the G7 countries.

The concept of emerging countries acknowledges the existence of a group of economically dynamic countries, which are demographic heavyweights, destined to become at least regional powers, but it also encompasses several categories of power:

- On the one hand, it includes 'emerged' powers such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China, (the BRICs)[1], which have had an influence on the international system in the past,
- On the other hand, countries with high potential, equally dynamic or even more dynamic, but smaller in terms of size and weight, possessing only a limited number of the components of power, and whose assertiveness on the international scene is new. The most dynamic countries over the next twenty years should include South Africa, recently inducted into the BRICs[2], South Korea, Turkey, Mexico, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Ukraine, and Vietnam.

Despite their connections and their common features, these countries are not a uniform block, but just a set of heterogeneous powers with frequently divergent interests, different economic development models, and shifting alliances usually formed on the basis of specific issues.

The economic and financial crisis not only highlighted the resiliency of some of the emerging countries (China, Brazil, India, Turkey, etc.), but also revealed the fragility of the development model of some others, particularly Russia, which is nevertheless a special case amongst the so-called emerging powers[3].

'Emerging' countries will no longer automatically graduate to the status of an 'emerged' power that is established, global, and with the long-term capacity to take part in laying down rules in a certain number of key areas. This will largely depend on the ability of these countries to capitalise on their power in a particular sector (for example, the economic sector) to grow in other areas (e.g. military or diplomatic), and their ability to manage their internal problems (demographic, economic and social), most notably by reducing inequalities so that the vast majority of their population will no longer feel excluded from the new prosperity. The future of most of these new powers, which now have tremendous potential, remains uncertain, like Nigeria which seems likely to remain in a stagnant situation.

As these new powers assert themselves, South-South relations will increase in number and density, and are likely to downgrade North-South relations and modify certain international rules inspired by the Northern countries. The creation of increasingly robust coalitions, particularly in multilateral environments, will result in the emergence of a new diplomacy via the increasing number of discussion bodies with an ever-broadening agenda (of which the BRICS and IBSA[4] formats are the most complete) based first and foremost on a stance concerning, and usually against, the West (Europe, USA, and even Japan). In the face of this unity of priorities displayed in the international bodies, even despite the affinities that exist between certain Southern nations and Western powers, the countries of the North may increasingly find themselves in a minority concerning a growing number of subjects when they fail to agree amongst themselves.

1- The concept of the BRICs comes from a strategy analysis carried out Goldman Sachs in 2001. BRIC stands for Brazil, Russia, India, and China. It highlights the strong potential of those four countries, which together account for 40% of the world's population and 25% of the developed surface area of the globe, and whose GDP should exceed that of all the Western countries by 2030-2040.

2- South Africa was inducted into the BRIC forum, which then became BRICS, at the Hainan Summit in April 2011. Because of its weight, however, South Africa is not truly comparable to the BRICs. It remains a country with strong potential.

3- Whilst the emerging countries are engaged in an economic, strategic and political upturn, Russia, a former superpower, has kept some of the components of power (particularly its role on the international stage), but has suffered a downgrading, especially in strategic and economic terms. N. Mac Farlane, 'The R in BRICS: is Russia an emerging power?', International Affairs vol. 82, n° 1, January 2006.

4- India-Brazil-South Africa – a forum putting itself forward as a group of non-western, democratic powers.

FOCUS

Turkey: a re-emerging power between East and West

Turkey enjoys a dynamic demographic situation, with a present-day population of 72 million, of which almost half are under the age of 25, and a projected population of about 90 million by 2040. Turkey's economy is performing much better than that of the European countries. Turkey's GDP has trebled in less than 10 years and, with the 17th-ranking economy in the world, it has earned G20 membership. Despite certain persistent weaknesses (balance of payments highly dependent on foreign investment, trade deficit), this dynamic should continue in the years to come.

After several decades of military intervention in political life, in 2002 the Turks elected a government with Islamist leanings, which has been busy passing reforms aiming to align Turkey with European democratic standards, although the implementation of these reforms has been patchy, with EU membership as their stated priority. The new Constitution, due to be drafted in 2011-2012, will symbolically draw the chapter of the era of coups d'état to a close, and will shape the future of Turkey's political system and its society, which is currently facing the problem of being strongly polarised (secularist Kemalists/religious conservatives).

As the meeting point between several civilisations and because it occupies a central geostrategic position between Europe, Russia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, Turkey has long been seen as a 'bridge' between East and West. During the Cold War, Turkey stood firmly alongside the West, but since then it has changed. Acknowledging the shift of the international centre of gravity towards Asia, Ankara is increasingly asserting its ambitions. From now on, it intends to assume the role of a regional power in an extended strategic area (from the Balkans to Central Asia and from the Caucasus to the Middle East) by developing tighter, peaceful political, economic and cultural ties with all of its neighbours.

By relying on the application of *soft power*, Turkish diplomacy combines economic activism with the enhancement and reinforcement of its position in multilateral environments, support for dialogue and mediation in regional conflicts, where it aims to play an essential role, and the fostering of cultural, ethnic and Muslim community values. With ever-growing confidence, Turkey now intends to assert its own interests and to build a network of regional partnerships, even at the risk of annoying its traditional allies, but without breaking those ties.

Turkey maintains a major defence and security force, but it is essentially oriented towards a logic of defending the national territory (Kurdish terrorism, confrontation with Greece in the Aegean Sea, and maintaining a contingent in Cyprus), whilst its involvement in external multinational operations remains targeted on areas of direct cultural and economic interest (Afghanistan, Lebanon, the Balkans). Civil power, which once again predominates over defence policy, could make it evolve towards the projection of force and power, in accordance with the ambitious foreign policy developed in recent years.

With its proximity to areas of latent instability (Caucasus, Near East, Iran, Iraq), Turkey occupies a major geostrategic position, particularly in the fields of energy and water. As a pivotal point for the transport of energy between the reserves in the Middle East and Central Asia and its consumers in Europe, Turkey should be an essential partner with regard to the energy security of Europeans, who are keen to be free from any dependence on Russia. Moreover, despite climate change, it should maintain long-term control over the region's water resources (controlling the two main rivers in the Middle East, the Tigris and the Euphrates, favourable relief), which are likely to be brought into play in the event of tensions with its neighbours (Syria and Iraq).

Far from limiting its power ambitions to the regional level, Turkey is working on achieving the status of a global player, and for this purpose it is building political, economic and defence partnerships with a very large number of countries located far beyond its immediate vicinity, in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Uncertainties and foreseeable step changes:

Possible step changes could come from an open crisis with its western partners concerning regional issues, particularly related to Iran or Israel, increasingly sharp demarcation of transatlantic solidarity, increased rigidity of institutions calling certain democratic bases into question or changes in the regional nuclear balances, which would cause Turkey to review its stance. Conversely, a solution to the Cyprus Question and/or positive developments concerning Turkey's application to join the EU would have a decisive effect, both for Turkey and for the operation of European institutions.

In this context, Turkey should continue to maintain a balance between its Euro-Atlantic attachment and its regional aspirations in the Middle East. But the outcome of its application to join the EU, which is highly dependent on its compliance with European democratic standards and on improving its relations with Cyprus, is likely to have a strong influence on its positioning.

FOCUS

Nigeria: a power of the future?

Nigeria is often cited as an example of a new emerging nation, and it is a typical illustration of countries where doubt reigns with regard to their ability to take advantage of their potential to reach an intermediate stage of development and take their rightful place in terms of influence on the international stage.

Nigeria is currently a heavyweight amongst the 'Southern Countries' and in Africa. As the second economy in Africa, sixth oil producer in the world and eighth exporter, Nigeria has oil reserves that are estimated at more than 37 billion barrels. Its population was 158 million in 2010, having grown by a factor of five since 1950. It is projected to reach 320 million by 2040. Its GDP was 207 billion dollars in 2010, and could reach 900 billion dollars in 2020. With careful management of its resources, it could become the leading economic power in Africa by 2030, and could reach an intermediate stage of development that would consolidate its international stature. The GDP per inhabitant is only growing slowly, however: in 2000 it was similar to the per capita GDP in 1970 ($970). The current figure is $1300, with the increase mainly due to the high price of oil.

As a member of several bilateral and multilateral trade groups, such as the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the Economic Partnership Agreement between the ACP countries and the European Union (ACP-EU EPA), Nigeria, which is associated with the G8 but not a member of G20, has a clear vision of the consolidation of its international position. To consolidate this position, it has in particular developed the 'Vision 2020' programme, which aims to bring it into the top 20 world economies by the year 2020. In parallel, Abuja has the ambition of obtaining the permanent seat that could be granted to Africa as part of the possible reform of the United Nations Security Council.

The fact remains that the consolidation of Nigeria's ambitions will depend on various elements whose future development cannot be predicted:

- The balance of power between it and other leading African countries: South Africa, Ethiopia, and Angola: Nigeria will probably remain the economic pole of ECOWAS and an active player on the diplomatic scene, particularly through peacekeeping operations, but the extension of its region of influence on a continental scale remains uncertain,

- The consolidation of new international partnerships: Abuja has already diversified its international relations. In addition to the USA, which is bound to remain its leading partner thanks to oil exports, the trend is for exchanges with Brazil, India, Indonesia, Russia, and other emerging countries to intensify. Nigeria's ability to join the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) is not certain, and will depend on its ability to diversify its economic assets. Oil revenue is currently its main source of income: Approximately 80% of tax revenue and 95% of the country's exports;

- The progress of the national socio-economic and political substrate, dependent the implementation of a set of reforms, particularly in the institutional and socio-economic fields, will be particularly essential: Progress in terms of economic governance (improving the economic transparency and business legal security indicators) and political governance (fighting corruption, compliance with the rules of a constitutional state), the quality of mass education and the training of the elite class, the development of infrastructures, taking advantage of the significant Nigerian diaspora, and the development of the agricultural sector (which employs most of the population and could make the country self-sufficient in terms of food). The ability of the Nigerian authorities to control its security hot spots, which could threaten the country's economic performance (kidnappings, banditry or piracy, particularly in the Niger Delta) or stability (tension between different communities, risk of rising Islamic radicalism) will also be crucial.

Uncertainties and foreseeable step changes:

- As in all oil-producing countries, the main foreseeable step-change would be a major change in the worldwide energy market conditions, particularly in the event of a change in supply (gradual dwindling of resources, major conflict in the Gulf of Guinea region, or major trouble in the Niger Delta).

- Growing instability in the region: this interacts with a fragility due to tensions between ethnic and religious communities and social fragility, which could generate a large-scale cycle of violence that would threaten the cohesion of the country. This type of scenario could have a serious impact on the stability of West Africa.

2 An international system with uncertain boundaries

The globalisation process has been the greatest upheaval on the strategic front since the end of the Cold War. It should intensify and accelerate in the next thirty years, forcing the states to adapt to the changes in the international system:

- explosion of transnational flows (of persons, tangible and intangible goods, licit and illicit goods),
- increased interdependencies,
- sovereignty threatened by the increasing number and weight on the international scene of non-state players (international corporations, NGOs, civil society, media, diaspora, criminal groups) and by the porous nature of borders, the development and increasing autonomy of real-time immaterial exchanges (data, information, images, ideas).

Global networks of offices of some NGOs, 2010



Source: Activity reports, www.oxfam.org; www.panda.org; www.greenpeace.org; www.amnesty.org.

M.-F. Durand, P. Copinschi, B. Martin, P. Mitrano, D. Placidi-Frot, *Atlas de la mondialisation*, Presses de Sciences Po, Paris, 2010

STEP CHANGE

In view of the inability of a growing number of states to regulate and compensate for its negative effects, globalisation could be partially or fundamentally called into question. In that case, in an effort to control the destructuring effects of the transnational flows and to curb an ecological, economic, financial, or health crisis, these States, against a background of a resurgent nationalistic or ethnic discourse, would become withdrawn, implementing tight control of exchanges, including the Internet and the closing of borders. A reduction of interdependencies could lead to increasing fragility of the solidarity mechanisms, increasing inter-state rivalries, and increased risk of conflict.

2.1 - Sovereignty called into question

Under the effects of globalisation and the increasing weight of non-state players on the international scene, the erosion of the founding principles of international law, such as the sovereignty of states and the balance of power around a commonly accepted standard, recognised more than three centuries ago by the treaties of Westphalia, should continue.

However, despite their difficulty in controlling transnational flows, the systemic effects of globalisation and the contesting of the inter-state structuring of the international system by non-state players, which can sometimes supplant them, in the absence of other consolidated political structures, states will remain the major players in the international system for the next thirty years.

Through international institutions, they will continue to play a decisive role in economic, financial and legal regulation, the drawing up and implementation of new governance rules, the prevention and resolving of conflicts, the control of international flows and the handling of global challenges such as climate change or the fight against pandemics.

In a context where the territorial logic will continue to weaken in favour of a network logic and the immaterial economy, the power of a state will increasingly be gauged by its ability to exert influence. In parallel with the traditional power criteria (strategic autonomy, economy, military power), those based on an ability to lead (international credibility and legitimacy), and soft power (culture, technology) should carry more and more weight.

The increasing influence of non-state players, favoured by globalisation and new technologies, could lead to the emergence of virtual communities that are disconnected from any territorial reference points, and whose action, based on an issue or on values, may equally well be positive or negative.

In parallel, the interpenetration between local and global considerations, for which the term ‘glocal’ was coined, and of which megacities are one of the most iconic expressions, should increase, resulting in a strengthening of local power within global governance and a detachment of local power from its national ties.

FOCUS

The global city, new player in international diplomacy

In 2008, the world's urban population, 3.4 billion, matched the rural population for the first time. In parallel with this urbanisation process, megacities[1] are increasing in size and number. Most of these megacities are located in developed countries (New York, Paris, London, Tokyo), but there will be an increasing number of them in Southern countries, particularly the emerging countries (Shanghai, Sao Paolo, Mexico City, Mumbai, Jakarta, Bangkok, etc.). Above and beyond the human, social and environmental geography issues, this dynamic has major implications in terms of international relations and governance: the largest cities are becoming players in their own right on the international scene. They should become more numerous and carry more weight in the coming decades.

In addition to the megacities, global cities, fully integrated in the political, economic, financial, cultural, and communication networks, are characterised by their economic weight and their capacity for leadership and innovation, which make them better-equipped players, in many cases, than certain states (e.g., Tokyo has double the GDP of Brazil). With their claim to legitimacy based on their familiarity with local issues and their proximity to citizens, and their economic and political weight, these cities intend to play a role in global issues.

For the past two decades, big cities have been organised in an international network to co-operate and become more competitive based on attractiveness strategies, by trying to become *hubs* or the nodes of networks. Above and beyond their economic ambitions, global cities also intend to assert themselves as political players, stakeholders in global governance, and to handle big issues such as the environment (because they account for 75% of energy consumption and 80% of greenhouse gas emissions, cities will be *de facto* crucial players in discussions and implementation of policies concerning green governance and changing approaches to lifestyle.

As increasingly powerful players in international relations, global cities could constitute an additional influence lever for the states to which they belong. But, because these cities are increasingly autonomous, they will also be able to compete with, circumvent, or even oppose the will of their states, according to their own interests.

1- In 1975, there were only five *megacities* in the world, compared to 19 today, of which 15 are in developing countries.



Demographic trends in the main urban areas, 1950-2025

Trends and forecasts for the population of the *15 largest urban areas in 2005* (millions of inhabitants)

North America | South America, Central America, and Caribbean | Asia | Africa

Source: United Nations, Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision, February 2008, www.un.org

M.-F. Durand, P. Copinschi, B. Martin, P. Mitrano, D. Placidi-Frot, *Atlas de la modernisation*, Presses de Sciences Po - Paris, 2010

In parallel with the globalisation process, political fragmentation should continue under the effect of the resurgence and/or ethnic or religious demands, irredentist temptations, the questioning of artificial borders, or tensions involving access to natural resources.

As a consequence of all of this, the trend, which is already underway, towards an increasing number of states (Kosovo, South Sudan) should therefore continue.

Finally, the ongoing fragility of certain situations and the failure of certain states, leading to an increase in the number of 'grey areas', will contribute to the calling into question of sovereignty.

FOCUS

Fragile state: from marginality to a threat to international stability

To describe the decay of certain states, the concept of a 'failed', 'fragile', or 'failing'[1] state cropped up in the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union, during discussions on the new dynamics of political instability and the rising number of 'new' inter-state and asymmetric conflicts.

A state is considered to be 'failing' if it is incapable of carrying out its main governmental functions, particularly in terms of monitoring its territory and protecting its population, as well as satisfying its basic requirements (education, health, food). More than half of United Nations member states are *de facto* partially incapable of fulfilling their obligations. In an extreme case of the decay process, the collapsed state is characterised by complete economic, social and political disorganisation and a chaotic situation.

Thus, in 1992, The United Nations Security Council labelled the collapse of Somalia a threat to international peace and security.

The attacks of 11th September 2001 were a turning point in the development of the concept. The notion that a failed state is a threat to international security due to its inability to assume its role within the international system is gradually gaining wider acceptance. The deficiencies of such states generate a vulnerability not only for their own stability and development, but also in their regional environment and beyond, for international security, when they become a de facto sanctuary for criminal groups which thrive in the 'grey areas', which are transit zones for various types of traffic and a potential sanctuary for terrorist groups (e.g. Sahel, the Horn of Africa, certain parts of the Caucasus region, Afghanistan/Pakistan, etc.).

The failed state is presented as being likely to constitute a hotbed of international terrorism, making it a threat to international security which must be dealt with by every possible means: indirect measures – *nation* or *state building*, public aid to development[2] – or direct measures *via* military action. Thus, after humanitarian interference, the failure of a state is another legitimate motive for intervention, opening another and probably lasting breach in sovereignty.

1- This concept is not unanimously accepted; it is criticised for being 'Western-centric' and for the hazy and subjective boundaries of its definition. Some entities (including the EU) have replaced it with the concept of a State 'in a fragile situation'.

2- The ODA is increasingly basing its intervention policy on evaluating the degree of fragility of certain States.

Gang war,
Guatemala

JOHAN ORDONEZ/AFP

STEP CHANGE

It is conceivable that a non-state player (NGO, multinational, armed groups, etc.) relying on a combination of international support and social mobilisation, and taking advantage of symbolic and financial resources, could acquire sufficient influence and capability to act to enable it to act independently to pursue its own strategies and ambitions, including disruptive ones, and to implement private foreign policies.

This means that, if states retain their status as players that structure the international system, the growing interdependencies and systemic effects should increasingly prevent them from taking an insular attitude. There is already no state—not even the greatest of the major powers—that can single-handedly satisfy the main global challenges of the 21st century: food insecurity, access to energy resources and water, climate change, world economic and financial crisis, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

2.2 - The emergence of several power poles

Ideology used to be the factor that structured disjointed and antagonistic geographical areas, but it has long since ceased to be the pivotal consideration in geopolitics. It is gradually being replaced by a classic notion of interest, which is once again becoming the main key to understanding the relationships between the main players. In parallel with the traditional alliances, which are very likely to continue, the upheavals in the distribution of power and the new geopolitical balances will result in the creation of new alliances and informal partnerships based on common interest, favouring the creation of groups with shifting boundaries, which are not necessarily durable and are themselves likely to provoke realignments and reconstitutions.

These power poles, which would be like partnerships, will have several forms:

- They could be a classic relatively homogeneous group of states, possibly assembled around one predominant power. In this context, the emerging powers would increasingly act as autonomous hinges shaping a regional area undergoing restructuring, but without asserting themselves as arms of an outside power, as sometimes occurred during the Cold War. Beyond the spheres of influence, regional systems will also form, comprising participants pursuing common interests and sharing similar constraints;
- They could also be a mutual support network based on common values and a common identity (cultural, linguistic, or religious) and/or common interests (economic or security), without there necessarily being any territorial continuity or proximity between the participants of what could be seen as an 'archipelago of partners' supplementing the traditional alliances or regional groupings.

Within this new organisation of spaces and interactions between groups, which will be focal points for rich interactions and nodes for all types of exchange, several different categories of participant can be identified: global players, able to be simultaneously present and influential in the various domains of power (economic, military, cultural, religious, technological, etc.), with a high degree of strategic and political autonomy, dominant players, with recognised influence in a particular field, able to attract and distribute flows, and subordinate players, which will determine their interests according to their relative weight in each domain.

These developments could lead to the establishment of an 'oligopolar' international system (which is currently nascent) centred on a limited number of powers (five to ten). This balance of power configuration lies between bipolarity and multipolarity, and would foster co-operation because none of these poles could win out over the coalition of all the others. Defensive strategies could be drawn up with a view to establishing a form of compromise in which the interest of each member of the oligopoly would be satisfied. Such a configuration could offer the possibilities of a certain international stability which, however, currently seems to be conditional, uncertain, and incomplete, particularly because the groups constituting the oligopoly and the interventional capability of the non-state players cannot be precisely identified. Resurgence of a 'world directorate', currently represented by the various 'G' bodies. This would be a system oscillating between co-operation (against 'outsiders') and competition (when national interests are involved).

3 Towards a new world governance

Although the setting up of a global government by 2040 does not seem possible, the increasing number and the interconnected nature of world issues should lead to increasing demand for multilateral co-operation. Even so, this progress towards more global governance might only occur if spurred on by crises, [1]according to the principle that 'necessity is the mother of invention'.

Rather than a trend for the unification of global governance, an increasingly complex and composite multilateralism is growing and is constantly changing: more and increasingly overlapping areas, diversity of the formats and topics handled, changes in the multilateral practices characterised, in particular, by the constitution of fluctuating coalitions including states, international organisations, and non-state players, and by the growing influence of informal multilateralism within the institutional multilateralism.

In the coming years, the tensions between the need to broaden the boundaries for increased representativeness and to reach a consensus concerning effective solutions will be the main challenge facing global governance.



NGO with a consultative status according to ECOSOC, 1946-2009

End of 2009: 3195 NGOs
NGOs with three different statuses are counted in this total (in descending order of contribution):
- General status (4.5% of the total in 2009)
- Special status (65%)
- The list (30.5%)

NGO

Source: Compilation by Mélanie Albaret From the UN Yearbooks (from 1946 to 1991) and official ECOSOC documents (since 1992) - http://unbisnet.un.org

M. F. Durand, P. Copinschi, B. Martin, P. Mitrano, D. Placidi-Frot, *Atlas de la modernisation*, Presses de Sciences Po - Paris, 2010

1- Like the creation of the G20 in response to the world economic and financial crisis of 2008.

3.1 - Traditional institutions of world governance

Today it is universally recognised that the upheavals resulting from the transition from a unipolar world to an oligopolar world, which is moreover multipolar, against the backdrop of emerging new powers re-dealing the cards of power and changing the balance of power, must be taken into account in the international organisations created after the Second World War, including the UN, the Bretton Woods financial institutions, and NATO.

The financial and economic crisis that broke out in the autumn of 2008 heightened the need for in-depth reform of international finance institutions (IFI), particularly the World Bank and the IMF. The reform process that is underway, which aims to improve their representativeness by better allowing for the weight of the emerging countries (redistribution of quotas and voting rights) and to improve their effectiveness by giving them new means of prevention and reaction[1] (creation of the financial stability council including the G20 countries), should continue in the coming years.

1- The Gyeongju Summit (October 2010) gave greater weight to the emerging powers within the IMF (6% of voting rights granted to the emerging countries by the EU, and two seats on the governing council). The largest shareholders in the institution are now the USA, four European countries (Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy), Japan, and four emerging powers – Brazil, Russia, India, and China.

FOCUS

The United Nations in the face of tomorrow's challenges

The consolidation of the position of the emerging countries now urgently raises the question of expanding the Security Council, particularly with regard to its permanent members, which do not currently include any representative of Latin America or Africa. Since 2008, France and the UK have been proposing a reform based on an 'interim model' to resolve the deadlock situation. But this proposal does not seem to meet with the approval of a majority of member states, any more than the previous ones did; nor is it agreed to by all of the permanent members, without whose consent no reform can be adopted.

A failure to reform the Security Council, however, will not necessarily mean that its decision-making process will be blocked. The importance of the non-permanent members is increasingly significant in this context, particularly when those members are emerging countries. It gives rise to new alliances within the Council, a practice which will probably tend to increase; with Russia and China more and more clearly becoming the spokesmen.

The accentuation of multipolarity on a global scale will not fundamentally alter the operation of the UN in the sectors in which it acts, because its decision-making process in the General Assembly is already organised by regional groups. This context can only reinforce the existing situation.

In the field of peacekeeping, the number of blue berets deployed should not decrease significantly, because this method of handling crises is still a low-cost solution for keeping crisis situations down to a manageable level, and makes it possible to provide real long-term guidance to failing states. In this context, if the western states continue to steer clear of contributing to peacekeeping operations (in particular after pulling out of Afghanistan), dialogue between all of the peacekeeping participants (deciders, financial backers, and suppliers of troops) could become increasingly difficult. Peacekeeping could become a tool in the hands of the emerging countries, which would correspondingly increase their weight in the decision-making bodies – which could accentuate the loss of influence by Europeans and, to a lesser extent, the Americans in the Organisation.



Admissions to the UN, 1945-2012

1945 1946 50 70 90 2012

- Permanent Members of the Security Council
- Official candidates for a permanent seat on the Security Council: Germany, Brazil, India, Japan
- Undeclared candidate: South Africa
- States (Vatican) and entities (Palestinian Authority) not belonging to the UN or territories with an undefined status

1945: Creation of the UN

51 founding States

1960-1966: Admission of newly-independent African and Asian states emerging from French, British, Dutch, and Italian decolonisation.

1975: Admission of newly-independent African states emerging from Portuguese decolonisation.

1990-1993: Admission of states emerging from the dissolution of the USSR and the break-up of Yugoslavia.

(1) Since 1971, the People's Republic of China has replaced Taiwan in the United Nations. Since 1992, Russia has replaced the USSR in the United Nations.

The Palestinian Authority and the Vatican have Observer status.

Source: according to the Delegation for Strategic Affairs, 2012.

3.2 - 'Clubs': new sustainable governance tools?

Even though "club diplomacy"[1] – in select committees – is not new ("Concert of Europe" in the 19th Century), the trend, which had been towards increasing multilateralism based on values of universality, equality between states, and non-discrimination since the end of the Second World War, is now evolving, with the increasing number of new, select, bodies, towards what some call "minilateralism". Created according to ad hoc formats on the basis of common interests and in the context of co-operations based more on particular situations or events, to circumvent the rigidity and possibly the inefficiency of traditional multilateralism, they are accepted by the other states thanks to their operational effectiveness rather than any legitimacy, which had heretofore been the main criterion for UN multilateralism.

Some consider that the G20 and other 'G' groups are the expressions of a possible governance, which is complementary to that conducted in the context of UN institutions. The G20 was brought together in an emergency to respond to the world economic and financial crisis in 2008, and is now considered to be the main forum for economic governance, extended to its social dimensions. In spite of the reticence it elicits, there is now some discussion of institutionalising it by giving it a permanent organisation and secretariat. Does the G20 initiate a redistribution of tasks within global governance? Its future will largely depend on its ability to define a common agenda, provide an authoritative impetus, and rise above old rifts in its field of action.

Even so, the possibility cannot be ruled out that, instead of favouring consensus, the G20 might generate other fault lines and widen the gap between the most powerful players.

In any case, even though these groups could increasingly constitute alternatives to the historic multilateral institutions or historic alliances (and in spite of the circumvention strategies developed by certain groups of countries) the UN, the only truly universal institution and, as such, the one that possesses a legitimacy that no other institution can challenge, will remain indispensable in responding to the challenges that international society must face in the next half-century.

3.3 - The increasing weight of regional organisations

The regions that will assert themselves on the international stage are those that will be able to adapt to transnational risks and threats and to the new world balances by uniting around common goals. Thanks to advances in the regional integration processes in most regions of the world, the weight of regional organisations should increase, although different areas will develop in different ways; some will have high potential (AU, Mercosur), and others will be slowed by internal rivalries and mistrust, particularly in Asia.

This trend will be accompanied by a strengthening of interregional bonds (EU-AU; UE-Mercosur; Mercosur-NAFTA) based on co-operation between regions, without excluding power struggle between regional groups and the increasing number of interregional forums.

1- For this concept in particular, see 'La diplomatie de clubs' ('Club Diplomacy') by F. Petiteville, in 'La fin du monde unique', *L'état du monde 2011*, op. cit.

Regional processes, types and time frames 1945-2010



1. European Coal and Steel Community
2. West African Economic and Monetary Union
3. Caribbean Free Trade Area
4. Central Africa Economic and Monetary Community
5. Pacific Islands Forum
6. Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
7. Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference
8. Southern African Development Community
9. Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa
10. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
11. Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
12. Intergovernmental Authority on Development
13. North American Free Trade Agreement
14. Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development
15. Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation
16. Community of Sahel-Saharan States
17. Eurasian Economic Community
18. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
19. Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas
20. Union of South American Nations

Source: Compilation from official websites of the organisations

M. F. Durand, P. Copinschi, B. Martin, P. Mitrano, D. Placidi-Frot, *Atlas de la modernisation*, Presses de Sciences Po - Paris, 2010

3.4 Reconsidering "Western" standards and values?

The need to respond to major global challenges (access to resources, environmental protection, protection of 'common spaces' such as cyberspace, the oceans, space, etc.) will also result in a growing need for regulation, generating ever more regulations and co-operation.

International law should continue to be represented by the UN and its resolutions, whose legitimacy will remain strong. It will increasingly govern international relations via an increasing number of treaties and international agreements based on the Vienna Convention of 1969[1]. In all likelihood, the fundamental principle of this rule of law—not resorting to force to settle disagreements between states—will continue to be recognised.

As western influence experiences a relative decline in many areas (economic, cultural, military) due to the emergence of new powers or poles, the western-inspired legal and political standard could be challenged and, in any case, will be affected by different ways of thinking, particularly those from Asia. New, hybrid standards could contribute to the 'dewesternisation of the world'.

Despite this, in a more general sense, even though emerging powers seeking a redistribution of power propose alternative models that are sometimes at odds with the social and environmental standards promoted by the developed nations, they no longer (as sometimes occurred in the past in the name of Communism or Third-worldism) radically call into question the philosophical bases and inter-state, free-market structures on which the western model is based, even though the scale of the excesses of financial deregulation, brought to light by the economic and financial crisis of 2008, could nevertheless lead to a partial re-think of what a growing number of state and non-state participants perceive as the excesses of Capitalism. With regard to social matters, the individualistic model built on economic growth and the consumer and information society should complete its process of gradually asserting itself in the world over the next thirty years.

The predominance of a 'reformist' state of mind on the international stage will not prevent disruptive parties, 'networked pariahs', (currently Iran, North Korea, Syria, Belarus, etc.) relying on occasional mutual assistance, masked co-operation actions and alliances with non-state players, from trying to assert themselves on the international stage through radical posturing and behaviour, not hesitating to break certain taboos (nuclear, openly violent repression, etc.).

The universality of rights will continue to be called into question in the name of nationalism, specific cultural features, or considerations of an ethnic, geographical, or even religious nature. This should not, however, prevent the demand for human rights from being heard loud and clear all over the world, encouraged by the rise of better-off, more educated social classes that wish to be protected from the excesses and arbitrary nature of the State, and by the spread of information technologies (the role of the Internet and social networks).

1- Vienna Convention on treaty law, adopted in 1969 and in force since 1980.

This general trend should have several consequences. In terms of criminal matters, the International Criminal Court and other international courts will increasingly assert their authority on the international stage, despite the reticence and resistance of some of the large states. Following the adoption of Resolution 1973 by the United Nations Security Council on 17 March 2011, authorising military action in Libya, which was a turning point, the responsibility to protect should continue to grow, particularly under the pressure applied by NGOs and public opinion, despite the fact that the emerging powers wish to cling to the principles of sovereignty and refuse any form of interference. In any case, UN Resolution 1973 creates a precedent concerning the protection of civilians, the use of force, and the application of sanctions that will have durable repercussions.

STEP CHANGE

From this point of view, the revolutions and protest movements demanding democratic reform and the granting of basic human rights underway in the Arab world, the only region not to have achieved democratic progress since the end of the Cold War, should constitute a strategic breakthrough: the region is in the throes of inevitable social, political, and individualistic change, marking the end of the ''Arab Exception', with many consequences on the regional geopolitical balance and international stability.



International Organisations, 1945-2010

UN — WTO — OECD

NATO — ICC

Sources: Onu, www.un.org; CPI, www.icc-cpi.int; OMC, www.wto.org; Otan, www.nato.int, OCDE, www.oecd.org.

Map Department of Sciences Po, 2011

CONSEQUENCES FOR DEFENCE

Redefining military power

The next thirty years will be a period of transition towards a multipolar system, and should be characterised by greater instability and power rearrangements which, in the defence sector, will result in a series of developments that France and its European partners and allies should all incorporate:

1 - The relative decline of American power, likely to result in military withdrawal from certain regions. Even though the USA considers Europe to be a region of major interest, it might deem that the nature of the risks does not justify a large-scale involvement;

2 - Risk of the relative strategic and technological downgrading of Europe. Faced with the continual shrinkage of the defence budgets of its member states at a time when these budgets are increasing in most other regions of the world, and in the absence of a European defence system, Europe could witness a reduction in its interventional capabilities and could lose some of its autonomy, including in the industrial sector. Such downgrading would also have an impact on the Atlantic Alliance, whose membership is more than two-thirds European.

3 - Whilst intervention will increasingly take place in a multinational context, particularly involving the UN, the EU, and NATO, the interoperability of forces will be crucial between Europeans, necessary with the Americans, and desirable with other partners. The credibility of the institutions will depend on the success of the operations.

4 - The development of new relations and growth of the co-operation for defence: The new geostrategic players (China, India, Brazil), whose presence in the external theatres should assert itself, must be taken into account. New defence partnerships and co-operation agreements should spring up. France and the EU will increase their support to regional organisations whose scope of action will continue to extend to security, in Africa, Latin America, or Asia. France and its partners will seek to empower regional or local players in crisis management by giving them assistance and training;

5 - Uncertainty concerning the real desire for proactive commitment of the emerging powers in conflict prevention or resolution. Reduced involvement of the western powers and the failure of any responsible emerging powers to take over their role, would create a power vacuum giving free rein to disruptive state and non-state international players.

FOCUS

NATO: future scenarios

Through the renovation of its strategic concept in 2010 and its ongoing transformation processes, NATO intends to continue adapting to the security challenges of the 21st century and remain an essential mainstay of its members' security and a major contributor to crisis management.

NATO will now extend its field of competence to face emerging security challenges such as cyber attacks, terrorism, energy security, etc. Based on the experience of the operations in Afghanistan, it also plans to equip itself with the capability to contribute to the global approach to crises jointly with other (civilian and humanitarian) organisations. In an effort to protect the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic zone, NATO will continue in a spirit of mutual confidence to extend its network of partnerships all over the world and its co-operative security network. Certain allies, however, remain wary of any excessive extension of its fields of action outside the military sphere, which could cause it to stray from its core business, spread its resources thinly, and lose its relevance.

The geographical enlargement of the Alliance is likely to continue in Europe. Following its growth from 12 members in 1949 to 28 in 2009, NATO could welcome, in particular, the Balkan countries that have not yet joined, Sweden, and—in a more hypothetical and distant future—Georgia and the Ukraine. The strengthening of the strategic partnership with Russia and several of its neighbours should continue thanks to the warming of relations with the USA, provided that certain suspicions or any reticence on either side can eventually be overcome.

Whilst the raison d'être of the Alliance is still the collective defence of its members, a major international crisis or a direct attack on an ally which NATO handled effectively could bolster its credibility and tighten the bonds between its members. On the other hand, if NATO demonstrated an inability to respond to a crisis at its borders or to protect one of its members effectively, this could be a serious blow to its credibility.

A major challenge for the Alliance in the years to come will depend on its ability to reform its operation to rationalise its structures, control expenditure, and improve efficiency. The reform movement initiated by the Lisbon summit will have a long-term effect on the investments NATO must make to modernise and preserve its resources. In addition, the durable reduction of the defence budgets of European countries should irrevocably accentuate the capability gap between the USA and Europe, ultimately with several consequences:

1- Increased dependence of Europe on the USA, particularly by the pre-empting and harnessing of Europe's meagre contributions for the benefit of the American arms industry (via the constitution of joint capabilities, presented as being less expensive but disempowering for the Allies),

2- The Americans distancing themselves from the Alliance, to which the new generation of leaders might show a lesser commitment, either by using *ad hoc* coalitions to carry out their operations or by breaking their association with NATO operations which they do not believe to be their concern.

FOCUS

European defence policy: an ongoing project

At a time when the USA's geostrategic interests are moving towards the Pacific, and when the security of the European continent hangs on its (Eastern and Mediterranean) markets and, often, in areas where NATO is not in the best position to intervene, Europe is faced with a strategic choice, which will have a decisive impact on its position on the international scene and its ability to guarantee its security in the next thirty years.

Although Europe has succeeded in asserting its position as a recognised crisis management player since the Saint Malo Summit (1998), with 25 civil and military operations, European defence policy has now reached a turning point.

The future of European defence will essentially depend on:

- The political will and ability of the member states, which often have differing points of view and positions on foreign and defence policy, to find common stances, take them onto the international stage, and implement them,
- The EU's ability to better structure its internal security, neighbourhood, external, and common defence and security policies and to ensure their coherence. In particular, this will involve taking full advantage of the institutional innovations and instruments provided by the Lisbon Treaty to allow the EU to develop reactive mechanisms to respond to external crises or crises on the European territory and, wherever possible, these mechanisms should be integrated, combining military, civil crisis management, and judicial co-operation tools, civil protection mechanisms, economic weapons (particularly sanctions), development aid and humanitarian aid,
- The ability of member states to rise to the capability challenge by seeking common, flexible, and reactive solutions to share and pool capabilities, synergies between the armed forces, economies of scale and improved productivity, whilst favouring common R&T and R&D investments to strengthen operational effectiveness and increase the actual projection capability of the European defence tools.

General Kandji
and General Ganascia
greet each other

J.F. D'ARCANGUES/EUFOR CHAD-CAR