

**Somalia**

**Joint Strategy Paper**

**for the period 2008 - 2013**

## GENERAL PROVISIONS

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- (1) Being without an international recognised national government since the beginning of the 90s, Somalia did not ratify the ACP-EC partnership Agreement and there has been no functioning National Authorising Officer (NAO). In accordance with the conclusions of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers adopted on 18 November 1992, the Chief Authorising Officer (CAO) of the European Development Fund was entrusted with the authority of the National Authorising Officer, "acting on behalf of the Somali people". Given the uncertainty regarding the overall political evolution and in particular the degree and geographic spread of the international political authority of the Transitional Government, it has been decided to maintain this arrangement<sup>1</sup>.
- (2) Similarly, Somalia does not at present have the necessary functioning institutions to sign and ratify the Cotonou Agreement signed in Cotonou on 23 June and revised in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005. Therefore, access to resources for development finance cooperation under the 10<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund has been granted to Somalia by the ACP-EU Council of Ministers<sup>1</sup> under article 93.6 of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement.
- (3) As regards the which the Community plans to make available to for the period 2008-2013, an amount of € 212 million is scheduled for the allocation referred to in Article 3.2(a) of Annex IV to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement (A allocation) and of € 3.8 million for the allocation referred to in Article 3.2(b) (B allocation). These allocations are not entitlements and may be revised by the Joint Council of Ministers in accordance with Article 92.6 to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement.
- (4) The A allocation is intended to cover macroeconomic support, sectoral policies, programmes and projects in support of the focal or non-focal areas of Community assistance. The Somalia Special Support Programme in Part 2 concerns the A allocation. It also takes into consideration financing from which benefits or could benefit under other Community resources. It does not pre-empt financing decisions by the Commission.
- (5) The B allocation is intended to cover unforeseen needs, such as emergency assistance where such support cannot be financed from the EU budget, contributions to internationally agreed debt relief initiatives and support to mitigate adverse effects of instability in export earnings. The B allocation will be triggered in response to specific mechanisms and procedures and therefore does not yet constitute a part of the Indicative Programme.
- (6) Resources can be committed within the framework of this Joint Strategy Paper and Somalia Special Support Programme upon the entry into force of the 10th EDF multi-annual financial framework for the period 2008-2013 of the revised ACP-EC

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<sup>1</sup>

Partnership but not before the decision by the ACP-EU Council of Ministers regarding the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF allocation to Somalia. Financing decisions for projects and programmes can be taken by the Commission within the limits of the A and B allocations referred to in this document on the basis of Article 4(5) of Annex IV to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement. Financing decisions can also be taken on the basis of Article 15(4) in conjunction with Article 4(1) (d) of Annex IV to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement for support to non-State actors or on the basis of Article 72(6) of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement for humanitarian and emergency assistance funded from the B allocation. Financing decisions will be taken and implemented in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in the EC Council Regulations on implementation of the 10th EDF and in the Financial Regulation applicable to the 10th EDF and in Annex IV to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement.

- (7) The European Investment Bank may contribute to implementation of this Joint Strategy Paper by operations financed from the Investment Facility and/or from its own resources, in accordance with Articles 2(c) and 3 of Annex Ib to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement regarding the 10th EDF multi-annual financial framework for the period 2008-2013.
- (8) In line with Article 5 of Annex IV to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, the EC Special Envoy/Head of the Somalia Operations Unit will undertake an annual operational review of the Indicative Programme and the Somalia Special Support Programme and mid-term and end-of-term review of the Joint Strategy Paper and the Somalia Special Support Programme in the light of needs and performance at the time. The mid-term review will be undertaken in 2010 and the end-of-term review in 2012.

## Key data on Somalia

Surface area (sq. km) <sup>1</sup>		637, 660.0
Total population (million) <sup>2</sup>	2006	7.7
South Central Somalia		4.9
Somaliland		1.1
Puntland		1.7
Population growth (annual %)	2006	2.9
Average per capita income (\$ PPP) <sup>3</sup>	2005	226.0
Percentage of population living below \$1/day (PPP)	2002	43.2
Percentage of population living below \$2/day (PPP)	2002	73.4
Income inequality – Gini Index <sup>4</sup>	2002	39.7
Life expectancy at birth (years)	2002-2005	46.2
Under-five mortality rate (per 1000 live births)	2004	225.0
Physicians per 100,000 people <sup>5</sup>	2000-2004	4
Prevalence of HIV (% of population aged 15– 49 years)	2006	< 1.0
Population with sustainable access to an improved water source (%) <sup>6</sup>	2004	29.0
Population with sustainable access to improved sanitation (%)	2004	26.0
Primary school gross enrolment rate (% of school age children in school)	2003-2004	22.0
South Central Somalia		16.0
Puntland		24.0
Somaliland		33.0
Internally Displaced Persons <sup>7</sup>	2005	400,000.0
Refugees		400,000.0
UNDP Human Development Index ranking (out of 163 countries)	2001	161.0

1 World Bank Development Indicators Database <http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/>

2 RDP – note however that population figures are extrapolations, and are highly contentious

3 World Bank Interim Strategy Note for Somalia

4 WB/UNDP 2002 Socioeconomic survey of Somalia

5 Human Development Report 2007/08

[http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/data\\_sheets/cty\\_ds\\_SOM.html](http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_SOM.html)

6 Human Development Report 2006

[http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/data\\_sheets/cty\\_ds\\_SOM.html](http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_SOM.html)

7 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2004 <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/44e96c842.pdf>

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## **Executive Summary**

### **Policy Framework and Objectives**

The strategy is based on the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, the European Consensus on Development, the EU Strategy for Africa, the OECD/DAC Guidelines for International Engagement in Fragile States and the Somalia Reconstruction and Development Programme. The overall objective is to help establish a peaceful and secure environment in Somalia, and to reduce poverty by providing basic social services and increasing economic activity. In this framework, the critical intermediary political goal is to support the delivery of the two main outcomes of the transitional period (2005-2009): a new constitution adopted by referendum, and democratically elected institutions.

### **Analysis and challenges facing Somalia**

After sixteen years of civil war, Somalia faces the key challenges of building peace and security, establishing democratic processes and institutions and strengthening human rights. Poverty remains acute and support for the development of livelihoods is a priority. Social services are rudimentary; particularly in South Central Somalia, service provision is fragmented and ad hoc due to lack of security and institutional structures. Basic infrastructure has deteriorated markedly since the collapse of the last national government in 1991. Inequality remains a concern; women and girls continue to be socially excluded. The private sector has survived and to some extent flourished in the near anarchic environment of the past decade and a half; however, for further growth and inward investment, legal and regulatory frameworks have to be developed.

In the autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland some progress has been made in establishing a peaceful and secure environment, developing a democratic process, building institutions and beginning to address the basic needs of citizens. However, these gains are as yet fragile, and have thus far not been replicated in South Central Somalia. The relationship of a future – possibly federal – state with the autonomous regions has also yet to be clarified.

### **Overview of past and present cooperation**

Building on the work of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body established in 1996, reviews of external support to Somalia over the past decade have progressively led to a more focused and coordinated donor approach, culminating in the UN/World Bank-led Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) conducted in 2006. The donors participating in this JSP acknowledge the importance of coordinated and coherent programming based on the JNA process, while recognising the continuing need for rapid and flexible responses in a constantly evolving environment.

### **Response strategy**

Without peace and security it is not possible to engage effectively in longer-term development. Priority will therefore be given to promoting a peaceful and secure environment in which human rights are respected and democratic processes and institutions can develop, to providing basic social services and to developing an enabling environment for sustainable and equitable economic growth. With the overall aim of improving the lives of the poorest and the most vulnerable groups, gender, environment, HIV/AIDS and conflict prevention will be mainstreamed in all areas of activity. Capacity-building and LRRD will likewise be considered strategic approaches to be integrated into all sector programmes.

## STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND COUNTRY ANALYSIS

### CHAPTER I: FRAMEWORK FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EC, EU ACTORS, NORWAY AND SOMALIA

#### I.1. General objectives of JSP Partners

The primary and overarching objective of EU and Norwegian development policies is the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, in line with the international agenda, and with particular focus on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The EC and EU Member States' policy framework on development cooperation, to which Norway also subscribes, comprises *The Treaty Establishing the European Community*, the *ACP-EU Partnership Agreement*<sup>8</sup>, the *European Consensus on Development*<sup>9</sup> (2005) and the *EU Strategy for Africa* (2005). In accordance with Article 177 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, development co-operation is intended to foster:

- The sustainable economic and social development of developing countries, particularly the most disadvantaged among them.
- The smooth and gradual integration of developing countries into the world economy.
- The campaign against poverty in developing countries.

#### I.2. Strategic objectives of cooperation with Somalia

The *EU Strategy for Africa (2005)* provides a long-term strategic framework for interaction between Europe and Africa. The Council specifically agreed to enhance support for post-conflict reconstruction in Africa, to strengthen fragile states and give due priority to peace and security and effective governance as a prerequisite for attaining the MDGs. The Strategy also emphasises the need to sustain peace in post-conflict situations by developing a more coherent and smooth transition between short-term (humanitarian assistance) and long-term (development) strategies in post-conflict situations.

The Communication on Governance of 30 August 2006 stresses the need to follow preventive approaches in fragile states and the importance of avoiding the marginalisation of the most vulnerable countries and peoples. At the OECD/DAC High Level Meeting on 3 March 2005, Somalia was chosen as a pilot country for the implementation of the principles governing international engagement in fragile states. The following four key principles were considered particularly relevant for Somalia:

- Take context as the starting point and build on what is there;
- Focus on state building and help Somalis create a vision for a state;
- Build practical coordination mechanisms workable in the Somali context;
- Do no harm.

Following a broad-based and consultative Joint Needs Assessment exercise in 2006, a Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) has been prepared for Somalia. The RDP recognises the varying development needs and levels in different parts of the country; its

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<sup>8</sup> *Partnership Agreement ACP-EC*; signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, revised in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005.

<sup>9</sup> JOCE 2006/C46/0,24.2.2006.

[http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/european\\_consensus\\_2005\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/european_consensus_2005_en.pdf)

synthesis volume and three regional volumes were produced in consultation with the federal and regional parliaments, governments and civil society umbrella groups. The four RDP volumes, together with the six cluster reports on which they are based and the specific development strategies developed by the regional authorities of Somaliland and Puntland, comprise the agreed framework for support to Somalia for the next five years.

The overarching strategic objectives for EU and Norwegian engagement in Somalia, based on the policy and principles described above and contributing to coordinated and effective international community (IC) assistance, are to:

- Encourage reconciliation, democracy and the development of governance structures at all levels, with the critical intermediary political goal of delivering a new constitution adopted by referendum and democratically elected institutions at the end of the transitional period (2009);
- Assist the Somali people, particularly the most vulnerable groups, in the reconstruction of the country, linking relief with rehabilitation and development and putting in place disaster preparedness measures;
- Restoring the rule of law by supporting Somali-owned governance and security sector initiatives.

Strategic engagement will be guided by the following principles endorsed by successive General Affairs Councils:

- Progressive stepping-up of constructive engagement in Somalia;
- Support for processes and institutions rather than individuals;
- Inclusiveness to remain a guiding principle while not being a precondition for engagement;
- Assistance to be delivered in accordance with (a) the Declaration of Principles, agreed by the Stockholm meeting on Somalia on 29 October 2004 and endorsed in February 2005, (b) the OECD principles for international engagement in fragile states and (c) the Reconstruction and Development Programme;
- Building on regional approaches to conflict prevention and mitigation.

At regional level, on 20 October 2006 the European Commission adopted a Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on an "EU partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa", setting out a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention in the Horn of Africa, tackling the root causes of instability, and providing a political framework for concrete regional initiatives and for structured dialogue between partners. The regional and cross-border issues highlighted in the Horn strategy - such as governance, security, migration and refugees, the management of natural resources and pastoralism, the importance of education and the rise of religious fundamentalism - are all embedded in this Joint Strategy Paper (hereafter JSP). Somalia is considered a test case for the stabilisation of the broader Horn of Africa region.

### *Aid effectiveness*

In respect of the principle of concentration, a limited number of priority areas within the Somali Reconstruction and Development Programme have been selected, on the basis of dialogue with key stakeholders and an examination of the areas in which the JSP donors can add most value.

With weak institutions and policy-frameworks, ownership and alignment remain challenging for donors committed to the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness. Legitimacy and



representativity must be considered carefully when establishing where ownership in fact lies. The Paris Declaration emphasises that aid management should be designed to decrease fragmentation and transaction costs. In this regard, the JSP donors undertake to work towards harmonisation in budgeting and reporting requirements with the aim of strengthening mutual accountability.

A coordinated donor response to the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) can significantly contribute to more efficient use of resources for the benefit of the Somali people. The JSP donors are therefore willing to start adjusting individual procedures and requirements in order to achieve a more streamlined and efficient donor response to the needs in Somalia and ease the implementing partners' burden.

### **I.3 Bilateral Agreements**

While Somalia is not a signatory of the Cotonou Agreement, Article 93.6 provides for support to countries which, in the absence of normally established government institutions, have not been able to sign or ratify the Agreement. Such support may concern institution-building and economic and social development activities, in particular taking account of the needs of the most vulnerable sections of the population.

In March 2006, the European Commission and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which lays the groundwork for partnership and the mutually agreed goals of promoting peace, democracy, security and the eradication of poverty through the guiding principles enshrined in the Transitional Federal Charter.

## **CHAPTER II: COUNTRY DIAGNOSIS**

### **II.1. Analysis of the political, economic, social and environmental situation**

#### **II.1.1 Political and institutional situation**

Somalia has not functioned as a unitary state since 1991, when the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime ushered in a long period of instability, from which the country has yet to emerge. The State has effectively fragmented into three distinct regional blocks, loosely reflecting the territorial distribution of the major clans, which - with their myriad sub-clans - remain the dominant force in the country's social, political and economic affairs. Annex 10 provides further information and analysis of the role of the clans.

In late 2004, after two years of talks, a Somali National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC) held in Kenya adopted a Transitional Federal Charter for a five-year period, at the end of which a new constitution is to be adopted by referendum and democratic elections are to be held. The Charter established a number of Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI), including a 275-strong Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) whose membership is designed to balance the distribution of power and influence among Somalia's main clan families. Abdullahi Yusuf, leader from the Darod clan elected President by the TFP, appointed Ali Gedi of the Hawiye clan as Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

After fourteen failed attempts to broker peace in Somalia, the SNRC explicitly acknowledged the regional dimension to Somalia's problems (discussed in further detail in Annex 11) by engaging the sub-regional organisation IGAD as the basis for the Conference, rather than individual states of the region. The SNRC also included warlords and other power brokers

and adopted a progressive approach to the development of a federal system, decentralised governance and reconciliation.

However, while the SNRC created a framework for reconciliation and power sharing, it did not deliver inclusive reconciliation as such on the ground.

The result were transitional institutions largely confined first to Jowhar and then to Baidoa, with warlords remaining in control of much of South Central Somalia.

Early in 2006, the *Union of Islamic Courts* (UIC) spearheaded a revolt which finally dislodged the warlords from Mogadishu by June. The UIC set about consolidating its control of the capital and beyond by forming consultative and executive bodies, and rapidly extended its influence to other parts of South Central Somalia. The inevitable confrontation with the TFG resulted in the latter requesting military support from Ethiopia. UIC forces were rapidly defeated by TFG and Ethiopian troops, who entered Mogadishu in early January 2007. Annex 11 assesses in more detail the phenomenon of militant Islam in Somalia.

With the endorsement of the UN Security Council, the African Union (AU) agreed to deploy a six-month peacekeeping mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in order to stabilise the situation and defuse public resentment of an Ethiopian presence perceived by many Somalis as a hostile occupation force. Approximately half of the target figure of 8,000 peacekeepers was pledged at the AU Summit of January 2007, and a first contingent of Ugandan troops was deployed in February. At the same summit President Yusuf announced that he would convene a National Reconciliation Congress (NRC) to address the grievances of all clan, religious, civil society, business and political groups.

However, the situation on the ground remained highly volatile, with frequent clashes in Mogadishu between TFG and Ethiopian forces and a resistance movement partly consisting of Islamist extremist (ex-UIC) units but increasingly also taking on a clan dimension, as the rival sub-clans of the *Hawiye* began to coalesce into a united front against the TFG. March 2007 saw the worst clashes in the capital in sixteen years; four days of heavy fighting reportedly resulted in more than a thousand casualties, half of them civilians; over 200,000 people fled from the capital in the first quarter of the year. Mogadishu and other parts of South-Central Somalia continue to witness almost daily clashes between insurgents and TFG and Ethiopian forces, with targeted assassinations and other acts of violence against the population, aid workers and the media also commonplace.

The NRC nevertheless took place in Mogadishu in July-August 2007 with strong political and financial support from the EC and other donors. While there were some doubts as to the legitimacy of the participants and the management and process of the NRC, the Congress nevertheless delivered a certain number of actionable recommendations on “governance”, notably including opening the TFG (cabinet) to non-MPs, a broad-based reconciliation process and the completion of the main tasks of the transition (a constitution to be approved by referendum and elections to be held) by end-2009, as envisaged in the Charter. The TFG accepted these recommendations, which were subsequently endorsed by the TFP.

However, persistent internal tensions within the TFIs continued to hamper progress on the enactment of the NRC recommendations, until PM Gedi was forced to step down on 29 October through a combination of internal and external pressure. He was replaced on 22 November by Nur Hassan Hussein “Adde”, who had in recent years headed the Somali Red Crescent Society. After his initial cabinet had been rejected by Parliament, PM Nur announced a new, lean government line-up on 4 January, drawing half its 18 Ministers from

outside the TFP and including a number of new faces, with a strong diaspora component. The new PM set about changing the image of the TFG through a series of cautious but symbolically important steps, including the release of political detainees in Mogadishu. These moves were welcomed by public and international opinion, but condemned by the President's camp.

### **Regional characteristics**

Somalia's history since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime has been characterised by the interference of neighbouring countries. While the tenor and thrust of this interference clearly evolved during the latter parts of the SNRC and thereafter, the sub-region continues to play an influential role in the country's internal political, military and economic affairs. As Somalia strives to re-establish its eroded sovereignty, the regional political dynamic (notably the simmering conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea) and the strategic interests of its individual neighbours remain paramount to the success or failure of attempts to establish governance.

The north-western region of Somaliland, a former British protectorate which had opted for unification with Italian Somaliland in 1960, unilaterally declared its independence from Somalia in 1991. Although not hegemonic, the *Isaq* clan is dominant in the self-styled Republic of Somaliland, which comprises five of the eighteen administrative regions of Somalia. Somaliland remains internationally unrecognised, but - as a result of a home-grown, clan-based reconciliation process (culminating in the Boroma Conference of 1993) - has developed its own political institutions, judiciary, police, armed forces and currency. A bicameral legislature, made up of an elected House of Representatives (HoR) and a traditional, clan-based Council of Elders (*Guurti*) incorporated into the governance structure as the upper house, oversees an executive headed by an elected President.

Largely under its own steam, Somaliland has made considerable progress towards stabilisation and democratisation. Nevertheless, the state remains fragile, not least owing to international ambivalence in the matter of recognition; the EU and Norway consider the territorial integrity of Somalia an issue to be resolved first and foremost among Somalis themselves, and then to be addressed by the African Union.

The north-eastern region followed Somaliland's example in 1998 with the creation of the semi-autonomous "Puntland State of Somalia". Home to the *Darod/Majerteyn* clan, Puntland comprises three of the eighteen regions of Somalia, and contests control of two further regions, Sool and Sanaag on its western marches with neighbouring Somaliland, a dispute exacerbated by the reportedly significant mineral deposits in the disputed area. Unlike Somaliland, Puntland does not seek international recognition as an independent state, but advocates a federal Somalia in which it would exist as an autonomous entity. Puntland formally endorses the transitional federal process, but boasts its own constitution, political institutions and armed forces, and conducts its own foreign and trade policies.

Although the three regional blocks – Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia – are all, to varying degrees, characterised by fragility and vulnerability to conflict, they are distinguished by markedly different levels of political and institutional development. While the Republic of Somalia remains the *de jure* sovereign entity, the *de facto* situation on the ground requires a “variable geometry” approach to development, deploying the full range of LRRD instruments flexibly and sensitively, while continuing to advocate and promote a politically sustainable solution for Somalia as a whole.

	Characteristics	Priority Needs
South/Central	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ Complex emergency</li> <li>❖ Dependence on humanitarian assistance</li> <li>❖ Access and security difficulties with pockets of stability</li> <li>❖ Increased IDPs</li> <li>❖ Food insecurity</li> <li>❖ Minimal quality frameworks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ Large-scale humanitarian and recovery</li> <li>❖ Access expansion</li> <li>❖ Quality standards</li> <li>❖ Coverage</li> </ul>
Puntland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ Relative stability</li> <li>❖ Functioning regional administration/ institutions</li> <li>❖ Early stages of recovery</li> <li>❖ Disruption of livelihoods</li> <li>❖ Access: Sool and Sanaag<sup>4</sup></li> <li>❖ Emerging quality assurance frameworks</li> <li>❖ Incipient government presence</li> <li>❖ Limited institutional capacity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ Reconstruction and capacity building</li> <li>❖ Access expansion</li> <li>❖ Quality standards</li> <li>❖ Coverage</li> </ul>
Somaliland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ Relative political stability and social opportunity</li> <li>❖ Early stages of development</li> <li>❖ Functioning Parliament</li> <li>❖ Functioning regional administration/ institutions</li> <li>❖ Disruption of livelihoods</li> <li>❖ Access: Sool and Sanaag<sup>5</sup></li> <li>❖ Growing quality assurance framework</li> <li>❖ Visible government role</li> <li>❖ Lack of sustainability or institutional capacity</li> <li>❖ Strong private sector participation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ Rehabilitation and development-based interventions</li> <li>❖ Capacity building</li> <li>❖ Access expansion</li> <li>❖ Quality standards</li> <li>❖ Coverage</li> </ul>

Source: RDP

**II.1.2 Economic and commercial situation**

Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita income of \$226. The economy of Somalia has come through sixteen years of civil war and the absence of central government with the private sector showing some resilience, trade and communications growing and strong livestock exports. Annual remittances of about \$1 billion have been a key factor in keeping the economy afloat, particularly at household level. However, public finances are extremely weak or non-existent, even in Puntland and Somaliland.

*Economic situation, structure and performance*

During the 1980s, Somalia experienced stagnant per capita output, accompanied by the deterioration of physical infrastructure, a decline in the quality of public services, severe macroeconomic imbalances, and negative growth between 1988 and 1990. Since 1991, the economy has suffered further from the absence of government, civil war, and recurrent environmental disasters (droughts and floods). One consequence of this is that macroeconomic data post-1990 are very scarce and all data should be treated with caution.

The structure of the economy remains similar to the pre-1991 period. The economy is dominated by agriculture, which accounted for some 64% of GDP in 1991. About half of this was generated by the livestock sub-sector and around 37% from crops and fruit. The most prominent sub-sectors in services were trade, hotels, transport and communications. Somalia has a large diaspora, whose contributions play a central role in Somalia’s economy. An

estimated \$1 billion is remitted annually, with approximately one third of this figure going to individual households, the rest representing private investments. However, caution is needed when considering remittances as there is a lack of data on the end-use of funds.

Reflecting the traditional role of pastoralism in Somali society, livestock is the most important productive sector of Somalia and is closely linked to commercial and export-orientated processing and marketing structures. Despite continuing livestock bans, approximately 2 million animals are exported each year, accounting for about 60% of Somalia's employment opportunities and generating about 40% of GDP and 80% of foreign currency earnings. Taxation of livestock trade and export is one of the major revenue sources for the regional administrations in Puntland and Somaliland. Banana exports that represented the second foreign currency earner collapsed and practically stopped after the El Nino floods of 1997/98.

The fisheries sector has potential but remains almost entirely undeveloped. Exploitation by Somalis remains small-scale, with growth restricted by the lack of infrastructure for storage, processing and distribution. Even before the war, it is estimated that only 3% of Somalia's potential sustainable catch was being exploited domestically; the long period of conflict has furthermore seen the exponential development of predatory exploitation by foreign fleets.

In all agriculture sub-sectors, including fishing, output is potentially higher than historic and current levels. However, the environmental aspects will have to be carefully managed if growth is to be sustainable. Even charcoal, although environmentally damaging at present, is an important economic activity and has potential for sustainable growth. The contribution of manufacturing to GDP in the late 1980s was no more than 5% and it remains very low today.

The economic infrastructure comprises some 22,000 km of roads, four major ports and 15 airfields, four of which have paved runways. Since the late 1980s there has been little investment in or maintenance of the roads network, which is now in a poor condition, with the situation being slightly better in the autonomous northern regions where some limited maintenance has commenced under the Somaliland Road Authority and the Puntland Highway Authority. There is no national electricity grid or legal and regulatory framework in place; most energy is provided by the private sector from privately owned generators at a relatively local level. Urban infrastructure in general is in poor condition.

### *The role of the private sector*

The private sector has, to a significant extent, mitigated the impact of state collapse and war on the Somali people. Prior to 1991, the economy was led by the public sector, but with government collapse the pattern has been reversed. Private investment in commercial ventures, such as money transfer services and transport and communications, has been robust, and this in turn supports other economic activities, notably those of traders doing business with the Middle East and Asia. The private sector, with external support including international Islamic and diaspora funds, has also invested strongly in the provision of basic services such as education and health, and delivery has actually improved since state collapse in the early 1980s. However, such services are generally concentrated in urban centres and do not cater for the needs of the poor. The private sector has also partially filled the gap in infrastructure provision left by conflict and lack of government, and has been involved in the management of various infrastructure facilities such as roads, airports/airstrips, ports, water supply and sanitation, and power generation and supply.

### *Structure and management of public finances*

In South Central Somalia there is no effective public sector finance management at federal government level. While both Puntland and Somaliland do have a budget and fiscal flows, fiscal management suffers from low revenue collection, expenditure mostly going on security and general administration, and poor planning. Revenues derive mainly from trade taxes, mostly specific rather than ad valorem, and including export taxes. They contribute more than 80% of annual revenue and have fluctuated widely in recent years as a result of the ebb and flow in the security environment, but in 2005 were approximately \$22 million in Somaliland and \$16 million in Puntland. Deficit financing is limited to semi-voluntary loans from major business people that are repaid through tax exemptions. In both Somaliland and Puntland, salaries account for most of the public budget, dominated by the police and armed services. Embryonic progress has been made on public finance management at municipal/local level in the autonomous regions. Some of these measures are currently being replicated on a very limited scale in the more stable parts of South Central Somalia; local administrations and municipalities remain an important entry point for governance-building.

The establishment of public finance management, and the development and implementation of revenue generation and collection policies and frameworks, lie at the heart of macroeconomic policy for Somalia and are strongly supported by the international community.

#### *Trade policy and the external environment*

Trade has grown steadily since 1991, seemingly benefiting rather than suffering from state failure. Increases in remittances have underpinned growth and helped to stabilise the Somali shilling. Trade has no doubt benefited from the virtual dollarisation of the economy.

The EU has little or no formal or direct trade with Somalia, whose main trading partners (principally in livestock) are the Gulf States and Yemen. The RDP envisages an expansion of trade through the development of processing industries for livestock and fish, and small-scale industry (aromatic gums and honey).

Somalia is a member of IGAD, the African Union, the League of Arab States, the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the UN Assembly, and has bilateral agreements with Kenya (revenue sharing) and Uganda and Ethiopia.

### **II.3 Social situation, including decent work and employment**

In 1989, Somalia was a sparsely populated country of 6 million people. The population was estimated at 6.8 million in 2001, 7.3 million in 2004, and 7.7 million in 2006. The implied population growth rate is about 2.9%.

As a result of the decades of civil war, local and clan conflict, absence of government, continuing insecurity in many parts of the country and inadequate access to basic services and infrastructure, welfare has declined compared to both pre-civil war times and the economy's potential achievements in the absence of civil strife. The cost in terms of loss or disruption of human lives alone has been considerable, with an estimated population deficit - relative to expected levels on the basis of pre-1980 long-term growth patterns - of about 2 million people.

Somalia's population is predominantly rural, with over 50% being traditionally linked to the nomadic pastoral food economy and about half that figure associated with sedentary agro-pastoral/ riverine livelihoods. However, urbanisation has been very rapid in recent years, with

the population of major Somali towns reportedly increasing by an average of 300-500% since the start of the civil war. While the absence of hard demographic data makes it impossible to gauge the extent of the phenomenon, it is clear that the rural/ urban population profile is in the process of radical change.

Despite the lost growth and potential - two generations of children have had no real access to education - there have been some gains in education indicators, although they remain extremely low, easily at the bottom of the African rankings. The primary school gross enrolment rate (GER) was only 22% in 2003-04, but when compared to a GER of about 12% in 1988 there are signs of improvement. Girls represent only about a third of total enrolment and are also subject to high dropout rates. Secondary education shows a GER of less than 2% with under-representation and underperformance of girls. Adult literacy is estimated at 20% - some success in tackling this can be seen from distance education with at least 30,000 adults (70% women and older than the primary age group) acquiring first-level literacy through a national radio programme implemented in cooperation with BBC Somalia.

Overall life expectancy at 47 years in 2002 is very low. Under-five and maternal mortality rates are among the worst in the world at 224 and 11-16 per 1,000 live births respectively. 26% of children under five are underweight and full immunisation coverage for one-year-olds is 36%. Malaria is endemic, and is the leading cause of death in children under five. TB infection rates are amongst the highest in the world, with 1 in 270 people infected and an estimated 25,000 new cases every year; prevalence is particularly high among young men. HIV and AIDS prevalence is currently estimated at less than 1%, although factors such as high mobility, polygamous behaviour patterns, female genital mutilation, early marriage and sexual exploitation linked to the ubiquitous presence of armed men have the potential to fuel an increase in the coming years.

In the health sector institutional management, coordination and service delivery capacity are weak or non-existent, with most health care offered by NGOs and religious organisations or by the private sector in urban areas. With healthcare spending estimated at under \$5 per capita per year, the sector is a long way from establishing a functional public healthcare system. Wider coverage is severely limited by the poor security situation.

Somalia is considered to be water scarce. People in rural areas generally have access only to surface water; reticulated water is available on a limited basis in urban areas, usually managed by the private sector. Data on access to water are sketchy but would indicate that less than 20% of the population in rural areas and about 30% in urban areas have access to safe water, while less than 50% overall have access to sanitation.

Already prior to war Somalia was structurally food insecure; ongoing conflicts and erratic climate conditions have eroded livelihoods and led to increased vulnerability and food insecurity. Access to services and markets is poor, undermined by chronic insecurity and the legacy of the previous, highly centralised government system, with its strong urban bias. Opportunities to market and export agricultural goods are hampered by the absence of credible control and certification systems, in particular non-compliance with the OIE sanitary standards, and by related livestock export bans.

In Somaliland and Puntland, the basic processes and structures of public administration are in place although focused on security and to some extent the provision of basic services (authorities for water and roads and education and health ministries). The absence of fully operational public institutions, policies and legal and regulatory frameworks hinders the development of the social and productive sectors, in particular agriculture and livestock. In

health, unregulated private sector provision is a cause for concern. In education, communities, religious agencies and NGOs are providing some basic education, providing models which could be supported and developed in the future. Owing to the absence of public funding mechanisms, basic social service provision remains dependent on contributions from service recipients - families finance the majority of the operational costs of education and health care - and external funding (remittances, donations and aid). The objective of a basic education and health system that is accessible to all remains a pipedream in the present environment, although it is noteworthy that the Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic stipulates the right to free education (Art. 24), and identifies access to public health services as a responsibility of the Government (Art. 26).

Basic human rights of children, women and other vulnerable groups are severely compromised. Children are at extreme risk (50% of the population is below the age of 18 and some 20% are under the age of 5), mainly as a result of under-nourishment (with global acute malnutrition running at between 10% and 20%) and lack of protection. Somalia has signed neither the Convention on the Rights of the Child nor the protocols on children affected by conflict. Somalia's current high malnutrition levels among children reflect the enormous toll that conflict, drought, poverty and food insecurity have taken on the capacity of Somali households to produce or purchase food to support the needs of their children.

Women and girls are particularly vulnerable to the consequences of insecurity. With traditional structures and coping mechanisms breaking down, limited financial resources require decisions on where money is spent; in most cases, the priority goes to male children and men. Many girls marry or are forced to marry before the age of 14 and the practice of female genital mutilation is widespread. The nomadic sector of the population has specific problems, not least their lack of access to adequate health, education and other services, and appropriate provision has to be made to meet the emergency needs of the large number of IDPs, and to support their reinstallation and reintegration.

UNHCR estimated the number of IDPS in Somalia to be around 750,000 people at the end of 2007, of whom 400,000 were from Mogadishu<sup>10</sup>. Living conditions in most IDP camps, where access to safe places often requires paying landlords, are very poor, with insufficient water and sanitation facilities and limited access to health care.

#### **II.4 Environmental situation**

In Somalia natural resources are the basis of livelihood security and thus the foundation for economic growth and development.

##### *Key environmental issues and challenges*

The people of Somalia, particularly pastoralists, possess a rich knowledge about their environment and how to manage it, but they are increasingly unable to do this because of insecurity, migration and displacement, population growth, urbanisation, climate change, recurring droughts and natural disasters. Insecurity, population growth and unplanned urbanisation all seriously threaten an extremely fragile and risk-prone environment and increase competition for limited resources. Rapid urbanisation places further demands on natural sources of energy supply such as fuel wood and charcoal, and increases water and air pollution. Wider socio-political and economic development increasingly conflicts with pastoralism, resulting in the traditionally effective communal management of rangelands

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<sup>10</sup> <http://www.unhcr.org/home/PUBL/474ac8cf0.pdf>



being reduced to “first come first served” or the rule of the gun. Private rangeland enclosure, conversion of prime pasture, and commercial charcoal production are causes of degradation and land disputes. Water extraction for irrigated agriculture increasingly conflicts with urban and livestock demands. Climate change is a reality and the Horn of Africa is expected to be exposed to more frequent and extreme droughts and floods, putting further pressure on natural resources, in particular soil and water. Somalia’s marine resources are threatened by over-fishing by illegal and unlicensed foreign fleets, illegal dumping of toxic waste and discharges from ships along its coastline. Deposits of toxic waste and unexploded landmines and other ordnance represent localised but considerable threats to human health.

### *Legislation, institutional framework*

National sector policies and legislation date back to the pre-war period and are usually weak, outdated, not supported by enabling institutions - and therefore not enforced. First attempts to establish environmental policies and legislation together with the respective institutions have been made in Somaliland and Puntland, but their impact on environment conservation and livelihood improvement is yet to be assessed. Somalia has signed various international agreements and Multilateral Environment Agreements, all of them unenforced and hence ineffective. Moreover, the UN Framework Convention for Climate Change and the Basel Convention on Hazardous Waste, of direct and immediate relevance to Somalia, have not yet been signed. Somalia needs to return to the international arena and reaffirm its commitment to the global effort of conserving and managing the environment.

The Somalia Country Environmental Profile notes that all sectors have a positive or negative environmental footprint to a greater (agriculture, industry, urban, water) or lesser (security, education) extent. Environmental concerns will be mainstreamed through engaging all stakeholders - civil society, the private sector, users of environmental services, pastoralists, farmers and urban dwellers. In this manner programmes and projects in all sectors will integrate and implement environment-related activities in support of their own objectives.

## **II.2. Poverty reduction analysis**

As in all other areas a major concern is the lack of recent and accurate data on poverty with no really adequate survey mechanisms since the 1970s and no census data since the early 1990s. On an income measure of poverty 43% of the population are extremely poor (less than \$1 per day at PPP) with a wide difference between urban (24%) and rural (54%) areas. The incidence of general poverty (less than \$2 per day PPP) is 73% (61% urban and 80% rural). The poverty gap, which indicates the depth of poverty, stands at 18.3%. All these indicators will need to be monitored.

Income inequality is significant, both among households across Somalia and between regions. Household surveys suggest that the poorest 30% of the population receives only 7.8% of the total income generated in Somalia, whereas the richest 10% of the population receives 35.6% of the total income (a Gini coefficient of 0.4 has been calculated). Life expectancy at 47 years in 2002 is very low.

Nutritional indicators serving as a good proxy for poverty and social deprivation show levels of malnutrition among children which, in other countries, would be considered a national emergency. A 2003 UNICEF survey showed that even in Hargeisa, considered the richest and most developed Somali city, 14.4% of children had severe wasting (acute malnutrition). In regions affected by drought these indices often rise to 20% or more. Rates of stunting (the result of chronic malnutrition), which can be taken as an indicator of long-term stress and

poverty, are above 30% in those parts of South Central Somalia region that have been surveyed. The effect of such high rates of stunting on children's growth and cognitive ability will be severe.

The most important form of social safety net in Somalia is the extended family and the clan, and in particular their management of remittances. The successful growth of remittance companies that channel large transfers from migrants and refugees abroad to their relatives in the country has been almost completely dependent on cohesiveness and trust within sub-clans. Remittances from abroad are estimated to be a lifeline for a third of the population and have since 2003 been supported by the Somalia Financial Services Association.

In addition to remittances, a recent survey indicated that a wide variety of civil society institutions are providing various forms of social protection and are playing a major secondary role as substitutes for government. The most important of the civil society organisations (CSOs) that have emerged during the last 15 years are the religious organisations that undertake substantial social service work, largely in health and education, and social protection programmes.

### **II.3. The Somalia development strategy**

In 2005 a process was initiated to prepare a post-conflict needs assessment for Somalia that would identify key development areas and financial needs for a five-year period (Joint Needs Assessment – JNA). A multidisciplinary team made up of international experts, experts from the Diaspora and Somalis seconded from the federal and regional authorities prepared the assessment on the basis of desk studies and extensive field consultations conducted with a wide range of stakeholders throughout Somalia.

The end product of the JNA exercise is a Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which constitutes Somalia's development strategy for the next five years, focusing on deepening peace and reducing poverty. The architecture of the RDP recognises the "variable geometry" of development needs and opportunities. It consists of a synthesis volume and three regional volumes for South Central Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland; in the case of the latter two, the regional volumes take account of home-grown development plans. In all three regions the framework is built on three pillars:

- Deepening peace, improving security and establishing good governance;
- Strengthening essential basic services and social protection;
- Creating an enabling environment for private sector-led growth to expand employment and reduce poverty.

The agreed framework was the subject of joint RDP-JSP consultations undertaken by the UN, World Bank and participating donors with federal and regional governments, parliaments and civil society umbrella groups in January 2007. The consultations with the Transitional Federal Institutions and South Central Somalia civil society groups were perforce less extensive than was possible in Somaliland and Puntland owing to the conflict that broke out in December 2006 and which continued to the time of drafting; the fighting coincided with political upheavals (such as cabinet reshuffles, the replacement of the Speaker and the dismissal of many MPs) which made it difficult for the international community to engage directly.

### **II.4. Analysis of the viability of Somalia policies and the medium-term challenges**

The extensive consultations on the JNA and the RDP provide the basis for a realistic policy framework and strategic agenda to build and strengthen a lean and efficient federal state. The RDP recognises the different stages at which Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia are in the process of state building and that there is no ‘one size fits all’ formula for development in Somalia. The RDP supports a multilayered approach, with institutions at regional and sub-regional levels to be developed and strengthened. At the same time local community initiatives that fully involve all elements of society will be encouraged and supported.

The main focus of the RDP is on establishing and deepening peace and security and strengthening democratic institutions. Capacity in all forms is in short supply and the challenge will be to build and extend local capacity, ensuring ownership of institution-building while supporting these efforts with extensive external technical assistance.

The RDP recognises the importance of the MDGs but is also pragmatic in regard to what can be achieved in the medium term. Given the lack of reliable baselines in almost all fields, the development and strengthening of data collection and analysis capacity will be a key component of RDP strategy across the board.

From the point of view of practical implementation, the RDP is very ambitious in terms of its goals and the financial envelope required to realise them (over €2 billion for five years) – particularly in view of the limited institutional capacity of the private and public sectors.

While the RDP constitutes the main development strategy, it will build on the extensive network of relief programmes that have been maintained during periods of crisis, particularly in the South Central Somalia region. The aim will be to create opportunities that will allow relief activities to link with or lead to medium and longer-term development.

## **CHAPTER III: OVERVIEW OF PAST AND PRESENT COOPERATION, COMPLEMENTARITY AND CONSISTENCY**

### **III.1 Overview of the donors' past and present cooperation (lessons learned)**

Throughout the conflict years resources have been focused on conflict-prevention and peace-building efforts while maintaining support to the UN, INGOs and local NGOs for basic service provision. Reviews of EC, EU Member State and Norway programmes have been carried out regularly and have contributed to increased focus and greater coherence. There is a better and growing understanding of the opportunities and risks involved in working in Somalia and of the mechanisms available to mitigate these risks. This section draws on partners’ experiences outlined in Annexes 6 and 12 as well as other reports and sources.

#### *Key lessons learned*

Despite the difficulties of engaging in development work in Somalia there have been some successes and these provide the input for the lessons learned. Notably, it has been possible to engage in dialogue on governance and peace issues as the donor community has a skilled and knowledgeable human resource base in Nairobi along with mechanisms for regular exchange of ideas. Donors have become more focused on areas where they can add value. Specific examples clarifying the key lessons learned as outlined below are described in Annex 12.

1. A good understanding of a highly dynamic political environment, the ability to analyse and update this and apply the findings to the development agenda is critical; such analysis helps to identify potential entry points and evaluate risks.
2. Multi-donor coordination and planning with other partners, particularly in the governance and security areas, has proved beneficial in providing a coherent programme that ‘speaks with one voice’ in a politically sensitive environment.
3. Fully functioning state structures are not in place, so innovative and non-traditional avenues have to be explored to build capacity at different levels.
4. Community-driven development is and will remain a key mechanism. Capacity-building and institutional strengthening will be embedded as a component in all programmes, thus also reinforcing the “governance dividend” approach.<sup>11</sup>
5. In line with this approach, donor flexibility has proved critically important in exploiting windows of opportunity, particularly in the fields of governance and reconciliation (notably in respect of support to non-state actors).
6. With donors’ financial and human resources limited, focusing on fewer areas and committing to long-term support provides a greater chance of sustainable outcomes.
7. The acute lack of reliable, regular and timely data greatly hampers priority-setting in programming and the monitoring and evaluation of strategic outcomes - to the extent that in a number of cases evidence of impact is merely anecdotal. A considerable effort needs to be made to establish baselines and develop and manage information systems.
8. While remaining flexible, programming and resources have to be committed to a medium to long-term perspective, particularly when developing institutions and providing capacity-building. When dealing with a fragile security and political situation this can prove something of a risk. For Somalia, where the different regions have very different institutional structures and capacities, this affects both the aid delivery mechanisms to be selected and the capacity to absorb resources.

### **III.2 Information on the programmes of other donors (complementarity)**

A summary of past and ongoing development assistance provided by the EC, Member States and Norway to Somalia is given in Annex 6.

#### **III.1 Other instruments**

##### *The Peace Facility and Stability Instrument*

In 2007, Somalia benefited of a package of €15 million from the Africa Peace Facility and an allocation of almost €5 million from the Stability Instrument to support AU’s capacity to plan and manage the AMISOM deployment.

##### *Non-State Actors (NSAs) and Local Authorities in Development*

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<sup>11</sup> Governance dividend: an approach adopted in the Mid-Term Review of the Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia (SISAS; 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> EDFs). It entails: (a) identifying “home grown” governance initiatives in different parts of the country that are accepted and supported by the local population and do not exclude a possible future federal structure; (b) encouraging these initiatives by creating a critical mass of integrated assistance promoting democratisation, the rule of law and institutional capacity, while stepping up support for the development of livelihoods and social services. Somaliland and Puntland have been beneficiaries of this approach, as have selected local administrations elsewhere. Excluded are areas in conflict, “warlord fiefs” and other predatory or imposed administrations; in these areas support for livelihoods and social services is provided directly to the end beneficiaries.

The EC promotes the creation of appropriate space and opportunity for civil society and the private sector to contribute to policy decision-making and strategic priority-setting. In particular, non-state actors (NSAs) are to be encouraged to have a greater say and more involvement in the reconstruction of the country as a whole through delivering services, supporting the democratic role of parliament and other public scrutiny bodies to increase accountability, and supporting a free media. NSAs, including normally excluded groups, are given space during the planning and delivery of development programmes supporting the state-building process. The programme will also provide assistance to other NSA groups (e.g. traditional leaders) to regain and strengthen their status in the reconciliation process. Specific support will target women and women's groups with a view to developing common agendas and securing for them a fair role in the reconstruction of the country.

#### *Food Security Thematic Programme*

The Food Security programme is aimed at improving food security at household and community level through irrigation infrastructure rehabilitation, improvement of community irrigation management, crop diversification and marketing. There have also been ad hoc responses to food security crisis situations, complementing humanitarian aid interventions.

Somalia is one of the target countries for the food security thematic programme, with an initial allocation of EUR 12 million for the period 2007-2010. The programme will focus on crucial investments to protect, maintain and recover productive and social assets to allow economic integration and long-term rehabilitation, while also addressing vulnerability to shocks and strengthening vulnerable groups' resilience, with particular emphasis on IDP groups and women, through support for crisis prevention and management, including support to food security information systems. A joint LRRD strategy will be established together with ECHO and other stakeholders during 2008.

*Humanitarian assistance:* During the period 2003-2006, funding for Somalia from the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO) has totalled EUR 29.5 million, with an additional EUR 5 million being provided in 2006 from the food security budget line for food aid assistance to the victims of the drought. The focal points of ECHO support are health, nutrition, water and sanitation, livestock, food security and support for the Internally Displaced. ECHO is also providing assistance to the Somali refugees in Kenya. Partners' access and monitoring of the programmes remain the main challenges for delivering the EC humanitarian assistance to the Somali population.

*Other instruments:* additionally, there have been projects financed from other budget lines such as the Banana Budget Line and Mines Budget Line.

### **III.3 Description of the political dialogue between the donors and Somalia**

Although repeated attempts have been made to establish a forum for structured interaction between the international community and the Somali side, political dialogue in the formal sense has yet to be developed. In the case of Somaliland and Puntland, where varying degrees of capacity and enthusiasm for such a dialogue do exist, the issue of the international status of these autonomous regions prevents international partners from engaging officially. In the case of the TFIs, the obstacles are linked to lack of capacity and internal divisions on the Somali side, together with obvious logistical and security-related constraints on the international side. As part of the interim arrangements for the transitional period, a three-tier international joint coordination mechanism, together with a related Declaration of Principles, was agreed at the Stockholm conference in late 2004 and signed by the UN and the TFG in February 2005. The

top tier of the mechanism was to consist of a policy-level Coordinating and Monitoring Committee (CMC) co-chaired by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to Somalia and the Prime Minister of the TFG. This was to have been complemented by a Joint Planning Committee (JPC) to manage aid programming and coordination at the strategic level under the co-chairmanship of the UNDP/WB and the Minister of Planning of the TFG. The third tier was to comprise sector-level Joint Thematic Committees (JTCs), under the joint leadership of the relevant federal line ministry and an appropriate counterpart international agency. The JPC met only twice, in mid-2005, and the JTCs were never formed. The CMC met in Nairobi before the TFIs relocated to Jowhar in mid-2005, but was never convened thereafter, despite repeated attempts – mainly driven by the EU – to reanimate it.

The EU and Norway were, together with the regional partners (IGAD, AU and LAS), the driving force behind the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC) held in Kenya from 2002 to 2004. Since the conclusion of the Conference, political dialogue with Somali parties at EU level has been conducted on an intermittent basis through positions coordinated at Head of Missions/political counsellors meetings, and Troika/Presidency démarches have been undertaken where appropriate. For its part the Commission attempted to develop a structured dialogue by signing an MoU with the TFG in Brussels in March 2006, which provides, inter alia, for “political and security-related dialogue at all levels”.

Somalia is a member of IGAD and the League of Arab States; both regional fora are strongly engaged in the transition and regularly debate policy on Somalia at a high level. In 2005 IGAD went as far as proposing to deploy a peacekeeping force in Somalia (IGASOM), but owing to differences within the grouping (in particular opposing Eritrea and Ethiopia), it eventually fell to the African Union to take forward this initiative. For its part the LAS sponsored a dialogue between the TFIs and the Union of Islamic Courts during the latter’s period of ascendancy in 2006; delegations from the two sides thrice met face-to-face in Khartoum, and despite some progress in the early stages, this initiative also petered out amid mutual recriminations.

The International Contact Group (ICG) established in May 2006 provides a mechanism for high-level coordination of international policy on Somalia. The ICG, the membership of which includes the USA, AU, IGAD, LAS, Kenya, Tanzania and the EU (Presidency, Commission and Italy, Sweden and the UK) is an informal forum, and does not interact directly with the TFG. However, the communiqués issued at ICG meetings have been shown to have a substantial impact, and there may be scope to develop this body’s role in the future.

#### **III.4 Description of the state of the partnership with Somalia and progress towards harmonisation**

In 1993 the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) was established by an international conference in Addis Ababa. In the absence of functioning state institutions, the SACB and its sector sub-committees represented for over a decade the locus for the coordination of aid to Somalia. As a result of the creation of the TFIs and UN reforms, following extensive consultation in 2005 the SACB was transformed into a new body for the *Coordination of International Support to Somalis (CISS)*. The CISS is governed by an Executive Committee co-chaired by the UN and the World Bank and assisted by a permanent Somali Support Secretariat (SSS). Membership of the Executive Committee is limited to representatives duly delegated by each of the three main constituencies (NGO Consortium, the Somalia Donor Group and the UN Country Team) and the chairs of the CISS sector committees. The CISS is designed to provide a more coordinated and coherent international approach promoting joint sector and thematic structures (in line with the three pillars of the RDP) at field level. As with

the political dialogue fora detailed above (and for the same reasons) the CISS format does not as yet make explicit provision for structured interaction with Somali counterparts.

The *Somalia Donor Group* meets monthly and is the forum for internal donor coordination and harmonisation, and for agreement on a constituency position for the CISS Executive Committee. The *NGO Consortium of Somalia* is a voluntary organisation composed of interested international and national NGOs working in Somalia. The NGO Consortium is based in Nairobi and in Hargeisa. The *UN Country Team* (UNCT) likewise meets on a regular basis under the leadership of the Resident Coordinator (RC); it encompasses all organisations of the United Nations system dealing with operational activities for development. The World Bank participates in UNCT meetings. The *EU Development Counsellors* group also meets regularly and Norway attends this group when specific JSP-related issues are addressed.

As regards humanitarian aid specifically, in line with the global UN reform process OCHA established the *Somalia Inter Agency Standing Committee* (IASC) in January 2006. The group meets on a monthly basis, with the FAO's FSAU and FEWS/NET acting as technical advisors. A seat to be filled by a Somali representative has remained vacant.

### **III.5 Analysis of policy coherence for development**

The EU acknowledges that development aid in itself is not sufficient to reach the MDGs; however, it also has to be recognised that non-aid EU policies currently have a limited impact in Somalia.

#### *Trade*

Somalia is neither a member of the regional trade organisation COMESA nor a WTO member. While effective participation in the Multilateral Trading System is not even on the agenda, financial and economic liberalisation, in the form of removal of restrictions to trade, has occurred in an institutional vacuum, leading to unchecked sub-standard imports of products (including foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals) and technical barriers to trade. Somalia does not take part in regional EPA negotiations between East and Southern Africa and the Commission which are now in their third and final stage, and its trade with the EU is negligible (main trading partners are the Gulf States and Yemen). However, as a least developed country (LDC), Somalia may benefit further from the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative launched in 2001 to grant duty-free access to imports of all products from LDCs without any quantitative restrictions, except for arms and munitions.

#### *Fisheries*

As for fisheries, it should be noted that one of the priorities of the EU in this area is the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities which undermine the economy and sustainability of a third country. In this regard, the establishment of viable security conditions in the Somalia Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) could play an important role in order to enhance the fight against IUU activities.

Furthermore, in line with partnership the Communication of 23 December 2002 on an Integrated Framework for Fisheries Partnership Agreements with Third Countries (COM(2002) 637), the EC encourages the conclusion of fisheries agreements in order to contribute towards sustainable exploitation of marine resources. As of September 2000 Community negotiating mandates were in existence in 25 countries, including Somalia. The status of marine resources along the Somali coastline is largely unknown, but in the absence

of a monitoring system it is apparent that these have been regularly plundered by unlicensed trawlers during the last 15 years. Somalia could greatly benefit from measures identified in the EU action plan to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. The EC is funding a Regional Programme on Integrated Coastal Management of the Western Indian Ocean countries, including Somalia, aiming at the development and implementation of national integrated coastal zones management plans.

### *Transport*

The *EU Strategy for Africa* highlights the fact that limited access to transport constrains economic growth. The Commission has responded to such constraints by establishing an *EU-Africa Partnership for Infrastructure* to support and initiate programmes (Trans-African Networks) for the promotion of regional integration. In addition, infrastructure features as a concentration sector under the Regional Indicative Programme for the Eastern and Southern Africa region.

### *Migration*

The *European Consensus on Development* recognises that the increase in migratory flows is one element of globalisation and that development is the most effective long-term response to forced migration and destabilising migratory flows.

DfID's new policy paper on migration and development, "*Moving out of poverty: Making Migration work better for poor people*" likewise identifies the main policy approaches which can help reduce poverty and gain benefits from migration.

Somalia is a major labour-exporting country and the refugee situation is engendering a protracted crisis. Repatriation is still not an option for the present, mainly because of lack of durable solutions and administration-led policy initiatives to manage migration.

The scale of the ongoing humanitarian situation in Somalia requires an integrated, comprehensive response from the international community. The Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) for Somali Refugees initiated by UNHCR in collaboration with the Somali authorities, regional host states, the European Commission, Denmark, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in mid-2004 aims to provide effective protection and a range of durable solutions for Somali refugees and IDPs. The main thrust of the CPA lies in the ongoing repatriation programme that was launched in Somalia in the early 1990s to ensure the sustainability of returns and reintegration.

The Population Movement Tracking (PMT) initiative began with the onset of drought in South/Central Somalia in December 2005 and has expanded to cover displacement caused by floods, clan conflict, clashes and cross-border movements. It now includes data from Somaliland and Puntland as well. The PMT data on displacement caused by the sudden onset of an emergency situation support an early warning system. These data also provide an overview of areas of displacement, patterns of movement, trends, protection issues and urgent humanitarian needs. Additionally, the PMT acts as a trigger for investigation of protection issues that come to light through the tracking process. Most recently, the PMT has proved extremely valuable in tracking movements, human rights violations and protection issues throughout the conflict of late 2006 and during the insecurity that has since prevailed.



## CHAPTER IV: RESPONSE STRATEGY

### IV.1 Background

In 2005 the international community and Somali partners agreed that the time was right to prepare a medium-term development plan for Somalia, paving the way for a donors' conference when circumstances allow. As a first step, a comprehensive joint needs assessment (JNA) was prepared, drawing on the skills and expertise acquired from the diaspora, from within Somalia and from international agencies. The World Bank/UN-led assessment was funded by the EC and several EU Member States, and managed by a representative Coordination and Support Group chaired by the European Commission. The process included wide consultations in Somalia; the JNA's findings, conclusions and recommendations were further reviewed with stakeholders in a series of validation workshops. Taking as a starting point the MDGs and the need for a peaceful and secure environment for reconstruction and development and the eradication of poverty, six cluster reports were prepared:

- i) Governance, Security and the Rule of Law
- ii) Macroeconomic Policy Framework and Data Development
- iii) Infrastructure
- iv) Social Services and Protection of Vulnerable Groups
- v) Productive Sectors and the Environment
- vi) Livelihoods and Solutions for the Displaced

The cluster report findings were summarised and synthesised in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which builds the conclusions of the JNA into a prioritised and costed framework built on three pillars:

- (i) *Deepening peace, improving security and establishing good governance through disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), the establishment and strengthening of core public and private sector institutions (including security institutions), decentralisation, and conflict resolution mechanisms;*
- (ii) *Investing in people through improved social services (especially education, health, water and sanitation) to raise human skills, and actions to address the needs of specific vulnerable groups such as IDPs; and*
- (iii) *Establishing a sustainable enabling environment for rapid poverty-reducing development, to expand employment and reduce poverty. This includes investment in socio-economic infrastructure and maintenance, as well as policies and actions to overcome constraints facing the livestock and agriculture sectors and to ensure protection of the environment and sustainable use of natural resources.*

The different degree of progress within each of these pillars of the different regions (Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia) is reflected in separate regional volumes.

### IV. 2 Response Strategy

The EU and Norway are supportive of the RDP approach and have developed the JSP response around the three RDP pillars. Based on the respective policy perspectives and priorities, comparative advantage, competencies and where available the anticipated financial resources, priority strategic objectives have been agreed.

Key to the response is the recognition that medium and long-term development can only take place where citizens can live in peace and safety within a secure environment, where basic

human rights are respected and the concerns of the most disadvantaged are addressed. Major elements of a response that will secure such an environment include security sector reform (including disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation - DDR), democratisation processes, building institutional and human capacity, providing basic social services, improving food security and ensuring that all these activities can be sustained by supporting economic development. The approach aims to link relief with rehabilitation and development and to ensure phasing, complementarity and coherence between different response mechanisms.

The focus on state-building – strengthening those institutions already in place and supporting the establishment of new institutions, developing policy frameworks and strategic programmes, putting in place enabling legal and regulatory frameworks and building capacity to implement, monitor and adjust policy – is a priority strategic response that has been identified in each of the pillars. While state-building is the foundation for development, a coordinated, well managed and phased approach is necessary. In order to avoid precedents being set by programmes or projects within or outside the JSP programming process, a set of principles for institution and capacity-building has been developed.

There are other inter-pillar linkages and common concerns such as urban and rural development, user charges and cost recovery, and the need for accurate and timely data.

### **IV. 3 JSP strategic response to the RDP pillars**

The response strategy is built on the following concepts:

- The Fragile States initiative and OECD/DAC principles and the Commission proposal for an EU response towards situation of fragility<sup>12</sup>;
- A ‘variable geometry’ approach acknowledging different regional development needs;
- Working towards the MDGs;
- A focus on vulnerable groups, particularly women and IDP.

Each strategic cluster takes account of three key cross-cutting issues – conflict prevention (“Do No Harm”), environment, and gender – and in each case is sensitive to linking relief to rehabilitation and development (LRRD) and building counterpart capacity. The detailed pillar strategic responses include specific indicators to ensure that cross-cutting issues are mainstreamed in the strategic responses and can be monitored during the review process.

#### **IV.3.1 Pillar 1 Deepening peace, improving security and establishing democratic governance**

In Somalia, following a decade and a half of civil war and anarchy, the creation of viable security and stability conditions is a prerequisite for an environment conducive to the establishment of institutions and democratic governance, reconciliation and longer-term development. The background documents prepared for this JSP include a comprehensive description of the democratic governance approach, an analysis of the situation in which the approach is embedded, and the pillar implications for sector programming.

##### **IV.3.1.1 Strategic objectives**

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<sup>12</sup> See also: “Towards an EU response to situations of fragility - engaging in difficult environments for sustainable development, stability and peace” - Com communication {SEC(2007) 1417}

### *A. Establish viable security conditions*

In line with the EU policy framework - notably the joint paper on Security Sector Reform (SSR) - the strategy will focus on support to enhance security, governance (institutional capacity – state institutions, including executive, legislative and judiciary, planning, regulatory frameworks, etc.), support for the establishment/development of a civilian police force and demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) programmes. The importance of regional aspects in the Somali context will require that IGAD and the AU play an active role in this sector. Programmes will be context-sensitive and responsive to the political environment as it develops. Parliamentarians will be a key target group in order to strengthen democratic debate and oversight.

### *B. Support reconciliation through dialogue and peace-building at political and community levels*

Short and medium-term support will be provided to the reconciliation and dialogue process. At national level, this will involve sustained support for the activities of the independent National Reconciliation Commission provided for in the Transitional Federal Charter. In the shorter term, assistance will focus on the organisation of an independently managed National Reconciliation Congress as the critical first step towards inclusive governance and the realisation of the core objectives of the transitional period (a new constitution adopted by referendum and democratically elected institutions). At community level, special attention will be paid to supporting and developing the role of traditional leadership in conflict resolution. The strategy will also strengthen the role of women and women's groups in advocating peaceful resolution of conflicts at political and community levels.

### *C. Based on democratic principles, support the establishment and/or strengthening of effective governance and macroeconomic structures*

State-building is the most important initiative for Somalia once viable security conditions are established. A specific medium-term priority in this context will be to support the independent National Constitutional and Federal Commission provided for in the Transitional Federal Charter. The strategy will further support the development and/or establishment of coherent governance structures at all levels (federal, regional and district and with special attention to urban centres) with agreed levels of autonomy as prescribed in the constitutional framework.

The macroeconomic framework and state financial institutions and public finance management in resource allocation, revenue raising and accountability will be re-established or strengthened. There will be a specific focus on supporting local governance as a sustainable entry point in a volatile and fragile political situation. Governance in urban areas, important for both economic and political growth, will be strengthened and complemented by limited infrastructure development. Despite provision for women's representation in the transitional federal charter, actual representation in the current structures is very limited at federal, regional and district levels. This will be addressed by proactive interventions working with existing women's groups.

### *D. Support the effective participation of Non-State Actors in peace-building and good governance.*

The strategy will ensure that there is adequate space and opportunity for civil society and the private sector to contribute to policy decision-making and strategic priority-setting. In particular, Non-State Actors (NSAs) will be encouraged to have a greater say and more

involvement in the reconstruction of the country as a whole through cooperation with local authorities, delivering services, supporting the democratic role of parliament and other public scrutiny bodies to increase accountability, and supporting a free media. NSAs, including normally excluded groups, will continue to be given space during the planning and delivery of development programmes supporting the state-building process. The strategy will also provide assistance to other NSA groups (e.g. traditional leaders) to regain and strengthen their status in the reconciliation process. Specific support will target women and women's groups to develop common agendas and to advocate for a fair role in the reconstruction of the country.

All donors engaged in Somalia already jointly support peace and reconciliation initiatives and intend to continue or increase their support in this area, which for the EC is a focal area. The World Bank will support capacity development in all areas of PFM (allocation and accountability, civil service reform/ development).

### **IV.3.2 Pillar 2 Investing in people by improving equitable access to affordable and sustainable social services: education, health, water and sanitation**

Service delivery will be improved by providing equitable and affordable access to social services. The key principles are: a) build on what is there and is known to work; b) support integrated service delivery at community level making sure there is strategic coordination, capacity and coherence at the district and regional levels; c) work with all service providers; d) provide an enabling legal and regulatory framework; e) positive discrimination in favour of women and girls in order to overcome the current imbalance in their access to services. The acute lack of baseline data will be addressed as a key component of activities in all sub-sectors.

#### **IV.3.2.1 Strategic objectives**

*A. Strengthen government and non-government institutions at federal, regional and decentralised levels to coordinate and enable the delivery of social services, especially ensuring access for the poorest and most excluded groups.*

The strategy will build towards an integrated, horizontal and sector-wide approach, addressing the varying needs and capacities in the regions, districts and the private sector. It will support an enabling regulatory and policy role for government, ensuring improved quality and monitoring of service delivery, and ensuring that service delivery is inclusive and accessible to all. Partnerships with the private sector (particularly through PPP), NGOs and other providers will be supported to meet demand and improve service quality. Critical attention will be paid to addressing financing of services – particularly affordability and access for the very poorest. This will include setting out options for recurrent costs, user fees, cash transfers, etc.).

*B. Education: Strengthen or establish the education institutional frameworks for the delivery of accessible and good quality education for all Somalis including formal, non-formal and Islamic education.*

A sector-wide approach to education will aim to provide access to broad-based education for all children and for adults who have missed out on education because of conflict, instability and inadequate or non-existent government institutions. Activities in this sector will focus on improved delivery of basic formal and non-formal education for children and adults. This will include literacy training; education support for nomadic groups, internally displaced people,

improving standards and curricula; linking vocational training with labour market opportunities (including for ex-combatants in DDR programmes); expanding professional (not financial) links with Islamic education systems (the strategic objective being to boost participation levels and integration, and achieve better harmonisation/ articulation); at the same time, present quality concerns (characterised by extremely high drop-out rates) will be addressed through continued and intensified training of teachers and improved (more relevant) curricula, also including people with special needs.

The education sector support will address these immediate concerns with a programme of rapid action based on a structured rationale which will seek to improve, in the medium- term, the capacity of Somali institutions in the areas of policy formulation and planning on the basis of sound data, concepts and appropriate institutional settings.

The JSP will ensure better donor harmonisation and alignment with the needs of Somali partners, as well as increased coordination amongst those providing education services and support – to ensure coherent and strategic approaches to education. Involvement of non-traditional donors and partners will also be an important focus of activity.

Education is currently a key sector for the EC and will become a focal sector under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF. Italy and the UK will also continue to give support in the sector. Initial work will seek to consolidate interventions within an overall strategic framework. Following close sector policy dialogue and improved coordination (with other development partners and on the ground) will ensure that the limited funding will warrant effective (and visible) changes.

*C. Health: Strengthen the technical and administrative capacity of the health sector to sustain delivery of, and access to, good quality basic health care. Support increasing coverage and improvement of the quality of basic health care; strengthen the development of efficient health systems and progressively reduce inequality of access to basic health services.*

The strategy focuses on consolidating and rationalising the existing healthcare delivery system, strengthening an agreed set of health facilities, improving health service delivery systems, increasing funds for recurrent costs, carrying out limited, urgent rehabilitation work, upgrading the skills of health personnel, management and health information systems and support for tertiary health institutions. Financing of health care will be an important focus of attention – including salaries of health personnel, user fees and subsidy schemes, and ensuring retention of skilled Somali health personnel.

Humanitarian and disease-specific control programmes will continue to receive support through existing mechanisms such as the CAP, GAVI and GFATM.

Tertiary health care is being supported by Italy, and the UK is exploring how to engage in the sector, possibly building on the current EC-supported programme of decentralised primary healthcare provision and capacity-building implemented by UNICEF.

*D. Water and sanitation: Promote equitable and environmentally sustainable access to water and sanitation in line with the MDGs.*

The strategy will focus on delivery of water & sanitation services and hygiene education to communities, primarily through public-private partnerships. Priority will be given to providing affordable access to poor communities and providing water and sanitation to all schools and clinics. As Somalia is water scarce, sustainable water resource management will need to be an integral component of all water supply programmes, particularly managing the balance between human and agricultural needs. Support related to water and sanitation will be channelled through interventions in the rural development, food security, education and health

sectors. Since access to water is a key area of conflict, water issues will be addressed in conflict prevention efforts.

### **IV.3.3 Pillar 3 Poverty reduction and the consolidation of peace through sustainable and equitable economic growth**

Broad-based growth to generate employment and incomes will be central to the effective consolidation of peace and reduction of poverty. The immediate post-conflict environment will require considerable efforts and resources to be directed towards supporting and increasing livelihood assets. Broader poverty-reducing economic growth factors such as investment in infrastructure, transport, power and communications will need to be addressed to underpin the medium and longer-term development agenda.

The key to equitable economic growth will be to support and expand the already vibrant Somali private sector, increase productive capacity and increase employment opportunities. Specific areas to be developed are processing and marketing of traditional agriculture products, the livestock and fishery sectors, support to public investments in enabling infrastructure, support for other existing productive sectors, and the exploration of new opportunities for private investment. At the same time, livelihoods of the poorest strata of the population require additional support in order to reduce food insecurity and prevent them falling into destitution as a result of external shocks.

#### **IV.3.3.1 Strategic objectives**

##### *A. Establish strengthen institutions and develop policies, laws and regulations*

Effective and accountable state and non-state institutions will be given assistance to negotiate and prepare an enabling legal and regulatory framework that provides space for the private sector to grow, both in urban and rural areas. As much of Somalia's potential growth is predicated on trade and integration into the broader Horn and Eastern Africa regional economy, programmes that facilitate such economic growth will be supported. Somalia is prone to disasters and support will be provided for disaster prevention and preparedness.

##### *B. Provide an enabling environment for investment and Public-Private-Partnership and for improving livelihoods*

Supported by an appropriate legislative and regulatory framework, Somalia's private sector will benefit from an integrated development approach providing access to productive assets and markets, improved enabling infrastructure, improved natural resources management, territorial development, support to traditional productive areas of agriculture and livestock and basic urban and rural infrastructure.

The EC will focus on supporting economic development with particular emphasis on improving rural and urban livelihoods and support to public investments in basic infrastructure.

## **IV.4 Cross-cutting issues**

### **IV.4.1 Conflict prevention**

Prevention of resource, clan and religion-based conflict and armed violence in urban and rural areas through the active identification of community-based conflict management and peace-

building initiatives will be a core element of all programme design and implementation. Programming will include appropriate conflict assessment and review based on the Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention tool developed by Saferworld. This tool includes lessons learned from other post-conflict contexts, as well as recommendations on how to take forward the conflict assessment components in the various sectors of intervention; the specific activities and schedule for this are to be agreed upon between the Commission, Member States and Norway. DDR will be an important part of the process of peace building and conflict prevention; programmes will include targeted action to ensure ex-combatants have the skills needed to contribute to the economy. Other entry points for the implementation of this conflict prevention tool may be land issues, education and Non-State Actors.

#### **IV.4.2 Gender**

The gender profile suggests that there have been some notable examples of women and women's organisations challenging traditional, male-dominated power structures, the militias and the causes and course of conflict. However, they have not achieved the critical mass to effect sustainable social change and are clearly under-represented in the political, economic and social spheres. While conflict may raise the profile of women and give them new roles, evidence suggests that this is short-lived once there is peace.

The diverse and fragmented nature of the legal system does not serve to provide a sound basis for the resolution of gender issues. The practice of female genital mutilation is widespread (possibly as high as 98%) and while swift abandonment of the practice is unlikely, support will be provided for creating a dynamic of change. Women's and broader human rights will be monitored closely as new social agendas emerge and develop.

The objective of embedding gender in all programmes will be to secure the rights of Somali women and men, taking particular account of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) will be encouraged and steps will be taken to monitor the situation relative to the Convention's provisions. All programmes will include gender-specific indicators.

#### **IV.4.3 Environment**

The key environmental challenges for Somalia stem from the effects of climate change on water, arable soils and biodiversity, increased population pressures, natural resource based conflicts, increased urbanisation and changing social patterns brought about by conflict. Degradation of catchments, range areas, agricultural lands and the marine environment combined with illegal and abusive exploitation are critical issues to be addressed as they all impact on people's ability to meet subsistence needs and enhance productivity and economic growth.

The Country Environmental Profile identifies challenges for the sectors covered by the three pillars. A Strategic Environmental Assessment process will be used when preparing programmes resulting in specific actions and indicators being identified and included. Somalia is a signatory to a number of international agreements; however, these are largely unimplemented and so attention will be paid to making them operational and incorporating the commitments into programmes, as well as promoting the signature of other instruments relevant to Somalia such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change or the Basel Convention on Hazardous Waste.

#### **IV.4.4 HIV/AIDS**

While the incidence of HIV/AIDS is believed to be low in Somalia, there is a potential for a rapid increase in infection rates. Conflict and post-conflict environments, transnational trading routes and large numbers of internally and externally displaced persons together with the breakdown of social structures have long been recognised as fertile breeding grounds for the spread of the disease. Policy will be reviewed in the context of each pillar and capacity strengthened to enable institutional contact points to act effectively in both the public and private sectors. Education, health and training interventions will be used as a specific vehicle to relay relevant messages.

#### **IV.5 Opportunities and Risks**

##### Opportunities

The completion of the JNA and the RDP and the preparation of the JSP coincide with changes to the agreed multi-donor coordination and management structures. The UN and the World Bank have prepared strategies to engage in and strengthen partnership (UN Transitional Plan, WB Interim Strategy Note). Taken together, these provide a unique opportunity for a harmonised and coordinated approach to development in Somalia. Donors have agreed to concentrate on sectors where they can bring clear added value.

While the political situation remains fragile, there are opportunities to build on the capacity and institutional strengthening that has taken place in Somaliland and Puntland over the past years. A genuine partnership for planning and monitoring should be built in the coming years.

The RDP (including its cluster reports) provides a basis for considering development in a holistic, sector-wide manner. Key to this will be the ability of the overall governance framework to include benchmarks for specific areas such as the civil service, public finance management and institutional capacity in general, and the preparation of sector strategic frameworks that account for regional capacity and institutional differences but are nationally coherent.

##### Risks

There are risks that need to be monitored and managed over the short and medium term. These risks will be identified and managed in the frame of OECD DAC good practice for fragile states and the lessons learned over the years from Somalia, embedded in the considerable institutional memory of donors and the increasing international experience and thinking on difficult partnerships. Particular risks in the immediate future are:

- The political and security environment, particularly in South Central Somalia, will remain volatile for some time to come. This may have a spillover effect on Somaliland and Puntland. Indeed there is a potential for insecurity in the region as a whole.
- An intensification of conflict or a return to peace and security may prompt rapid and large-scale population movements that can overwhelm already fragile systems and draw focus away from development to more immediate emergency concerns.
- The lack of a political and institutional framework can lead to fragmented and disjointed interventions, particularly given that there is a deep historical distrust of political institutions in Somalia. This dilemma has to be resolved by careful programming and participatory planning.



- Delivering on the ‘governance dividend’ has risks of heightened expectations that cannot be met due to lack of institutional or other capacity.
- Non-State Actors, including the media, are increasingly targeted by all parties to the conflict. Support in this field will need to include a particularly thorough and sensitive risk analysis and be responsive to the requests of NSAs themselves.

A high degree of flexibility will be required in the implementation of this strategy in terms of both timing and location. Geographical asymmetry, in the implementation of the governance dividend principles, will guide this response strategy.

#### **IV. 6 Implementation and financing mechanisms**

To ensure that interventions to implement the JSP strategic framework are internally coherent, complementary with the actions of other donors and other stakeholders, and consistent across the pillars, joint programming, monitoring and review mechanisms will be established whenever possible. The approach adopted for the JSP consolidates the move towards a programme-based approach and away from fragmented and isolated projects.

Financing modalities for programme implementation will initially comprise a variety of donors’ own procedures with a gradual move towards a more harmonised approach which may include co-financing and delegated authority. The situation in Somalia is unlikely to allow for any form of direct budget support in the period of the current JSP, and alternative mechanisms to maximise aid efficiency and to reduce transaction costs will be explored. Lessons learned from the experiences of using pooled funding and co-financing modalities in other countries emerging from conflict will be applied when designing programme financing.

The RDP proposes a Multi Donor Trust Fund approach and some initial discussions have been held on how this might be put into operation. This type of fund will be further explored along with alternative mechanisms for pooling and managing resources. In addition, other innovative financing mechanisms to leverage additional resources will be explored, for example by establishing financial frameworks to encourage development investment from the Somali Diaspora.

Monitoring and review of the JSP will be undertaken on an annual basis with all JSP participants. The key elements of the review process will be the pillar indicators and the disaggregated indicators at sector programme level, including the cross-cutting indicators. The JSP review will be linked to the RDP review.

## 10<sup>TH</sup> EDF

### SOMALIA SPECIAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME (SSSP)

#### 1. *Introduction*)

On the basis of the cooperation strategy and in accordance with Article 4 (7) of Regulation (EC) No 617/2007, this Special Support Programme has been drawn up as a set of tables showing the intervention framework for each sector, the financial programming timetable and a detailed schedule of activities for all listed programmes over a rolling three-year period.

Amounts mentioned in this chapter indicate the overall breakdown of funds between the focal sectors, and other programmes. The breakdown may be adjusted in the light of the operational, mid-term, final or ad hoc reviews. However, for any adjustment resulting in a substantial change to the structure of the response strategy, a formal decision in the form of an addendum to the strategy document will be required.

The situation in Somalia requires that allocations are seen as indicative and subject to change further to assessment of the political processes, agreed focuses of the Reconstruction and Development Programme for Somalia and priority decisions of partners.

The implementation of this programme will require a Decision by the Council of Ministers as provided for in Article 93 (6) of the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000<sup>1</sup> and revised in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005<sup>2</sup>, once this Agreement will have entered into force.

#### 2. *Financial instruments*

The implementation of the cooperation strategy with Somalia will be financed from several financial instruments. The following is an indication of their mobilisation as currently envisaged.

- a. **10<sup>th</sup> EDF, country allocation (A envelope) €212 million:** this envelope will cover long-term programmable development operations under the strategy, and in particular the EC response to the Reconstruction and Development Programme for Somalia, with particular focus on the Governance, Education and Economic Development sectors.
- b. **10<sup>th</sup> EDF, B envelope: € 3.8 million:** this envelope will cover unforeseen needs, such as emergency assistance which cannot be financed from the EC budget, contributions to internationally agreed debt relief initiatives and support to mitigate the adverse effects of instability in export earnings. In accordance with Article 3(5) of Annex IV to the Cotonou Agreement, this amount may, if necessary, be increased in the light of the operational or *ad hoc* reviews.

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<sup>1</sup> OJ L 317, 15.12.2000, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> OJ L 287, 28.10.2005, p. 4 – 40.

**c. Investment Facility**

In addition to the above-mentioned financial instruments, of which the A envelope is the main programmable basis for the NIP, the 10th EDF also includes an Investment Facility managed by the European Investment Bank. The Investment Facility is not part of the NIP.

- d. 10th EDF, regional indicative programme:** this allocation will cover long-term programmable development operations under the regional strategy for East and Southern African region. The allocation is not part of the SSSP but may have repercussions at national level depending on the participation of Somalia in the programmes proposed under the regional framework.

**e. Other financial instruments:**

Specific interventions may be supported by external actions funded by the general budget of the European Community carried out under the financial framework for 2007-2013 subject to special procedure and availability of funds, and out of the own resources of the EIB. Actions funded by the general budget include, among others, programmes funded under the Development Cooperation Instrument such as the thematic programmes "investing in people", "non state actors in development", "migration and asylum", "environment and sustainable management of natural resources" and "food security", as well as actions funded from other instruments such as the stability instrument, the instrument for the promotion of human rights and democracy or the instrument for humanitarian and emergency assistance.

Somalia is one of the target countries for the Food Security Thematic Programme within the strategic priority addressing food security in exceptional situations of transition, fragile and failed states, with an allocation of €12 million for the period 2007-2010. The programme will focus on crucial investments to protect, maintain and recover productive and social assets to allow economic integration and long-term rehabilitation. It will aim at strengthening vulnerable groups' resilience to shocks through crisis prevention and management, including support to food security information systems. A joint LRRD strategy will be established together with ECHO and other stakeholders in 2008.

**3. Monitoring and evaluation**

Monitoring of results and evaluations of impact of individual activities (programmes, projects, sectors) under this Special Support Programme will be undertaken in line with the Technical and Administrative Provisions that are attached to each individual Financial Conditions prepared to implement this Strategy Paper.

The results and impact of the Community's cooperation with Somalia implemented through the Special Support Programme and through other external actions funded by the general budget of the European Community, will be assessed by means of an independent external evaluation. This country-level evaluation may be undertaken jointly with EU Member States and possibly also with other donor agencies'.

#### 4. *Focal sectors*

##### *Focal sector 1: Governance*

The specific objective being pursued consists in deepening peace, improving security and establishing good governance. As an indicative amount, €60 million will be set aside for this field. The main actions proposed for all donors are:

- Promote **security** through the development of an international strategy for engagement in the security sector and the implementation of support in the areas of law enforcement, judiciary, DDR/force reduction, human rights and gender and mine action with interventions adapted to regional needs and specificities and appropriate links to the political process. Interventions in this sector are complemented by support provided to the AU through the Peace Facility and Stability Instrument;
- Support **reconciliation** through dialogue and peace-building at political and community levels. Support is envisaged to the National Reconciliation Commission as part of the package supporting the Transitional federal Institutions as well as continued support to the involvement of Non State Actors in any reconciliation process, with special attention to traditional elders and women. Specific local conflict resolution initiatives will also be supported through local Somali partners;
- Based on democratic principles, support the **establishment and/or strengthening of effective governance** and macro-economic structures. This will be done through (i) support to institution building and capacity development with an emphasis on public finance management and civil service reform; (ii) support to constitutional and democratisation processes, including electoral processes and (iii) support to the establishment and/or reinforcement of local governance structures and systems;
- Support the effective participation of **Non-State Actors** in peace-building and good governance. Established dialogue mechanisms for the civil society and private sector to contribute to policy decisions taken by the Somali administrations particularly in areas where the civil society and private sector are deeply engaged will continue to be supported, other areas to be supported will be: registration of civil society organisations (CSOs); regulations for CSOs; regulations for professional associations (including chambers of commerce); mechanisms for funding CSOs; mechanisms for involving CSOs in planning, notably in the social sectors (health and education) where CSOs play an essential role in service provision.

The main implementing instrument will be sector support through a multi-donor mechanism (to be set up). Should that mechanism not be available, it is intended to continue with multi-donor co-financing and programme support with the exception of interventions in support of Non-State Actors which will keep a project approach.

It is to be noted that the current context of weak governance and institutions does not allow for the adoption of main sector policy measures by the Government as a contribution to the implementation of the response strategy.

## *Focal sector 2: Education*

The following specific objective will be pursued:

Effective delivery of relevant and sustainable education services (including Islamic education), accessible to the entire population. As an indicative amount, approximately € 55 million will be set aside for this field.

The main actions proposed are:

Within the framework of a sector-wide approach in which Italy and the UK will continue to concentrate their support to the expansion of primary and basic education services, the EC will contribute to:

Strengthening and expanding:

- capacity of the **administrations** at central, state and local levels to formulate policies on the basis of relevant data, manage the sector and deliver quality education services;
- capacity of the **teaching force** in primary/basic, secondary and vocational education;
- **access** to secondary and tertiary education services and improving the quality;
- **participation** of disadvantaged adults (ex- militia, displaced individuals, women and others) in basic skills and entrepreneurial training.

The main implementing instrument will be sector support through a multi-donor mechanism (to be set up), and if this is not possible, through co-financing and project support.

The main sectoral policy measures to be taken in coordination with Somali institutions are:

- Monitor, adjust and implement a comprehensive (sector wide) education development and financing programme based on a coherent sector policy aimed at facilitating rapid expansion of the education system and improving quality of services delivery (raising efficiency and effectiveness)
- Increase contribution to the teacher remuneration budget
- Introduce an education management information system and ensure linkages with policy development
- Fully support gender-sensitive policy development and implementation, including gender sensitive-staffing within the administration
- Support actively and credibly fighting HIV/ AIDS

If and when needed, the appropriate type of environmental assessment (SEA or EIA) will be carried out.

### *Focal sector 3: Economic Development and Food Security*

The specific objective being pursued is to reduce food insecurity and to promote private sector-led economic development through an improved institutional and regulatory framework and sustainable natural resource management. As an indicative amount, approximately €55 million will be set aside for this field.

The main actions proposed are:

- Develop the institutions to provide for policy development and a legal and strategic framework for sustainable private sector-led growth both in urban and rural areas;
- Support to main productive sectors' sustainable development including technical services, applied research, information, market and marketing promotion rehabilitation of feeder roads and technical education;
- Support to territorial development for sustainable management of natural resources including strengthening of economic assets and infrastructure development;
- Support to livelihood recovery and food security for the benefit of chronic food-insecure populations.

The main implementing instrument will be through co-financing and project support.

The key cross-cutting issues will be the **environment, conflict prevention, and gender**. All interventions will promote awareness and understanding of the above issues in Somalia and how they can be addressed.

When needed, the appropriate type of environmental assessment (SEA or EIA) will be carried out.

## **5. General budget support**

The indicative programme does not provide for general budget support. However, in the light of changing needs, it may be decided to reallocate funds from other application points in the SSSP to this type of support, the pre-condition being the emergence of national institutions with the capacity to receive and manage this form of support. Such a decision could then be taken in the context of an operational, mid-term, final or ad hoc review.

## **6. Other programmes**

An indicative amount of €27 million is set aside for the following actions:

- Air transport services (€16M)

The following specific objective will be pursued:

To facilitate access to Somalia for efficient implementation of operations financed by the EC as well as those financed by EU Member States and Norway.

The main action will be the continuation of the air transport services from Nairobi to Somalia and within Somalia for the transport of passengers and goods in the implementation of EC, Member States and Norwegian aid programmes to Somalia.

- Technical and Administrative support (€11M);

Additionally, a reserve of €15 million is foreseen for insurance against possible claims and to cover cost increases and contingencies.

## 7. Intervention Framework

### First focal sector – Governance

Intervention logic	Indicators	Sources of verification	Assumptions
<b>Overall Objective</b>			
Poverty alleviated within a peaceful, secure and democratic Somalia			
<b>Programme Purpose</b>			
Peace deepened, security improved and good governance established	Impact: GDP per capita (PPP US\$) (HDI) <sup>3</sup> ; Proportion of population below \$1 a day  Output: Federal state elections conducted and national elections prepared by 2009	Government documents UN security reports Police records Court records Human Rights reports (UN & NGOs)	Attainment of sustainable peace Frontline states committed to peace process
<b>Results</b>			
Sustainable security enhanced	Outcome: Change in conflict-related refugee/IDP population <sup>4</sup> ;  Outcome: Decrease by x% in number of weapons available to civilians;  Outcome: Political stability and absence of violence Index <sup>5</sup>  Output: Police/population ratio (North); 10% active militia (particularly children) demilitarised and demobilised (South)	AU ceasefire report UN panel of experts report Security reports Commission reports Government budget Project reports Parliament reports UN Human Rights and Amnesty International reports Media monitoring reports Codes and constitutions	Cooperation and full involvement of all relevant central and regional institutions

<sup>3</sup> GDP per capita alone measures economic performance. GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity terms in US dollars) divided by midyear population is a composite of the Human Development Index. Economic growth is the primary indicator of a successful state and also measures the opportunity cost of undermining the state through resorting to violence, because it serves as proxy of economic opportunities such as jobs and starting a business. Many studies see GDP per capita as a measure of state strengths; wealthy societies have larger tax bases and the incentives and means to protect their assets, making conflict less attractive.

<sup>4</sup> Data from this source should be based on several precise legal definitions of what is an officially recognised refugee and IDP. The inflows and outflows of refugees and IDPs can be taken as a population's confidence in a country, and labour's confidence in particular ('voting with their feet'). Hence, refugee and IDP flows tend to be a concurrent or lagging indicator of state fragility and possibly of state failure.

<sup>5</sup> The Political Stability and Absence of Violence Index is a World Bank Index that measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.



	Input: Military spending to GDP <sup>6</sup>		
Reconciliation achieved through dialogue and peace-building at political and community levels	<p>Outcome: as above</p> <p>Output: peace processes take place and develop in a progressive manner</p> <p>Output: NSAs and Parliament (specifically women) are involved in political dialogue and play an increased advocacy role</p>	<p>Commission reports</p> <p>Government budget</p> <p>Project reports</p> <p>Parliament reports</p> <p>UN Human Rights and Amnesty International reports</p> <p>Media monitoring reports</p> <p>Codes and constitutions</p>	Cooperation and full involvement of all relevant stakeholders
Effective governance and macro-economic structures established and/or strengthened, based on democratic principles	<p>Outcome: Prosecution rate</p> <p>Outcome: Crime detection ratio</p> <p>Outcome: Share of government revenues in GDP<sup>7</sup></p> <p>Outcome: Rule of Law Index<sup>8</sup></p> <p>Outcome: Government Effectiveness Index<sup>9</sup></p> <p>Output: existence of clear legal and administrative framework including</p>	<p>Surveys</p> <p>Constitutional documents</p> <p>Election reports</p> <p>FSAU reports</p> <p>Government reports</p> <p>Project reports</p>	<p>Employment of the trained staff in the related fields</p> <p>Availability and sustainability of sufficient human resources</p> <p>Cooperation and full involvement of all relevant central and regional institutions</p>

<sup>6</sup> High military spending is a negative input indicator, which reflects a government's priorities in allocating budget funds. Military spending makes fewer resources available for social programmes and other human or economic development activities and is correlated with higher state fragility.

<sup>7</sup> This indicator includes tax revenue and other domestic revenue such as fisheries, mineral royalties and fees. Unusually low revenue collection is taken as a sign of weak and corrupt institutions for economic governance and lack of serious commitment to mobilising resources for essential public services. Low levels of revenue collection limit the resources of the state and state's ability to provide the needed goods, services and infrastructure needed.

<sup>8</sup> The Rule of Law Index is a World Bank Index that a composite of various survey results on the extent to which the public has confidence in and abides by the rule of law, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the incidence of crime and the reliability of the judicial system. The indicator therefore represents a broad gauge of the effectiveness of the legal system and the rule of law. The index is defined on a scale of -2.5 to +2.5, with scores around the mean of 0.0 measured in standard deviations.

<sup>9</sup> The Government Effectiveness Index is a World Bank Index that measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.

	competencies between institutions (courts, prosecutors, prisons, police) and within each institution; independence of the judiciary guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution; impartiality of the judiciary, on factual basis and in accordance with the law		
Effective participation of Non State Actors in peace building and good governance supported	<p>Outcome: Voice and Accountability Index<sup>10</sup></p> <p>Output: existence of clear legal framework and appropriate space for NSAs to contribute to reconstruction and democratisation</p>	<p>Surveys</p> <p>Project reports</p> <p>CSOs reports/audit reports</p> <p>Donor reports</p> <p>Codes of conduct for CSOs</p> <p>NSA Forum project reports</p> <p>Minutes of NSA meetings</p> <p>Key government documents and legislation</p>	NSAs willing to support collective actions

<sup>10</sup> The Voice and Accountability Index is a World Bank index that measures the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

## Second focal sector – Education

Intervention Logic	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Sources of Verification	Assumptions
<b>Overall Objective</b>			
Poverty alleviated within a peaceful, secure and democratic Somalia			
<b>Programme Purpose</b>			
Effective delivery of relevant and sustainable education services (including Islamic education), increasingly accessible to the entire population.	Impact: Literacy rates (of young adults, 15-35 years old) improved to 50% by 2013; youth employment improved by annually 10,000 youth trained (and 7,000 employed)	Surveys Policy and strategic documents Annual statistics Internal government physical and financial audit reports	Attainment of sustainable peace Frontline states committed to peace process
<b>Results</b>			
Administrations at central, state and local levels manage the sector, develop sound policies (based on relevant sectoral data) and deliver quality education services;	Output: policies and strategies are developed and regularly reviewed; work plans in use. Input: financial: public expenditure on education as percentage of GDP and public expenditure on education as percentage of total public expenditure with (as target) an increase to 15% in Somaliland and Puntland, 10% Central South by 2013	Policy documents Annual statistics Reports – government, implementers EMIS data Inspectorate reports Research reports from Universities	Employment of the trained staff in the related fields Availability and sustainability of sufficient human resources Cooperation and full involvement of all relevant central and regional institutions Commitment to and timely implementation of related strategies in the education sector
Teaching force in primary/basic, secondary and vocational education in place;	All teachers (primary education) certificated by 2013		
Increased access to good quality basic, secondary, vocational and tertiary education;	Outcome: a) measuring access: Gross Enrolment Rate: primary, secondary, tertiary <sup>11</sup> with (as target) 65% GER in		
Participation of disadvantaged adults (ex-militia, displaced individuals, women and others) in basic skills and entrepreneurial			

<sup>11</sup> The gross enrolment rate is the total enrolment in a specific level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education in a given school year. Gross Enrolment Ratio is widely used to show the general level of participation in a given level of education. It indicates the capacity of the education system to enrol students of a particular age-group. It is used as a substitute indicator to net enrolment ratio (NER) when data on enrolment by single years of age are not available. Furthermore, it can also be a complementary indicator to NER by indicating the extent of over-aged and under-aged enrolment.

training improved; Quality and relevance of higher education improved	primary education by 2013 and 2,000 additional secondary education students enrolled p.a.; b) measuring efficiency: retention rates, completion rates <sup>12</sup> and pass rates		
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### Third focal sector – Economic Development and Food Security

Intervention Logic	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Sources of Verification	Assumptions
<b>Overall Objective</b>			
Poverty alleviated within a peaceful, secure and democratic Somalia			
<b>Programme Purpose</b>			
To reduce food insecurity, promote sustainable private sector-led economic development and reduce poverty	Impact: GDP per capita (PPP US\$) (HDI) increased with (as target) 5% increase p.a.  Impact: proportion of population above \$1 a day (MDG) increase with (as target) 1% increase p.a.	UNDP Human Development report FSAU reports UNICEF multi-indicator cluster survey World Bank Watching Brief Government financial and banking reports	Attainment of sustainable peace Frontline states committed to peace process
<b>Results</b>			
Institutions provide policy development and a legal and strategic framework for private sector led growth (rural and urban);	Output: regulations and institutions conducive to poverty reduction and economic growth in place and operational by	Government & regional Administrations reports Programme & project	Macro-economic climate favourable for investment Marketing and employment

<sup>12</sup>Completion rate is a measure of education efficiency. It refers to the total number of students successfully completing (or graduating from) the last year of primary school in a given year, divided by the total number of children of official graduation age in the population. In countries where the number of primary graduates is not reported, a proxy primary completion rate is calculated: the total number of students in the final year of primary school, minus the number of students that repeat the grade in a typical year, divided by the total number of children of official graduation age in the population.

<sup>13</sup> Foreign direct investment is a cross-border investment to acquire a lasting management interest in an enterprise. It includes the initial investment and reinvestment of earnings (but no repatriation of profits, which is a current account flow). This indicator is a net figure in that it takes flow – inward and outward FD- into account and is represented as percentage of GDP. FDI is evidence of external investor confidence. It also serves as a source of additional financing to promote growth and can often be a conduit for technology transfer to promote traditional growth.

<p>Main productive sectors developed in a sustainable manner including technical services, applied research, information, market and marketing promotion and technical education;</p> <p>Territorial development for sustainable management of natural resources, including strengthening of economic assets (rural and urban) and infrastructure development;</p> <p>Livelihood recovery and food security for the benefit of chronic and acute food-insecure populations.</p>	<p>2013</p> <p>Outcome: private investment increase in key productive areas with (as target) 5% increase p.a.; change in FDI net inflows<sup>13</sup> with (as target) 5% increase p.a.; trade openness to GDP<sup>14</sup> with (as target) 5% increase p.a.</p> <p>Outcome: Household income increase with (as target) 50% increase for at least 70% of final target beneficiaries by 2013</p> <p>Output: increase in livelihood assets of chronically food insecure target population with (as target) at least 70% of target population increasing assets value by 50% by 2013</p>	<p>reports</p> <p>Donors' reports</p> <p>SSS's Reports</p> <p>Programme Surveys</p> <p>FSAU</p> <p>Programme Surveys</p> <p>FSAU</p>	<p>of the trained staff in the related fields</p> <p>Availability and sustainability of sufficient human resources</p> <p>Cooperation and full involvement of all relevant central and regional institutions</p> <p>Climatic conditions remain favourable</p> <p>Communities willing to support collective actions</p>
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<sup>14</sup> This indicator is defined as the value of total imports plus exports (goods and services) as percentage of GDP. It is used to measure integration into the world economy. Low levels of trade openness are likely to correlate with causes of state failure: cronyism, corruption, lack of secure property rights, enforceable contracts and the rule of law, rent seeking.

## 8. Timetable of indicative commitments and disbursements

### 7.1 Indicative timetable of global commitments

	Indicative allocation	2008		2009		2010→	
		1	2	1	2	1	2
<b>1<sup>st</sup> FOCAL SECTOR – Governance</b>	<b>€60M</b>						
Support to enhanced governance, reconciliation, security and sustainable peace building (I)	€30M		30				
Support to NSAs (I)	6 €M			6			
Support to enhanced governance, reconciliation, security and sustainable peace building (II)	20 €M						
Support to NSAs (II)	4 €M						
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> FOCAL SECTOR – Education</b>	<b>€55M</b>						
- Support to the Education sector in Somalia I	€30 M		30				
- Support to the Education sector in Somalia II	€25M						25
<b>3<sup>rd</sup> FOCAL SECTOR – Economic Development and Food Security</b>	<b>€55M</b>						
- Support for the Economic Development of Somalia I	€25 M			25			
- Support for the Economic Development of Somalia II	€23 M						
- Food Security Analysis Unit	€7 M		4				
<b>NON-FOCAL SECTORS</b>	<b>€27 M</b>						
- Technical and administrative support	€11 M		7				
-EC Flight	€16 M		16				
<b>Total Cumulative Commitments :</b>	<b>€197M</b>		<b>87</b>	<b>31</b>			<b>25</b>
<b>Reserve</b>	<b>€15 M</b>						
<b>Total</b>	<b>€ 212 M</b>		<b>87</b>	<b>31</b>			<b>25</b>

## 7.2 Indicative timetable of disbursements

	Indicative allocation	2008		2009		2010→	
		1	2	1	2	1	2
<b>1<sup>st</sup> FOCAL SECTOR – Governance</b>	<b>€60 M</b>						
- Support to the Governance and Security sector in Somalia I	€30M			10			10
- Support to NSAs( I)	€6M			1.5			2
- Support to the Governance and Security sector in Somalia II	€20M						
- Support to NSAs( II)	€ 4 M						
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> FOCAL SECTOR – Education</b>	<b>€55 M</b>						
- Support to the Education sector in Somalia Phase I	€30 M			15			10
- Support to the Education sector in Somalia Phase II	€25 M						
<b>3rd FOCAL SECTOR – Economic Development and Food Security</b>	<b>€ 55 M</b>						
- Support to the Economic Development of Somalia Phase I	€25 M				8		10
Support to the Economic <b>Development</b> of Somalia Phase II	€23 M						
- Food Security Analysis Unit + other actions from the food security thematic programme (therefore not included in the SSSP total)	€7M(€12 M)			3			
<b>NON FOCAL SECTORS</b>	<b>170 €M</b>						
- Technical and administrative support	€11 M		2.5	2.5		2.5	
- EC Flight	€16 M			1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
<b>Total Commitments</b>	<b>€197 M</b>						
<b>Reserve</b>	<b>€15M</b>						
<b>Total</b>	<b>€212M</b>		2.5	33.2	9.2	3.7	33.2

## 9. Chronogram of activities<sup>15</sup>

1 <sup>st</sup> FOCAL AREA (€60 M) Governance	Indicative allocation	2008				2009				2010→			
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Support to enhanced governance, reconciliation, security and sustainable peace building (I)	30 €M		AF		AAP	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Support to NSAs I	6 €M					AF	AAP	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Support to enhanced governance, reconciliation, security and sustainable peace building (II)													
Support to NSAs II													
2 <sup>nd</sup> FOCAL AREA (€55 M) Education		2008				2009				2010→			
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
- Support to the Education sector in Somalia Phase I	€30 M		AF		AAP	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
- Support to the Education sector in Somalia Phase II	€25M												
3 <sup>rd</sup> FOCAL AREA (€55M) Economic		2008				2009				2010→			

<sup>15</sup> Most feasibility studies will be funded by the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF ETR funds in preparation for the implementation of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF.



Development and Food Security													
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Support to the Economic Development of Somalia Phase I	€25 M					AF	AAP	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Support to the Economic Development of Somalia Phase II	23€ M												
Food Security Analysis Unit	€4M		AP		AAP		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
<b>NON FOCAL AREAS (€27 M)</b>		<b>2008</b>				<b>2009</b>				<b>2010→</b>			
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Tech. Supp.	€11 M		AP		AAP								
EC Flight	€16 M		AP		AAP		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
FS: Feasibility Study AF: Action Fiche AAP: Annual Action Programme ☐: Project implementation													

## ANNEX 1

### Country at a Glance Table

The following table summarises key macro economic indicators for Somalia between 1980 and 1990. There is no data to support later assessments, and many of the ratios are likely to have changed very substantially.

<b>Macroeconomic Indicators, 1980-1990</b>			
	1980-83 (aver.)	1984-87 (aver.)	1988-90 (aver.)
GDP (constant prices. Somali Shilling millions)	80.842	88.330	93.790
Real GDP growth (annual % change)	0.3	5.0	-0.7
Population (millions)	6.6	6.5	6.7
GDP per capita (€ PPP)	115	132	142
Mogadishu CPI (annual % change)	34.2	48.5	107.3
REER (1980=100)	102.5	93.2	21.3
Gross Domestic Investment (% of GDP)	30.4	25.3	19.8
Private Investment (% of GDP)	13.4	9.7	6.3
Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP)	-17.1	-15.1	-12.1
Private Savings (% of GDP)	-9.5	-0.8	3.1
Total Expenditure (% of GDP)	22.2	26.7	36.7
Total Revenue (% of GDP)	9.6	6.4	5.6
Fiscal Deficit (including grants. % of GDP)	-9.0	-9.3	-9.9
Fiscal Deficit (excluding grants. % of GDP)	-12.6	-20.4	-31.0
Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)	17.2	9.5	7.1
Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)	65.2	46.2	33.1
Current Account Deficit (including grants. % of GDP)	-18.2	-14.6	-12.9
Current Account Deficit (excluding grants. % of GDP)	-40.3	-43.3	-38.6
Gross International Reserves (months of import)	0.4	0.6	1.0
Broad Money. including foreign currency deposits (% change)	17.7	69.9	71.2
Nominal Stock of Debt (US\$ millions) 1/	837	1.451	1.801
Debt Service/GDP	3.8	14.3	15.4
Stock of Arrears (US\$ millions)	83	124	348

Source: WB World Development Indicators: WB Somalia PER 1991.

**Table 2 Agricultural production in Somalia**

	1982	1989	1999	2002
<b>Crops ('000 tonnes)</b>				
Sorghum	169.2	247	93.3	145 (2004)
Sesame seed	57.1	48	22	25
Bananas	78.7	116	45	36.9
<b>Livestock ('000 head)</b>				
Cattle	4,574	5,036	4,609	
Camels	6,239	6,890	6,294	
Sheep	10,580	14,316	11,834	
Goats	19,000	20,570	16,164	
Total	40,393	46,812	38,901	
Notes:	1989 is a good comparator, as it appears to have been a peak year for agricultural production			
Source: Various, World Bank Country Economic memorandum, tables 30 and 33				

**Table 3 Trade Flows, 1980-2004**

	1980	1988	1990	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Total Merchandise Exports US\$m	166.4	137.4	163.7	68.2	77.6	118.3	157.9	265.5
Total Merchandise Imports US\$ mn	439.5	267.0	351.8	263.6	280.8	299.8	340.3	460.8
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics based on partner data.								

**Table 4 Imports and exports, 1990 and 2003**

Product	1990		2003	
	\$mn	%	\$mn	%
<b>Principal exports</b>				
Livestock, live	32.8	25	35.7	42.3%
Wood charcoal	0.01	-	8.3	9.8
Fish (live or dead)	10.8	8.2	1.6	2.0
Bananas	34.5	26.2	none	-
Other products	53.6	40.7	38.8	46.0
Total <sup>(1)</sup>	131.7	100	84.4	100
Total <sup>(2)</sup>	163.7		157.9	
<b>Principal imports</b>				
Sugar and sugar preparations	2.3	1	50.9	22
Crude vegetable materials (khat)	0.1	-	29.7	12.8
Cigarettes	7.9	3.9	19.7	7.7
Cement	0.4		8.8	
Road vehicles <sup>3</sup>	29.4	11.2	3.4	
Petroleum and petroleum products <sup>3</sup>	20.4	7.7	11.0	
Others	201.6		108.7	
Total <sup>(1)</sup>	262.1	100	232.2	100
Total <sup>(2)</sup>	351.8		340.3	
Sources: <sup>(1)</sup> Based on Somalia's partner data drawn from UN COMTRADE statistics.				

**Table 5 Stock of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt at end-2004 (US\$ million)**

Creditor	Nominal Stock					NPV of total debt 2
	Total		Arrears 1			
	Stock	(%)	Principal	Interest	Total	
<b>1. Multilaterals</b>	<b>1,273</b>	<b>39.7</b>	<b>479</b>	<b>344</b>	<b>822</b>	<b>1,118</b>
World Bank – IDA	491	15.3	81	46	127	353
IMF	345	10.8	174	171	345	345
AfDB Group	126	3.9	37	21	57	102
Others	310	9.7	187	106	293	318
<b>2. Bilaterals &amp; commercial</b>	<b>1,935</b>	<b>60.3</b>	<b>924</b>	<b>833</b>	<b>1,757</b>	<b>1,861</b>
Paris Club creditors	1,472	45.9	573	740	1,314	1,398
Non Paris Club & commercial creditors	462	14.4	351	93	444	463
<b>Total Debt (1+2)</b>	<b>3,207</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,403</b>	<b>1,177</b>	<b>2,580</b>	<b>2,979</b>
Sources: Creditor Statements and World Bank Global Development Finance.						
1/ Includes principal and interest arrears as well as penalty charges.						

2/ Calculated using end-2004 exchange rates and, as discount rates, currency-specific average CIRRs from OECD.

**Table 6 Key social indicators<sup>1</sup>**

DPT	..	19	20(2006)	59	67
Child malnutrition (% under 5 years)	..	..	35(2006)	..	44
<b>Life expectancy at birth</b>					
<i>(years)</i>					
Total	42	42	47	46	58
Male	40	40	46	45	57
Female	44	43	49	46	59
<b>Mortality</b>					
Infant (per 1,000 live births)	133	133	96(2006)	101	79
Under 5 (per 1,000 live births)	225	225	156(2006)	171	122
Adult (15-59)					
Male (per 1,000 population)	500	..	516	519	317
Female (per 1,000 population)	412	..	452	461	266
Maternal (modelled, per 100,000 live births)	..	..	1,013(2006)	24	538
Births attended by skilled health staff (%)	..	..	33 (2006)	39	38
Rural headcount index	..	..	53.4 (2002)	..	..
<b>INCOME</b>					
GNI per capita (US\$)	137	150	226 (2003)	600	510
Consumer price index (1995=100)	..	..	..	..	..
Food price index (1995=100)	..	..	..	..	..
<b>INCOME/CONSUMPTION DISTRIBUTION</b>					
Gini index	..	..	39.7 (2002)	..	..
Lowest quintile (% of income or consumption)	..	..	4.1 (2002)	..	..
Highest quintile (% of income or consumption)	..	..	35.6 (2002)	..	..
<b>SOCIAL INDICATORS</b>					
<b>Public expenditure</b>					
Health (% of GDP)	..	..	..	2.6	1.5
Education (% of GDP)	..	..	..	3.4	3.2
<b>Net primary school enrollment rate</b>					
<i>(% of age group)</i>					
Total	..	..	19 (2006)	64	78
Male	..	..	21(2006)	68	82
Female	..	..	17(2006)	60	76
<b>Access to an improved water source</b>					
<i>(% of population)</i>					
Total	..	..	29 (2006)	58	75
Urban	..	..	58.4(2006)	82	89
Rural	..	..	13.7(2006)	45	69
Nomadic			3.8(2006)		
<b>Immunization rate</b>					
<i>(% of children ages 12-23 months)</i>					
Measles	9	30	19(2006)	61	66

<sup>1</sup> Source: World Development Indicators Database, World Bank - 04/05/06.

Note: Net enrolment rate: break in series between 1997 and 1998 due to change from ISCED76 to ISCED97. Immunization refers to children ages 12-23 months who received vaccinations before one year of age.

**Table 7 Somalia - Millennium Development Goals<sup>2</sup>**

	Somalia	Somaliland	Puntland	South-Central	Target for 2015
<b>Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger</b>					
Population living below \$1/day	43% (2002)	..	..	..	22%
Poverty gap ratio at \$1/day	18.3%(2002)	..	..	..	9%
Share of poorest quintile in national consumption	4.1% (2002)	..	..	..	2%
Children underweight for age (% of children under 5)	35% (2006)	19.6%(2006)	26.2%(2006)	39.7%(2006)	18%
<b>Achieve universal primary education</b>					
Net primary enrollment ratio (% of school age population)	19% (2006)	39.7%(2006)	27.7% (2006)	10.4%(2006)	100%
Youth literacy rate (% ages 15-24)	20% (2004)	..	..	..	100%
<b>Promote gender equality and empower women</b>					
Ratio of girls to boys in primary & secondary education	0.55 (2000)	0.44 (2004)	..	..	1.0
Ratio of literate females to males (ages 15-24)	0.52 (2002)	..	..	..	1.0
Proportion of seats in parliament held by women	25/275(2003)	0/82 (2003)	5/68 (2003)	..	1.0
<b>Reduce child mortality</b>					
Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000)	156 (2006)	116 (2006)	115 (2006)	173 (2006)	78
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	96 (2006)	73 (2006)	73 (2006)	105 (2006)	48
One-year-olds immunized against measles (%)	19% (2006)	..	..	..	
<b>Improve maternal health</b>					
Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births)	1,013 (2006)	1,600 (2005)	..	..	275
Births attended by skilled health staff (%)	33% (2006)	41.3%(2006)	36.8% (2006)	29.7% (2006)	
<b>Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases</b>					
HIV Prevalence (% adults ages 15-49)	0.9% (2004)	..	..	..	
HIV Prevalence (% females ages 15-24)	0.9% (2004)	..	..	..	
HIV prevalence among 15-24 yr old pregnant women	0.9% (2004)				Halt and begin to reverse spread of HIV/AIDS, incidence of malaria and other major diseases.
Contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49)	15% (2006)	26% (2006)	12% (2006)	12% (2006)	
Prevalence associated with malaria (per 100,000)	118 (2000)	..	113 (2005)	..	
Death rates associated with malaria	82 (2000)	..	..	..	
Incidence of TB (per 100,000)	412 (2003)	460 (2000)	..	..	
TB cases detected under DOTS (%)	23% (2003)	..	..	..	
%age of children under 5 treated with anti-malarials (within 24 hours)	3% (2006)	1.6% (2006)	4.9%(2006)	2.8% (2006)	
<b>Ensure environmental sustainability; land, air and water</b>					
Proportion of land area covered by forest	12% (2002)	..	..	..	Integrate principles of sustainable development into policies; reverse loss of environmental resources.
Ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area	0.01% (2002)	..	..	..	
Energy use per unit of GDP	50.43 kg p.a. (2000-02)	..	..	..	
Proportion of population using solid fuels (%)	99.6%(2006)	98.9%(2006)	99.4%(2006)	99.9%(2006)	
Access to an improved water source (% of population)	29% (2006)	40.5%(2006)	25%(2006)	25.5% (2006)	64.5%
Access to improved sanitation (% of population)	37% (2006)	40%(2006)	43.7 (2006)	35.3%	68.5%

<sup>2</sup> Sources: WB World Development Indicators 2006; UNDP MDG Report Somalia, 2004; UNDP and the WB, Somalia Socio-Economic Survey 2002; UNDP Somalia Human Development Report, 2001; Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, 1999; Conflict Analysis Regional Report: Puntland, 2004; UNICEF Primary School Survey 2004/05; UNICEF, The State of the World's Children, 2004; Ministry of Planning of Puntland, Facts and Figures 2004; WHO Annual World Health Report, 2004.

<b>Develop a global partnership for development</b>				(2006)	
Fixed line and mobile phones (per 1,000 people)	15 (2002)	20 (2004)	..	..	With the private sector, make available benefits of new technologies.
Personal computers in use per 1,000 people	0.5 (2002)	0.5 (2004)	..	..	
	9 (2003)	6.7 (2003)	..	..	
Internet users per 1,000 people					

Goals	Deepening peace, improving security & establishing good governance													Investing in people through improved social services													Establishing a sustainable enabling environment for rapid poverty reducing development												
Donors - Sub areas/ outcomes	Reconciliation Constitutional Processes Democratization & electoral processes Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reintegration (DDR) Police Mine action Judiciary Architecture of Government Capacity Building for Government Institutions and Civil Service Decentralisation of Responsibility and Service Delivery Civil society & Media Fiscal & Monetary Policy Resource Mobilisation Data Development Budgeting Expenditure Management Procurement Improve Access, Quality and Gender Equity in Primary Education Improve Access, Quality and Gender Equity in Secondary and Tertiary Education Expand Non Formal Education Support Institutional & Systems Development Capacity Building and Institutional Development for Basic Health Services Rehabilitate Infrastructure for Basic Health Services Respond to Communicable Diseases HIV/ AIDS, Malaria & TB Improve Health Information, Monitoring and Awareness Programmes Rehabilitate, Extend, Improve Existing and Affordable Water & Sanitation Facilities Develop Institutional, Legal and Training Structures for Integrated Water Management Enhance Private Sector Participation in Water & Sanitation Service Delivery Direct Assistance for IDPs and Returnees towards Reintegration and Livelihoods Provide Academic and Vocational Education to IDPs and Refugees Promote Conducive Legal Environment for IDPs and Refugees Improve Community-Based Identification of Disadvantaged Groups Provide Targeted Service and Assistance (legal aid, psycho-social care etc.) Expand Protection Monitoring and Coordination (disaster awareness; indicators etc.)													Road Transport Airports Ports Urban Electrical Network Alternative Energy Urban Water and Sanitation Infrastructure Commercial Banking Microfinance and Small Credit Facilities Insurance Services Livestock (Disease Control; Certification and Inspection) Crop Production and Watershed Management Fisheries Other Productive Sectors Enabling Regulatory and Legal Framework Livelihoods Diversification to Increase Livelihood and Food Security Studies; Links to the RDF; Coordination & Quality Assurance																									
Strategic areas	Conflict Resolution, Peace Building and Democratization Security and Rule of Law Administrative Governance Macroeconomic Stability Public Finance Management Education and Training Services Basic Health Services Provision of Water, Sanitation and Shelter Solutions for IDPs and Returning Refugees Protection of Vulnerable and Disadvantaged Groups													Infrastructure Financial Services Key Productive Sectors Other Productive Sectors Natural Resource Management Livelihoods and Food Security Coordination and Quality Assurance																									
CSP Donors																																							
EC																																							
Denmark																																							
DfID																																							
Finland																																							
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Other Donors																																							
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USAID																																							
Canada																																							
LAS																																							
Japan																																							
China																																							
Switzerland																																							





# Country Environmental Profile for Somalia Executive Summary Pre-Publication Draft



**Prepared by IUCN Eastern Africa Regional Office  
For the EC Somalia Operations Unit, Nairobi, Kenya**

## 1. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

The Eastern African Regional Office of IUCN, the World Conservation Union developed this Country Environmental Profile (CEP) for the EC Somalia Operations Office. This CEP comes at an opportune time because:

1. The EC Somalia Operations Unit in collaboration with Member States and Norway is preparing its Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for Somalia, where the CEP provides arguments for the greater integration of environmental issues;
2. Somalia is entering a period of stability, where nation building will be the main focus. The CEP argues for the environmental goods and services as the basis for sustainable development; and
3. The Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) is carrying out a comprehensive assessment of all the needs of Somalia, and this CEP provides additional independent input on environmental issues.

The objective for Somalia's CEP is to "Provide environmental, social and economic information to the EC Somalia Operations Office and the Somalia Administrations to guide the identification of specific recommendations on environmental objectives and benchmarks for the EC Cooperation activities in its 2008-2013 indicative programmed for Somalia".

This CEP recognizes the importance of the environment for reconstruction, development, economic planning and to the achievement of the MDGs (Millennium Development Goals). The environmental goods and services are the foundation for sustainable development and long term planning. Evolving policies, laws and institutions, together with the international community, can integrate environmental concerns and issues in a positive manner. The CEP points out ways by which this can be done. However, in developing this CEP, there were constraints, which included difficulties of trying to work in the 3 areas of Somalia; it was not possible to hold an inception workshop in central and southern Somalia due to security concerns; and difficulties in accessing and validating many of the data sets, as much of the data is old (before 1990), and may have wide error margins.

A series of inception workshops were held (Nairobi, Hargeisa and Bosaso). Many of the recommendations from these workshops have been integrated, and have helped corroborate, or not, the data and perspectives found in the literature.

## 2. Overview of the Natural and Human Environment in Somalia

Somalia covers an area of 637,657 sq.km and comprise the areas known as Somaliland, Puntland, and Central and Southern Somalia. Somalia has the longest coastline in Africa (3,025 km), and has an estimated population of 7.7 million comprising 6 major Somali clans and other groups. The country is hot, arid to semi-arid with a rainfall of between 50-150 mm along the coast and up to 500 mm in the northern highlands. The land forms comprise flat plateaus and coastal plains. Highlands are only found to the north, where there are mist forests. There are two permanent rivers – the Jubba and Shabelle – which are shared with Ethiopia. The remaining water courses are ephemeral, but important as water sources (wells), and for their relatively richer vegetation.

Forests and woodlands cover about 23% of the country and are dominated by Acacia species. There has been significant, but localized, deforestation for agriculture, fuel wood, and charcoal. Trees are the most important terrestrial resource because of the goods they provide, particularly in dry times.

With the longest coastline in Africa, the marine environment is rich due to nutrient upwellings which supply important off-shore fisheries that are the subject of a lot of Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing by foreign vessels. There is an artisanal fishery, which is relatively low level as Somalia does not have a strong tradition of fishing. There are some fringing reefs and coral patches along the Gulf of Aden and near the Kenya border.

Livestock is the main economic activity for 50% of the population and over 40% of GDP (Gross Domestic Product). This is based on pastoralism which makes best use of wet and dry season grazing. There is some evidence of localized range degradation. Crop cultivation is mainly limited to the irrigated areas of the Jubba and Shabelle rivers. At present the land under irrigation is relatively small compared to the irrigation potential, but irrigation needs to relate to wider river catchment planning. Opportunistic rain-fed cultivation is widely practiced, in particular for sorghum and millet. Approximately 14% of the population is engaged with cultivation based agriculture.

Urbanization is increasing rapidly, and this places a greatly increased demand on the natural environment, particularly in the catchments of urban centres. Urbanization is exacerbated by returnees. The social indicators are amongst the worst in the world for health and education, while the Gross National Income (GNI) is the third lowest in the world. However large amounts of funds are remitted by the Somali diaspora.

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<sup>1</sup> In addition to the executive summary, two tables have been produced – an environmental fact sheet for Somalia, and how the environment can be directly linked to the MDGs in Somalia. While the recommendations are mainly targeted at the EC, they are more generic in nature for other agencies and institutions.

### 3. Key Environmental Issues and Challenges

The following areas constitute major environmental challenges – the effects of climate change, increased population pressures, natural resource based conflicts, increased urbanization, and the effects of decreasing remittances – all of which will impose further pressures on the environment. Degradation of catchments, range areas, agricultural lands and the marine environment, combined with illegal use are critical issues to address, though much of it is localized. All impact on the ability of people to meet subsistence needs, and enhance productivity to contribute to local, national and even international trade and economic growth. There are opportunities to short and long term resolution of environmental issues in Somalia, and the following areas are seen as critical to addressing environmental issues.

1. The environment is the foundation for sustainable development in Somalia, and underpins livelihood plans and strategies. This may be realized, but too easily assumed and not integrated into rural sector strategies, and so not recognized at sectoral or donor levels;
2. With respect to the socio-economic development of Somalia, the environmental goods and services need to be appreciated (economically, socially, politically) for the true values they provide to society (family, local, national, international);
3. Environmental issues are multi-sectoral and impact on all aspects of life, and call for “mainstreaming”. The development of, and agreement to environmental management plans and green indicators at sectoral levels will help, and could be linked to poverty reduction plans, as a basis for resource prioritization, allocation, implementation, and reporting;
4. The international community should support governance structures to combat illegal, usually unsustainable resource exploitation and export through policy support and capacity building. This includes the export of charcoal, IUU fishing and the dumping of waste in Somalia’s EEZ (Economic Exclusion Zone) or on land. Regional bodies (such as IGAD, PERSGA, the Arab League) can assist, but action is also required at the international level (UN, EU in particular);
5. Somalia’s permanent rivers (Jubba and Shabelle) are part of regional water basins. As Somalia is water scarce, these two rivers are critical assets to be managed sustainably, which will require integrated river basin management at the national and regional levels, where the role of regional bodies such as IGAD will be important;
6. Risk management and mitigation, combined with the enhancement of the resilience of natural resource systems are critical strategies on which Somalia land use was based upon. Many of these systems have broken down, and need to be reconstituted (and re-understood), and combined with more “technical”

approaches to early warning, for example through the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) and FAO’s Food Security Analysis Unit (FSAU), FAO-Somalia Water and Land Information Management Unit (SWALIM) and the IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre;

7. Climate change predictions for the Horn of Africa indicate that the area will become drier. Adapting to an increasingly dry climate, with more extreme and frequent droughts and floods will be required. It is critical to investigate the potential effects, develop and test appropriate adaptation measures and ensure that they are mainstreamed.

### 4. Legislation and Institutional Context

Policy and legislation with respect to the environment is weak and outdated, and would benefit from environmental input, in terms of assessing the potential impact of such policies on the environment, or how they could contribute to environmental conservation and livelihood improvement. A process of Strategic Environment Assessment (SEA) could be used as an important internationally recognized tool. SEA would identify, in all sectors, policies and laws where environmental issues are, or could be important. Somalia has signed a number of international agreements and Multilateral Environment Agreements (MEAs), although there has been little progress in implementation.

#### Key Recommendations

1. Mainstream the environment across all sectors and amongst civil society and the private sector;
2. Provide support to ensure that SEAs are carried out for existing and future policy and legislation so that environmental concerns and opportunities are recognized, understood and integrated into policy and law. While at a project level EIAs should be introduced as a mandatory requirement;
3. Develop capacity within Somalia to carry out SEA, and awareness amongst those concerned with policy on the importance of SEA;
4. Develop capacity in national accounting (including national statistics offices) and for evolving Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP) processes so that environmental goods and services are recognized (economically, sectorally, nationally). Strengthen livelihood – environment linkages, which would include public sector expenditure reviews on the environment;
5. Given the level of risk (climatic, drought, floods) in Somalia, develop and support national capacity for risk management (early warning systems, risk management, adaptation) that can react rapidly;
6. Identify the opportunities and constraints to increased growth based on the environment and natural resources, and assess the impact of the key productive sectors on the environment;
7. Create greater awareness in all sectors and agencies on the importance of environmental goods and

services, how they can be integrated into agency and sector workplans;

8. Develop capacity to monitor the environment (for example with respect to climate change, land use, impact assessments of new activities) at different levels (village upwards) and be able to provide input on the achievement of the MDGs and poverty reduction strategies;
9. Develop the institutional and human resource capacity for environment and natural resource planning (e.g. integrated land use planning, water basin management, management of off-shore fisheries, and environmentally benign technologies for fuel) at various administrative levels (village to national);
10. Support Somalia to re-affirm its commitments to the international agreements it is party to, and ratify other important agreements, such as those on hazardous waste and UNFCCC; and
11. Assist Somalia to prepare for, and attend Conferences of the Parties of the various MEA's.

## 5. Governance and Peace Building

Village based land use and environmental management planning combined with the decentralization of rights and responsibilities to the lowest appropriate level would appear to be the best policy option for overall and more integrated land use and environmental management. This needs to be integrated at district, regional, state and national levels. Government would have overall responsibility for the enabling policy framework and legislation, and retain the role of 'regulator of last resort'. Such an approach would enable pastoralist livestock movements to be negotiated for, create a context for agricultural (crop based) development, improve ways to manage risk (especially drought), adapt to climate change, and offer support for decentralization and greater equity. This will foster local level ownership, and make the links to water basin and catchment plans to promote overall improved natural resource and land management. The broad absence of (or very weak) governance structures and systems has allowed civil society and the private sector to take on many of the roles of government. Unravelling the thousands of land and property disputes emanating from the collapse of the State will be a major hurdle in reconciliation efforts. Women are the backbone of Somali society doing much of the labour required for survival, and play an important role in keeping the peace. Traditionally, women had no formal role in the clan based political processes, nor are they often involved in the decision making processes of government and public bodies, and this has implications for the role of men and women in managing natural resources in Somali society.

### Key Recommendations

1. Support policy processes for devolved land use and environmental management planning as the foundation for wider land use planning and management. Such planning should be cross sectoral

and cross-institutional, and owned at various administrative levels including the village level. It should be capable of integrating issues that go beyond the village level, such as pastoralist grazing patterns, access to water, exploitation of marine resources etc.;

2. Support devolved land use planning in projects. Lessons from practice in Somaliland are available as a basis, and a similar but adapted process could be used for small urban centres;
3. Support partnerships (Government-NGO, NGO-Private Sector, etc.) to build on the comparative advantages of the different sectors in development, environmental change, and nation building;
4. Support activities which promote the responsible devolution of rights and responsibilities to the lowest appropriate levels;
5. Develop capacity so that Somali people and their institutions can take on their rights and responsibilities both generally and with respect to the environment;
6. Study the reasons for natural resource (e.g. water, rich patch vegetation) conflict, how local communities manage conflict internally, and how such conflict management systems can be better understood and used;
7. In the longer term support processes to resolve, reconcile, negotiate, and in some cases restore land claims. This is central to long term peace, and the basis for sustainable environmental management;
8. A greater understanding (studies, empowerment) of the different gender roles women and men play with respect to the environment is required, and how these can be recognized and valued in development, land use and sustainable development; and
9. As women generally lack power and authority, increased support is needed for greater equity in all aspects of decision making and in society, but with particular respect to the environment.

## 6. Reduction of Widespread Vulnerability (Drought, Climate Change)

Somalia lacks the capacity to deal with major disasters such as the tsunami, protracted droughts and El Nino floods.. Climate change is an acknowledged fact. There is little appreciation of the threats that climate change could place. Unless early action is taken to adapt to climate change, the country may not be in a position to achieve any of the MDGs, and could have drastic effects on well-intentioned development efforts by the Government, local communities and international organizations.

### Key Recommendations

1. Support institutions to develop and implement short and longer term strategies for disaster management, and develop the capacity to do so;
2. Understand existing customary coping and risk management strategies, and what natural assets

survive best through drought times, and integrate the importance of such coping mechanisms into land use and environmental planning;

3. Study and assess the impacts of climate change as reduced precipitation is likely, combined with a greater frequency and intensity of droughts and floods. Integrate the findings in risk mitigation and early warning strategies, and build them into land use planning;
4. Support processes to internalize early warning systems at different levels of government, amongst communities, and NGOs;
5. Support the development and implementation of specific drought intervention measures;
6. Identify how environmental assets could play an important role in mitigating the effects of climate change;
7. Test strategies for adapting to climate change, e.g. through the wider use of more drought tolerant grass and tree species, so that a greater proportion of the rainfall is absorbed. This can be supported by a greater understanding of what species survive well through prolonged periods of drought; and can continue to supply products; and
8. Enhance the ability of early warning systems to include the impacts of climate change and be able to offer more “real time” data and analysis to users. This should include the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS), FAO’s Food and Security Analysis Unit (FSAU), and IGAD’s Climate Prediction and Application Centre.

## 7. Rural Development and Food Security

**Livestock** are the mainstay of people’s livelihoods strategies. Pastoralism has proved to be the best way to secure people’s livelihoods while maintaining fragile arid and semi-arid ecosystems.

### Key Recommendations

1. Considering the economic importance of the livestock sector, efforts need to be made to adapt traditional production systems to new challenges such as increasing population, resource scarcity, changing property rights, and the demand for better social services and living standards, while conserving the biodiversity of fragile arid and semi-arid ecosystems;
2. Assess the impact of the commercial livestock trade and export on environment, and develop related mitigation measures at private and public sector level.
3. Integrate traditional pastoral land management systems into wider land use and environmental development and management of Somalia’s agro-ecological zones; and
4. Reliable and updated baseline data is needed to support sustainable land use planning and impact monitoring, with respect to, for example livestock

numbers (seasonally and over a number of different seasons).

**Agriculture (cultivation based):** In the arid- and semi-arid conditions of Somalia crop cultivation is of limited potential due to aridity and water access, except for irrigation. As part of pastoralism, opportunistic rain fed agriculture can be integrated into pastoralist land management.

### Key Recommendations

1. Plan irrigated agriculture in relation to wider catchment and land use needs, e.g. access to dry season forage and water;
2. Further explore and promote agroforestry for improved use of cultivated lands, e.g. by combining fruit and multipurpose trees with crops, or producing forage for the dry season;
3. Improve the management of irrigation so as to be able to mitigate problems associated with, e.g. salinization, chemical pollution, and invasives; and
4. Support rain-fed farming that is environmental viable, given the implications of climate change, and is integrated into village land use.

**Forests and Woodlands:** Trees and woody species are the most important vegetation, and are particularly important in dry and drought times, where they are a critical component of pastoralists risk and drought management strategies. This needs to be reconciled with competing demands for trees and shrubs (for example the thresholds for sustainable fuel, charcoal, building timber, and fodder use and production) to achieve the sustainable management of natural resources.

### Key Recommendations

1. Carry out an inventory of Somalia’s timber and range resources with respect to distribution, species composition, use and degradation, and the potential for sustainable and productive use;
2. Develop appropriate management plans and related legal frameworks for sustainable exploitation of forests and woodlands;
3. Gain a better understanding and improve the management, production and marketing of important non wood tree products, especially for henna, myrrh, frankincense etc.; and
4. Assess the existing and potential economic benefits (including being able to process, value add) of tree products as one basis for improved and sustainable rural economic growth.

**Energy:** Rural and urban energy needs are primarily wood and charcoal based, though there is an increasing use of oil based energy in urban areas. With increasing urbanization, combined with the return of the Somali diaspora, energy demands will increase. As an imperative for economic growth and nation building, sustainable sources of energy will be needed combined with more efficient use of existing energy sources.

## Key Recommendations

1. Continue to promote energy efficient cooking stoves and the use of alternative sources (solar, wind) which are environmentally appropriate and socially acceptable;
2. Promote strategies for a sustainable internal charcoal trade, including sustainable management of trees, improved means of charcoal burning, more efficient marketing systems with the appropriate controls in place;
3. Unless charcoal comes from sustainable sources, ensure that the charcoal export ban is enforced to control illegal cutting; and
4. Promote improved tree management (restoration, planting, management) both around the homes, on rangelands, and along rivers.

**Marine:** The rich waters off the long coastline contain important pelagic fish, all of which are taken by artisanal fisheries and offshore foreign fishing vessels (which operate illegally and provide little or no revenue to the country). The marine environment poses two major challenges of how to ensure a more sustainable and locally owned artisanal fishery, and how the IUU offshore fishery can be controlled, and benefit the country. The first could be addressed through community based coastal seascape management, and the second requires strong international intervention.

## Key Recommendations

1. IUU fishing needs urgent address by government and the international community (UN, EU);
2. Improve the understanding of marine and coastal systems to assess what pressures they are under, and how they are being managed;
3. Develop fisheries management plans for sustainable fisheries, based on a comprehensive assessment and evaluation of pelagic and demersal stocks;
4. Give priority attention to protecting the coral reefs, islands and mangroves that stretch from Mogadishu south to the coastal border with Kenya, and environments on the Gulf of Aden coast;
5. Under UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), the EC could, under its Common Fisheries Policy, support EU member states (and others) to enter into partnership agreements with Somalia to create a more sustainable and nationally beneficial fishery; and
6. Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in community fisheries management need to be stressed, as they provide sanctuaries to breeding stocks, and might be a basis for community conserved marine areas, which would both assist in conservation and sustainable fishery management.

**Conservation:** Somalia possesses important biodiversity with a high level of endemism. Many of these species and their habitats are threatened. There are a range of natural ecosystems that could form a basis for creating conservation areas, for example community conserved areas to integrate conservation and livelihood objectives.

Conservation threats to natural ecosystems include climate change, uncontrolled land clearing for agriculture, deforestation, and overgrazing.

## Key Recommendations

1. Develop and implement strategies to reconcile the importance of conserving important areas of biodiversity with those of human use. This could include ways to integrate conservation with sustainable use, e.g. through the designation of community conserved areas (for forests, drylands, riparian areas or in the marine ecosystems);
2. Many country's have completed NEAPs (National Environment Strategies and Action Plans), and NBSAPs (National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plans). There is an opportunity to take some of the key approaches and tools from these planning tools and make them relevant to Somalia, in a manner that supports national economic development and conservation;
3. Assess the scale and extent of invasive species together with the potential problems such invasives might cause;
4. When undertaking land use and environmental management planning, take into account the need to conserve (where they exist) and create (if possible) biodiversity conservation corridors to support connectivity in the landscape; and
5. Train and develop national capability in conservation, and re-enforce communal, clan or other traditional means of resource management.

## 8. Access to Social Services (including Education)

**Water:** The rivers (seasonal or perennial) are critical for people's livelihoods. The two permanent rivers (Shabelle and Jubba) are a source of seasonal flood recession farming and organized irrigation. Understanding the centrality of water, and water management and its linkages to wider environmental management will be critical for future development, as Somalia is a "water scarce" country. In addition water and catchment conservation measures would improve water retention and vegetation cover – key tools for adapting to climate change.

## Key Recommendations

1. Assess and plan for the two permanent rivers in terms of potentially competing demands, and implement catchment wide approaches, including the need to address cross border issues, where IGAD could play a role;
2. Plan for the provision and development of potable water (e.g. from wells, boreholes, berkedes and balleys) in a wider landscape and environmental context to ensure that unplanned water development does not exacerbate degradation; and
3. Pay greater attention to improved water harvesting and water use efficiency, e.g. collection of rain

water, improved urban water use efficiency and distribution.

**Health:** The environment is a key element underpinning health through both the goods (e.g. medicinals, fruits and drought time foods), and services (e.g. catchments being able to supply clean water). The impacts of HIV/AIDS could bring on changes in land use, as people have to rely on practices such as extensive farming and natural resource use that can be damaging. While waste disposal and sanitation are key health issues to address.

#### **Key Recommendations**

1. Assess the importance of environmental goods and services to human health and well being (through e.g. clean water from well maintained catchments, use of nutrient rich wild foods and fruits, the importance of dry and drought time foods, importance of herbal remedies etc.);
2. Develop capacity at all levels so that the health sector acknowledges, understands and uses the importance of the environmental goods and services as a key asset in health service delivery; and
3. Support policies and programmes that promote safe waster disposal (all types, urban, rural) and improve hygiene and sanitation.

**Education:** As education curricula and schemes of work (all levels, including functional literacy) are evolving in Somalia, there is an opportunity to ensure that the importance of the environment is reflected. This is also important for Koranic schools, as the environment is important in the Koran.

#### **Recommendations**

1. Support activities to integrate environmental education (relating to water and sanitation, pollution, land and marine use, endangered species, biodiversity conservation etc.) as part of primary and secondary school curricula and schemes of work, and for functional literacy programmes; and
2. Specific efforts are required to address gender issues (e.g. a greater understanding of gender, greater equity between men and women, empowerment of women), and ensure that the pastoralists and minorities (such as the Bantu population) receive equitable access to such education.

### **9. Economic Growth and Cooperation**

The goods and services of the environment present a tremendous, yet largely unrealized opportunity for economic growth. Most of Somalia's GDP is based on the environmental good and services.

#### **Key Recommendations**

1. Support environmental accounting (including economic valuations at all levels) so that evolving national accounts (together with data collection from

a national bureau of statistics) reflect the real values of environmental goods and services;

2. Assess (sectorally) how the economic values of environmental goods and services contribute to that particular sector economy, e.g. the value of herbal remedies to health, the value of selling natural products for paying for school fees; and
3. Ensure that evolving poverty reduction strategies take into account the real contribution of the environment.

### **10. Urban Development**

The urban environment is a cause of environmental degradation (e.g. waste management and pollution), as well as a consumer of environmental products – the most visible of which is fuelwood and charcoal, as well as food (fish, meat, agricultural products). Urban demands are increasing, and this is exacerbated by Somali returnees moving into urban areas. The impact of urban development, with respect to such issues as natural resource demands, consumption and emissions, effluents, waste and refuse, spillages and the dumping of hazardous products etc. need to be better integrated into overall land use and habitat planning.

#### **Key Recommendations**

1. The ability of the environment to sustain and support urban development (e.g. provide water, fuel and other products on a sustainable basis) needs to be considered in the context of wider urban planning that integrates urban areas with their wider catchments (landscape, products, water etc.);
2. The impact of urban development (with respect to natural resource demands, consumption and emissions, effluents, waste and refuse, spillages and the dumping of hazardous products) needs to be assessed and mitigated; and
3. Study how to reduce and recycle waste, through introducing alternatives (e.g. paper not plastic bags), and cost effective and environmentally friendly technologies.

### **11. Donor and Regional Cooperation**

The six Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) cluster reports provided a lot of data, but need to take a more strategic approach to environmental issues, which cut across all six clusters. The main recommendations could better embrace the overall importance of the environment and its goods and services. Given the importance of the environment, development support should ensure that all projects and programmes address environmental issues. Somalia is a "member" of IGAD and the Arab League, which should form a strong basis for improved regional co-operation, for example with PERSGA along the Red Sea, and IGAD to address issues relating to shared ecosystems.

### **Key Recommendations:**

1. Within each of the cluster reports the JNA should identify strategic environmental issues to be addressed, and ensure that actions and related environmental indicators are suggested to address them, and monitor impact;
2. Within each of the six clusters, demonstrate linkages between the specific cluster and the environment more clearly, and link it to specific actions and related environmental indicators to address them, and monitor impact; and
3. Support the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) to ensure that environmental issues are integrated into all different sectoral committees;
4. Support SWALIM to continue providing relevant information for decision making and action in Somalia, but with an increased emphasis on, and integration of environmental concerns;
5. Support processes to establish relationships with IGAD, the Arab League and PERSGA to implement activities along the Red Sea (PERSGA), with shared river (Jubba and Shabelle) basin management and wider shared land use systems (IGAD); and
6. Work with counterpart agencies (e.g. donor agencies in Ethiopia or Kenya with respect to water or shared land use planning) to enhance the value added of regional programmes addressing environmental issues.

## **12. Environmental Integration into CSP and Project Cycle Management**

This CEP has demonstrated the importance of environmental goods and services as a core asset in Somali life, and a key opportunity for future development, livelihood improvement and to the achievement of the MDGs. The CSP should ensure that its strategy for future investment by the EC and related donors takes into account the following:

1. Overall national level environmental and land/sea use planning is required that builds on community and district level planning to integrate the different aspects of sustainable land and sea use with respect to the wider environment;
2. The importance of integrating environmental goods and services into all the different sectors, policies and laws as a basis for mainstreaming, where SEA could be a key tool;
3. EIA's need to be carried out in line with EC policy, at both project and activity levels;
4. Develop environmental management plans and monitoring indicators at programme and project level;
5. Better integrate environmental concerns and impact into urban planning;
6. Somalia and its people need the capacity and tools to manage the risks of, and be able to adapt to the reality of climate change;

7. Somalia will develop PRSP processes (Somaliland has already started) as a focused basis to the achievement of the MDGs. This forms a strategic entry point for the EC and other donors to address environmental concerns, degradation and unsustainable resource use in the context of poverty reduction and the achievement of the MDGs; and
8. The EC Somali Operations unit could promote improved environmental mainstreaming in all activities through the initiation of a call for proposals which could centre on, for example "Economic recovery and sustainable environmental management". The EU's other funding mechanisms for Somalia need to ensure that they also include the environment in an accountable manner.

Somalia does not yet receive direct budgetary support, nor are there any sector specific support programmes. In this respect Agency (multi-lateral or NGO) – Government partnerships could be fostered to build government capacity. Similar partnerships could be fostered with the private sector in order to "green" their work and test approaches for greater rural economic growth based on the sustainable management and use of natural resources, including value-adding and improved marketing.

### **Key Recommendations**

1. In the longer term provide support to link sector and budgetary support with environmental concerns and opportunities;
2. Support "green accounting" through improvements in national accounting, statistical data gathering, and the setting of priorities for investment;
3. Ensure that all EC supported projects include a strong environmental component, adhere to EC environmental regulations, and have appropriate EIA procedures in place. At a minimum this should seek to "do no harm"; and
4. The EC and other donors should initiate longer term and more phased approaches for environmentally sensitive activities, for example rangelands, the marine environment, and land use planning as environmental issues are long term and often beyond 4-5 year donor funding horizons.



## Somalia Environmental Facts, Opportunities and Issues Sheet<sup>2</sup>

<p><b>Land Area:</b> 637,657 sq.km. with longest coastline (3,025 Km) in Africa, and border Djibouti (58km), Ethiopia (1,600 Km) and Kenya (682 Km).</p>
<p><b>Climate:</b> Hot, arid and semi-arid. South has higher rainfall. Two wet seasons (April to June, and October to November) with approximately 500 mm in the northern highlands, 50-150mm along coast, and 300-500 mm in the southwest. With climate change, extremes (drought, flood) likely to increase in frequency and ferocity.</p>
<p><b>Land Forms:</b> Flat plateaus and plains, coastal plains, Jubba and Shabelle the main and only permanent rivers. Highlands to the north with important mist forests.</p>
<p><b>Land Use:</b> 13% country potentially arable (2001), of which 20-30,000 Ha irrigated, permanent pastures (dry and wet season areas) over 50%.</p>
<p><b>Forests and woodlands:</b> 12% of country, with an average deforestation rate of 0.97% per annum. Dominated by <i>Acacia</i> and <i>Commiphora</i> shrub and woodlands. Extensive areas riverine forests cleared for agriculture, and localized dryland forest clearance for charcoal. Mist forests in north only true forests and under threat. Increased pressures on forests for charcoal – especially for urban areas – huge demand, also export trade.</p>
<p><b>Biodiversity and Conservation:</b> 0.8% of the land protected (2000). National Conservation Strategy used to exist. Part of Conservation International Horn of Africa Hotspot which has over 60 endemic genera and over 2,750 endemic species. Part of Somalia-Masai region of plant endemism (Savannas and shrub lands). 24 important bird areas. Generally fauna depleted due to over and illegal use. Invasives (e.g. <i>Prosopis</i> spp. and the Indian House crow, <i>Corvus splendens</i>) important to address, though <i>Prosopis</i> could be used for charcoal.</p>
<p><b>Marine:</b> Fringing reefs and coral patches in Gulf of Aden, few mangroves; On Somalia Indian Ocean Coast, fringing and back reef lagoons from the Kenya border to Kismayu. From Kismayu onwards there are no reefs, because of nutrient rich deep water upwellings, which supply very important offshore fisheries (tuna). Artisanal fishing at low level, not a widespread tradition, but pressure has increased due to displacement of people from inland to coast. Traditional shark and ray fishing on Gulf of Aden coast for the salted/dry local (regional) market, but now shifted to shark fin export to Asia. Illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing by foreign vessels now a critical issue. Commitment from local NGOs high; technical capacity for management needs building.</p>
<p><b>Water and wetlands:</b> 1,685 cu.m. per person per annum, but distribution very skewed. Water critical resource ultimately determining livelihoods. Jubba and Shabelle only perennial rivers, many seasonal streams. Historically water management integrated with livestock management. Now much unplanned for water supply construction (berked, balley, wells) individually owned – increases pressures on rangelands. Irrigation agriculture use to account for over 90% of water use.</p>
<p><b>People:</b> population estimated at 6.4 million (2001) and 7.3 million (2004), with 52.% female and 47.% male. Approximately 64% rural and 36% urban. Poverty levels high with nearly 80% of rural population living in poverty (less than \$2 per day), while a total 53.4% live in extreme poverty (less than \$1 per day). Six major clans – 4 are mainly pastoralist, 2 agricultural. Lack of clarity of land tenure and security of rights to land. There are about 10 people per sq.km and an annual growth rate of 2.8%.</p>
<p><b>Administration:</b> 18 regions; Somaliland in the north has its own self-declared Government, as does Puntland in the north-east but it is more closely linked to central and southern Somalia Administrations.</p>
<p><b>Social Services and Education:</b> Health indicators some of worst in Africa with high mortality rates. Estimated life expectancy at birth low, while average life expectancy of 47. Infant mortality is 115 deaths per 1,000 births. Infectious diseases, nutritional deficiencies and birth related problems are major health risks, and water borne diseases are on the increase. HIV/AIDS prevalence estimated at less than 1% (2001). Primary school enrollment is only 20.8% for boys and 16.9% for girls. The overall adult literacy rate of 25% for males, and 12% for females with the literacy in rural areas being extremely low. In addition to low education levels, there are been a great brain drain to other countries.</p>
<p><b>Gender:</b> Though over half the population, women have very little voice. But many civil society groups negotiating for greater equity in decision making. With increased democracy role of women likely to improve.</p>
<p><b>Agriculture:</b> Main food crops are sorghum, millet, maize, rice. Main cash crops were bananas, sugar, cotton. Crops limited mainly to irrigated areas, but an increase in high risk opportunistic rain fed cultivation removes land from livestock based systems. Emphasis on cultivation based agriculture as main vehicle for livelihood improvement. Indigenous crop varieties (sorghum, cowpeas) emphasized. 14% of the population are engaged with farming.</p>
<p><b>Livestock:</b> Pastoralism accounts for over 50% of the population, 40% of GDP, 65% of export earnings, and is the mainstay of the economy based on wet and dry season grazing/browsing of natural resources (grasses, herbs, browse, trees and shrubs). Most of country annual grasslands with shrubs and woodlands in wetter areas where they may also be perennial grasses. Trade with gulf states key to livestock industry. There is evidence of rangeland degradation as a result of strife and insecurity, but the scale and extent is difficult to validate. Private grass enclosures further alienating land from common property management.</p>
<p><b>Urbanization and Infrastructure:</b> Increasing rapidly (now about 36% of the population are urban), especially with returnees who can no longer fit into pastoral system. Urban areas not seen in context of greater landscape. Great demands on rural environments – charcoal, forage. Infrastructure under-developed – much destroyed during periods of insecurity.</p>

<sup>2</sup> The Sources for the data in this fact sheet are referenced in the main text of the overall CEP

<p><b>Economics and livelihoods:</b> Livestock the main economic base for the country. Many natural products sold – especially Frankincense (used to be 4<sup>th</sup> largest foreign currency earner) and Myrrh (used to be worlds largest producer). Industry small scale, mainly service – but potential for processing and value adding on natural resources. Potential for Somali industrial fisheries and new artisanal fisheries development if IUU addressed. The GNP is \$200 per capita. There are large remittances (estimated at between \$300-\$500 million per annum), while donor support is estimated at about \$115 million per annum (2000 figures)</p>
<p><b>Natural disasters:</b> Tsunami best known, but effects of droughts and floods far more serious. From 1961-2004 18 floods killed 2,600 people, and 12 droughts killed 19,600 people. With land conversion (for irrigation, charcoal, urban needs), effects of drought exacerbated. Massive coral bleaching occurred worldwide in 1998 due to climate change and resulted in widespread coral mortality, which is likely to have impacted Southern Somalia and Gulf of Aden coast.</p>
<p><b>Impacts of insecurity:</b> Massive refugee movements. Breakdown in social fabric of country resulting in “free for all” in terms of land and natural resource use – meant that traditional land use systems no longer respected. Still many hundreds of thousands of land mines – especially in Somaliland and Puntland.</p>
<p><b>Governance, Policy and Law:</b> In terms of environment very weak. Somaliland and Puntland have better evolving policy/legal framework. No EIA’s except as donor requirement. Government signatory to number of international agreements – but not able to implement.</p>
<p><b>Environmental Opportunities in Somalia</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Extensive traditional knowledge about natural resources and their use – especially for livestock, but also in terms of human use (fruits, foods, medicines). Gender differences in knowledge systems.</li> <li>2. Detailed land management systems – wet, dry and drought season grazing areas with reciprocal rights for livestock movements, together with institutions for management.</li> <li>3. Detailed knowledge about managing risk and enhancing resilience.</li> <li>4. Livestock management (main economic activity) depends on conservation and sustainable natural resource management.</li> <li>5. Sustainable and locally focused fisheries a great opportunity to contribute to local livelihoods and economic growth, with the potential to develop new fisheries based on the diverse range of marine resources currently not, or under utilised.</li> <li>6. Conservation areas could be seen as part of natural resource management – importance of community conserved areas.</li> <li>7. Strong sense of awareness about environmental issues.</li> <li>8. Opportunity for environmental issues to be addressed in different sectors as part of mainstreaming, but need for accountable indicators.</li> <li>9. Locally based (village) land use and environmental management planning as tool for enhancing devolution, &amp; creating management planning systems that are integrated at local level (land suitability for different uses, taking into account local needs, pastoralist grazing, cultivation, making trade-offs). Use as basis for district and regional land use planning and ultimately at national level.</li> <li>10. Environmental goods and services are the livelihood basis for the people – so key to MDG delivery.</li> <li>11. Many natural resources (frankincense, myrrh, gum Arabic, henna, aloe etc.) strong potential for small scale industry and value adding. Also opportunity for sustainable fuelwood and charcoal production but has to be carefully managed.</li> <li>12. Donors, NGOs and government have opportunity to integrate environmental issues in responsible manner in all work.</li> <li>13. NGO-Government partnerships to make best use of advantages of both to deliver development. This can be an important development approach, through SACCB donor and NGO coordination.</li> <li>14. Diversifying and value adding in marine fisheries to develop new but sustainable marine resource based livelihoods.</li> <li>15. Water resources management – in terms of existing work on catchment conservation, and water source protection.</li> <li>16. Existing efforts in environmental sanitation management – solid waste management, and hygiene awareness promotion.</li> </ol>
<p><b>Environmental Issues, Concerns and Problems in Somalia</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Unsustainable tree use – clearing for agriculture, use for making charcoal both for local use and export, where the export should be made illegal. Charcoal burning is confined to certain areas (e.g. close to urban centres).</li> <li>2. Expansion of land for cultivation into areas inappropriate for cultivation.</li> <li>3. Irrigation resulted in clearing of riverine forests without concern for broader landscape management – though an old issue still needs to be linked into wider environmental management.</li> <li>4. Insecurity means that environmental issues not considered important.</li> <li>5. Lack of security in terms of rights to land and natural resources, and clarity in land tenure where the more powerful tend push out the weaker.</li> <li>6. Illegal dumping (oil, waste – some of which toxic) by international fleet, though evidence difficult to substantiate.</li> <li>7. Illegal and unregulated fishing by international fleet (especially trawlers from Asia and Europe), also at artisanal level.</li> <li>8. Charcoal export key issue to stop, as destroying many woodland areas to the south of Mogadishu, and in many of the woodland areas with easy access to the Gulf states.</li> <li>9. Unplanned private water development (especially for berkedes) increasing pressures on surrounding rangelands, exacerbated by increased use of private enclosures for grass which curtails grazing routes.</li> <li>10. Donor attention to environment not given seriousness and support needed – seen as mainstreaming, but need for accountable indicators to the environment in all such activities and so identification of priority intervention areas and sectors. Need to go beyond the rhetoric.</li> <li>11. Invasives need to be managed as could encroach and degrade the landscape – esp. <i>Prosopis</i> spp. around Hargeisa.</li> <li>12. Policy and legislative framework for environmental issues weak to non-existent.</li> <li>13. Biodiversity and conservation not seen as important for its own sake.</li> <li>14. Management of both energy and more broadly urban emissions as a result of expanding urbanization and effects on ground water, waste management, pollution.</li> <li>15. Soil Erosion – gully, wadi erosion.</li> <li>16. Trade on life plant and animal species from the country itself and elsewhere.</li> <li>17. Air pollution through urban and/or energy emissions.</li> </ol>


## The Millennium Development Goals, Somalia and the Environment

MDG	Target	In Somalia How Does, & How Could The Environment Contribute? – Some Ideas
1. Eradicate Extreme Poverty & Hunger	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day</li> <li>Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Livestock sector (which is based on natural browse &amp; forage);</li> <li>Sustainable fishing and marine resource use where benefits accrue locally;</li> <li>Potential for greater value adding in the livestock sector (hides, skins, milk products);</li> <li>International fishery supporting local development through fees and licenses;</li> <li>Use of wild foods &amp; fruits for subsistence &amp; as risk management strategy;</li> <li>Economically viable natural products (henna, frankincense, myrrh, gum arabic etc.) – rural economic growth – processing, marketing;</li> <li>Natural resources and environment valued &amp; accounted for in macro-economic planning and development;</li> <li>Integration of important indigenous trees on farm as part of agroforestry &amp; improved land use;</li> <li>Potential for green labelling;</li> <li>Clarity of tenure and resource access rights so that local institutions and people can take on their rights and responsibilities; and</li> <li>Opportunities for waste recycling and processing.</li> </ul>
2. Achieve Universal Primary Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensure that all boys &amp; girls complete a full course of primary schooling</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sales from natural products (livestock, other products based on natural resources) to provide cash for school costs (fees, buildings);</li> <li>Environmental education as part of schooling; and</li> <li>Schools as practical environmental learning centres.</li> </ul>
3. Promote Gender Equality & Empower Women	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eliminate gender disparity in primary &amp; secondary education preferably by 2005, &amp; at all levels by 2015</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reduced time to collect fuelwood, water &amp; other important natural resources (so more quality time available for other activities, e.g. family), through tree planting, restoration and water provision;</li> <li>More efficient fuel use;</li> <li>Recognize &amp; value gender differences in natural resource management &amp; use;</li> <li>More girls can go to school, as natural resources help pay for costs; and</li> <li>Greater ability of women to manage, process, market and benefit from natural resource based enterprises.</li> </ul>
4. Reduce Child Mortality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improved catchments resulting in more clean water;</li> <li>Improved nutrition – fruits &amp; other wild (&amp; domesticated) foods contribute to nutrition &amp; food diversity through improved tree use, restoration and tree planting;</li> <li>Herbal remedies; and</li> <li>Improved control and management of waste.</li> </ul>
5. Improve Maternal Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Nutrition, clean water;</li> <li>Less time spent on e.g. fuelwood &amp; water collection therefore better able to retain health;</li> <li>Herbal remedies; and</li> <li>Improved control and management of waste.</li> </ul>
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria & Other Diseases	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Halt &amp; begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS</li> <li>Halt an begin to reverse the incidence of malaria &amp; other major diseases</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Clean water, control of mosquitoes &amp; other vectors;</li> <li>Environment providing fruits &amp; foods which help provide a more balance diet (&amp; so stronger to be able to resist/manage disease);</li> <li>Environment as provider of natural remedies &amp; medicinals; and</li> <li>Improved control and management of waste.</li> </ul>
7. Ensure Environmental Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies &amp; programmes; reverse loss of environmental resources</li> <li>Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water</li> <li>Achieve significant improvement in lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers, by 2020</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Village environmental &amp; land use management planning as both a practical and policy approach;</li> <li>Community based coastal and fishery management planning;</li> <li>Improved planning for, and regulation of the off-shore fishery;</li> <li>Clean catchments &amp; clean potable water – adopting river basin and catchment approaches which complement village land use planning;</li> <li>Improved fuel efficiency (including solar) for urban people (charcoal especially);</li> <li>Biodiversity more sustainably managed as foundation for the other MDGs;</li> <li>Potential to establish (or re-establish) network of protected areas that are part of lived in land- and sea-scapes, also national parks to conserve critical biodiversity;</li> <li>Risk mitigation and management strategies that build on existing knowledge systems of people – also as basis for climate change adaptation. Importance of early warning systems;</li> <li>Mainstreaming the environment across all the sectors; and</li> <li>Importance of capacity at different levels and across sectors to better understand and respond to environmental needs and sustainable environmental management, from policy to practice.</li> </ul>
8. Develop Global Partnership for Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eight indicators are listed relating to such partnerships. See <a href="http://www.undp.org/mdg">www.undp.org/mdg</a></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Partners integrate greater environmental issues &amp; concerns into on-going work, through SEA, EIA, and use of environmental indicators and activities;</li> <li>Support mainstreaming of environment in all sectors, &amp; in policy and practice; and</li> <li>Different sectors integrate environmental issues into the work plans as core component of their business.</li> </ul>

**Map 1: General Map of Somalia**



**Map 2: Land forms, Rivers and Administrative Boundaries in Somalia**



## ANNEX 4

### Somalia migration profile

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#### 1. Background

Somalia is fifth in the list of countries with populations of concern by UNHCR in its 2005 Global Refugee Trends Report, June 2006. These include, refugees, asylum-seekers, returnees during 2005, internally displaced people (IDPs), returned IDPs in 2005, stateless persons and others.

During 2005, a global total of 136,000 *prima facie* refugee arrivals were reported by 19 asylum countries, 13,600 of those were Somalis (fourth country after Togo, Sudan and DRC).

During 2005 a global total of 668,000 first instance or appeal applications for asylum or refugee status were submitted to governments or UNHCR offices in 149 countries most of them in Europe (a 2% decrease in the number of applications compared to 2004). Somalia accounted for 36,200 of these (two thirds of them in Kenya), second only to Myanmar (55,800).

The refugee situation in Somalia is a protracted crisis, in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and tractable state of limbo. Their lives might not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile. These situations frequently occur where there is a political impasse.

#### 2. History of migration movements

The history of forced migration in Somalia is directly related to armed conflict that began with the Ogaden war in 1977. From being a major refugee-receiving country in the 1970s, the stream of refugees out of Somalia gained pace from 1988 onwards and escalated throughout the 1990s. Drought, flooding, and famine have combined with warfare to cause the mass flight of refugees and the large-scale displacement of Somalis inside the country (see below under 3 for factors impacting migration trends).

The war in 1977 with Ethiopia over the disputed Ogaden region concluded with the defeat of Somali troops in 1978. The war had an immediate effect in terms of refugee flows into Somalia which was to prove decisive for the Barre regime's relations to the *Isaq* clans based in the north-west of the country. At the outset of the war there was a massive influx of ethnic Somalis and Oromos into the north western border regions of Somalia. By 1979 there were officially 1.3 million refugees in the country. The arrival of refugees placed additional strains upon resources, which in some cases caused tensions between local *Isaq* Somalis and the refugees. Many refugees were forced by Barre into government militias which were then used to repress the *Isaq* population in the North West (Africa Watch 1990).

At that time, the *Isaq* were being systematically weeded out from the civil service and armed forces. Government persecution of the *Isaq* escalated in 1981 after the Somali National Movement (SNM) located its headquarters in neighbouring Ethiopia (Africa Watch 1990). This resulted in the imposition of a state of emergency in northern regions, the operation of curfew, confiscation of property, withdrawal of export licences, and the relocation of villages. Barre was faced with opposition from the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the SNM, both of which led their operations from inside Ethiopia. It was this joint assault which led Barre to negotiate peace with Mengistu of Ethiopia, thereby dropping all previous territorial claims to the

formation of a Greater Somalia in return for Mengistu's cessation of support for the SNM and SSDF.

In May 1988 the SNM launched co-ordinated attacks on the northern cities of Hargeisa and Burao and succeeded in temporarily routing Barre's forces. By July of the same year Barre regained both cities, having subjected them to heavy artillery and aerial bombardment. In total, an estimated 100,000 civilians lost their lives in the bombing of the northern towns. As a result of the war in the north-west and Barre's forces' systematic destruction of livestock and the resources vital for the pastoral economy, 365,000 Somalis sought refuge in Ethiopia. An additional 60,000 people became internally displaced. Persecution of the *Isaq* also spread to the south of the country.

While the SNM was recovering from this assault, the *Hawiye* (the largest and most powerful clan in the south) had founded the United Somali Congress (USC). This quickly split into two factions. Ogadeni refugees in Hargeisa, who had been used by Barre against the SNM, formed their own Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) which also opposed the regime.

Having reached an accord in August 1990, the three liberation movements (the SPM, USC, and SNM) led a co-ordinated attack against Barre that resulted in his overthrow and flight from Mogadishu in January 1991. Barre was to continue destabilising the south of the country through his army, reconstituted as the *Darod* affiliated Somali National Front (SNF), with devastating effects for the inhabitants who were in the majority of cases from minority clan groups with no direct involvement in the conflict.

The coalition of forces which overthrew Barre soon dissolved into factional disputes: the Manifesto Group hurriedly appointed Ali Mahdi Mohamed, belonging to the Abgal sub-clan of the *Hawiye*, as interim president of a new Somali Republic. General Aideed, belonging to the rival Habr Gedir sub-clan of the *Hawiye*, had led the United Somali Congress (USC) rout of Mogadishu and opposed Ali Mahdi on political, ideological, and personal grounds (Abdullahi 1995). A final rupture occurred between the two factions of the USC in September 1991, resulting in Ali Mahdi occupying the north of Mogadishu and Aideed the south. By this time Aideed's faction (along with the SPM) had transmuted into the Somali National Alliance (SNA). Between December 1991 and March 1992, when the UN intervened to arrange a ceasefire, there was continuous conflict between the different factions of the USC. The USC and the SPM were also involved in a sustained war with Barre's forces under the SNF.

The coastal regions of Brava and Merca, the *Benadiri* population in general, and the central agricultural regions were systematically looted and razed to the ground as the contending factions battled for resources and power. The outcome of the civil war in Somalia's central regions was the destruction of the agricultural belt occupied by the *Rahanweyn*, *Digil*, *Gosha*, and other minority clans and communities. With the destruction of livestock, hundreds of farmers were forced to flee to the regional capital of Baidoa. At the worst points of the conflict, an estimated 800,000 Somalis were refugees in neighbouring countries. Some 400,000 went to Ethiopia, and over 200,000 went to Kenya. Approximately 2 million were internally displaced. The war in the south resulted in a huge displacement of people, an estimated third of the entire southern population. Up to a quarter of a million people from rural areas flooded into the relief camps in Mogadishu. With intensified conflict in Mogadishu, renewed population displacement took place as residents and IDPs were forced to flee the city.

The international response was slow in coming. UN peacekeeping forces had arrived in Somali in April 1992, as part of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Their role was

limited to overseeing a ceasefire between the different clan factions. Only a handful of aid agencies had remained in the country after Barre's departure from Mogadishu in 1991. As a result, extensive knowledge of local conditions was lacking in the humanitarian agencies when emergency food flowed into the regions, resulting in the de-stabilisation of food markets. Delivering humanitarian aid to the affected regions was particularly difficult for the agencies involved, many of which were forced to pay armed militia to distribute relief. This in turn encouraged a war economy, which quickly became dependent upon overseas cash flows and personnel. The concentration of aid in and around Mogadishu drew increasing numbers of displaced people from rural areas to the relief camps in the city.

The deteriorating situation inside Somalia led US President George Bush to intervene in December 1992. Operation Restore Hope committed 28,000 US troops to the US-led United Nations Task Force (UNITAF). What may have begun as a humanitarian operation to ensure that food supplies reached the victims of famine quickly degenerated into an exercise in 'nation-building' under UNOSOM II in May 1993. This succeeded in alienating Somalia's powerful warlords, notably Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA). The spectacle of a dead US soldier's body being hauled through the streets of Mogadishu rapidly led to the decision to withdraw US troops from Somalia. A deadline for US withdrawal from Somalia agreed in March 1994 was completed by March 1995.

Conflict continued in different regions of the country in the latter half of the decade, causing local population displacement. During 1998, conflict in the southern coastal areas forced an estimated 25,000 people to flee. Up to 10,000 Somalis fled by boat to Yemen during that year, many hundreds of them drowning at sea. Violence during 1999 forced at least 50,000 people to flee their homes, either to neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia or internally to Mogadishu. Mogadishu housed an estimated 230,000 individuals in 200 camps during 1999. Thousands of residents from southern Somalia also fled to the north of the country.

By 2000 the security conditions in Somalia varied enormously from region to region. While Somaliland and Puntland in the north were generally stable, violence and insecurity were commonplace in the south, east, and west of the country. Mogadishu and Merca continued to experience high levels of criminal and political violence. Approximately 4,000 Somalis fled to Kenya and other neighbouring countries during 2000. Somalis affected by drought in the Bay and Bakool regions migrated towards urban areas. Some 11,000 Somalis migrated in and out of the Gedo region during 2000.

A decade of civil war, the massive population displacement of about 700,000 Somalis, and the combined effects of drought, famine, and flooding had conspired to keep Somalia amongst the poorest of the world's nations.

The establishment of the TNG in 2000 led to some of the worst fighting in years. Combined with drought in 2001 (in the Gedo, Bay, and Bakool regions) this resulted in the displacement of 25,000 Somalis during the year. Continuing violence between the TNG and the factions opposed to it, largely in central and southern Somalia, pushed refugees into neighbouring Kenya, other neighbouring states, Western Europe, and the United States.

The TNG did however never manage to establish its authority in Somalia and soon, and IGAD led national reconciliation conference was organized in Kenya, resulting in the establishment of the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in late 2004. Instability and internal differences have so far characterized the life of the TFIs. The Somali Transitional Federal Charter recognizes the obligation of the government to "make necessary efforts to resettle refugees and



displaced persons”, but security circumstances in Somalia, particularly in South Central Somalia, prevent return or sustainable reintegration for the time being. Actual repatriation and implementation of reintegration will depend on the restoration of peace, stability and governance.

Accompanying the dissolution of the Somali state has been a gradual process of partial country level regional reconstruction. Somaliland and Puntland in the north of the country are relatively stable and conflict-free whereas areas of the southern regions are subject to violence and continued population displacement.

Table 1: Links between main conflict/natural disasters and migration flows

Year	Incident/Event	No of refugees	Origin	Destination
1979	Ogaden War	1,3 million	Ethiopia (Somali ethnic and Ogaden)	Northern border regions of Somalia
1988	Armed opposition to S. Barre	400,000	North West Somalia	Ethiopia/Djibouti
1988	Armed opposition to S. Barre	60,000	North West Somalia	IDPs
1992	Civil war (height of conflict)	800,000	Somalia	400,000 Ethiopia 200,000 Ken 200,000 Other
1992	Civil war (height of conflict)	2 million	Somalia	IDPs
1998	Conflict in Southern Coastal areas	25,000	South Somalia	10,000 Yemen
1999	Conflict	50,000	South Somalia	Kenya, Ethiopia IDPs (Mogadishu, North)
2000	Conflict	4,000	South Somalia	Kenya Other countries in region
2000	Drought	11,000	Bay, Bakool, Gedo	Kenya IDPs
2001	Conflict from establishment of TNG + Drought	25,000	Bay, Bakool, Gedo	Kenya Other countries in region Europe, US

### 3. Current migration trends

There are three types of factors that generate forced migration in Somalia:

*Natural disasters:* Somalia’s geographic location places it in a region featuring extreme climatic variability. Severe droughts occur in parts of Somalia on average every five years, as do severe flooding in riverine areas. Given Somalia’s variable climate, one factor which is very likely to create some level of population displacement in the next few years is a flood or severe drought. While Somalia’s rural populations of pastoralists and farmers both have well developed coping

mechanisms to survive such natural disasters, a combination of political insecurity, rangeland degradation, and privatization of watering holes and pasture (enclosures) is rendering both farming and pastoral communities more vulnerable to flood and drought events. Typically, victims of natural disasters in Somalia will relocate to wherever they believe relief is available, either to regional urban centres or across borders. How relief agencies target aid is thus a critical factor in determining population movement in natural disasters.

*Political crises:* The trend assessment suggests that political instability and armed clashes may continue to plague much of South Central Somalia in coming years, but that those political crises are likely to be localized in nature. This means that we can expect to see more of what occurred in the late 1990s –clashes which typically produce internal displacement in the hundreds or thousands, with IDPs relocating to the nearest safe town or city. War-induced displacement which yields refugees into Kenya or Ethiopia is not considered very likely, except for clashes and insecurity in the Juba regions from Kismayo to Gedo, where displaced populations can reach the Kenyan border with relative ease.

*Incremental crises:* Of equal concern are trends which appear to be creating conditions of increased vulnerability rendering some population groups more prone to displacement. All of the regional economies in Somalia are very vulnerable to both internal and external shocks (closure of remittance companies, hyperinflation, closure of borders, political crises) which could prompt population movements. The economy of pastoral households, which has suffered a persistent decline in terms of trade in livestock to dry rations, is leading more nomadic families to drift to urban areas, and renders remaining pastoralists more vulnerable to the effects of drought and livestock epidemics. Likewise, the reduced carrying capacity of rangeland, resulting from overgrazing and charcoal production, places pastoral households at greater risk of displacement when rains fail. Finally, the complete lack of basic services in many rural regions constitutes an additional impetus for households seeking access to education and health care to move to cities.

Population displacement and refugee flows in Somalia are affected by more positive factors as well. This is most dramatically in evidence in the high rates of displacement/migration of southern Somalis relocating to northern urban areas where economic prospects are good and security is better than in the south. Mogadishu also attracts a flow of migrants from the countryside despite its insecurity, as quality schools and other services are concentrated there. Positive factors which contribute to refugee flows into Kenya and elsewhere have in the past been limited to two: the immediate guarantee of food relief and shelter in the camps, and the prospects of transiting through Kenya or Yemen to a third country for work or asylum.

For the purposes of this country profile, we have divided groups into three different categories: refugees in the region (mainly in camps), Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and Somali Diaspora.

### **3.1. Refugees in the region and international resettlement**

Most Somali refugees are in a state of limbo, unable to locally integrate or return to their place of origin. Regionally, strict encampment policies have been introduced to restrict refugee mobility, preventing Somalis from accessing the informal labour market. Living conditions inside the camps are inhospitable and inappropriate for long-term re-settlements, and camps are frequently located in remote, semi-desert areas. Urban refugees are exposed to harassment, detention and discrimination, usually without recourse. There is limited documentation and statistics on urban refugees.

Table 2: Refugees in Neighbouring Countries as of May 2006 (source: UNHCR)

Host country	Number of refugees
Djibouti	9,800
Eritrea	3,621
Ethiopia	16,070
Kenya	137,733
Yemen	80,000
Uganda	1,618
<b>Total</b>	<b>248,656</b>

Of the above, it is estimated that around 200,000 refugees originate from South Central Somalia, particularly from Lower Juba, Middle and Lower Shabelle and Banadir regions.

According to the UNHCR Nairobi Hub Resettlement centre's figures from 2005, a total of 66,000 Somali refugees (from the camps in the region) have been re-settled to mainly Western countries since 1990 (mainly those belonging to minority groups, e.g. Bantu).

Table 3: Resettlement of refugees 1990-2005 (source UNHCR)

Receiving country	Percentage (total of 66,000)
USA	84%
Canada	7%
Australia	6%
other	3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>

UNHCR Somalia estimates that more of 1, 2 million individuals have returned to various regions in Somalia during the period 1990-2005 (UNHCR Returnee Monitoring data, 2004-2005). The authorities in Somaliland and Puntland are concerned that they lack the capacity to receive more returnees. In South Central, most returnees receive no assistance and find it difficult to reintegrate effectively, many live destitute alongside the urban poor and IDPs (also in Somaliland and Puntland).

Table 4: Region of destination for returnees 1990-2005 (source: UNCHR)

Region	Returnees
South Central	240,000
Puntland	150,000
Somaliland	680,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,070,000</b>

Ironically, there are more than 2,000 asylum seekers and refugees in Somaliland and Puntland. A few are from eastern and central Africa but the majority is from Ethiopia.

### **3.2. Internal displacement**

At the height of fighting in 1992, up to 2 million Somalis were internally displaced. By May 2006, UN estimates indicated that between 370,000 and 400,000 Somalis were internally displaced, most of them women and children. This is approximately 5 per cent of the Somali population (calculated at 7,73 mill).

The main causes of internal displacement have been the looting and destruction of food stocks, grazing lands, and trading roads. The destruction of the livelihoods of opposing clan factions has been a major instrument of the conflicts. The areas most affected have been in the south. Many IDPs come from the Bantu, Bajuni, and minority clans including the Rahanweyn. IDPs typically concentrate in urban areas such as Hargeisa (Somaliland), Bossaso (Puntland), and Mogadishu, where they mix with other indigent groups and refugees. They are typically located on the fringes of urban areas and are forced to make livelihoods through begging and casual work. As IDPs are dispersed amongst other groups, their living conditions are difficult to estimate. What evidence there is suggests high levels of under nourishment, disease, and vulnerability to human rights abuse. Most IDPs lack the protection of clans and effective social support. In reality, the de facto authorities throughout Somalia fail to protect the displaced and often divert humanitarian assistance intended for IDPs.

UN estimates indicate approximately 370,000-400,000 persons are internally displaced throughout Somalia, representing approximately 5% of the current total population (7,73 million according to UNDP estimates of November 2004).

Having lost their assets and livelihoods, social dislocation deprives IDPs of traditional support and social safety nets. This makes them vulnerable to discrimination and human rights violations. Many IDPs are from ethnic minority groups - Bantu, and Gaboye and tend to ghettoise in over-crowded slum areas on the periphery of urban centres. This is notable in Hargeisa, Bosaso, Boroma, Burao, Galkacayo, and Mogadishu.

Women, children and the elderly are the most vulnerable, constituting approximately 75% of the total IDP population. There are also a disproportionate number of female-headed households who rely on the economic contributions of women and young girls. Their social condition is precarious because of the security conditions in the settlements.

Land and property issues are the main obstacle for durable solutions for IDPs. The majority of IDPs are from rural, nomadic populations, forced to migrate to urban areas as a consequence of conflict and natural disaster. These IDPs live under horrendous conditions, frequently in destroyed and abandoned former government structures alongside the urban poor, non-integrated returnees and other vulnerable communities. Both Hargeisa and Bosaso host a disproportionately high number of IDPs, 40,000 and 60,000, respectively, without adequate protection and assistance schemes. Mogadishu, despite insecurity, has attracted the largest displaced population at an estimated 233,000-300,000.

The vast majority of IDPs live on privately-owned land where they pay approximately \$1.50-\$2 per month. Others squat in former government buildings which have been appropriated by militias, as is the case in South Central Somalia. Established authorities have little or no authority to adjudicate land reform or provide public space for IDPs and returnee use. As a result, IDPs and returnees living in these areas are vulnerable to harassment, extortion and eviction.

While many IDPs from minority clans did not own property before displacement, others were farmers in the fertile riverine area. Unable to use these skills, they frequently resort to casual labour and begging. Some men find employment in the construction sector whilst others work as craftsmen.

### **3.3. Somali Diaspora**

Refugees fleeing Somalia after 1988 added to the Somali migrant workers already living in the Gulf and Western Europe. In addition to the refugees who fled to Yemen, Djibouti, and Libya, there are now established communities of Somalis living in North America and Europe. In Europe, although the Scandinavian countries were the favoured destination for Somalis in the 1988-94 period, by the end of the decade the UK had vastly outstripped all other countries, accounting for 53 per cent of all Somali applicants to Europe, in 1999 some 7,000 individuals. By the fourth quarter of 2002 Somalia was the third-largest country of origin for asylum seekers to the UK. The presence in the UK of established Somali communities going back to the nineteenth century is an important factor in explaining migration patterns. Today, there are Somali communities in most of the UK's major cities.

According to the UNDP/WB Socio Economic Survey of 2002, Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world with an income per capita of US\$226. However, there have been significant (but unmeasured) private investments in commercial ventures, including in trade and marketing, money transfer services, transport, communications, airlines, telecommunications; other services including constructions and hotels, education and health; and fishery equipment, all largely funded by the large remittances from the Diaspora. Remittances have been estimated by the Macroeconomic Policy Framework and Data Development Draft Cluster report for the JNA (July 2006) to amount to at least US\$1 billion today, 71.4 % of the GNP. The Diaspora hence continues to play a key role in helping the Somali economy survive as well as in providing a main income for thousands of families in the country.

The flow of refugees and asylum seekers over the past two decades has however had a very negative effect on the human resources available in the country. The brain drain has become more evident now with the establishment of the TFIs and the realization of the extremely limited number of skilled and educated individuals available to join the civil services and the institutions in general and to contribute to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country.

In addition to legal refugees and asylum seekers, Somalia's prolonged crisis has triggered an enormous movement of its people abroad in search of employment. With an economy that is increasingly dependent on remittances, Somalia's chief export is now its own people and their labour. There are large flows of Somali illegal immigrants seeking entry into Gulf States (usually via Yemen), Europe (generally via North Africa), and also into states as far as South Africa and Australia. For some host countries, large numbers of Somali economic immigrants, mostly illegal, create social and political problems they are keen to avoid. Somali also acts as a conduit for Ethiopian and other illegal job seekers heading via Yemen to Gulf and other states.

Today, most Somalis leaving Somalia do so as economic migrants or as part of family reunification programs. Increasingly stringent asylum policies in Europe, and increased security restrictions on cross-border movements since the 9/11 attacks, have affected refugee movements. But because Somalia's economy is so heavily dependent on remittances, the outflow of Somali migrants is likely to remain strong even in the event a central government is re-established.

#### **4. Conclusion and way forward**

UNHCR continues to believe that repatriation to Somalia, and South Central Somalia in particular, is still not an option for the present. In a position paper from January 2004, UNHCR “considers that persons originating from southern Somalia are in need of international protection and objects to any involuntary return of rejected asylum-seekers to the area south of the town of Galkayo. Despite the fact that security, stability and governance prevail in Somaliland and to an increasing extent in Puntland, the conditions are not generally favourable for the forced return of large numbers of rejected asylum-seekers”.

The main challenges facing the return of refugees and IDPs in Somalia have been identified by the JNA draft cluster report on Livelihoods and Solutions for the Displaced (July 2006) as follows:

- Land and property issues are the main obstacle for durable solutions;
- Lack of livelihood opportunities;
- Insecurity;
- Lack of capacity by central and regional authorities;
- None existence of national monitoring and reporting framework;
- Lack of access to Basic social Services.

Although the political situation is far too volatile to predict today what the future will bring, one can expect for the trends in terms of refugees and Diaspora to continue for a number of years, even if the best case scenario of peace and development. The RDP is expected to put emphasis in creating the minimum basis for governance, security and economic development that would eventually allow for consideration of return. As part of this strategy and in the short and medium-term, re-integration of ex-combatants (estimated at between 60,000 and 80,000 individuals) will most likely take priority over the re-integration of refugees.

While solutions for IDPs are already being sought and will certainly be addressed in the immediate period as a humanitarian issue, attracting Diaspora professionals back to the country to contribute to the process of reconstruction remains a challenge for both the institutions and the international community supporting the process. Remittances are however expected to continue to play a key role in the economic development. Voluntary return, especially to South Central Somalia cannot be expected in the immediate future.

There are currently no administration led policy initiatives to manage migration. DDR is an important element of programmes in Somaliland and is currently managed by UNDP/ROLS.

## ANNEX 5

### The CSP drafting process

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#### 1. Organisation of the Drafting Process

The multi-annual strategy framework is an essential instrument of the EU contribution to the aid effectiveness agenda. For Somalia, the next multi-annual strategy, 2007 – 2013, translates into practice the commitments made at global level towards improving aid effectiveness through better dialogue between the EC and Somali counterparts, and between the EC and the EU Member States and other donors.

In line with these commitments, and the EC Consensus proposals for joint CSP preparation, the CSP has been prepared by the EC in cooperation with some EU Member States (Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Sweden and the UK) and Norway.

This multi-annual strategy builds on the analytic work of the comprehensive Joint Needs Assessment for Somalia which presents priorities for reconstruction and development, a process launched in September 2005 and completed in 2007.

A number of programming events were organised; the main ones are in the list attached.

The concept of joint programming and a joint multilateral strategy was introduced to EU Member States and other donors at a meeting organised on 10 May 2006. A working group was formed following confirmation of participation by Denmark, Finland, Italy, the UK and Norway in the programming process. France and Sweden were at first closely associated with the process but fully joined at a later stage. To manage and oversee the process, a CSP Drafting team was formed which met regularly at EU Development Counsellors meetings or at ad hoc meetings called by the European Commission. The members of this drafting team took forward the drafting process, the various annexes and the organisation of subsequent rounds of consultations.

In June and July 2006, the European Commission and several CSP partners made a presentation on the development of a broad-based multi-annual strategy to government, Parliament and Non State Actors in Somaliland and Puntland. This was essentially an information session to explain to Somali counterparts that the European Commission programmes its external assistance on the basis of a multi-annual strategy. It was further explained that the CSP is essentially a planning tool used to define the right policy mix and make sure that the most appropriate intervention sectors are selected over the medium term.

During the drafting process, it was agreed that the CSP should respond to the Reconstruction and Development Framework (RDF) which is a synthesis of the work done during the Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) process.

On 4-5 September 2006, the EC organised an internal workshop to agree on a common position vis-à-vis the response strategy. This was followed on 8-10 November 2006 by a workshop with all participating donors to agree on the main elements of a draft document.

In January 2007, a second round of joint RDP/CSP consultations was organised to share the main elements of both documents for information and discussion with Somali counterparts in Somaliland and Puntland. Consultations were held with the government, parliament and non state actors separately and in plenary. This was followed on 3 February 2007 by an informative meeting with TFG/TFP representatives in Baidoa.

The draft CSP was circulated widely to Member States in Nairobi and at Headquarters. The EC internal process of consultation included a Country Team Meeting in March 2007 and a one day Joint Programming Meeting in Brussels also in March 2007.

In November 2007, the reviewed CSP was presented again to all stakeholders (Executives, Parliaments and NSAs) in Puntland and Somaliland. The formal presentation of the reviewed CSP to the TFG is still pending. Although it was planned to held discussions at the beginning of December 2007, the crisis in the Government with the replacement of the Prime Minister has advised to postpone this exercise. However, the EC Special Envoy discussed the issue twice with the new Prime Minister, once in Baidoa on 29 November 2007 and a second time on 13 December 2007 during a joint meeting with the EU Heads of Mission in Nairobi. During these meetings, both the three CSP's pillars and the proposed "joint governance commitments" were explained.

The final draft has been prepared by the EC Somalia Operations Unit following the EC inter-service consultations. This draft was shared with the Member States represented at Nairobi at the beginning of April and approved by silence procedure.

## **2. Partnerships and Stakeholders**

The CSP Drafting team shared drafts of the response strategy with partners, UN Agencies, WB, international NGOs and Coordination of CISS. In Puntland and Somaliland, three constituencies were consulted in separate meetings; the government, the parliament and non state actors. The utilisation of the JNA and RDF documents, which result from broadly consultative processes, has strengthened the consultation process. The programming process was periodically discussed in monthly donors meetings: in particular at the EU Development Counsellors Group and at the Somalia Donor Group. Other donors such as USAID, China, Saudi Arabia and the Arab League were consulted in bilateral meetings.

## **3. Documentation**

The programming process specifically paid attention to utilising existing analytical work in order to avoid duplication and built on the evaluation of the Strategy for Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia (SISAS) in October 2005. In addition, the EC and Norway commissioned further studies where gaps were identified: the *Country Environmental Profile*; and a *Gender Profile*. A series of follow up studies on financing modalities were also commissioned by DfID.



Process	Timing
Informative Meeting on EU Consensus	27 April 2006
Informative Meeting on EU Africa Strategy	4 May 2006
Informative Meeting on EC/EU Commitments to aid effectiveness agenda	10 May 2006
Consultation with EU MS	May-June 2006
Deadline expression of Interest from EU MS	7 June 2006
First Round of Consultations: Mission to Puntland	19-22 June 2006
First Round of Consultations: Mission to Somaliland	10-12 July 2006
Informative Meeting on CSP Drafting Process for UN Agencies and International NGOs	4 August 2006
First Round of Consultations: in country consultations for Non State Actors in Mogadishu (managed by CRD on behalf of the European Commission)	12-13 August 2006
Draft Analysis	14 August 2006
Briefing Meeting with the National Technical Coordinator for EC/EU Assistance to Somalia - NATTCO	22 August 2006
Informative Meeting on CSP Drafting Process for SACB Sector Chairs	28 August 2006
Bilateral Meeting on CSP Drafting Process with Saudi Arabia Ambassador	30 August 2006
Internal Workshop on CSP Drafting Process	4-5 September 2006
Meeting with Somalia Donor Group	12 September 2006
CSP Mombassa Retreat	8-10 November
Follow up Dialogue with NATTCO at special EU Development Counsellors Meeting	17 November 2006
Meeting with UN Country Team	4 December 2006
Second Round of Consultations: Preparatory Mission to Somaliland	11 January 2007
Second Round of Consultations: Preparatory Mission to Puntland	16 January 2007
Second Round of Consultations: Mission to Somaliland	20-22 January 2007
Second Round of Consultations: Mission to Puntland	22-24 January 2007
First Round of Consultations: Technical Mission to Baidoa	3 February 2007
Country Team Meeting, Brussels	4 March 2007
Somalia Donor Joint Programming Meeting, Brussels	6 March 2007

## ANNEX 6

### Member States and Norway Review of Programmes, Progress from Past to Present Cooperation

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#### The European Commission

##### *Background*

As Somalia is not a signatory of the Cotonou Agreement, the Head of the EC Delegation in Nairobi has been entrusted by the ACP-EC Council with the role of National Authorising Officer (NAO). Following the closure of the EC Delegation in Somalia in June 1993, EC assistance has been managed by the Somalia Unit, now the EC Somalia Operations, integrated within the Delegation of the European Commission to Kenya in 1997.

The EC has established Field Offices in Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Garoowe and Baidoa, staffed by a Field Officer and a small local team varying in size to facilitate dialogue with the Somali authorities and to monitor programmes.

##### *Current Strategic Framework*

In August 2002, the European Commission adopted a “Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia 2002-2007” (SISAS) with the objective to contribute *to the alleviation of poverty* and *to the promotion of a more peaceful, equitable and democratic society*.

In early 2004, a Mid Term Review (MTR) took place to critically examine the validity of the EC’s strategic approach. In view of the uncertain political scene in Somalia, and drawing on lessons learnt from the implementation of consecutive Rehabilitation Programmes, the continuing validity of the dual objective of the 2002-2007 SISAS was recognised. However, the EC Delegation proposed that a more focused sector-oriented approach be adopted in order to achieve higher and better measurable impact, more in line with the Millennium Development Goals, while also taking into account new EU policy initiatives.

The shift identified three focal sectors and one non-focal sector, within the four *clusters of intervention* of the SISAS, allowing for greater coherence in the definition of strategy and the choice of interventions. Selected clusters were: a) governance and security; b) rural development and food security; and c) social services: education, health and water. Support towards rehabilitation of essential infrastructure, traditionally a sector of EC intervention, was curtailed.

In 2006 the End of Term Review (ETR) indicated that concentration had resulted in greater effectiveness, but advised to further reduce activities and focus on outcomes rather than on project level outputs, for greater focus on strategic aspects of programming and performance monitoring.

In order to respond to the outcome of the peace process, the EC introduced a criterion of “governance dividend” in the implementation of EC co-operation in order to promote the return of effective administration and good governance in Somalia. This remains an active element of the EC response strategy.

It has proved difficult to quantify programme outcomes and so it is difficult to show progress to the MDG. A challenge for the new programmes will be to ensure solid baselines for agreed outcome indicators and then the collection and analysis of data to show progress to the agreed

targets. A further challenge has been to respond to the low level of involvement of Somali institutions in all phases of the programming cycle -resulting from a number of factors chief of which has been weak institutional capacity.

### ***Cooperation Overview***

The 4<sup>th</sup> Rehabilitation Programme (€50 million) was the first EC funding implemented under the framework of the SISAS. During 2003 particular emphasis was placed on peace building and reconciliation, with major support being given to the Somali National Reconciliation Conference. Taking into account the continued uncertainty, the Strategy's in-built flexibility allowed the EC to adapt its response to an ever-evolving situation.

The 5<sup>th</sup> Rehabilitation Programme (€100 million) was signed in December 2003 and aimed to respond to specific needs in terms of the restoration of peace and governance and poverty reduction. Particular emphasis was placed on governance, education and access to safe water with continuing flexibility in the EC's approach to adapt interventions to the changes occurring in Somalia and significant regional variations.

The Somalia Recovery Programme (€70 million) has a focus on the re-establishment of democratic governance, reducing food insecurity, and access to basic services.

These envelopes have been complemented with co-financing from Italy and regular allocations from the thematic budget lines - De-mining, Decentralised Co-operation, the Special Framework of Assistance for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas, Food Security and Food Aid, NGO Co-financing and Humanitarian Assistance managed by ECHO.

### ***Programme funding and financing modalities***

Having considered the difficult operating environment in Somalia in 2004 EC agreed to a request for a "crisis situation" to be declared allowing for direct agreements in "exceptional and duly justified cases", stressing that Calls for Proposals for grant contracts should be utilized where possible and that the decision would apply for four month periods, subject to reviews on the basis of an implementation report. This 'crisis' situation has continued and the mechanism of Calls for Proposals allowed several Direct Agreements with International NGOs and UN agencies making possible rapid responses to the positive developments in the peace process and other development activities.

## **Italy**

### ***Background***

Italian Cooperation with Somalia is financed through multilateral funds (to UN agencies and the EC under the co-financing scheme); emergency funds (UN agencies and NGOs); and co-funding to Italian NGOs (*Progetti Promossi*).

Funding is allocated yearly. In 2005, a total of €15.5 million were allocated and disbursed, including €2.1 million under the EC co-financing scheme; and as of 30 June 2006, €7.6 million had been disbursed, of which €4.8 million under the EC co-financing scheme.

### ***Current Strategic Framework***

Italy supports and participates in all coordination mechanisms, in particular the CISS, the Somalia Donor Group (SDG), and the Coordination and Support Group (CSG) of the Joint Needs Assessment. Adhering to the principles of the European Consensus and the Strategy

for Africa, Italy has worked in close coordination with the EC and the other EU Member States.

Since the inception of the current peace process, Italy has supported its steady advancement towards the re-establishment of sustainable governance framework in Somalia based on a shared regional agreement. At the end of the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference held in Kenya, Italy has provided substantive support aimed at the establishment of basic TFIs infrastructure. In order to advance the peace process on the ground, Italy acted in all relevant international *fora* with the aim of helping the agreed outcome of the SNRC to be rooted throughout the territory of Somalia and ensure that political dialogue was to take place within the framework of the TFIs so as to better reconcile differences. Following political developments in early 2006, Italy has strongly supported the inception and continuation of dialogue, supporting facilitation efforts by the League of Arab States, with the aim of focussing dialogue on a clear agenda which would drive the peace process forward by extending the methods of reconciliation and inclusivity to the new reality emerged in the capital and its environs.

### ***Cooperation Overview***

Interventions are spread evenly throughout Somalia, with most projects having countrywide coverage. Significant investments have aimed at fostering peace and reconciliation and promoting district level dialogue. In the health sector, interventions mostly focussed on the delivery of essential health services to vulnerable groups and support to hospitals in the areas most affected by conflict.

Italy also supports the health sector in Somalia through its contributions to the Global Fund and coordination within the framework of CISS Health Sector Committee. In the education sector, Italian Cooperation has promoted access to primary education, teacher training, rehabilitation of school buildings and provision of teaching materials. In recent years, initiatives were also carried out to establish and support technical schools and foster tertiary education and specialised training.

Italian Cooperation has paid particular attention to training of farmers and veterinary assistants. Somalia's economy being predominantly rural, development activities in the agricultural and livestock sectors are an important component of Italian Cooperation, with projects focusing on irrigation channels construction and maintenance, distribution of high quality seeds, technical training, diversification of agricultural products, improvement of food security and control of animal diseases.

### ***Programme funding and financing modalities***

Considering an aggregate of 2005 and 2006 programmes, excluding the EC co-financing funds, most funds (37% of total allocated funds) were in support of humanitarian interventions; governance (21% of allocated funds) and education and health (17 and 16% respectively).

A significant proportion of humanitarian interventions has been funded as a response to the annual Consolidated Appeal Process - CAP - of the United Nations (around €5-6 million per year), but *ad hoc* funds were also provided to address humanitarian interventions (Tsunami and drought in 2005 and 2006).

WFP, UNDP and UNICEF have received the largest contributions in the past two years. Italian NGOs, who have proven to be a crucial driving force for the implementation of development cooperation activities in Somalia, are supported through emergency funds (mostly in the health sector), under the co-financing scheme and by co-funding with other

donors. Rural development (including components of food security and water and sanitation), health and education are the main sectors in which Italian NGOs participate.

Funds in the governance sector increased dramatically after the establishment of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and will continue to grow both through direct contributions to the governance sector and by mainstreaming institution building and technical assistance principles in interventions carried out in other sectors.

## **Finland**

### *Background*

Implementation of Finnish Development Assistance to Somalia is managed by the Africa Department in Helsinki. Finnish Assistance is mostly humanitarian in nature and is provided on an annual basis under the joint management of the Africa Department Humanitarian Aid Unit and the Embassy of Finland in Nairobi.

### *Cooperation Overview*

Historically and particularly in the 1980's, Finland had considerable cooperation with Somalia. At that time Finnish assistance was mainly concentrated in health sector within which tuberculosis prevention was a major focus. During the last five years, Finland has provided an average of €1 million a year of mainly humanitarian assistance.

As Somalia's situation has been so fragile and vulnerable to political and other shocks, Finland has not developed a special development strategy for Somalia, but considers it important to underpin its cooperation within the framework of the EU Africa Strategy, this Country Strategy and the European Consensus.

### *Programme funding and financing modalities*

The Finnish Government has allocated funds for humanitarian aid in 2006 through multilateral aid to WFP (€500,000), UNDSS (€200,000), WHO (€500,000) and for de-mining through the HALO trust (€200,000). Development projects mainly implemented by Finnish NGOs have been funded from the Fund for NGO-Budget (€284 277). Currently Finland does not have specific budget allocations for Somalia and as a result programme support is allocated annually.

A total of €1,593,118 and €1,684,277 were allocated in 2005 and 2006 respectively, mainly in health and nutrition (€505,400); governance (€433,860); de-mining and education €101,360.

Most projects are countrywide and implemented through UN agencies (€870,200), Somaliland is a major recipient of total funding (€478,724), followed by South Central Somalia (€190,194) and Puntland (€44,000).

## **The UK Department for International Development (DfID)**

### *Background*

Having had a close association with Somalia since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when British Somaliland became a British protectorate, the UK continued to support post-independence Somalia with a modest bilateral aid programme. In 1991 that programme was suspended following the civil war. Between then and 2003, UK assistance via DfID and its predecessor prior to 1997 –the Overseas Development Administration- focused mainly on humanitarian responses to the effects of natural disasters and conflict. Between 1991 and 2002, the UK assistance, worth a

total £70 million, focused on emergency health, water and sanitation, agriculture, and supplementary feeding activities implemented via UN and NGO partners. A contribution was also made towards cost sharing of EU/UN programmes. DfID's global Civil Society Challenge Fund supported NGOs interventions in the field of peace building, integrated health, training and education and agro-pastoral development.

However, all of this assistance focused on reacting to Somalia's continuing crises, in the form of short-term humanitarian or social sector initiatives. This has changed since 2003. With the prospect of a return to stable governance, the approach has moved towards strategic preparation for recovery currently set out in a 2004 Country Engagement Plan. Although humanitarian relief still takes a large share of DfID expenditure. Given the sensitive and highly political nature of Somalia's emergence from conflict, DfID's involvement has been closely co-ordinated with other parts of the UK Government. A broad British strategy towards the country, underpins individual departmental objectives e.g. on foreign relations, development, immigration and security. Britain's overall goal is a peaceful, politically stable and economically viable Somalia leading to a sustainable reduction in poverty levels.

DfID's assistance to Somalia is currently managed by Africa Equatorial Department's Horn Unit (4 programme staff plus 2 full-time and 7 shared professional advisers) in DfID London. This team is supported by 2 programme staff, a Human Development Adviser and a Regional Humanitarian Adviser in DfID's Nairobi, Kenya office. Political issues are covered from London by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, with a full time Counsellor in Nairobi and an Addis Ababa-based Second Secretary on Somaliland issues. With no representation in Somalia, the UK relies heavily on close co-operation with the EC, UN agencies, NGOs and other bilateral donors for country situation updates. DfID monitors its bilateral aid through regular reports, coordination bodies and country visits. DfID supports various coordination mechanisms such as the Somalia Donor Group, the Inter Agency Steering Committee and the Stockholm-endorsed joint Co-ordination and Monitoring Committee (CMC) mechanisms.

#### *Current Strategic Framework*

DfID's Country Engagement Plan for Somalia, developed in 2004, has three main objectives:

- To help achieve a just and viable political settlement;
- To work with others to establish the basis for effective development assistance, with an initial focus on improving governance and service delivery; and
- To ensure timely provision of humanitarian relief.

To deliver these objectives, DfID:

- Works with other UK Government Departments, the EU, the AU and the UN, to help achieve, establish and consolidate a sustainable political settlement;
- Works with other members of the international community to improve the co-ordination and effectiveness of development and humanitarian assistance;
- When possible, channels development and humanitarian assistance through, or jointly with, other stakeholders (multilateral donors, UN agencies, or major international NGOs);
- Ensures its approach is flexible, and focuses on areas where the UK can add particular expertise or understanding.

In line with the 2005 Stockholm Declaration of Principles, DfID is committed to preserve and support existing areas of tranquillity, e.g. Somaliland and Puntland.

The second objective recognises the need to improve co-ordination of development assistance. DfID works with other donors and UN agencies to achieve this through the Somali Support Secretariat and other mechanisms. Since 2005, DfID and the World Bank

have facilitated the piloting in Somalia of the OECD DAC's Principles for Engagement in Fragile States. Much of DfID's funding is allocated after consultation with other donors to UN or NGO programmes, and, most recently, via multi-year strategic partnership agreements with UNICEF and UNDP for support to governance and education.

### ***Cooperation Overview***

*Governance:* DfID works with its partners to help the emergence of a viable state in Somalia, including the continued development of stable institutions in Somaliland and Puntland. After modest support to the 2002-2005 National Reconciliation Conference, DfID directed funding to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) which emerged from it, grass-roots peace building and reconciliation efforts. DfID's support has included £2.5 million (€3,675,000) to UNDP Somalia Institutional Support Programme (SISP) to develop the physical and institutional capacity, and key functions of the TFIs; £0.5 million (€735,000) to UN Habitat to build capacity for urban planning in local administrations; £ 0.15 million (€220,000) to HornAfrik Media for the development of media in Somalia through journalist training; and £0.5 million (€735,000) to the Interpeace-implemented Somali Democratisation Programme, which funded the successful parliamentary elections in Somaliland in 2005.

DfID is currently supporting the development of public financial management capacity in Somalia, regarded as crucial to the development and potential growth of the country. The support will be mainly through UNDP programmes. DfID has also supported UNDP's work on Somali remittance companies which has helped to bring them together with wider global financial institutions. DfID is considering how to support private sector development, financial institutions strengthening and revenue raising potential.

Most of these activities are co-funded with the EC, other EU Member States and Norway, and some will be financed via an initial £5 million (€7,350,000) 18-month DfID/UNDP Strategic Partnership to ensure continuity, co-ordination and macro-management of funds.

*Security and stabilisation:* DfID's has contributed £0.5 million (€735,000), with a further £1.5 million (€2,200,000) contribution to the UNDP's Rule of Law Programme for judiciary, prisons and the development of a TFG-endorsed police strategy and action plan for the re-establishment of the Somali police service.

DfID led calls for, and partially funded, development of a National Security and Stabilisation Plan as the framework for co-ordinating the security sector and external support. Its £0.725 million (€1,050,000) worth contribution to Interpeace's Dialogue for Peace programme has allowed grass-roots civil society and public debate on stabilisation and governance.

*Humanitarian assistance:* DfID has been funding some humanitarian work in the worst affected areas through MSF, ICRC, and IMC. In 2005/06, £15.6 million (€23,000,000) was committed to humanitarian assistance, including de-mining and peace building activities. In late 2005, at the onset of the Horn of Africa drought, DfID committed an additional £11.8 million (€17,350,000) for emergency humanitarian assistance.

The ongoing humanitarian programme includes projects such as:

- Health and nutrition through Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), IMC, Gedo Health Consortium in Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Middle and Lower Juba and Mogadishu
- Food Aid through WFP and ICRC
- Protection through ICRC and UNHCR
- Water and sanitation through ICRC

*Socio-economic recovery:* DfID has deepened its support to the social sectors by increasing allocations to education and health over longer periods. This includes pan-Somali support through UN agencies and NGOs, largely benefiting those areas which have achieved stability and improved governance.

In this area, DfID provides support to:

- HIV/AIDS prevention with UNDP/UNAIDS and others (£1.2 million - €1,430,000)
- Gedo Health consortium (£ 0.29 million - €197,000)
- WHO immunisation (£0.64 million - €436,000)
- UNESCO SUPERP II Upper Primary Textbooks Programme (£0.5million - €340,000)
- World Bank Community Driven Recovery Programme (£0.950 million - €650,000)
- AET's Hargeisa Examinations Centre Project (£1.1 million - €750,000)
- Save the Children Basic Education Hiran (£1.4 million -€950,000)
- UNICEF/UNESCO's national education programme (£6 million over 3 years - €4,090,000)
- National employment and economic recovery through the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (£3 million €2,050,000)

*Programme funding and financing modalities*

Expenditure (see table below) increased from £3.1million (€3,450,000) in 2002/2003 to £18.8 million (€27,575,000) in 2005/6 and should continue to rise as donor confidence in stability, governance and absorption capacity grows. Current plans propose a budget of £21million (€30,805,000) by 2007/08. As a principal donor to the Joint Needs Assessment and Reconstruction and Development Framework process, DfID sees the latter as the basis for donor financing in the future.

DfID Disbursements 2000/01 to 2005/06<sup>1</sup>£ thousands

Year	PRBS	Other financial aid	Technical cooperation	Grants and other aid in Kind	Humanitarian assistance	DfID debt relief	Total DfID bilateral programme
2000/01	n/a	17	11	218	1,235	n/a	1,480
2001/02	n/a	16	92	55	1,575	n/a	1,739
2002/03	n/a	16	8	180	2,920	n/a	3,124
2003/04	n/a	15	12	781	3,165	n/a	3,973
2004/05	n/a	14	n/a	2,263	3,043	n/a	5,320
2005/06	n/a	13	59	3,092	15,589	n/a	18,753

*DfID-UNDP Strategic Partnership:* in July 2006, DfID and the UNDP signed a strategic partnership initiative worth £5m (€7,330,000) over an initial 18 months period. The goal of the Partnership is the achievement of reconciliation, stability and improved governance and rule of law in Somalia. In order to achieve this goal, DfID will invest in the following outcomes for Somalia:

- i) State building: Functioning state capacities at federal, state and regional/local level for policy making, planning and oversight, including adoption and initial implementation of early recovery strategies
- ii) Constitution: Constitution, reconciliation and national governance processes and electoral system founded on democratic principles

<sup>1</sup> Source: Statistics on International Development 2000/01 – 2005/06: National Statistics



- iii) Rule of law and Security: Rule of law, access to justice and security strengthened with competent civilian police force, judiciary and custodial corps in compliance with international human rights standards.

*DfID-UNICEF/UNESCO Strategic Partnership:* DfID has recently agreed a 3-year £6 million (€8,750,000) partnership agreement with UNESCO and UNICEF, which aims to strengthen education systems, increase access to schools and reduce and eventual abolish user fees. The partnership focuses strongly on girls' education including increasing access and enrolment.

*UNAIDS:* DfID supported UNAIDS in scaling up a national response to HIV/AIDS by providing financial backing to 3 zonal HIV/AIDS Commissions in Somaliland, Puntland and South Central. These Commissions have agreed to work together in harmonising an effective 'Somali' approach. This signifies a breakthrough in a country where zonal divisions have caused continued unrest.

*Aid instruments:* DfID cooperation is framed by the Paris Declaration on alignment and co-ordination of policies and harmonisation of procedures. Pool-funded and partnership programmes through UN agencies and International NGOs are used to overcome the absence of strong government institutions. DfID also supports the annual Humanitarian Consolidated Appeal which uses a Common Humanitarian Action plan based on consultation between operational agencies led by the UN and donors. Much of DfID support is co-financing with EC and other donors of UN-implemented projects/programmes. A significant part of the DfID budget is specific to Somaliland whose stability, democracy and general progress attract a "peace dividend".

## ANNEX 7

**Table including Somalia positions in relation to key international conventions**

### UNITED NATIONS

<i>Instrument</i>	<i>Status</i>	<i>Date of signature</i>	<i>Date of receipt of instrument by the UN</i>	<i>Date of entry into force</i>
CAT-Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	Accession	--	23/02/90	24/01/90
CAT-OP-Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	No Action	--	--	--
CCPR-International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	Accession	--	24/04/90	24/01/90
CCPR-OP1-Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	Accession	--	24/04/90	24/01/90
CCPR-OP2-DP-Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	No Action	--	--	--
CED-Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance	No Action	--	--	--
CEDAW-Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	No Action	--	--	--
CEDAW-OP-Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	No Action	--	--	--
CERD-International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination	Ratification	26/01/67	25/09/75	26/08/75
CESCR-International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	Accession	--	24/01/90	24/04/90
CMW-International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families	No Action	--	--	--

CPD-Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	No Action	--	--	--
CPD-OP-Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	No Action	--	--	--
CRC-Convention on the Rights of the Child	Signature only	09/05/2002	--	--
CRC-OP-AC-Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict	Signature only	16/09/2005	--	--
CRC-OP-SC-Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children child prostitution and child pornography	No Action	--	--	--

## REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS

<i>Instrument</i>	<i>Status</i>	<i>Date of signature</i>	<i>Date of receipt of instrument by the UN</i>	<i>Date of entry into force</i>
With respect to <b>Member States of the African Union:</b>				
African Charter on Human and People's Rights	--	20/03/86	--	--
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights	--	--	--	--
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa	--	--	--	--
African Charter on Rights and Welfare of the Child	--	06/91	--	--
With respect to <b>Member States of the Arab League:</b>				
Arab Charter on Human Rights	--	--	--	--

## **ANNEX 8**

### **Debt Sustainability Analysis**

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At the end of 1989, Somalia's external debt was estimated at \$1,774 million, almost twice the value of GDP or nearly 30 times the value of merchandise exports. Of the total debt outstanding, 47% was owed to multilateral institutions. In May 1988, with arrears of SDR27 million (\$33 million, 54% of quota) and no prospects for an agreement on an economic programme in sight, the Executive Board of the IMF declared Somalia ineligible to use Fund resources. The undrawn balance of IDA credits with the World Bank was also frozen.

From 1990 to 2006, as a result of significant arrears on past debt-servicing obligations, the lack of a fully functional national government, and the unstable security situation, Somalia neither borrowed nor serviced its public debt. The NPV of the total debt stock is \$ 2.97 billion. Somalia remains at pre-decision point for HIPC.

Total official development assistance (ODA) to Somalia has been rising slowly but steadily in recent years, with actual expenditure in 2004 reaching \$222 million (\$30 per capita).

## ANNEX 9

### Executive summary of the Gender Profile for Somalia

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#### 1. Introduction

A comprehensive Country Gender Profile (CGP) was commissioned as part of the preparation of the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for Somalia in order to ensure that issues and challenges associated with gender are taken into account and mainstreamed in the programmes. The full CGP document, of which this is a brief summary, forms one of the CSP supporting documents.

The CGP provides information on the following areas:

- Whether there are specific issues for Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia that need to be taken into account and the implications of this for gender programming;
- Different roles for the different groups of women – urban, peri-urban, pastoralists, agriculturists etc. the challenges and opportunities that can be identified;
- Clan organisation and lines of conflict in a gender perspective;
- Conflict prevention, security, protection, reconciliation, reconstruction and peace building: Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security;
- Female combatants or former combatants and women who are in other ways affiliated with combatant groups;
- Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) from a gender perspective;
- Gender-based violence and sexual abuse, addressing ways to enhance protection from such violence;
- Review of the traditional role/ position of women in Somali society and the actual/ possible impact of different levels/types of Islamic authority, including the current trend of Islamisation in parts of Somalia;
- Rights issues (CEDAW convention) –taking in particular account of the different legal systems applied, transitional justice systems, rule of law initiatives and the barriers/opportunities they represent to women;
- Female Genital Mutilation and or Female Genital Cutting (FGM/FGC) and women’s sexual and reproductive rights and health; spread and variation of practices, impact on women’s position, particulars of the practice that may help identify strategies for its eradication;
- Barriers to equal and non-discriminatory access to services and strategies to address these –education, health, water, information, family planning, business/credit and employment;
- Formal and informal barriers and opportunities to political representation and participation (power and decision making) at various levels;
- A bibliography on gender in the Islamic world;

#### 2. Impact of the war on Gender Roles and Responsibilities

Women’s gender roles have been stretched beyond traditional limits to meet the new domestic, social and economic needs of the family and local community. Many women are now taking the main role in domestic decision-making and working in whatever way they can to provide an income for their families, even where men are present in the household. Women have been at the forefront of emergency care and social recovery efforts at community level, often playing active public roles to influence and mobilise support. Women’s organisations and women-led organisations have mushroomed since 1991 (as have non-state actor organisations of all kinds). Individually and collectively women have, with some notable successes, fulfilled their customary peace-building role, using their multiple relationships

within the clan system of social organisation to influence the traditional power structures, militia and course of certain conflicts in the war.

Men's gender roles have tended to contract since the war along with their responsibility for the family upkeep. Overall men remain in control of the political domain and women remain excluded but men have reduced economic and decision-making power in the home. Many men are no longer the family breadwinner instead they are now financially dependent on their kinswomen, a situation that would normally be shameful in Somali society. Often men, who have been the main target of killings throughout the war, have failed to be able to fulfil their traditional responsibilities as their family's protector. Unknown numbers have had to flee their families and or been forced to watch loved ones endure rape and other horrendous sexual violations carried out in the name of war.

## **2. Gender-based violence – A feature of the war, and its consequences**

Gender-based violence has been a significant feature of the war in which customary conventions to protect women and children and preserve human dignity have been violated. Women and girls have been targeted for rape, abduction and sexual slavery as well as more recently, clan-related revenge killings<sup>1</sup>.

Men and boys have been the target of systematic and extensive clan-related killings, threatened with death and torture, coerced to participate in militia groups, forced at gunpoint to perpetrate and to witness rape and other sexual violations against women and girls.

Boy children have been co-opted or coerced into taking up arms as part of the various armed factions that have operated throughout the course of the war.

The full impact of these experiences is yet to be understood but the immediate impact has included:

- Widespread break-up and displacement of families;
- Loss of male providers and male labour;
- Destruction of homes, loss of household resources;
- Collapse of community resources such as health centres and schools rendering women more vulnerable to chronic economic and food insecurity i.e. Increasing feminisation of poverty;
- Decreased mobility for women and girls in some areas affecting access to firewood and water, fields for cultivation, livestock, services, support networks, and employment opportunities;
- Curtailment of male mobility at times in some areas;
- A lucrative business in human trafficking run from Bosaso;

## **3. Key Gender Issues and Challenges**

Although some changes to gender roles have occurred, the basic values attached to gender identities remain unchanged. Women and girls continue to be considered legal minors (in customary law) and generally inferior to men and boys.

Outside the household there has been little, if any, transformation in the gendered dimensions of social institutions such as the clan. Despite their increased economic role, their valued peace-building strategies and contributions to clan activities women have not gained membership of community or clan institutions involved in political decision-making.

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<sup>1</sup> Reported in Gender Profile of the Conflict in Somalia, UNIFEM

For some women, but by no means all, the war's impact has resulted in empowerment and new, welcomed opportunities. A question confronting those concerned with gender equity in Somalia is how to consolidate and build on those changes in gender roles that can be identified as positive in order to further empower women and reshape Somali gender ideologies towards a more gender-equitable society? A real fear, based on women's post-war experiences elsewhere, is that the 'acceptable' space for women will contract as men seek to restore the pre-war status quo and once again define women's niche as within the home.

The existing gender ideology remains within which politics and peace-making are exclusively male domains. During internationally sponsored peace processes in which men have asserted women's right to participate women have been nevertheless consistently excluded from key discussions and have had little or no say in what is effectively the creation of a new vision of Somali society.

War and state collapse has stripped women of the considerable legal and political gains made during the years after Independence. Since 1991 the re-emergence of customary law, the extended use of *shari'a* law and resort to clan-based forms of political representation has meant women have been virtually excluded from the political and judicial structures that have emerged in different parts of the country. Somali customary law recognises the rights of men but limits the rights of women. *Shari'a* law offers women far greater justice but can only be administered by men; in practice it is reportedly often misapplied in the interests of men. Women are disadvantaged by their lack of education and poor knowledge of the *Quran*. Hence, as long as male dominated clan politics prevails, women will be marginalized due to the gendered nature of the clan system that guarantees the loyalty of its male members but not its female members.

Women's desire to be taken seriously as political players is undermined by the scarcity of women who have the time, resources and forbearance to attempt a career in politics in addition to the clan loyalty dimension, by the social prejudice, held by both women and men that views women as intellectually inferior to men and thus unsuitable for politics. Where women have been afforded the right to participate equally, as in Somaliland's three-party election process, very few women came forward to stand for election, the male-dominated parties did not prioritise women candidates and the voters, the majority of whom were women, chose not to vote for women candidates.

UNSC Resolution 1325 remains unfulfilled in Somalia's case. The absence of precise objectives in relation to transforming the position of women at the political level suggests international sponsors of Somali politics have yet to demonstrate a serious commitment to Somali women's political rights and aspirations.

Female literacy in Somalia is among the lowest in the world. Improving female literacy is an essential step towards addressing women's political exclusion and their disempowerment by the various male dominated, male controlled judicial systems that operate in different parts of the country. Male literacy is also among the lowest in the world yet significantly more boys than girls are afforded education. Access to education is harder than ever for girls whose mothers are the family breadwinner. Older daughters typically find they are unable to start or continue school because their domestic labour is needed at home to replace their mother's. This tends to hold true even if there is an idle but able adult male in the household.

The impact of the war on the male population has so far received minimal attention. Little is understood about how men and boys' fates and opportunities are circumscribed by their gender identity. There are those whose interests are served by the war (just as it also serves the interests of some women) but many more have lost the means to fulfil their traditional gender roles of provider and protector – the roles that underpin their status and identity in

society. Evidence suggests that these men and boys are not stepping into alternative, traditionally female roles so as to help the family and ease the burden on the women and girls.

Those concerned about gender issues in Somalia need to consider the different needs of the male population and how can they be addressed. What are the alternative male role models for Somali boys and male youth emerging from the war? How far are they influenced by globalisation and the war on terror? Is an alternative, new vision of the Somali man being generated or will the traditional man that partly measures his influence through his control over women prevail?

#### **4. Key Gender Benchmarks and Indicators by Sector**

##### *Deepening peace, improving security and establishing good governance*

###### Benchmarks

- Public elections are held in which women and men can vote
- Women have the right to participate in politics on an equal basis with men
- Women make up a significant part of government, local and national
- Women are represented in the leadership level of political parties
- Quotas for women are introduced (as affirmative action) or maintained and improved, or replaced with a system that better ensures women's representation in government
- Women are free to form and belong to non-state actor organisations concerned with political and public issues

###### Indicators

- Affirmative actions are taken to increase women's representation in government e.g. removal of all forms of cultural discrimination against women, voter education, higher quotas for women, support for effective campaigning by women and men concerned with gender equity in politics.
- Greater numbers of aspirant women politicians emerge and are visible in national and local government.
- Government finances activities to make equity in politics a reality.
- Political parties develop positive pro-equity policy enabling more women candidates to be nominated.
- At election time women candidates are placed higher up the lists of political parties than to date.
- Women's political and umbrella organisations develop a common analysis and agenda for women's rights in politics and provide successful leadership and advocacy on the issue.
- Pro-women and politics coverage by the in-country media.
- Women continue to be active in the NGO sector.

##### *Investing in people by improving equitable access to affordable and sustainable social services: education, water and sanitation*

###### Education

###### Benchmarks

- Education policies and budgets address girls' access to education;
- Free primary education for girls and boys;
- Girls and boys enrolment figures reach parity and continue to rise;
- Affirmative policy and actions taken to increase female literacy levels



## Indicators

- Policy documents and implementation reports demonstrate affirmative policies have been made and actions have been taken to increase girls enrolment and retention rates, such as fee reduction, more women teachers, single sex classes, address family income issues, introduce flexible teaching hours and term times, parental advocacy especially with mothers;
- Statistics indicate higher enrolment / lower drop-out figures for girls;
- Teacher training colleges report more women teacher trainees;
- School statistics show more female teachers in schools;
- Parents, pupils, watch-dog organisations and others report reduced complaints by girls of discrimination and other harassment in the classroom and that girls and boys receive an equal level of encouragement and educational opportunity;
- Statistics show the mean /median age of marriage (urban & rural) stays at or near 20 for females and 25 for males.

## Health

### Benchmarks

- The Maternal mortality rate drops -as women have better access to better resourced and staffed health and referral services, family planning methods, and female literacy increases;
- Household income increases making choices around health care less difficult and less likely to discriminate against women and girls;
- FGM rates drop.

## Indicators

- More and better health services catering for women's needs are available;
- More midwives and nurses are trained and working;
- The number of gynaecologists increases, including an increase in females;
- Training of Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) improves their knowledge and practices related to hygiene and emergency referral;
- TBAs, Mother and Child Health centres and hospitals are linked and operate a referral system for pregnancy-related cases.

## *Poverty reduction and the consolidation of peace through sustainable and equitable economic growth*

### Benchmarks

- A reversal of the increasing feminisation of rural poverty;
- Rural women participate in consultation and planning processes concerning developments in their areas;
- Developments in rural areas for economic growth are not detrimental to women's relationship with the rural economy, ownership of property, land, produce, or access to markets;
- Loan conditions set out by financial and credit institutions do not advertently or inadvertently discriminate against women;
- More women and men have more secure incomes;
- Any engineering of the remittance economy takes place without jeopardising the benefits ordinary women currently gain through household to household remittances.

## Indicators

- Improvements in female literacy & school enrolment for the rural areas;
- Policies demonstrate the needs & interests of rural women have been taken into account and are catered;
- Policies and planned initiatives concerning Natural Resource Management (NRM) e.g. charcoal & frankincense production take account of women's role in NRM and their dependency on the rural economy;
- Women trained and/or working in the rural areas as extension workers, health workers, rural development practitioners;
- Livelihood options available to poor rural women expand rather than contract;
- Women's organisations, financial and credit institutions report women's access to credit and loans has improved;

Gender disaggregated statistics show:

- No decrease in women's property ownership;
- Women's control or shared control over expenditure decisions has remained or increased;
- Women petty traders report better access to the kind of support (financial and other) they need to break out of the subsistence level poverty they are experiencing;
- Women report continued access to financial support through the remittance economy;
- Money transfer agencies report no decrease in the number of women receivers of household to household remittances.

## **5. Monitoring Women's Rights in Somalia**

Whatever the ideology of 'government' in Somalia understanding and monitoring women's rights is an essential part of gender-aware programming and will provide a valuable picture of human rights, social, political and economic trends. The full Gender Profile document contains a proposed Women's Rights Monitoring Tool for Somalia. This framework takes articles from the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), describes the normative situation in 2006, suggests possible benchmarks for target setting and identifies possible Indicators for monitoring purposes.

## ANNEX 10

### The role of the Somali clan system

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The challenges facing Somalia, and in particular those relating to efforts to establish and build governance, cannot be addressed without some understanding of basic clan structures and dynamics and their central role in shaping the social, political and economic landscape.

#### I. Introduction : clan structure

With the brief exception of the administrative structures established in the colonial period and the ensuing, highly centralized and progressively autocratic state apparatus which collapsed in 1991, the Somali people have not historically espoused a governance system predicated on a nation-state. Rather, the pre-eminent focus of the social, legal, political and economic organization of the Somali nation has been and remains the clan, itself an agglomerate of extended family and lineage groupings.

The *jiffo*, the smallest social unit with a distinct geographical and juridical identity, consists of several *reer* (groupings of closely related nuclear families), and can be loosely defined as comprising all the descendants of the same great-grandfather. The *jiffo* collectively guarantees the security of its members, the payment of bride prices and compensation for minor violations of customary law (*xeer*). Compensation for major crimes (particularly payment of the blood price or *diya*) and protection against greater security threats require a larger collective, the *jilib*, consisting of several *jiffos* tracing their descent from a common ancestor. The *jilib*, in everyday parlance generally referred to as a “sub-sub-clan,” is the core unit of the Somali political and customary legal system. Related *jilibs* themselves combine into larger lineage groups, and so on up to clan level. Clans descended from the same distant ancestor are identified as a “clan family” (*xolo*). The four major Somali clan families, each comprising well over a million members, are the Darod, the Hawiye, the Dir and the Digil-Mirifle. It is the power and resource-sharing relationships between these *xolos* and among their sub-clans that primarily determine the viability of governance systems in Somalia. The collapse of the state in 1991 was directly attributable to the increasingly hegemonic dominance of the state apparatus by Siad Barre’s Darod/Marehan clan and its allies and clients.

#### II. The clans as actors in conflict

The 2005 World Bank report “Conflict in Somalia: Drivers & Dynamics” sees clannism and related disputes over territory and resources as the major factors driving conflict in Somalia. Localized conflicts can be and are regularly solved through traditional, clan-based mechanisms through the intervention of clan elders and the *xeer* (customary legal) system, which based on the concept of group liability and compensation (see section I above). However, the authority of these traditional mechanisms has been undermined in recent years by warlordism, particularly in southern Somalia, where the collapse of the state in 1991 in a heavily militarized environment allowed a number of strongmen to establish personal control of local fiefs providing revenues from charcoal, drugs and other products, arbitrary taxation of trade and commercial infrastructure (particularly ports and airports) and extortion of the population (roadblocks). No Somali can live outside the clan, and these warlords rely on

militia from their own sub-clans for protection and enforcement, although they also generally challenge and undermine the traditional authority of their clan elders.

At the other end of the scale, the long-running border dispute between the autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland can be understood as a “super-clan” conflict exacerbated by *sui generis* political and economic factors. The disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag, claimed by Somaliland on the grounds that they were part of the former British Protectorate, are home to Darod clans with kinship ties to the population of Puntland, who are unrelated to the Dir *xolo* to which the vast majority of Somaliland’s population belong. The situation is further complicated by economic rivalry for control of the reportedly significant natural gas deposits located in the disputed area. Given the lack of authority of the federal government and the fact that neither Somaliland nor Puntland have a recognized legal identity, there is no mechanism for dialogue to resolve this dispute, which periodically erupts into conflict.

On a scale situated somewhere between these highly localized and sub-regional scenarios, the stability and development of much of southern Somalia especially is constrained by a host of territorial disputes, some going back centuries, between rival clans and sub-clans. Examples include the permanent struggle for supremacy in Mogadishu between the two largest Hawiye clans, the Abgal (longer-term residents), and the Habargedir (more recent arrivals); and the historic feud between two Habargedir sub-clans, the Sa’ad and the Saleban, in Mudug region.

Further south, Kismayo and the Juba valley region provide a poignant example of the structural clan tensions cumulatively generated by successive migrations. The region is an economic powerhouse in Somali terms, its pre-eminence based on a thriving, export-oriented livestock sector. The region’s historic inhabitants, various Bantu tribes and the Oromo (a Cushitic people now mainly found in neighbouring Ethiopia) were progressively supplanted from the 17<sup>th</sup> century on by Somali pastoralists of the Darod/Ogaden clan, whose supremacy was in turn to be challenged by the aggressive southward migration of Harti clans from the north of Somalia from the latter part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The Harti (President Yusuf’s clan) share the same Darod heritage as the Ogaden, but – being more commercially adept (particularly in international trade) – soon gained control of livestock exports from their base in Kismayo. This has resulted in permanent tension between the Ogaden and the Harti, frequently boiling over into armed clashes and tit-for-tat massacres. More recently, Siad Barre aggressively promoted his own Marehan clan (another Darod lineage group) in the region, only for these newcomers in turn to be confronted by the encroachment of the warlike Hawiye/Habargedir/Ayr sub-clan (now the hard core of the armed opposition to the TFIs and the Islamist movement). No match for the Ayr in military terms, the Marehan were obliged to enter into an unlikely and uneasy Hawiye-Darod wealth-sharing accommodation.

### **III. The clans and the “variable geometry” of Somali political structures**

During sixteen years of continuous if sporadic and localized conflict since the collapse of the state structure established at the end of the colonial period, the country has effectively split into three regional blocs. Each of these blocs has quite distinct clan demographics, and each has a different relationship with the TFC and the TFIs that emerged from the SNRC.

#### **1. Somaliland**

The former British protectorate in the northwest has a relatively homogeneous clan profile, the population being made up primarily of the Dir clan family (notably including the Isaq).

The Republic of Somaliland unilaterally declared its independence in 1991, has its own central bank and currency and conducts its own foreign and domestic policies. Although as yet unrecognized internationally, it has remained relatively stable for over a decade, and has achieved notable progress in democratization and development.

The internal conflicts that came to the fore following the brutal war of independence against the Siad Barre regime were addressed and healed through a traditional, clan-based peace and reconciliation process. The constitution subsequently adopted notably established a bicameral parliament and ruled that only the three parties gaining the most votes in local elections may contest national elections, provided they score at least 20% of the vote in at least four of the six regions (a measure to deter clannism). A full cycle of local, legislative and presidential elections has been completed since 2001, culminating in the parliamentary elections of September 2005 in which the two opposition parties secured 60% of the 82 seats in the lower house of parliament.

With the next presidential elections scheduled for April 2008, Somaliland stands at an important crossroads; successful, free and fair elections would further consolidate one of Africa's most remarkable democratic processes. However, while the long-term trend is unmistakably positive, the opposition's dominance of the HoR has brought the parliament into confrontation with the ruling party. To this political crisis must be added the longer-term challenges of the unresolved, clan-driven conflict with Puntland over the disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag, and Somaliland's as yet unsuccessful quest for international recognition and independence. Relations between Somaliland and the rest of Somalia remain tense, a homegrown Islamist movement also poses a latent threat which periodically erupts into violence, and internal tensions persist between the majority Dir family and the Darod clans (the Warsangeli and Dulbahante) of the eastern regions of Sool and Sanaag.

## 2. Puntland

The defining characteristic of this northeastern region is its demographic homogeneity, with the vast majority of the population belonging to the Majerteyn clan of the Darod/Harti. Unlike Somaliland, the autonomous Puntland State of Somalia created in 1998 acknowledges the authority of the TFIs and positions itself as a regional entity in a future federal state. Indeed, the federal President, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, was formerly President of Puntland, and continues very much to rely on the support and human and financial resources provided by his fellow Majerteyn clansmen. Puntland can thus be sited somewhere between Somaliland and South-Central Somalia in terms of developing political governance. No democratic elections have yet been held. The single chamber parliament appointed through clan-based mechanisms elects a President, who in turn nominates a small cabinet of ministers. Puntland conducts its own foreign and domestic policies but has no central bank or currency of its own.

Arid and sparsely populated, Puntland is the least economically developed region, but like Somaliland is relatively stable, and has developed its own (albeit embryonic) system of governance. However, Puntland is also vulnerable to Islamist destabilization and clan-related border conflicts in the northwest (see above) and the south (the Darod-Hawiye "fault line").

### 3. South-Central Somalia

Contrary to Somaliland and Puntland, the population profile of this region is extremely heterogeneous, comprising clans from all four major families, together with Bantu and minority Somali clans. The lion's share of Somalia's economic potential is concentrated in this region, notably in the Juba and Shabelle river basins and the major trading ports of Kismayo and Mogadishu, the former traditionally a Darod stronghold, the latter dominated by the Hawiye. Because of this economic pull factor, the clan settlement patterns outlined below are dynamic; both historically and in recent times southern and central Somalia has seen repeated and sometimes aggressive territorial encroachment by southward-migrating clans. The resulting clan rivalries and intense competition for economic resources have prevented the emergence of a regional administration in South-Central Somalia, which cannot be assigned a meaningful geopolitical identity in the same way as Somaliland and Puntland. In simplified terms, from north to south the major clan settlement patterns are as follows:

- a) South of the town of Galckayo (which marks the "border" with Puntland), the three central regions of Hiran, Mudug and Galgadud are primarily populated by Hawiye sub-clans whose traditional rivalries periodically erupt into conflict.
- b) The Bay and Bakool regions are home to the Digil-Mirifle (Rahanweyn) clans.
- c) Mogadishu and the two hinterland regions of Lower and Middle Shabelle are also mainly – but not exclusively – inhabited by Hawiye clans, also riven by internal feuds. In particular, the bitter rivalry between the two largest Hawiye clans, the Abgal and the Habargedir, has dominated Mogadishu politics since the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991.
- d) The riverine border regions of Middle and Lower Juba and Gedo comprise "Jubaland", a now defunct administrative entity inherited by the British from the Zanzibaris and ceded to Italy in 1925. This region, and its "capital", the port of Kismayo, is predominantly (but not entirely) inhabited by Darod clans who have migrated to the area at different times.

### IV. **Clan representation in the TFIs**

The "4.5" power sharing formula adopted by the Somali National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC, Kenya 2002-2004) allocated 61 parliamentary seats to each of the four major clan families (Dir, Darod, Digil-Mirifle and Hawiye), and 31 seats to minority groupings referred to collectively as the "fifth clan".

However, clan representatives in the TFIs created by the SNRC in 2004 were appointed, rather than elected, and at least two of the four main clan families (representing approaching half the population of Somalia) contested their legitimacy from the outset. While the Darod and the Digil-Mirifle (or Rahanweyn) clan families can be said to be full participants in the TFIs, the Dir, although numerically represented in the TFIs on the same basis as the other major clan families, cannot be said to be full participants in qualitative terms. The much larger and more powerful northern branch of the family, which dominates the demography of the breakaway region of Somaliland, boycotted the SNRC and does not recognize the TFIs.


As for the Hawiye, several sub-clans and leaders of this, perhaps the most complex, and least unified and homogeneous of the four main clan families, have continued to contend that – despite their allocation of 61 MPs – their interests are not represented by a TFI membership perceived as imposed by the warlords who dominated Mogadishu and its hinterland at the time of the SNRC. Indeed, rather than any great love for radical *wahabi* Islam, it was

primarily this simmering clan resentment and the Islamic Courts' success in reestablishing law and order on their streets that rallied the Hawiye to the Courts' banner and resulted in the swift overthrow of the warlords in June 2006.

The objections of many Hawiye to what they perceived to be a Darod-dominated apparatus led to a major split within the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) soon after their creation; the Parliament in particular did not really function at all in the first year of its existence. Although the TFP was eventually brought together in early 2006 through a combination of Arab diplomacy and EU funding, the fault lines remained, culminating a year later in the dismissal of the Speaker and a group of around 30 MPs and the adoption of an Emergency Law which suspended the Charter and vested executive power in the hands of the President.

This shaky political and democratic foundation has been further eroded by the failure (despite several attempts by the international community) to broker a meaningful political dialogue that would allow the concerns of the Hawiye clan family in particular to be accommodated by consensus within the framework of the TFIs. The TFG's decision to opt instead for a military strategy with the support of the Ethiopian army has further exacerbated this underlying clan dimension, and has undoubtedly contributed to continued public sympathy for the armed Islamist opposition. Thus, despite the Ethiopians' and the TFGs' eventual success in taking control of Mogadishu in April 2007, much of South-Central Somalia in effect remains in a state of latent or actual conflict.

**SIMPLIFIED TREE OF THE MAIN SOMALI CLAN FAMILIES**  
Showing selected clans and sub-clans



Important notice: the above tree is highly simplified, designed to give non-specialists a broad idea of some of the main Somali kinship ties. In the interests of clarity, important steps in the genealogical order are skipped, the status of the clans in their lineage hierarchy is not respected, and by no means all clans and sub-clans of the same hierarchical status are indicated. No offence is intended by the many omissions and over-simplifications in this tree, which does not imply any particular position or view on the part of the European Commission.



## ANNEX 11

### Religion and the regional dimension in Somali conflict dynamics

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In addition to the historical internal rivalries between the Somali clans which are examined in some detail elsewhere in this document, external (regional and international) factors also play an important part in driving conflict in Somalia. The most significant of these factors – which are to a considerable extent interlinked in terms of their impact on regional insecurity - are the presence of large Somali populations in all three neighbouring countries, and Somalia's location on the religious "front line" as a Muslim country with two powerful "Christian" neighbours in Kenya and Ethiopia.<sup>1</sup>

#### I. The colonial legacy and the dream of a "Greater Somalia"

The territorial carve-up agreed by the disengaging colonial powers created a legacy of cross-border tension, with Somalis constituting the largest population group in neighbouring regions of Djibouti, northern Kenya, and eastern Ethiopia. While Kenya has seen Somalia-linked terrorist activity in recent years and the northern borders are periodically subjected to cattle rustling and cross-border raids, this demographic legacy has been particularly explosive in the Ogaden or Fifth Region of Ethiopia.

The government of the first Somali republic made no attempt to hide its intention to establish a "Greater Somalia" encompassing all the Somali peoples of the Horn region. These avowedly irredentist designs have never been abandoned by a certain body of public and political opinion in Somalia. In mid-1977, the Siad Barre regime launched a full-scale invasion of the Ogaden, which after spectacular initial gains was only eventually repulsed a year later following a desperate Ethiopian rearguard action with significant support from Soviet and Cuban forces.

The irredentist agenda has been most notably articulated in recent times by the Somali Islamist movement *Al Ittihad Al Islamiya* (AIAI - see below) which rose to prominence in the 1990s and is believed to have been responsible for a series of bomb attacks in public places in Addis Ababa in 1996 and 1997. Irredentism again resurfaced with the rise of the Islamic Courts movement that briefly threatened to take control of Somalia in 2006. Throughout this period, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), an ethnic Somali rebel group formed in 1984, has regularly made common cause with these and other elements inside Somalia in its political and military opposition to Addis.

This post colonial history of tension and conflict has understandably pre-disposed successive Addis governments to expect the worst, and to seek to pre-empt any perceived threat to their internal security by intervening directly or indirectly in Somalia. "Christian" Ethiopia is also a landlocked country whose geostrategic outlook is informed by the imperative of securing and diversifying its access to the sea, and by its regional rivalry (notably over the control of Nile waters) with (Muslim) Sudan and Egypt. Ethiopia's strategic aims have thus had significant influence on the post independence history of Somalia, whether expressed through political means (for example through the dominant role played by Addis in the process and outcomes of the 2002-2004 Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Kenya), indirect military support (for example to Abdullahi Yusuf in his campaign against AIAI in Puntland in the late 90s) or direct military intervention, most recently in the conquest and occupation of Mogadishu and southern Somalia in support of the TFIs in late 2006-early 2007.

Ethiopia's constant and periodically overt involvement in Somalia's affairs has tended not only to fuel domestic nationalist and religious opposition to Addis and its Somali allies, but has recently also drawn Ethiopia's regional rivals into the fray. Thus, certain Arab countries have reportedly armed and supported the Islamic Courts and other elements opposing the TFIs; much of this assistance has

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<sup>1</sup> While the majority of the population and the ruling elites are strongly identified with Christianity in Ethiopia and Kenya, both countries in fact have substantial Muslim minorities (Kenya 10%, Ethiopia 40% or more).

reportedly been channelled through Eritrea, which has allegedly continued to provide bilateral assistance –including active combatants – to the Islamic Courts, the ONLF and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).<sup>2</sup> Somalia thus finds itself the battlefield for a wider regional conflict being fought by proxy in the streets of Mogadishu.

## II. The religious dimension

Somalis have historically practised a distinct form of Islam informed by the mystic tradition of *sufism*, which encompasses a diverse range of beliefs and practices dedicated to the experience of divine love and the cultivation of the personal sanctity. The incremental development of a personal relationship with God and the Truth, and a tradition of good works carried out by and through the Sufi Orders (*Tariqas*) are central to the practice of Somali Islam, which has little in common with the ascetic fundamentalism of the *wahabi* or *salafi* school, generally perceived as the nursery of militant extremism and international *jihadism*.

However, the anarchy that followed the collapse of the state in 1991 provided a fertile breeding ground for the establishment of radical *wahabism* in Somalia, in both home grown and imported forms. The most successful domestic movement was Al Ittihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI), which emerged in the nineties under the spiritual guidance of the Sudanese ideologue Al-Turabi, and reportedly received financial support from Osama Bin Laden. During the 1990s Somalia is thought to have played host to foreign *jihadis*, including an Al-Qaeda cell which according to US intelligence was responsible for the American Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam that killed 224 in 1998. Again according to US intelligence, a handful of these “high value targets” (HVTs) allegedly remain in Mogadishu, protected by radical Somali sympathisers. Although the AIAI movement was eventually crushed by direct and indirect Ethiopian military intervention in 2001, many of its members, including the totemic Hassan Dahir Aweys, re-emerged as leading figures in the Islamic Courts movement which was to take control of Mogadishu in 2006 and briefly mount a serious challenge to the TFIs until it was defeated and dispersed, again by Ethiopian military action.

## III. The Islamic Courts Union

The rapid rise to prominence – and equally dramatic fall – of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Mogadishu in 2006 merits more detailed analysis. For although the ICU’s success proved short-lived, the movement enjoyed (and still enjoys) significant – though qualified – public and diaspora support, and has – since its conventional defeat by TFG/Ethiopian forces at the turn of 2006/2007 – regrouped and reinvented itself, both as a political organisation (now externally based in Asmara) and as an effective *guerrilla* force on the ground.

Public sympathy for the movement was predicated on several factors: (i) universal loathing of the warlords who had controlled the capital city for a decade (ii) US support for the warlords’ self-styled *Coalition for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism* in Mogadishu (iii) the perceived under-representation of the Hawiye clan family (the main lineage group in the capital and its hinterland) in the TFIs and their Darod/Majerteyn-dominated armed forces (iv) broader disillusionment with the TFIs, which after two years remained weak and divided, and had delivered little in the way of reconciliation and governance (v) the TFIs’ increasingly overt reliance on the military support of Ethiopia, Somalia’s historic enemy.

These diverse factors enabled the Courts to exploit clan, religious and nationalist sentiment in pursuing its immediate objective of establishing control over the capital. After just three months of intense fighting in early 2006 that left some 400 dead and 2,000 wounded, the movement succeeded in driving the warlords from the city, and by June had consolidated its control of Benadir, Lower and

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<sup>2</sup> This paragraph draws on reports of the Independent Panel appointed to monitor the UN Arms Embargo

Middle Shabelle regions through a combination of military conquest and a network of alliances with local sympathizers.

The Islamic Courts Union was in essence an umbrella movement bringing together a number of individual *sharia* courts, a heterogeneous grouping encompassing a range of religious traditions and political perspectives. The individual courts were originally organised on sub-clan lines, generally claiming and exercising jurisdiction only over members of their own sub-clan and/or a defined geographical area. The ostensibly apolitical and generally successful focus of the courts on law and order, combined with the simplicity of their structures, relative accountability (based on sub-clan mechanisms) and disciplined, drug-free militias made them more broadly acceptable and popular than other forms of factional authority.

The first such courts appeared in Somalia in the 1990s, shortly after the fall of the Siad Barre regime, as local initiatives to establish a minimum of law and order amidst the prevailing anarchy. They were as such less a product of active Islamist radicalism than an expression of local clan interests and traditional Somali Islam. However, from 1998 a new type of court began to appear under the auspices of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, *eminence grise* of AIAI.

The focus of the Somali political establishment and the international community on the IGAD-led Somali National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC) launched in Kenya in late 2002 provided militant Islamist groups (not represented in the SNRC) with an opportunity to develop and expand. Further clan-based courts were established in several parts of the country during this period, which also saw the emergence of *jihadi* organisations such as the *Hisbul Shabab*. Under the mentorship of the ultra-radical Sheikh Hassan Abdulle Hersi (“Hassan Turki”), the *Shabab* (“Youth Party”) and its sister organisations propounded an extremist *wahabi* ideology which, although foreign to the *sufi* tradition of Somali Islam, began to find a constituency both in Somalia and northern Kenya, and received financial support from certain businessmen. Equally significant was the cross-clan nature of the *Shabab*, a key factor in the rise of the ICU and its reincarnation following the Ethiopian intervention at the end of 2006. By mid-2005, at a time when the TFIs had only just relocated to Jowhar and remained weak and deeply divided, eleven sub-clan-based courts had been established in Mogadishu, most of them traditional in nature, some of them altogether more radical. The court established in Merka under Yusuf “Indho’adde” was a vehicle for the expansion of Hawiye/Habargedir/Ayr clan political and economic interests in Lower Shabelle, while another Ayr court created in Ifka Halane (western Mogadishu) emerged as a platform for *jihadi* Islamism under Adan Hashi Ayro, who was to go on to command the *Shabab*’s quick reaction force. By early 2006, the radical courts were openly rejecting the authority of their sub-clans.

It was against this backdrop that a group of warlords who had carved up Mogadishu among themselves for a decade or more formed – with US backing – their ill-fated *Coalition*, launching in earnest the battle for Mogadishu. Riding a wave of popular mobilisation against the warlords, the better trained and more motivated and disciplined Islamist fighters cut a swathe through the fragmented and poorly commanded *Coalition* militias, and by early June had taken full control of the capital. For the first time in sixteen years, Mogadishu came under the authority of a unified administration which energetically set about dismantling road blocks and militias, removing guns from the streets and imposing the legal authority of the *sharia* courts. The Courts rapidly gained control of most of southern and central Somalia, and – on the strength of its no nonsense administration of the areas under its control – gained the respect not only of the local population, but also of the diaspora, the business community and much (though by no means all) of the international community. However, the very rapidity of the Courts’ victory in Mogadishu also sowed the seed of their downfall. ICU leaders were as surprised as anyone by how quickly they had taken control; it soon became apparent that the structure of their organisation was insufficiently mature, and unprepared to take power so suddenly. This lack of readiness was to result in a series of misjudgements which eventually led to their demise at the hands of the TFG/Ethiopian forces.

In particular, it was the Courts' inability to contain the hardline element in their midst, centred on the military capacity of the radical *Shabab*, which led to their downfall. The ICU was undoubtedly a very broad church, most of whose members and supporters would be classified as moderates by most reckonings. Indeed, in the early days the leadership went to some lengths to reassure international and domestic opinion as to their moderate credentials, appointing the *sufi* Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as Chair of the movement's Executive Committee. However, following the initial euphoria of the victory over the warlords, clan tensions once again came to the fore, notably between the Hawiye, who had provided the bedrock of the Courts-led uprising against the warlords (and who expected to be appropriately rewarded in the emerging administration), and the other clans. The Courts' leadership was not equipped to resolve these issues, and the *Shura* (Council) – intended to be the movement's policy-making body – in effect never functioned. The ensuing power vacuum fairly quickly allowed the highly focused, well funded and organised radicals of the *Shabab* to take control of the ICU agenda, in terms of both domestic (including social) policy and military strategy.

The ICU leadership at first made some effort to persuade the international community that it had no hostile intentions towards Ethiopia, and even met Addis representatives informally. However, with the moderates losing ground to the hardliners, the Courts were bounced by the *Shabab* into taking an increasingly confrontational line. International hopes of brokering a deal between the ICU moderates and the TFG were dashed by the intransigence imposed on both parties by their own hardliners; the Islamist radicals, buoyed by their political and military ascendancy, saw no advantage in discussing power sharing with an apparently moribund government sustained only by the protection of Ethiopia; for its part, a weak and divided TFG was desperate to avoid engaging in a process of which the only likely outcome would be significant concessions – notably including the Prime Minister's post – to the Courts. The Khartoum process hosted by the League of Arab States was stillborn.

At the same time, the ICU's extremist core continued to pursue a policy of military expansion which, given the historical context, was bound, sooner or later, to provoke Ethiopia. Whether or not the hardliners wanted an actual war, or merely sought to foster the threat of war as a way of retaining public support and control of the ICU agenda, their repeated calls for *jihad* against Ethiopia, the reiteration of irredentist claims on the Ogaden, and their close links with Eritrea, the OLF and the ONLF could only have one outcome. The war finally broke out in December 2006. No match for the Ethiopians' conventional firepower, the Islamist militias were swiftly overwhelmed, putting an end to the ICU as a coherent political and military force, and leading in short order to the Ethiopians' occupation of Mogadishu, followed by the worst fighting the city had seen for 15 years, and a major humanitarian disaster.

#### **IV. The global war on terror**

This internationalisation of the conflict dynamic in Somalia is linked to, and has been further underlined by the global counter-terrorist (CT) agenda. In particular, following the failure of their attempt to contain radical Islamism and pursue their "HVTs" by supporting the warlords' *Coalition*, the United States not only supported the Ethiopian military offensive in 2006-2007 but itself intervened directly in the campaign on several occasions. This too was the result of a misjudgement by the ICU, which – even in the early days when they enjoyed some political goodwill internationally - failed to respond to repeated attempts to get them to take the HVT issue seriously. CT concerns are to varying degrees shared by other players, both regional and international, concerned by the destabilizing impact of hosting large numbers of Somali refugees and economic migrants ("the diaspora"), considered vulnerable to radicalisation; several of the perpetrators of the July 2005 bombings in London were of Somali origin, and a number of Somalis and ethnically Somali Kenyans reportedly with extremist Islamist connections have been detained in Kenya in 2007.

## ANNEX 12

### Lessons learned - examples of specific success stories

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This annex refers to and develops the key lessons learned outlined in section III.

1. *A good understanding of a highly dynamic political environment, the ability to analyse and update this and apply the findings to the development agenda is critical; such analysis helps to identify potential entry points and evaluate risks.*
2. *Multi donor co-ordination and planning with other partners, particularly in the governance and security area has proved beneficial in providing a coherent programme that 'speaks with one voice' in a politically sensitive environment.*

Programmes which apply this approach include the UNDP-implemented Rule of Law and Security Programme (RoLS) and the Somali Institutional Support Programme (SISP). The former aims to strengthen the rule of law and security through capacity development of key law enforcement and judicial personnel, including training of police cadets. Given the varying degree of security and different political realities in Somalia, the programme is responsive to the specific dynamics, needs and priorities of geographic areas and requires multi-donor coordination and a harmonized, inter-disciplinary approach. In Somaliland, the focus is on progress from institution strengthening and infrastructure rehabilitation to capacity building and sustainability of institutions. In Puntland, which is at an earlier stage in its development, the focus is still mainly on institutional strengthening and infrastructure rehabilitation. In South Central, the approach is to seize opportunities for quick, high impact projects, with the objective of using such experiences as a foundation for future programming. Continuous knowledge sharing, partnership building amongst donors and UN agencies allows streamlining of strategies, approaches and processes related to law enforcement, judiciary and custodial corps.

The Somalia Institutional Support Project (SISP) aims to enable the TFIs to carry out their basic functions of informed and coordinated policy and law making, strategy setting, oversight, reconciliation as well as security and law enforcement through enhanced leadership and institutional capacity. At a critical time, the SISP has provided a vehicle to ensure coordinated, flexible and swift donor response toward enhancing the capacities of key ministries, offices and departments of the Transitional Federal Institutions as well as much needed operational support to the TFI to overcome the above-mentioned challenges. It represents an extension (Phase II) of the support provided under the Somalia Emergency Budgetary Support Project (SEBSP), which was amended to address lessons learned from Phase I, to enhance coordination and collaboration with other programmes and respond to the new political environment in which the TFIs currently operate.

This “evolutionary” process is still ongoing, with discussions among donors and implementing partners now under way with a view to further streamlining existing governance and capacity instruments into three major programmes: (i) federal and state institutional capacity (ii) decentralised (local) governance (iii) rule of law.

3. *Fully functioning state structures are not in place and so innovative and non traditional avenues have to be explored to build capacity at different levels.*

In the *education sector* a number of projects are co-funded with Denmark, the UK and Sweden. Building on the analytical basis of the Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) and the Reconstruction and Development Framework (RDF) which – although not formally finalised

owing to intractable political constraints – is technically complete and sets out a broadly endorsed national development strategy to guide donor support.

Progress is now being made by national and external partners towards establishing a consensus on how this can be translated into improved education sector development. Recent discussions have led to some agreement on the need for a sector wide strategy for Somalia. This dialogue has been coordinated under the Somalia Support Secretariat (SSS) and its Education Sector Committee (ESC).

There is broad consensus that a sector wide strategy would have significant benefits for sector development and improved aid management in this complex context. Indeed, it has been widely documented and agreed that the Somali situation represents unique challenges, beyond the recognised OECD Principles for good international engagement. This is characterised by substantially diversified challenges in the sector which require a custom-made, asymmetric approach. A series of discussions led by DfID, UNESCO, UNICEF and the EC and coordinated by the Somalia Support Secretariat (SSS) have concluded that well coordinated and harmonised aid programmes increasingly aligned behind national strategies will be critical to ensure the most effective response and make best use of the scarce resources available, building on existing programmes and over time developing a more strategic response.

In the *health sector*, to remedy the fragmentation caused by vertical programmes, stand alone projects and emergency aid, the EC has adopted a new approach focussing on capacity building as a sector-wide and long term process of skill transfer. In order to make this approach operational, the EC, in consultation with donors active in the health sector and in the framework of the CSP, earmarked towards improving access to basic quality health services within the framework of a structured and harmonised health system. The rationale of this new approach is the following: by developing minimum health sector standards, including policy guidelines and by strengthening the capacity of public administrations, it is hoped that the congruency of health activities, particularly those funded by the EC and EU MS, will increase. The new approach underlines the importance of following an integrated approach to supporting sustainable health services and health facilities to facilitate the harmonised application of national standards and norms on the basis of a sector-wide strategy.

The methodology applied to strengthening local and regional managerial and financial capacities builds on best practice observed in previous, successful interventions and building capacity through a UNICEF-run capacity building cell operational in Hargeissa (Somaliland) and Garowe (Puntland). The continuous physical presence of qualified technical assistance working side-by-side with Somali Ministry of Health staff will benefit the health sector by creating a long term vision and transferring the managerial skills necessary to building an integrated approach to supporting sustainable health services.

4. *Community driven development is and will remain a key mechanism. Capacity building and institutional strengthening will be embedded as a component in all programmes, thus also reinforcing the “governance dividend” approach.*<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Governance dividend: an approach adopted in the Mid-Term Review of the Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia (SISAS; 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> EDFs). It entails: (a) identifying “home grown” governance initiatives in different parts of the country that are accepted and supported by the local population and do not exclude a possible future federal structure; (b) encouraging these initiatives by creating a critical mass of integrated assistance promoting democratisation, the rule of law and institutional capacity, while stepping up support for the development of livelihoods and social services. Somaliland and Puntland have been beneficiaries of this approach, as have selected local administrations elsewhere. Excluded are areas in conflict, “warlord fiefs” and other predatory or

Poor and marginalized people have often been viewed as the target of poverty reduction efforts. Community driven development approaches turn this perception on its head, and treat poor people and their institutions as assets and partners in the search for sustainable solutions to development challenges. Broadly defined, community driven development is an approach that gives control over planning decisions and investment resources to community groups and local governments. In rural development and food security, community driven development programmes operate on the principles of local empowerment, participatory governance, demand-responsiveness, administrative autonomy, greater downward accountability, and enhanced local capacity. Experience has shown that given clear rules of the game, access to information and appropriate capacity and financial support, poor men and women can effectively organize in order to identify community priorities and address local problems, by working in partnership with local governments and other supportive institutions.

With the consent of the local administrations, target groups and stakeholders at different levels have been directly involved in project preparation, implementation and monitoring. Where assets and services are provided, beneficiaries also contribute to cost recovery (in cash or in kind). It is self-evident that productive infrastructure is used in a sustainable manner if local institutions are involved and strengthened to operate and maintain them. In this regard, cost recovery or at least cost sharing is of fundamental importance in programmes striving to empower Somalis to improve the management of their own affairs, be it at household or institutional level. Improved targeting and shared responsibility in projects have heightened the sense of ownership and positively impact on sustainability and community development. The involvement of the beneficiary community is also a requirement in all calls for proposals issued in support of civil society and Non State Actors.

5. *In line with this approach, donor flexibility has proved critically important in exploiting windows of opportunity, particularly in the fields of governance and reconciliation (notably in respect of support to non-state actors).*

In the *governance sector*, programmes are designed in such a way as to embed flexibility and allow change depending on the evolving political situation and based on a common assessment by donors and the implementing agency. In particular, country-wide programmes in such as the Inter-peace '*Dialogue for Peace*' allow funds and activities to be shifted when regions become inaccessible owing to insecurity.

The use of modalities which pool resources in a common fund has already been successfully piloted in these areas. Options for expanding such modalities are being explored, although issues of accountability and autonomy will have to find custom-made solutions. If these mechanisms are to be used in the future then careful and detailed planning is required so as not to create delays in funding programmes. All ongoing and planned governance programmes use this approach, including -in addition to those already mentioned- institutional technical assistance, an integrated local governance package, support to the constitutional process, and the decentralised democratisation programme in place since 2005.

The use of steering committees has proved useful in building a common vision that drives the project, identifies risks, and raises policy issues for consideration and resolution, whilst monitoring progress and reviewing deliverables.

6. *With donors' financial and human resources limited, focusing on fewer areas and committing to long-term support provides a greater chance of sustainable outcomes.*

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imposed administrations; in these areas support for livelihoods and social services is provided directly to the end beneficiaries.

Joint or coordinated implementation under the CSP umbrella is a formidable challenge. Somalia has not signed the Cotonou Agreement and does not fulfil the pre-conditions for budget support. Even sector support can be considered only to a limited extent. EC/EU and Norway assistance to Somalia is channelled through International Organisations, mainly the United Nations, and International NGOs, and operational costs are still very high. With the inevitable additional costs of serving much of Somalia from Nairobi owing to persistent security constraints: a WB study suggests that as much as 23% of all funds allocated to Somalia are estimated to go on operating costs and overheads.<sup>2</sup>

As project remains the sole aid modality possible, the resulting picture is one of fragmentation, with obvious limitations in terms of monitoring and evaluation, coherence and cost-efficiency. In addition, in as far as the relief-rehabilitation-development continuum, indeed, it has been widely documented and agreed that the Somali situation represents substantially diversified challenges which require a 'custom-made' asymmetric approach to the three different regions. Well coordinated and harmonised aid programmes increasingly aligned behind national strategies critical to ensure the most effective response and make best use of the scarce resources available, building on existing programmes and over time developing a more strategic response. Considering the asymmetric capacity of donors under the CSP-umbrella, varying in terms of decentralisation of management and decision making, availability of programmable funding and human resources, one can see the formidable challenges this would entail in terms of dialogue and coherence with other CSP donors.

Solutions are still to be widely debated. However, positive experiences can be found in the education sector, where considerable steps have been taken towards effective delivery of relevant and sustainable education services through the implementation of integrated programmes, often in partnership with UNICEF and UNESCO. The Strengthening Capacity of Teacher Training (SCOTT) programme is a case in point. With the growth of primary education opportunities, the need for a more balanced sector design and a more focused approach to raise the quality of the system has been recognised. It is widely agreed that pre-service teacher training is one of the effective levers to achieve further improvements in the quality of the education and training service delivery. Whilst some progress has been made through in supporting the development of a primary teacher training college in Somaliland, a more robust intervention is now proposed in order to address the shortfall in the supply of qualified teachers and achieve significant and sustainable levels of quality service delivery.

Given the urgent need to improve the participation of female teachers (who currently represent only 13% of the workforce), gender balance is routinely built into teacher training programmes, which have already substantially increased the presence of female teachers in primary and basic education and impacted positively on girls' participation in primary and secondary schooling.

Positive experiences with the Italian co-financing framework show how delegated cooperation can ease the burden of joint implementation while significantly reducing the transaction costs for both partner governments and donors. Delegated cooperation is a system whereby donors devise their interest in a certain sector and discuss concrete steps towards the development of operational principles on how to better organize the division of labour, while duly taking into account comparative advantages based on presence, resources, experiences and roles developed in the field as well as modalities such as lead donors. Silent donors then delegate management of interventions in certain sectors to a lead donor which maintains a direct dialogue with the partner country's authorities. The interaction between the donors should be described in the agreement between them. The partner country should be responsible for identifying possible needs for technical assistance, and such assistance should be subject to competition. The collaborating partners on their side must ensure that the group

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<sup>2</sup> World Bank study



of donors collectively has the necessary capacity and competence to carry out their obligations. The individual donor is responsible for fulfilling its designated role in the delegation agreement, with regards to own capacity and competence.

7. *The acute lack of reliable, regular and timely data greatly hampers priority setting in programming and the monitoring and evaluation of strategic outcomes - to the extent that in a number of cases evidence of impact is merely anecdotal. A considerable effort needs to be made to establish baselines and develop and manage information systems.*

Improving access to appropriate information for improved emergency responses and preparedness as well as development planning has been a priority intervention in the food security and rural development sector. The prevailing climatic and geo-morphological conditions in Somalia entail frequent droughts and floods, the impact of which is aggravated by the absence of a functioning government. To reduce the impact of such events, interventions have focused on supporting food security information systems and early warning systems; preparation of, and improved access to, baseline information on natural resources and natural resource management; development of forage and disease prediction models; and an internationally recognised epidemiological surveillance and response system.

More than 50,000 users (among them government institutions, civil society, the diaspora, iNGOs, UN agencies, donors and media agencies) regularly access data produced by EC-funded early warning and information systems. Data and analysis provided on food and livelihood security (Food Security Analysis Unit, FSAU), soil and water (Somalia Water and Land Information Management System, SWALIM) and livestock diseases (SASPH, PACE) has allowed timely and appropriate responses to different crises Somalia, including the 2003 drought in the Sool Plateau and the 2005 drought in Southern Somalia. Several outbreaks of epizootic diseases with zoonotic potential have been successfully contained by field surveillance operations<sup>3</sup>.

Other sectors are currently considering identifying information and data gaps and investing in information systems to cover these gaps in order to generate relevant information that would support sound, evidence based policy formulation. These include education and health.

8. *While remaining flexible, programming and resources have to be committed to a medium to long term perspective, particularly when developing institutions and providing capacity building. Nonetheless, when dealing with a fragile security and political situation, this can prove risky.*

For Somalia, where the different regions have very different institutional structures, delegated cooperation could ease the burden of joint implementation while significantly reducing the transaction costs for both partner governments and donors.

9. *Capacities, this affects both the aid delivery mechanisms to be selected and the capacity to absorb resources.*

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<sup>3</sup> In particular, the FSAU plays a key role in providing relevant information on livelihoods to the nascent Somali institutions in the process of developing policies. In the absence of any other source of information, FSAU remains the main source of analysis used by donors and implementing partners in designing their programmes and deciding on funding allocations.

**Joint Governance Commitments****Puntland executive**

In a meeting held in Garowe on 26<sup>th</sup> November 2007 between President Mohamud Muse Hersi of Puntland and the EC Special Envoy for Somalia, George-Marc André, it was agreed that the below mentioned “Joint Governance Commitments” would be the basis for a structured political dialogue between the EC and the Government of Puntland and would be also considered at the time of preparing the midterm review of the Joint Country Strategy Paper for Somalia (2008-2013):

- Constitutional review and creation of National Electoral Commission by the end of 2008;
- Adoption of electoral legislation by the end of 2008;
- Establishment of all district councils by the end of 2008;
- Free and fair legislative elections held by the end of 2009.

The EC aid programme to Somalia will support the Government of Puntland to reach these commitments through the ongoing “Democratisation Programme” and the “local Governance Programme” planned to start in January 2008.

**Somaliland Executive**

The proposed Joint Commitments regarding Somaliland were discussed and agreed in a meeting held in Hargeisa on 27<sup>th</sup> November 2007 between the President of Somaliland Dahir Rayale Kahin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Somaliland Mr. Mohamed Ali Duale and the EC Special Envoy for Somalia, George-Marc André. As in Puntland, it was agreed that political dialogue between Somaliland and the EC would be structured around the following “Joint Governance Commitments”:

- Voter registration exercise completed by end of 2008;
- Free and fair presidential elections held in line with the Constitution by the end of 2008;
- Local elections in which political associations participate freely in line with the Constitution held by the end of 2008;
- Constitutional review process launched by the end of 2009;
- Development of a transparent annual budget approved in timely fashion by the Parliament from 2008 onwards.

**Somalia Executive (TFG)**

Formal discussions with the TFG on possible “Joint Governance Commitments” are still pending. Although it was planned to hold discussions at the beginning of December 2007, the crisis in the Government with the replacement of the Prime Minister has advised to postpone this exercise. However, the EC Special Envoy discussed the issue twice with the new Prime Minister, once in Baidoa on November 29<sup>th</sup> and a second time on December 13<sup>th</sup> during a joint meeting with the EU Heads of Mission in Nairobi. During these meetings, both the three CSP’s pillars and the proposed “joint governance commitments” were explained. The need to move forward with the CSP as it stands, notwithstanding the fact that reviews would be carried out and full ownership by Somali Authorities would be ensured, was also indicated. In both occasions, the Prime Minister agreed on the overall content of the CSP and the commitments, which are linked to the Charter, and will be formally discussed, as has already been agreed with the EU Member States, in the framework of the International Action Plan to be drawn up by the Special Representative for Somalia of the UN Secretary General, with the support of the European Union.